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THREE  YEARS'  WAR 


THREE  YEARS'  WAR 


BY 

CHRISTIAAN  RUDOLF  DE  WET 


FRONTISPIECE  BY 

JOHN  S.  SARGENT,  R.A. 


FOUR  PLANS  AND  A  MAP 


NEW  YORK 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1903 


Copyright,  1902,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 

A  a  rights  reserved 
Published.  December,  1903 


TROW  OINCCTORV 

MiNTma  AND  tooKiiNsmo  companv 

niW  TORK 


MY  FELLOW  SUBJECTS 

OF 

THE  BRITISH  EMPIRE 


Preface 


By  way  of  introduction  to  my  work  I  wish,  dear 
reader,  to  say  only  this  short  word  :  I  am  no  book- 
writer." — But  I  felt  that  the  story  of  this  struggle,  in 
which  a  small  people  fought  for  liberty  and  right,  is 
rightly  said,  throughout  the  civilized  world,  to  be 
unknown,  and  that  it  was  my  duty  to  record  my  per- 
sonal experiences  in  this  war,  for  the  present  and  for 
the  future  generations,  not  only  for  the  Afrikander 
people,  but  for  the  whole  world. 

Not  only  did  I  consider  this  my  duty,  but  I  was 
encouraged  to  write  by  the  urgings  of  prominent  men 
among  my  people,  of  men  of  various  nationalities  and 
even  of  several  British  officers. 

Well,  dear  reader,  I  hope  that  you  will  not  feel  dis- 
appointed in  reading  these  experiences,  as  it  is  not  in 
me,  as  is  perhaps  sometimes  the  case  with  historical 
authors,  to  conjure  up  thrilling  pictures — imaginary 
things — and  put  them  together  merely  to  make  up  a 
book  or  to  make  a  name  for  themselves.  That  be  far 
from  me !  In  publishing  my  book  (although  it  is 
written  in  simple  style)  I  had  one  object  only,  viz.,  to 
give  to  the  world  a  story  which,  although  it  does  not 
contain  the  whole  of  the  truth,  as  regards  this  won- 
drous war,  yet  contains  nothing  but  the  truth. 


PREFACE 

The  original  has  been  written  by  me  in  Dutch,  and 
I  can  therefore  not  be  answerable  for  its  translation 
into  other  languages. 

C.  R  DE  WET. 


V«l 


Contents 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  I  Go  ON  Commando  as  a  Private  Burgher    .      .  3 

II.  Nicholson's  Nek  13 

III.  Ladysmith  Besieged  19 

IV.  I  AM  Appointed  Vechtgeneraal      .      .      .  .22 

V.  The  Overwhelming  Forces  of  Lord  Roberts      .  26 

VI.  Paardeberg  39 

VII.  The  Wild  Flight  from  Poplar  Grove   .      .      .  49 

VIII.  The  Burghers  Receive  Permission  to  Return  to 

their  Homes  56 

IX.  Sanna's  Post     .61 

X.  Four  Hundred  and  Seventy  English  taken  Pris- 
oner AT  REDDERSBURG  7I 

XI.  An  Unsuccessful  Siege  77 

XII.  The  English  Swarm  over  our  Country  .      .  .82 

XIII.  Our  Position  at  the  End  of  May,  1900  .      .  .92 

XIV.  ROODEWAL  96 

XV.  I  Make  Lord  Kitchener's  Acquaintance      .      .  108 
XVI.  Bethlehem  is  Captured  by  the  English       .  .117 
XVn.  The  Surrender  of  Prinsloo     .      .      .      .  .123 
XVIII.  I  AM  Driven  into  the  Transvaal    .      .      .  .129 

XIX.  I  Return  to  the  Free  State  144 

XX.  The  Oath  of  Neutrality  156 

XXI.  Frederiksstad  and  Bothaville       .      .      ,  .161 

XXII.  My  March  to  the  South  172 

XXIII.  I  Fail  to  Enter  Cape  Colony  180 

ix 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XXIV.  Wherein  Something  is   Found   About  War 

AGAINST  Women  191 

XXV.  I  Again  Attempt  to  Enter  Cape  Colony   .      .  197 

XXVI.  Darkness  Proves  my  Salvation    .      .      .  .215 

XXVII.  Was  Ours  a  Guerilla  War?        .      .      .  .225 

XXVIII.  Negotiations  with  the  Enemy     ....  230 

XXIX.  President  Steyn's  Narrow  Escape      .      .  ,242 

XXX.  The  Last  Proclamation  246 

XXXI.  Blockhouses  and  Night  Attacks       .      .      .  260 

XXXII.  My  Commando  of  Seven  Hundred  Men     .      .  267 

XXXIII.  A  Success  at  Tweefontein  275 

XXXIV.  I  Cut  my  Way  through  Sixty  Thousand  Troops  284 
XXXV.  I  GO  TO  THE  Transvaal  with  President  Steyn  298 

XXXVI.  Peace  Negotiations  305 

XXXVII.  The  End  of  the  War  .  .  .  ,  .  .319 
Correspondence   325 


APPENDICES 

A.  — Report  of  the  Meeting  of  the  General  Representa- 

tives held  at  Vereeniging  in  the  South  African 
Republic  on  the  15TH  of  May,  1902,  and  the  Fol- 
lowing Days  333 

B.  — The  Conference  at  Pretoria  between  the  Commis- 

sion OF  THE  National  Representatives  and  Lords 
Kitchener  and  Milner  (May  19TH-MAY  28TH,  1902)  365 
C— Minutes  of  the  Meeting  of  the  Special  National 
Representatives  at  Vereeniging,  South  African 
Republic,  Thursday,  the  29TH  of  May,  1902,  and 
he  Following  Days   .      .      .      .      .      .      .  397 

INDEX   .  429 

MAP  At  end  of  volume 

X 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


CHAPTER  I 


I  Go  on  Commando  as  a  Private  Burgher 

IN  the  month  of  September,  1899,  the  burghers  of 
the  Orange  Free  State  were  notified,  under  the 
Commando  Law,  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to 
go  on  active  service  at  the  shortest  possible  notice. 

Before  proceeding  any  further  I  should  like  to  ex- 
plain that  portion  of  the  Commando  Law  which  dealt 
with  commandeering.  It  stipulated  that  every  burgher 
between  the  ages  of  sixteen  and  sixty  must  be  prepared 
to  fight  for  his  country  at  any  moment ;  and  that,  if 
required  for  active  service,  he  must  provide  himself 
with  a  riding-horse,  saddle  and  bridle,  with  a  rifle  and 
thirty  cartridges — or,  if  he  were  unable  to  obtain  a 
rifle,  he  must  bring  with  him  thirty  bullets,  thirty  caps, 
and  half  a  pound  of  powder — in  addition  he  must  be 
provisioned  for  eight  days.  That  there  should  have 
been  an  alternative  to  the  rifle  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  law  was  made  at  a  time  when  only  a  few 
burghers  possessed  breech-loading  rifles — achterlaaiers, 
as  we  call  them. 

With  reference  to  the  provisions  the  law  did  not 
specify  their  quality  or  quantity,  but  there  was  an  un- 
written but  strictly  observed  rule  amongst  the  burghers 
that  they  should  consist  of  meat  cut  in  strips,  salted, 
peppered,  and  dried,  or  else  of  sausages  and  Boer 
biscuits."  ^  With  regard  to  quantity,  each  burgher  had 
to  make  his  own  estimate  of  the  amount  he  would 
require  for  eight  days. 

It  was  not  long  after  they  were  notified  to  hold 
themselves  ready  that  the  burghers  were  called  up  for 
active  service.    On  the  2nd  of  October,  1899,  the 

»  Small  loaves  manufactured  of  flour,  with  fermented  raisins  instead  of  yeast, 
and  twice  baked. 


3 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


order  came'.  On  that  day  the  Veldtcornets,  or  their 
lieutenants,  visited  every  farm  and  commandeered  the 
men. 

Amongst  the  commandeered  was  I  ;  and  thus,  as 
a  private  burgher,  I  entered  on  the  campaign. 
With  me  were  my  three  sons — Kootie,  Isaac,  and 
Christiaan. 

The  following  day  the  men  of  the  sub-district  of 
Krom  Ellenborg,  in  the  district  of  Heilbron — to 
which  I  belonged — mustered  at  Elandslaagte  Farm. 
The  Veldtcornet  of  this  sub-district  was  Mr.  Marthinus 
Els,  and  the  Commandant  of  the  whole  contingent  Mr. 
Lucas  Steenekamp.  It  soon  became  known  that  the 
War  Commission  had  decided  that  our  commando  was 
to  proceed  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the  Natal  frontier, 
and  that  with  us  were  to  go  the  troops  from  Vrede 
and  Harrismith,  as  well  as  some  from  Bethlehem, 
Winburg,  and  Kroonstad.  Carrying  out  these  orders, 
we  all  arrived  at  Harrismith  six  days  later. 

Commando  life  now  began  in  real  earnest. 

The  eight  days  during  which  the  burghers  had  to 
feed  themselves  were  soon  over,  and  now  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  Government  to  provide  for  them. 

It  may  be  interesting  to  mention  here  that  the 
British  commissariat  differed  greatly  from  ours.  Ra- 
tions were  served  out  daily  to  their  troops.  Each 
soldier  received  the  same  quantity  and  the  same 
quality  as  his  comrade.  Our  methods  were  very  dif- 
ferent, except  as  regards  flour,  coffee,  sugar,  and  other 
articles  of  that  nature.  The  British  soldier,  for  in- 
stance, received  his  meat  ready  cooked  in  the  form  of 
bully-beef  {blikkiescost  we  called  it),  whilst  the  burgher 
received  his  meat  raw,  and  had  to  cook  it  as  best  he 
could. 

Before  I  leave  this  subject  I  may  be  forgiven  if 
I  describe  the  method  of  distributing  meat  to  the 
burghers.  After  it  had  been  cut  up,  the  Vleeschkor- 
poraal  ^  handed  out  the  pieces — a  sufficiently  respon- 

*  Officer  in  charge  of  the  meat — literally,  Flesh-corporal. 
4 


I  GO  ON  COMMANDO  AS  A  BURGHER 


sible  task,  as  it  proved,  for,  as  the  portions  differed 
much  in  quality,  it  became  of  the  first  importance  that 
the  Vleeschkorporaal  should  be  a  man  whose  impar- 
tiality was  above  suspicion.  To  avoid  any  temptations 
to  favouritism,  this  useful  personage  used  to  turn  his 
back  on  the  burghers,  and  as  the  men  came  up  in 
turn  he  would  pick  up  the  piece  of  meat  which  lay 
nearest  to  hand  and,  without  looking  round,  give 
it  to  the  man  who  was  waiting  behind  him  to  re- 
ceive it. 

This  arrangement  should  have  been  satisfactory  to  all, 
but  it  sometimes  happened  that  some  burgher,  whom 
fortune  had  not  favoured,  made  no  effort  to  conceal 
his  discontent,  and  thus  squabbles  frequently  occurred. 
Then  the  Vleeschkorporaal,  fully  convinced  of  his  own 
uprightness,  would  let  his  tongue  go,  and  the  burgher 
who  had  complained  was  a  man  to  be  pitied.  But 
such  quarrels  only  occurred  early  in  the  campaign. 
By  the  time  that  the  Vleeschkorporaal  had  been  a  few 
weeks  at  his  work  he  had  gained  a  considerable 
knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  the  injustice  of  his 
fellows  no  longer  troubled  him.  Accordingly  he 
allowed  the  complaints  of  the  men  to  go  in  at  one  ear 
and  at  once  to  come  out  at  the  other.  The  burghers, 
too,  soon  became  convinced  of  the  foolishness  of  their 
conduct,  and  learnt  the  lesson  of  content  and  forbear- 
ance. 

As  I  have  already  stated,  the  burgher  had  to  boil  or 
roast  his  own  meat.  The  roasting  was  done  on  a  spit 
cut  in  the  shape  of  a  fork,  the  wood  being  obtained 
from  a  branch  of  the  nearest  tree.  A  more  ambitious 
fork  was  manufactured  from  fencing  wire,  and  had 
sometimes  even  as  many  as  four  prongs.  A  skilful 
man  would  so  arrange  the  meat  on  his  spit  as  to  have 
alternate  pieces  of  fat  and  of  lean,  and  thus  get  what 
we  used  to  call  a  bout  span} 

The  burghers  utilized  the  flour  supplied  to  them  in 


*  Literally,  a  team  of  oxen  which  are  not  all  of  the  same  colour. 

5 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


making  cakes ;  these  they  cooked  in  boiling  fat,  and 
called  them  stormjagers^  or  maagbommen} 

Later  on,  the  British,  finding  that  by  looting  our 
cattle  they  could  get  fresh  meat  for  nothing,  were  no 
longer  forced  to  be  content  with  bully-beef.  They 
then,  like  ourselves,  killed  oxen  and  sheep  ;  but,  un- 
like us,  were  very  wasteful  with  it.  Often,  in  the 
camping  places  they  had  vacated,  we  found  the  re- 
mains of  half-eaten  oxen,  sheep,  pigs,  and  poultry. 

But  I  shall  not  go  further  into  this  matter.  I  leave 
it  to  other  pens  to  describe  how  the  British  looted  our 
property,  wantonly  killed  our  cattle,  and  devastated 
our  farms.  In  the  course  of  this  narrative  my  inten- 
tion is  to  mention  only  those  cases  which  I  saw  with 
my  own  eyes.  The  reader,  perusing  them,  may  well 
pause  in  surprise  and  cry  out,  "  Can  such  things  be 
possible  ? "  To  such  a  question  I  have  only  one 
answer — "They  actually  occurred,  and  so  my  only 
course  is  to  record  them." 

But  enough  of  these  digressions.  Let  me  return  to 
my  proper  subject — the  story  of  my  own  experiences 
and  doings  in  the  great  struggle  which  took  place  be- 
tween Boer  and  Briton. 

As  I  have  already  said,  I  had  been  commandeered, 
and,  together  with  the  other  burghers  of  the  Heilbron 
commando,  had  just  reached  Harrismith,  on  the  road 
to  the  south-eastern  frontier. 

During  our  stay  there  the  other  commandos,  in 
obedience  to  Commando  Law,  joined  us,  and  we  pro- 
ceeded to  elect  a  Commander-in-Chief.  The  Com- 
mandants present  were  Steenekamp,  of  Heilbron  ; 
Anthonie  Lombaard,  of  Vrede  ;  C.  J.  De  Villiers,  of 
Harrismith;  Hans  Nande,  of  Bethlehem;  Marthinus 
Prinsloo,  of  Winburg  ;  and  C.  Nel,  of  Kroonstad. 
The  result  of  the  voting  was  that  Prinsloo  was  chosen 
for  the  supreme  command. 

Then  the  burghers  of  Winburg  selected  Mr.  Theu- 

>  Storm-hunters ;  so-called  from  being  rapidly  cooked.  ] 
Stomach-bombs — a  reflection  on  their  wholesomeness. 

6 


I  GO  ON  COMMANDO  AS  A  BURGHER 


nissen  as  their  Commandant.  He  fulfilled  his  duties 
admirably,  until  he  was  made  a  prisoner  of  war.  This 
happened  when  he  was  leading  a  courageous  attack 
at  Paardeberg  in  order  to  relieve  General  Piet 
Cronje. 

From  Harrismith  our  commando  advanced  to  with- 
in six  miles  of  the  Natal-Free  State  frontier,  and 
camped  not  far  from  Bezuidenhoutspas,  in  the  Drak- 
ensberg.  This  imposing  range  of  mountains,  which 
then  formed  the  dividing  line  between  Boer  and 
British  territory,  slopes  down  gently  into  the  Free 
State,  but  on  the  Natal  side  is  very  steep  and  pre- 
cipitous. 

The  day  after  we  had  elected  our  Commander-in- 
Chief  I  was  sent  by  Commandant  Steenekamp,  with  a 
small  detachment  of  burghers,  to  the  Natal  frontier. 
I  saw  nothing  of  the  English  there,  for  they  had  aban- 
doned all  their  positions  on  the  frontier  shortly  before 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  When  I  returned  in  the 
evening  I  found  that  the  burghers  had  chosen  me,  in 
my  absence,  as  Vice-Commandant^  under  Command- 
ant Steenekamp. 

It  was  at  five  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  that  day — 
the  nth  of  October,  1899 — that  the  time,  which  the 
ultimatum  allowed  to  England,  expired.  The  British 
had  not  complied  with  the  terms  which  the  South 
African  ^Republic  demanded — the  time  for  negotia- 
tions had  passed,  and  war  had  actually  broken  out. 

On  this  very  day  martial  law  was  proclaimed  by  the 
Governments  of  the  two  Republics,  and  orders  were 
given  to  occupy  the  passes  on  the  Drakensberg. 
Commander-in-Chief  Prinsloo  despatched  Steenekamp 
that  night  to  Bezuidenhoutspas.  Eastwards  from  there 
the  following  commandos  were  to  hold  the  passes  : — 
Bothaspas  was  to  be  occupied  by  the  commando  from 
Vrede  ;  Van  Reenen's  Pass  by  the  commandos  from 
Harrismith  and  Win  burg  ;  and  Tintwaspas  by  the 

»  A  Vice-Commandant  has  no  duties  to  fulfil  so  long  as  the  Commandant  is 
himself  in  camp  and  fit  for  work. 

7 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


commando  from  Kroonstad.  Westwards,  the  burghers 
from  Bethlehem  were  to  guard  OHviershoekpas. 

Commandant  Steenekamp  was  very  ill  that  night, 
and  was  unable  to  set  out ;  he  accordingly  ordered  me 
to  take  his  place  and  to  proceed  forward  with  six  hun- 
dred burghers. 

Although  I  had  only  to  cover  six  miles,  it  cost  me 
considerable  thought  to  arrange  everything  satisfac- 
torily. This  was  due  to  the  fact  that  real  discipline 
did  not  exist  among  the  burghers.  As  the  war  pro- 
ceeded, however,  a  great  improvement  manifested 
itself  in  this  matter,  although  as  long  as  the  struggle 
lasted  our  discipline  was  always  far  from  perfect.  I 
do  not  intend  to  imply  that  the  burghers  were  unwill- 
ing or  unruly ;  it  was  only  that  they  were  quite  unac- 
customed to  being  under  orders.  When  I  look  back 
upon  the  campaign  I  realize  how  gigantic  a  task  I  per- 
formed in  regulating  everything  in  accordance  with 
my  wishes. 

It  did  not  take  me  long  to  get  everything  arranged, 
and  we  made  an  early  start. 

It  was  impossible  to  say  what  might  lie  before  us. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  I  had  visited  the  spot  the  day 
before,  I  had  not  been  able  to  cross  the  frontier.  The 
English  might  have  been  on  the  precipitous  side  of 
the  mountains  under  the  ridge  without  my  being  any 
the  wiser.  Perhaps  on  our  arrival  we  should  find  them 
in  possession  of  the  pass,  occupying  good  positions  and 
quite  prepared  for  our  coming. 

Everything  went  well  with  us,  however,  and  no  un- 
toward incident  occurred.  When  the  sun  rose  the  fol- 
lowing morning  the  whole  country,  as  far  as  the  eye 
could  reach,  lay  before  us  calm  and  peaceful. 

I  sent  a  full  report  of  my  doings  to  Commandant 
Steenekamp,  and  that  evening  he  himself,  although 
still  far  from  well,  appeared  with  the  remaining  part 
of  the  commando.  He  brought  the  news  that  war 
had  started  in  grim  earnest.  General  De  la  Rey  had 
attacked  and  captured  an  armoured  train  at  Kraaipan. 

8 


I  GO  ON  COMMANDO  AS  A  BURGHER 


Some  days  after  this  a  war  council  was  held  at  Van 
Reenen's  Pass  under  Commander-in-Chief  Marthinus 
Prinsloo.  As  Commandant  Steenekamp,  owing  to 
his  illness,  was  unable  to  be  present,  I  attended  the 
council  in  his  place.  It  was  decided  that  a  force  of 
two  thousand  burghers,  under  Commandant  C.  J.  De 
Villiers,  of  Harrismith,  as  Vice-Vechtgeneraal,^  should 
go  down  into  Natal,  and  that  the  remaining  forces 
should  guard  the  passes  on  the  Drakensberg. 

Let  me  say,  in  parenthesis,  that  the  laws  of  the 
Orange  Free  State  make  no  allusion  to  the  post  of 
Vechtgeneraal.  But  shortly  before  the  war  began  the 
Volksraad  had  given  the  President  the  power  to  ap- 
point such  an  officer.  At  the  same  session  the  Presi- 
dent was  allowed  the  veto  on  all  laws  dealing  with 
war. 

As  Commandant  Steenekamp  was  still  prevented 
by  his  health  from  going  to  the  front,  I  was  ordered, 
as  Vice-Commandant  of  the  Heilbron  commando,  to 
proceed  with  five  hundred  men  to  Natal. 

It  soon  became  apparent  that  we  had  been  sent  to 
Natal  with  the  object  of  cutting  off  the  English  who 
were  stationed  at  Dundee  and  Elandslaagte.  We  were 
to  be  aided  in  our  task  by  the  Transvaalers  who  were 
coming  from  Volksrust  and  by  a  party  of  burghers 
from  Vrede,  all  under  the  command  of  General  Roch. 

We  did  not  arrive  in  time  to  be  successful  in  this 
plan.  That  there  had  been  some  bungling  was  not 
open  to  question.  Yet  I  am  unable  to  assert  to  whom 
our  failure  was  due — whether  to  the  Commandants  of 
the  South  African  Republic,  or  to  Commander-in- 
Chief  Prinsloo,  or  to  Vechtgeneraal  De  Villiers.  For 
then  I  was  merely  a  Vice-Commandant,  who  had  not 
to  give  orders,  but  to  obey  them.  But  whoever  was 
to  blame,  it  is  certainly  true  that  when,  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  23rd  of  October,  I  cut  the  line  near 
Dundee,  I  discovered  that  the  English  had  retreated 
to  Ladysmith.    It  was  General  Yule  who  had  led 

*  Fighting  general. 

9 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


them,  and  he  gained  great  praise  in  British  circles  for 
the  exploit. 

If  we  had  only  reached  our  destination  a  little  soon- 
er we  should  have  cut  off  their  retreating  troops  and 
given  them  a  very  warm  time.  But  now  that  they 
had  joined  their  comrades  at  Ladysmith,  we  had  to  be 
prepared  for  an  attack  from  their  combined  forces,  and 
that  before  the  Transvaalers,  who  were  still  at  Dundee, 
could  reinforce  us. 

The  British  did  not  keep  us  long  in  anxiety. 

At  eight  o'clock  the  following  morning — the  24th 
of  October — they  came  out  of  Ladysmith,  and  the 
battle  of  Modder  Spruit^  began.  With  the  sole  ex- 
ception of  the  skirmish  between  the  Harrismith  burgh- 
ers and  the  Carabineers  at  Bester  Station  on  the  i8th 
of  October,  when  Jonson,  a  burgher  of  Harrismith, 
was  killed — the  earliest  victim  in  our  fight  for  free- 
dom— this  was  the  first  fighting  the  Free-Staters  had 
seen. 

We  occupied  kopjes  which  formed  a  large  semicir- 
cle to  the  west  of  the  railway  between  Ladysmith  and 
Dundee.  Our  only  gun  was  placed  on  the  side  of  a 
high  kop  on  our  western  wing.  Our  men  did  not 
number  more  than  a  thousand — the  other  burghers 
had  remained  behind  as  a  rear-guard  at  Bester  Station. 

With  three  batteries  of  guns  the  English  marched 
to  the  attack,  the  troops  leading  the  way,  the  guns 
some  distance  behind.  A  deafening  cannonade  was 
opened  on  us  by  the  enemy's  artillery,  at  a  range  of 
about  4,500  yards.  Our  gun  fired  a  few  shots  in  re- 
turn, but  was  soon  silenced,  and  we  had  to  remove  it 
from  its  position.  Small  arms  were  our  only  weapons 
for  the  remainder  of  the  contest. 

The  English  at  once  began  as  usual  to  attack  our 
flanks,  but  they  did  not  attempt  to  get  round  our 
wings.  Their  object  appeared  to  be  to  keep  us  in 
small  parties,  so  that  we  should  be  unable  to  concen- 
trate a  large  force  anywhere. 

»  Sometimes  referred  to  as  the  battle  of  Rietfontein. 
10 


I  GO  ON  COMMANDO  AS  A  BURGHER 


Meanwhile  the  troops  which  were  making  the  at- 
tack pushed  on  closer  and  closer  to  us.  The  country 
was  of  such  a  nature  that  they  were  able  to  get  quite 
near  to  us  without  coming  under  our  fire,  for  small 
kloofs^  and  other  inequalities  of  the  ground  afforded 
them  excellent  cover.  But  when  they  did  show  them- 
selves they  w^ere  met  by  such  a  frightful  and  unceasing 
fire  that  they  could  not  approach  nearer  than  two  hun- 
dred paces  from  our  lines. 

The  brunt  of  the  attack  was  borne  by  the  burghers 
from  Kroonstad,  who,  under  Commandant  Nel,  formed 
our  western  wing.  More  to  the  east,  where  I  myself 
was,  our  men  had  less  to  endure.  But  every  burgher, 
wherever  he  might  be,  fought  with  the  greatest  cour- 
age. Although  there  were  some  who  fell  killed  or 
wounded,  there  was  no  sign  of  yielding  throughout 
the  whole  battle,  and  every  one  of  our  positions  we 
successfully  held. 

Till  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  we  kept  up  our 
rifle  fire  on  the  English,  and  then  we  ceased,  for  the 
enemy,  realizing  the  impossibility  of  driving  us  out  of 
our  positions,  withdrew  to  Ladysmith.  Shortly  after- 
wards we  were  able  to  go  over  the  battlefield.  There 
were  not  many  dead  or  wounded  to  be  seen  ;  but 
burghers  who  had  been  stationed  on  the  high  kop 
previously  mentioned  had  seen  the  English  remove 
their  wounded  during  the  engagement. 

We  ourselves  had  eleven  men  killed  and  twenty-one 
wounded,  of  whom  two  subsequently  died.  This  loss 
touched  us  deeply,  yet  it  was  encouraging  to  notice 
that  it  had  not  the  effect  of  disheartening  a  single 
officer  or  burgher. 

Just  as  the  battle  began  Mr.  A.  P.  Cronje  arrived 
on  the  scene.  He  had  been  nominated  by  the  Presi- 
dent as  Vechtgeneraal,  and  had  taken  over  the  com- 
mand from  Vice-General  C.  J.  De  Villiers.  He  was 
most  useful  in  this  engagement.  When  it  was  over  I 
agreed  with  him  in  thinking  that  our  forces  were  too 

*  Water-courses. 
II 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


weak  to  pursue  the  retreating  English  troops.  As 
soon  as  I  was  able  to  leave  my  position  it  gave  me 
great  pleasure  to  shake  hands  with  him,  for  he  was  an 
old  friend  and  fellow-member  of  the  Volksraad.  It 
was  pleasant  to  greet  him  as  Vechtgeneraal — he  was 
the  son  of  a  valiant  officer  who  had  fought  in  the 
Basuto  war  of  1865  and  1866.  He  had  reached  the 
age  of  sixty-six  years,  an  age  when  it  is  very  hard  for 
a  man  to  have  to  stand  the  strain  which  the  duties  of 
a  Vechtgeneraal  necessarily  entail. 


12 


CHAPTER  II 


Nicholson's  Nek 

UNTIL  the  29th  of  October  we  retained  our 
positions  at  Rietfontein.  On  that  date  Gen- 
eral Joubert  joined  us  with  a  portion  of  the  Transvaal 
commandos.  On  his  arrival  it  was  settled  that  the 
Transvaalers  should  proceed  to  the  north  of  Lady- 
smith  and  occupy  positions  on  the  east  of  Nicholson's 
Nek,  whilst  the  Free-Staters  were  to  go  to  the  west 
and  north-west  of  that  town. 

A  party  of  burghers,  under  Commandant  Nel,  of 
Kroonstad,  were  ordered  to  station  themselves  on  a 
kop  with  a  flat  top,  called  Swartbooiskop,'  an  hour 
and  a  half  to  the  south  of  Nicholson's  Nek.  After 
the  battle  which  was  fought  on  the  30th  of  November 
this  kop  was  christened  by  us  Little  Majuba. 

Just  after  sunrise  on  the  30th  of  November  the 
roaring  of  cannon  came  to  our  ears.  The  sound  came 
from  the  extreme  end  of  our  position,  where  the 
Transvaalers  were  stationed.  No  sooner  did  we  hear 
it  than  the  order  to  off-saddle  was  given.  I  myself 
asked  Commandant  Steenekamp,  who  had  arrived  the 
previous  day  from  Bezuidenhoutspas,  to  go  to  General 
Croup's  laager,  about  two  miles  distant,  and  to  request 
him  to  advance  to  where  the  firing  was  taking  place. 
To  this  request  General  Croup  acceded,  and  Com- 
mandant Steenekamp  went  there  with  three  hundred 
men,  of  whom  I  was  one.  Our  way  led  past  the  kop 
to  the  south  of  Nicholson's  Nek.  What  a  sight  met 
our  gaze  on  our  arrival  there  ! 

The  kop  was  occupied  by  the  English. 

'  About  nine  miles  :  distance  reckoned  by  average  pace  of  ridden  horse — six 
miles  an  hour. 


13 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


This  must  be  ascribed  to  the  negligence  of  Com- 
mandant Nel,  who  had  orders  to  guard  the  kop.  He 
excused  himself  by  assuring  us  that  he  had  been  under 
the  impression  that  one  of  his  Veldtcornets  and  a 
number  of  burghers  were  occupying  the  hill. 

What  could  we  do  now  ? 

Commandant  Steenekamp  and  I  decided  that  we 
must  storm  the  hill  with  the  three  hundred  men 
whom  we  had  at  our  disposal.  And  this  we  did,  and 
were  sufficiently  fortunate  to  capture  the  northern 
point  of  the  kop. 

On  reaching  the  summit  we  discovered  that  the 
British  troops  occupied  positions  extending  from  the 
southern  point  to  the  middle  of  the  mountain. 

The  enemy,  the  moment  we  appeared  on  the  ridge, 
opened  a  heavy  rifle  fire  upon  us.  We  answered  with 
as  severe  a  fusillade  as  theirs.  Whilst  we  were  shoot- 
ing, twenty  of  Commandant  Nel's  men  joined  us  and 
helped  us  to  hold  our  ground.  When  we  had  been 
engaged  in  this  way  for  some  time  we  saw  that  the 
only  possible  course  was  to  fight  our  way  from  posi- 
tion to  position  towards  the  English  lines. 

I  now  observed  that  the  mountain  top  was  of  an 
oblong  shape,  extending  from  north  to  south  for 
about  a  thousand  paces.  At  the  northern  end,  where 
we  were,  the  surface  was  smooth,  but  somewhat 
further  south  it  became  rough  and  stony,  affording 
very  good  cover.  In  our  present  situation  we  were 
thus  almost  completely  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire. 
The  English,  on  the  other  hand,  had  excellent  posi- 
tions. There  were  a  number  of  ruined  Kaffir  kraals 
scattered  about  from  the  middle  of  the  mountain  to 
its  southern  end,  and  these  the  enemy  had  occupied, 
thus  securing  a  great  advantage. 

Our  bullets  hailed  on  the  English,  and  very  shortly 
they  retreated  to  the  southernmost  point  of  the 
mountain.  This  gave  us  the  chance  for  which  we 
had  been  waiting,  for  now  we  could  take  the  splendid 
positions  they  had  left. 

14 


NICHOLSON'S  NEK 


Whilst  this  was  going  on  an  amusing  incident  oc- 
curred. A  Jew  came  up  to  a  burgher  who  was  lying 
behind  a  stone,  on  a  piece  of  ground  where  boulders 
were  scarce. 

"  Sell  me  that  stone  for  half-a-crown,"  whined  the 
Jew. 

Loop  ! "  ^  the  Boer  cried ;     I  want  it  myself." 
I  will  give  you  fifteen  shillings,"  insisted  the  Jew. 

Although  the  Boer  had  never  before  possessed 
anything  that  had  risen  in  value  with  such  surpris- 
ing rapidity,  at  that  moment  he  was  anything  but 
ready  to  drive  a  bargain  with  the  Jew,  and  without 
any  hesitation  he  positively  declined  to  do  business. 

In  the  positions  from  which  the  English  had  re- 
tired we  found  several  dead  and  wounded  men,  and 
succeeded  in  capturing  some  prisoners. 

The  enemy  were  now  very  strongly  posted  at  the 
south  end  of  the  mountain,  for  there  were  in  their 
neighbourhood  many  Kaffir  kraals  and  huge  boulders 
to  protect  them  from  our  marksmen.  Their  fire  on 
us  became  still  more  severe  and  unceasing,  and  their 
bullets  whistled  and  sang  above  our  heads,  or  flattened 
themselves  against  the  stones.  We  gave  at  least  as 
good  as  we  got,  and  this  was  so  little  to  their  liking 
that  very  soon  a  few  white  flags  appeared  in  the 
kraals  on  their  left  wing,  and  from  that  quarter  the 
firing  stopped  suddenly. 

I  immediately  gave  the  order  to  cease  fire  and  to 
advance  towards  the  enemy.  All  at  once  the  English 
blazed  away  at  us  again.  On  our  part,  we  replied 
with  vigour.  But  that  did  not  continue  long.  In  a 
very  short  time  white  flags  fluttered  above  every  kraal 
— the  victory  was  ours. 

I  have  no  wish  to  say  that  a  misuse  of  the  white 
flag  had  taken  place.  I  was  told  when  the  battle  was 
over  that  the  firing  had  continued,  because  the  men 
on  our  eastern  wing  had  not  observed  what  their  com- 
rades on  their  left  had  done.  And  this  explanation  I 
willingly  accept. 

>  Clear  oflf. 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Our  force  in  this  engagement  consisted  only  of 
three  hundred  men  from  Heilbron,  twenty  from 
Kroonstad,  and  forty  or  fifty  from  the  Johannesburg 
Police,  these  latter  under  Captain  Van  Dam.  The 
Police  had  arrived  on  the  battlefield  during  the  fight- 
ing, and  had  behaved  in  a  most  praiseworthy  manner. 

But  I  overestimate  our  numbers,  for  it  was  not  the 
whole  of  the  Heilbron  contingent  that  reached  the  fir- 
ing line.  We  had  to  leave  some  of  them  behind  with 
the  horses  at  the  foot  of  the  kop,  and  there  were 
others  who  remained  at  the  first  safe  position  they 
reached — a  frequent  occurrence  at  that  period. 

I  took  careful  note  of  our  numbers  when  the  battle 
was  over,  and  I  can  state  with  certainty  that  there 
were  not  more  than  two  hundred  burghers  actually 
engaged. 

Our  losses  amounted  to  four  killed  and  five  wounded. 
As  to  the  losses  of  the  English,  I  myself  counted  two 
hundred  and  three  dead  and  wounded,  and  there  may 
have  been  many  whom  I  did  not  see.  In  regard  to 
our  prisoners,  as  they  marched  past  me  four  deep  I 
counted  eight  hundred  and  seventeen. 

In  addition  to  the  prisoners  we  also  captured  two 
Maxim  and  two  mountain  guns.  They,  however, 
were  out  of  order,  and  had  not  been  used  by  the  Eng- 
lish. The  prisoners  told  us  that  parts  of  their  big 
guns  had  been  lost  in  the  night,  owing  to  a  stampede 
of  the  mules  which  carried  them,  and  consequently  that 
the  guns  were  incomplete  when  they  reached  the  moun- 
tain. Shortly  afterwards  we  found  the  mules  with 
the  missing  parts  of  the  guns. 

It  was  very  lucky  for  us  that  the  English  were  de- 
prived of  the  use  of  their  guns,  for  it  placed  them  on 
the  same  footing  as  ourselves,  as  it  compelled  them  to 
rely  entirely  on  their  rifles.  Still  they  had  the  advan- 
tage of  position,  not  to  mention  the  fact  that  they  out- 
numbered us  by  four  to  one. 

The  guns  did  not  comprise  the  whole  of  our  capt- 
ure :  we  also  seized  a  thousand  Lee-Metford  rifles, 

i6 


I 

NICHOLSON'S  NEK 

twenty  cases  of  cartridges,  and  some  baggage  mules 
and  horses. 

The  fighting  had  continued  without  intermission 
from  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  until  two  in  the  af- 
ternoon. The  day  was  exceedingly  hot,  and  as  there 
was  no  water  to  be  obtained  nearer  than  a  mile  from 
the  berg,^  we  suffered  greatly  from  thirst.  The  con- 
dition of  the  wounded  touched  my  heart  deeply.  It 
was  pitiable  to  hear  them  cry,  "  Water  !  water  !  " 

I  ordered  my  burghers  to  carry  these  unfortunate 
creatures  to  some  thorn-bushes,  which  afforded  shelter 
from  the  scorching  rays  of  the  sun,  and  where  their 
doctors  could  attend  to  them.  Other  burghers  I  told 
off  to  fetch  water  from  our  prisoners'  canteens,  to  sup- 
ply our  own  wounded. 

As  soon  as  the  wounded  were  safe  under  the  shel- 
ter of  the  trees  I  despatched  a  message  to  Sir  George 
White  asking  him  to  send  his  ambulance  to  fetch 
them,  and  also  to  make  arrangements  for  the  burial  of 
his  dead.  For  some  unexplained  reason,  the  English 
ambulance  did  not  arrive  till  the  following  morning. 

We  stayed  on  the  mountain  until  sunset,  and  then 
went  down  to  the  laager.  I  ordered  my  brother,  Piet 
de  Wet,  with  fifty  men  of  the  Bethlehem  commando, 
to  remain  behind  and  guard  the  kop. 

We  reached  camp  at  eight  o'clock,  and  as  the  men 
had  been  without  food  during  the  whole  day  it  can  be 
imagined  with  what  delight  each  watched  his  bout 
span  frizzling  on  the  spit.  This,  with  a  couple  of 
stormjagers  and  a  tin  of  coffee,  made  up  the  meal,  and 
speedily  restored  them.  They  were  exempted  from 
sentry  duty  that  night,  and  greatly  enjoyed  their  well- 
earned  rest. 

To  complete  my  narrative  of  the  day's  work,  I  have 
only  to  add  that  the  Transvaal  burghers  were  engaged 
at  various  points  some  eight  miles  from  Nicholson's 
Nek,  and  succeeded  in  taking  four  hundred  pris- 
oners. 

»  Hill. 
17 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


We  placed  our  sentries  that  evening  with  the  great' 
est  care.  They  were  stationed  not  only  at  a  distance 
from  the  camp,  as  Brandwachten^  but  also  close  round 
the  laager  itself.  We  were  especially  careful,  as  it  was 
rumoured  that  the  English  had  armed  the  Zulus  of 
Natal.  Had  this  been  true,  it  would  have  been  neces- 
sary to  exercise  the  utmost  vigilance  to  guard  against 
these  barbarians. 

Since  the  very  beginning  of  our  existence  as  a  na- 
tion— in  1836 — our  people  had  been  acquainted  with 
black  races,  and  bitter  had  been  their  experience. 
All  that  our  voortrekkers^  had  suffered  was  indelibly 
stamped  on  our  memory.  We  well  knew  what  the 
Zulus  could  do  under  cover  of  darkness — their  san- 
guinary night  attacks  were  not  easily  forgotten. 
Their  name  of  night-wolves  "  had  been  well  earned. 
Also  we  Free-Staters  had  endured  much  from  the 
Basutos,  in  the  wars  of  1865  and  1867. 

History  had  thus  taught  us  to  place  Brandwachten 
round  our  laagers  at  night,  and  to  reconnoitre  during 
the  hours  of  darkness  as  well  as  in  the  day-time. 

Perhaps  I  shall  be  able  to  give  later  on  a  fuller  ac- 
count in  these  pages — or,  it  may  be,  in  another  book — 
of  the  way  we  were  accustomed  to  reconnoitre,  and  of 
the  reasons  why  the  scouting  of  the  British  so  fre- 
quently ended  in  disaster.  But  I  cannot  resist  saying 
here  that  the  English  only  learnt  the  art  of  scouting 
during  the  latter  part  of  the  war,  when  they  made  use 
of  the  Boer  deserters — the  Hands-uppers." 

These  deserters  were  our  undoing.  I  shall  have  a 
good  deal  more  to  say  about  them  before  I  finally  lay 
down  my  pen,  and  I  shall  not  hesitate  to  call  them  by 
their  true  name — the  name  with  which  they  will  be 
for  ever  branded  before  all  the  nations  of  the  world. 

*  Literally,  watch-fire  men.    They  were  the  furthest  outposts,  whose  duty  it 
was  to  signal  by  means  of  their  fires. 
'  Pioneers. 


18 


CHAPTER  III 


Ladysmith  Besieged 

THE  Orange  Free  State  and  the  South  African 
Republic  held  a  joint  council  of  war  on  the  ist 
of  November,  and  it  was  then  decided  to  lay  siege  to 
Ladysmith. 

We  also  agreed  to  send  out  a  horse-commando  in 
the  direction  of  Estcourt.  This  commando,  under 
Vice-General  Louis  Botha,  had  several  skirmishes 
with  the  enemy.  On  the  15th  of  November  he  en- 
gaged an  armoured  train,  capturing  a  hundred  of  the 
British  troops.  This  was  General  Botha's  chief  ex- 
ploit, and  shortly  afterwards  he  returned  to  camp. 
But  I  must  not  anticipate. 

On  the  night  of  the  council  of  war,  General  Piet 
Cronje  was  sent  to  occupy  positions  to  the  south  and 
south-west  of  Ladysmith.  He  had  with  him  the 
Heilbron  burghers,  a  part  of  the  commandos  from 
Winburg  and  Harrismith,  and  two  Krupp  guns.  On 
the  following  day  a  brush  took  place  with  the  enemy, 
who,  however,  speedily  fell  back  on  Ladysmith.  On 
the  3rd,  a  few  of  their  infantry  regiments,  with  a 
thousand  or  fifteen  hundred  mounted  troops,  and  two 
batteries  of  15  and  12-pound  Armstrong  guns,  marched 
out  of  the  town  in  a  south-westerly  direction. 

The  English  brought  these  two  guns  into  position 
at  such  a  distance  from  us  that  we  could  not  reach 
them  with  the  Mauser  ;  nor  would  it  have  been  safe 
for  us  to  advance  upon  them,  for  between  them  and 
us  lay  an  open  plain,  which  would  have  afforded  no 
cover.  One  of  our  guns,  which  was  placed  exactly  in 
front  of  the  enemy,  did  indeed  begin  to  fire  ;  but  after 
a  shot  or  two,  it  received  so  much  attention  from  the 

19 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


English  artillery  that  we  were  compelled — just  as  at 
Rietfontein — to  desist. 

The  British  infantry  and  cavalry  did  not  show  any 
excessive  eagerness  to  tackle  us ;  and  we,  on  our  side, 
were  as  disinclined  to  come  to  close  quarters  with 
them.  Nevertheless,  the  enemy's  infantry,  backed  up 
by  the  thunder  of  twelve  guns,  did  make  an  attempt 
to  reach  us  ;  but  though  they  advanced  repeatedly,  they 
were  for  the  most  part  careful  to  keep  out  of  range  of 
our  rifles.  When  they  neglected  this  precaution,  they 
soon  found  themselves  compelled  to  retire  with  loss. 

Our  second  gun,  which  had  been  placed  on  a  tafel- 
kop  ^  to  the  east  of  the  ground  where  the  engagement 
was  taking  place,  did  excellent  work.  It  effectually 
baulked  the  enemy's  mounted  troops  in  their  repeated 
efforts  to  outflank  us  on  that  side,  and  also  made  it 
impossible  for  the  English  to  bring  their  guns  farther 
east,  so  as  to  command  the  tafel-kop.  They  did,  in- 
deed, make  an  attempt  to  place  some  guns  between 
us  and  Platrand,  which  lay  to  the  north  of  our  eastern 
position,  but  it  was  unsuccessful,  for  our  Krupp  on 
the  tafel-kop  brought  such  a  heavy  fire  to  bear  on  the 
troops  and  gunners,  that  they  were  forced  to  retire. 

We,  on  our  part,  as  I  have  already  said,  found  it 
equally  impossible  to  storm  the  English  positions.  To 
advance  would  have  been  to  expose  ourselves  to  the 
fire  of  their  heavy  guns,  whereas  an  attack  to  the  south 
would  have  involved  exposure  to  a  cross-fire  from  the 
guns  on  Platrand. 

Altogether  it  was  a  most  unsatisfactory  engagement 
for  us  both.  Nothing  decisive  was  effected  ;  and,  as 
is  always  the  case  in  such  battles,  little  was  done  ex- 
cept by  the  big  guns,  which  kept  up  a  perpetual  roar 
from  ten  in  the  morning  until  five  in  the  afternoon. 
At  that  hour  the  British  fell  back  on  Ladysmith. 

Our  loss  was  one  killed  and  six  wounded,  among 
the  latter  being  Veldtcornet  Marthinus  Els,  of  Heil- 
bron. 

*  A  table-shaped  mountain. 
20 


LADYSMITH  BESIEGED 


It  was  evident  that  the  English  did  not  escape  with- 
out loss,  but  we  were  unable  to  ascertain  its  extent. 
My  own  opinion  is  that  they  did  not  lose  very  heavily. 

From  that  day  nothing  of  importance  happened 
until  I  left  Natal ;  though  both  the  Transvaalers  and 
Free  State  burghers  had  a  few  slight  brushes  with  the 
enemy. 

During  the  night  of  December  the  7th,  "  Long 
Tom,"  the  big  Transvaal  gun,  which  had  been  placed 
on  Bulwana  Hill,  had  been  so  seriously  damaged  by 
dynamite,  that  it  had  to  remain  out  of  action  for  some 
time.  We  all  admitted  that  the  English  on  that  occa- 
sion acted  with  great  skill  and  prudence,  and  that  the 
courage  of  their  leaders  deserved  every  praise.  Yet, 
if  we  had  only  been  on  our  guard,  we  might  have 
beaten  off  the  storming  party  ;  but  they  had  caught 
us  unawares.  Nevertheless,  the  mishap  taught  us  a 
useful  lesson  :  henceforth  the  Transvaal  Commandants 
were  more  strict,  and  their  increased  severity  had  an 
excellent  effect  both  on  the  burghers  and  gunners. 

General  Sir  Redvers  Duller  had  landed  at  Cape 
Town  early  in  November.  We  were  now  expecting 
every  day  to  hear  that  he  had  assumed  the  chief  com- 
mand over  the  English  army  encamped  between  Est- 
court  and  Colenso.  The  number  of  troops  there  was 
continually  increasing  owing  to  the  reinforcements 
which  kept  pouring  in  from  over  the  ocean. 

Great  things  were  expected  of  Sir  Redvers  Duller, 
to  whom  the  Boers,  by  a  play  of  words,  had  given  a 
somewhat  disrespectful  nick-name.  He  had  not  been 
long  in  Natal  before  his  chance  came.  I  must,  how- 
ever, be  silent  about  his  successes  and  his  failures,  for, 
as  I  left  Natal  on  the  9th  of  December,  I  had  no 
personal  experience  of  his  methods.  But  this  I  will 
say,  that  whatever  his  own  people  have  to  say  to  his 
discredit.  Sir  Redvers  Buller  had  to  operate  against 
stronger  positions  than  any  other  English  general  in 
South  Africa. 


21 


CHAPTER  IV 


1  am  Appointed  Vechtgeneraal 

UP  to  the  9th  of  December  I  had  only  been  a 
Vice-Commandant,  but  on  the  morning  of 
that  day  I  received  a  telegram  from  States- President 
Steyn,  asking  me  to  go  to  the  Western  frontier  as 
V  echtgeneraal. 

This  came  as  a  great  surprise  to  me,  and  I  tele- 
graphed back  to  the  President  asking  for  time  to 
think  the  matter  over.  To  tell  the  truth,  I  should 
have  much  preferred  to  go  through  the  campaign  as 
a  private  burgher. 

Almost  immediately  after  this  there  came  another 
telegram — this  time  from  Mr.  A.  Fisscher,  a  member 
of  the  Executive  Council,  and  a  man  whom  I  respected 
greatly  on  account  of  his  official  position.  He  urged 
me  not  to  decline  the  appointment,  but  to  proceed  at 
once  to  the  Western  borders.  I  did  not  know  what 
to  do.  However,  after  deliberating  for  a  short  time, 
and  with  great  difficulty  overcoming  my  disinclination 
to  leave  my  present  associates,  I  decided  to  accept  the 
post  offered  to  me.  Commandant  Steenekamp  was 
kind  enough  to  allow  me  to  take  with  me  fourteen 
men,  with  whom  I  had  been  on  especially  friendly 
terms  ;  and,  after  a  few  parting  words  to  the  Heilbron 
burghers,  in  which  I  thanked  them  for  all  the  pleasant 
times  I  had  passed  in  their  company,  I  left  the  laager. 

It  was  heart-breaking  to  tear  myself  away  from  my 
commando  :  that  9th  of  December  was  a  day  which  I 
shall  never  forget. 

The  following  morning  I  arrived,  with  my  staff,  at 
Elandslaagte  Station,  on  our  way  to  Bloemfontein. 
A  special  train,  provided  by  the  Transvaal  authorities, 

22 


I  AM  APPOINTED  VECHTGENERAAL 


at  the  request  of  my  Government,  was  waiting  for  us, 
and  we  started  without  a  moment's  delay.  As  we 
journeyed  on,  the  conductor  would  sometimes  ask  me 
whether  I  should  like  to  stop  at  such  and  such  a  sta- 
tion, but  my  answer  was  always : 
*'  No!  no  !  hurry  on  !  " 

But  when  we  got  as  far  as  Viljoen's  Drift,  there  was 
an  end  to  my  special  train  !"  In  spite  of  the  Gov- 
ernment's orders  that  I  was  to  be  sent  forward  without 
delay,  I  had  to  wait  six  hours,  and  then  be  content  to 
travel  as  an  ordinary  passenger. 

At  Bloemfontein  we  found  everything  ready  for  us, 
and  at  once  started  on  our  journey  of  sixty  or  seventy 
miles  to  Magersfontein,  where  we  arrived  on  Decem- 
ber the  1 6th. 

During  the  time  I  had  spent  in  travelling,  three  im- 
portant engagements  had  taken  place,  namely  those  of 
Colenso,  Magersfontein  and  Stormberg.  At  Colenso, 
the  English  had  suffered  heavy  losses,  and  ten  guns 
had  fallen  into  our  hands.  Magersfontein  also  had 
cost  them  dear,  and  there  General  Wauchope  had  met 
his  fate  ;  while  at  Stormberg  seven  hundred  of  them 
had  been  taken  prisoners,  and  three  of  their  big  guns 
had  been  captured  by  us. 

At  Magersfontein  were  six  or  seven  thousand 
Transvaal  burghers  under  General  Piet  Cronje,  with 
General  De  la  Rev  as  second  in  command.  Thus 
It  fell  to  my  lot  to  take  over  the  command  of  the 
Free-Staters.  The  Commander-in-Chief  of  these  Free 
State  burghers,  as  well  as  of  those  who  were  camped 
round  Kimberley,  was  Mr.  C.  J.  Wessels ;  Mr.  E.  R. 
Grobler  commanded  at  Colesberg,  and  Mr.  J.  H. 
Olivier  at  Stormberg. 

I  spent  my  first  few  days  at  Magersfontein  in  or- 
ganizing the  Free  State  burghers.  When  this  task 
had  been  accomplished.  General  De  la  Rey  and  I 
asked  General  Cronje's  permission  to  take  fifteen 
hundred  men,  and  carry  on  operations  in  the  direction 
of  Hopetown  and  De  Aar  with  the  intention  of  break- 

23  - 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


ing  Lord  Methuen's  railway  communications.  But 
Cronje  would  hear  nothing  of  the  scheme.  Say  what 
we  would,  there  was  no  moving  him.  He  absolutely 
refused  to  allow  fifteen  hundred  of  his  men  to  leave  their 
positions  at  Magersfontein,  unless  the  Government 
found  it  impossible  to  procure  that  number  of  burghers 
from  elsewhere.    Thus  our  plan  came  to  nothing. 

Shortly  afterwards  De  la  Rey  was  sent  to  the  com- 
mandos at  Colesberg,  and  I  succeeded  him  in  the 
command  of  the  Transvaalers  at  Magersfontein.  The 
Government  then  put  General  Wessels  in  sole  com- 
mand at  Kimberley,  and  gave  General  Cronje  the 
chief  command  over  the  Free  State  burghers  at  Ma- 
gersfontein. Thus  it  was  that  I,  as  Vechtgeneraal,  had 
to  receive  my  orders  from  Cronje.  I  had  the  follow- 
ing Commandants  under  me  :  Du  Preez,  of  Hoofstad  ; 
Grobler,  of  Fauresmith ;  D.  Lubbe,  of  Jacobsdal ; 
Piet  Fourie,  of  Bloemfontein  ;  J.  Kok  and  Jordaan, 
of  Win  burg ;  Ignatius  Ferreira,  of  Lady  brand  ;  Paul 
De  Villiers,  of  Ficksburg ;  Du  Plessis,  and,  subse- 
quently, Commandant  Diederiks,  of  Boshof. 

The  English  had  entrenched  themselves  at  the  Mod- 
der  River,  we  at  Magersfontein.  There  w^as  little  or 
nothing  for  us  to  do,  and  yet  I  never  had  a  more  troub- 
lesome time  in  my  life.  I  had  all  the  Transvaalers 
under  my  orders,  in  addition  to  the  burghers  of  the 
Free  State,  and  the  positions  which  I  had  to  inspect 
every  day  extended  over  a  distance  of  fifteen  miles 
from  end  to  end.  I  had  to  listen  to  constant  com- 
plaints ;  one  of  the  officers  would  say  that  he  could 
not  hold  out  against  an  attack  if  it  were  delivered  at 
such  and  such  a  point ;  another,  that  he  had  not  suf- 
ficient troops  with  him,  not  to  mention  other  remarks 
which  were  nonsensical  in  the  extreme. 

In  the  meantime,  the  enemy  was  shelling  our  posi- 
tions unceasingly.  Not  a  day  passed  but  two  of  their 
Lyddite  guns  dropped  shells  amongst  us.  Some- 
times not  more  than  four  or  five  reached  us  in  the 

24 


I  AM  APPOINTED  VECHTGENERAAL 


twenty-four  hours ;  at  other  times  from  fifty  to  two  hun- 
dred, and  once  as  many  as  four  hundred  and  thirty-six. 

In  spite  of  this,  we  had  but  few  mishaps.  Indeed, 
I  can  only  remember  three  instances  of  any  one  being 
hurt  by  the  shells.  A  young  burgher,  while  riding 
behind  a  ridge  and  thus  quite  hidden  from  the  enemy, 
was  hit  by  a  bomb,  and  both  he  and  his  horse  were 
blown  to  atoms.  This  youth  was  a  son  of  Mr.  Gideon 
van  Tonder,  a  member  of  the  Executive  Council. 
Another  Lyddite  shell  so  severely  wounded  two  broth- 
ers, named  Wolfaard,  Potchefstroom  burghers,  that 
we  almost  despaired  of  their  lives.  Nevertheless,  they 
recovered.  I  do  not  want  to  imply  that  the  British 
Artillery  were  poor  shots.  Far  from  it.  Their  range 
was  very  good,  and,  as  they  had  plenty  of  practice 
every  day,  shot  after  shot  went  home.  I  ascribe  our 
comparative  immunity  to  a  Higher  Power,  which 
averted  misfortune  from  us. 

I  had  not  been  long  at  Magersfontein  before  I  be- 
came convinced  that  Lord  Methuen  was  most  unlikely 
to  make  another  attack  on  our  extensive  positions.  I 
said  nothing  of  this  to  any  of  the  burghers,  but  on  more 
than  one  occasion,  I  told  General  Cronje  what  I  thought 
about  the  matter. 

**The  enemy,"  I  repeated  to  him  over  and  over 
again,  will  not  attack  us  here.  He  will  flank  us." 
But  Cronje  would  not  listen  to  me. 

The  presence  of  women  in  our  laager  was  a  great 
hindrance  to  me  in  my  work.  Indeed,  I  opened  a 
correspondence  with  the  Government  on  the  matter, 
and  begged  them  to  forbid  it.  But  here  again  my 
efforts  were  unavailing.  Later  on,  we  shall  see  in 
what  a  predicament  the  Republican  laagers  were  placed 
through  the  toleration  of  this  irregularity. 

Meanwhile,  the  inevitable  results  of  Cronje's  policy 
became  more  and  more  apparent  to  me,  and  before 
long  we  had  to  suffer  for  his  obstinacy  in  keeping  us 
to  our  trenches  and  schanzes} 

»  A  shelter-mound  of  earth  and  boulders. 
25 


CHAPTER  V 


The  Overwhelming  Forces  of  Lord 
Roberts 

1 SPEEDILY  discovered  the  object  which  the 
English  had  in  view  in  taking  such  advanced 
positions  and  in  bombarding  Magersfontein.  They 
wished  to  give  us  the  impression  that  they  were  able 
to  attack  us  at  any  moment  and  so  to  keep  us  tied  to 
our  positions.  In  the  meantime  they  were  making 
preparations  in  another  direction,  for  the  movement 
which  was  really  intended — namely,  the  advance  of 
Lord  Roberts  with  his  overwhelming  force. 

The  Commander-in-Chief,  Piet  de  Wet  (and  before 
him  Commandant  H.  Schorman),  had  plenty  of  work 
given  them  by  the  English.  But  General  De  la  Rey 
had  been  so  successful  that  he  had  prevented  Lord 
Roberts,  notwithstanding  the  enormous  numbers  he 
commanded,  from  crossing  the  Orange  River  at  Nor- 
valspont,  and  had  thus  forced  him  to  take  the  Modder 
River  route. 

Lord  Roberts  would  have  found  it  more  convenient 
to  have  crossed  the  Orange  River,  for  the  railway 
runs  through  Norvalspont.  Yet  had  he  attempted  it, 
he  would  have  fared  as  badly  as  Sir  Redvers  Buller 
did  in  Natal,  Our  positions  at  Colesberg,  and  to  the 
north  of  the  river,  were  exceedingly  strong.  He  was 
wise,  therefore,  in  his  decision  to  march  over  the  un- 
broken plains. 

It  was  now,  as  I  had  foreseen,  that  the  English  re- 
newed their  flanking  tactics. 

On  the  nth  of  February,  1900,  a  strong  contingent 
of  mounted  troops,  under  General  French,  issued 
from  the  camps  at  Modder  River  and  Koedoesberg. 

26 


LORD  ROBERTS'  FORCES 

This  latter  was  a  kop  on  the  Riet  River,  about  twelve 
miles  to  the  east  of  their  main  camp. 

At  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning,  General  French 
started.  Immediately  I  received  orders  from  General 
Cronje  to  proceed  with  three  hundred  and  fifty  men 
to  check  the  advancing  troops.  As  I  stood  on  the 
ridges  of  Magersfontein,  I  was  able  to  look  down 
upon  the  English  camps,  and  I  saw  that  it  would  be 
sheer  madness  to  pit  three  hundred  and  fifty  men 
against  General  French's  large  force.  Accordingly  I 
asked  that  one  hundred  and  fifty  more  burghers  and 
two  guns  might  be  placed  at  my  disposal.  This  re- 
quest, however,  was  refused,  and  so  I  had  to  proceed 
without  them. 

When  we  arrived  at  Koedoesberg  that  afternoon, 
we  found  that  the  English  had  already  taken  posses- 
sion of  the  hill.  They  were  stationed  at  its  southern 
end,  and  had  nearly  completed  a  stone  wall  across 
the  hill  from  east  to  west.  Their  camp  was  situated 
on  the  Riet  River,  which  flows  beside  the  southern 
slopes  of  the  berg.  The  enemy  also  held  strong  posi- 
tions on  hillocks  to  the  east  of  the  mountain,  whilst 
on  the  west  they  occupied  a  ravine,  which  descended 
from  the  mountain  to  the  river. 

Commandant  Froneman  and  I  determined  to  storm 
the  berg  without  a  moment's  delay.  We  reached  the 
foot  of  the  mountain  in  safety,  and  here  we  were  out 
of  sight  of  the  English.  But  it  was  impossible  to  re- 
main in  this  situation,  and  I  gave  orders  that  my  men 
should  cHmb  the  mountain.  We  succeeded  in  reach- 
ing the  summit,  but  were  unable  to  get  within  seven 
hundred  paces  of  the  enemy,  owing  to  the  severity  of 
their  fire  from  behind  the  stone  wall.  And  so  we  re- 
mained where  we  were  until  it  became  quite  dark,  and 
then  very  quietly  went  back  to  the  spot  where  we  had 
left  our  horses. 

As  General  French  was  in  possession  of  the  river, 
we  had  to  ride  about  four  miles  before  we  could  ob- 
tain any  water. 

27  .... 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Early  the  following  morning  we  again  occupied  the 
positions  we  had  held  on  the  previous  evening  Al 
though  under  a  severe  rifle  fire,  we  then  rushed  from 
position  to  position,  and  at  last  were  only  three  hun- 
dred paces  from  the  enemy.  And  now  I  was  forced 
to  rest  content  with  the  ground  we  had  gained,  toi 
with  only  three  hundred  and  fifty  men  I  dare  not  risk 
a  further  advance,  owing  to  the  strength  of  the 
enemy's  position. 

The  previous  day  I  had  asked  General  Cronje  to 
send  me  reinforcements,  and  I  had  to  delay  the  ad- 
vance until  their  arrival.  In  a  very  short  time  a  small 
party  of  burghers  made  their  appearance.  They  had 
two  field-pieces  with  them,  and  were  under  the  com 
mand  of  Major  Albrecht.  We  placed  the  guns  in 
position  and  trained  them  on  the  English. 

With  the  second  shot  we  had  found  our  range,  while 
the  third  found  its  mark  in  the  wall,  so  that  it  was  not 
long  before  the  enemy  had  to  abandon  that  shelter.  To 
find  safe  cover  they  were  forced  to  retreat  some  hundred 
paces.  But  we  gained  little  by  this,  for  the  new  posi- 
tions of  the  English  were  quite  as  good  as  those  from 
which  we  had  driven  them,  and,  moreover,  were  al- 
most out  of  range  of  our  guns.  And  we  were  unable 
to  bring  our  field-pieces  any  nearer  because  our  gun- 
ners would  have  been  exposed  to  the  enemy's  rifle 
fire. 

Our  Krupps  made  good  practice  on  the  four  Eng- 
lish guns  which  had  been  stationed  on  the  river  bank 
to  the  south.  Up  till  now  these  had  kept  up  a  terrific 
fire  on  our  guns,  but  we  soon  drove  them  across  the 
river,  to  seek  protection  behind  the  mountain.  I  de- 
spatched General  Froneman  to  hold  the  river  bank, 
and  the  shiit  ^  which  descended  to  the  river  from  the 
north.  While  carrying  out  this  order  he  was  exposed 
to  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy's  western  wing,  which 
was  located  in  the  above-mentioned  ravine,  but  he 
succeeded  in  reaching  the  river  under  cover  of  the 

»  A  ravine  or  water-course. 
28 


LORD  ROBERTS*  FORCES 


guns.  Once  there,  the  enemy's  artillery  made  it  im- 
possible for  him  to  move. 

And  now  a  curious  incident  occurred  !  A  falcon, 
hovering  over  the  heads  of  our  burghers  in  the  sluit, 
was  hit  by  a  bullet  from  one  of  the  shrapnel  shells  and 
fell  dead  to  the  ground  in  the  midst  of  the  men.  It 
was  already  half-past  four,  and  we  began  to  ask  our- 
selves how  the  affair  would  end.  At  this  juncture  I 
received  a  report  from  a  burgher,  whom  I  had  placed 
on  the  eastern  side  of  the  mountain  to  watch  the 
movements  of  the  English  at  the  Modder  River.  He 
told  me  that  a  mountain  corps,  eight  hundred  to  a 
thousand  men  strong,  was  approaching  us  with  two 
guns,  with  the  intention,  as  it  appeared,  of  outflanking 
us.  I  also  learnt  that  eighty  of  my  men  had  retreated. 
I  had  stationed  them  that  morning  on  a  hillock  three 
miles  to  the  east  of  the  mountain,  my  object  being  to 
prevent  General  French  from  surrounding  us. 

It  now  became  necessary  to  check  the  advance  of 
this  mountain  corps.  But  how  ?  There  were  only 
thirty-six  men  at  my  disposal.  The  other  burghers 
were  in  positions  closer  to  the  enemy,  and  I  could  not 
withdraw  them  without  exposing  them  too  seriously  to 
the  bullets  of  the  English.  There  was  nothing  for  it, 
but  that  I  with  my  thirty-six  burghers  should  attack 
the  force  which  threatened  us. 

We  rushed  down  the  mountain  and  jumping  on  our 
horses,  galloped  against  the  enemy.  When  we  arrived 
at  the  precipice  which  falls  sheer  from  the  mountain, 
the  English  were  already  so  near  that  our  only  course 
was  to  charge  them. 

In  front  of  us  there  was  a  plain  which  extended  for 
some  twelve  hundred  paces  to  the  foot  of  an  abrupt 
rise  in  the  ground.  This  we  fortunately  reached  before 
the  English,  although  we  were  exposed  all  the  way  to 
the  fire  of  their  guns.  But  even  when  we  gained  the 
rise  we  were  little  better  off,  as  it  was  too  low  to  give 
us  cover.  The  English  were  scarcely  more  than  four 
hundred  paces  from  us.    They  dismounted  and  opened 

29 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


A  heavy  fire.  For  ten  or  fifteen  minutes  we  successfully 
kept  them  back.  Then  the  sun  went  down  !  and  to 
my  great  relief  the  enemy  moved  away  in  the  direction 
of  their  comrades  on  the  mountain.  I  ordered  all  my 
men  from  their  positions,  and  withdrew  to  the  spot 
where  we  had  encamped  the  previous  night.  The 
burghers  were  exhausted  by  hunger  and  thirst,  for  they 
had  had  nothing  to  eat  except  the  provisions  which 
they  had  brought  in  their  saddle-bags  from  the  laager. 

That  evening  Andreas  Cronje — the  General's  brother 
— joined  us  with  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  and  a 
Maxim-Nordenfeldt. 

When  the  sun  rose  on  the  followmg  day,  the  veldt 
was  clear  of  the  enemy.  General  French  had  during 
the  night  retreated  to  headquarters.  What  losses  he 
had  suffered  I  am  unable  to  say  ;  ours  amounted  to 
seven  wounded  and  two  killed. 

Our  task  here  was  now  ended,  and  so  we  returned 
to  Magersfontein. 

The  following  morning  a  large  force  again  left  the 
English  camp  and  took  the  direction  of  the  Koffiefon- 
tein  diamond  mine.  General  Cronje  immediately 
ordered  me  to  take  a  force  of  four  hundred  and  fifty 
men  with  a  Krupp  and  a  Maxim-Nordenfeldt,  and  to 
drive  back  the  enemy.  At  my  request,  Commandants 
Andreas  Cronje,  Piet  Fourie,  Scholten  and  Lubbe 
joined  me,  and  that  evening  w^e  camped  quite  close  to 
the  spot  where  the  English  force  was  stationed  ! 

Early  the  next  day,  before  the  enemy  had  made 
any  movement,  we  started  for  Blauwbank,^  and,  having 
arrived  there,  we  took  up  our  positions.  Shortly  after- 
wards the  fight  began  ;  it  was  confined  entirely  to  the 
artillery. 

We  soon  saw  that  we  should  have  to  deal  with  the 
whole  of  Lord  Roberts'  force,  for  there  it  was,  ad- 
vancing in  the  direction  of  Paardenberg's  Drift.  It 
was  thus  clear  that  Lord  Roberts  had  not  sent  his  troops 
to  Koffiefontein  with  the  intention  of  proceeding  by 

*  In  the  district  of  Jacobsdal. 
30 


LORD  ROBERTS*  FORCES 


that  route  to  Bloemfontein,  but  that  his  object  had 
been  to  divide  our  forces,  so  as  to  march  vi^  Paarden- 
berg's  Drift  to  the  Capital. 

I  accordingly  withdrew  with  three  hundred  and  fifty 
of  the  burghers  in  the  direction  of  Kofihefontein,  and 
then  hid  my  commando  as  best  I  could.  The  re- 
mainder of  the  men — about  a  hundred  in  number — I 
placed  under  Commandant  Lubbe,  giving  him  orders 
to  proceed  in  a  direction  parallel  to  the  advance  of  the 
English,  who  now  were  nearing  Paardenberg's  Drift, 
and  to  keep  a  keen  eye  on  their  movements.  It  was 
a  large  force  that  Lubbe  had  to  watch.  It  consisted 
chiefly  of  mounted  troops ;  but  there  were  also  nine 
or  ten  batteries  and  a  convoy  of  light  mule  waggons. 

I  thought  that  as  General  Cronje  was  opposing 
them  in  front,  my  duty  was  to  keep  myself  in  hiding 
and  to  reconnoitre. 

I  wished  to  communicate  with  General  Cronje 
before  the  English  troops  came  up  to  him,  and  with 
this  object  I  sent  out  a  despatch  rider.  The  man  I 
chose  for  the  mission  was  Commandant  G.  J.  Scheep- 
ers — whose  name  later  in  the  war  was  on  every  man's 
lips  for  his  exploits  in  Cape  Colony,  but  who  then  was 
only  the  head  of  our  heliograph  corps.  I  informed 
General  Cronje  in  my  message  that  the  English,  who 
had  been  stationed  at  Blauwbank,  had  made  a  move 
in  the  direction  of  Paardenberg's  Drift ;  and  I  advised 
him  to  get  out  of  their  road  as  quickly  as  he  could, 
for  they  numbered,  according  to  my  computation, 
forty  or  fifty  thousand  men. 

I  thought  it  wise  to  give  Cronje  this  advice,  on 
account  of  the  women  and  children  in  our  camps,  who 
might  easily  prove  the  cause  of  disaster.  When 
Scheepers  returned  he  told  me  what  reply  General 
Cronje  had  made.  It  is  from  no  lack  of  respect  for 
the  General,  whom  I  hold  in  the  highest  honour  as  a 
hero  incapable  of  fear,  that  I  set  down  what  he  said. 
It  is  rather  from  a  wish  to  give  a  proof  of  his  un- 
daunted courage  that  I  quote  his  words. 

31 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


"Are  you  afraid  of  things  like  that?"  he  asked, 
when  Scheepers  had  given  my  message.  "Just  you 
go  and  shoot  them  down,  and  catch  them  when  they 
run." 

At  Paardenberg's  Drift  there  were  some  Free- 
Staters'  camps  that  stood  apart  from  the  others.  In 
these  camps  there  were  a  class  of  burghers  who  were 
not  much  use  in  actual  fighting.  These  men,  called 
by  us  "  water  draggers,"  correspond  to  the  English 
"  non-combatants."  I  ordered  these  burghers  to  with- 
draw to  a  spot  two  hours'  trek  from  there,  where  there 
was  more  grass.  But  before  all  had  obeyed  this  order, 
a  small  camp,  consisting  of  twenty  or  thirty  waggons, 
was  surprised  and  taken. 

In  the  meantime,  keeping  my  little  commando  en- 
tirely concealed,  I  spied  out  the  enemy's  movements. 

On  the  1 6th  of  February,  I  thought  I  saw  a  chance 
of  dealing  an  effective  blow  at  Lord  Roberts.  Some 
provision  waggons,  escorted  by  a  large  convoy,  were 
passing  by,  following  in  the  wake  of  the  British  troops. 
I  asked  myself  whether  it  was  possible  for  me  to  capt- 
ure it  then  and  there,  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
it  was  out  of  the  question.  With  so  many  of  the 
enemy's  troops  in  the  neighbourhood,  the  risk  would 
have  been  too  great.  I,  therefore,  still  kept  in  hiding 
with  my  three  hundred  and  fifty  burghers. 

I  remained  where  I  was  throughout  the  next  day  ; 
but  in  the  evening  I  saw  the  convoy  camping  near 
Blauwbank,  just  to  the  west  of  theRiet  River.  I  also 
observed  that  the  greater  part  of  the  troops  had  gone 
forward  with  Lord  Roberts. 

On  the  1 8th  I  still  kept  hidden,  for  the  English 
army  had  not  yet  moved  out  of  camp.  The  troops, 
as  I  learnt  afterwards,  were  awaiting  the  arrival  of 
columns  from  Belmont  Station. 

On  the  following  day  I  attacked  the  convoy  on  the 
flank.  The  three  or  four  hundred  troops  who  were 
guarding  it  offered  a  stout  resistance,  although  they 
were  without  any  guns. 

32 


LORD  ROBERTS'  FORCES 


After  fighting  for  two  hours  the  English  received  a 
reinforcement  of  cavalry,  with  four  Armstrong  guns, 
and  redoubled  their  efforts  to  drive  us  from  the  posi- 
tions we  had  taken  up  under  cover  of  the  mule 
waggons.  As  I  knew  that  it  would  be  a  serious  blow 
to  Lord  Roberts  to  lose  the  provisions  he  was  expect- 
ing, I  was  firmly  resolved  to  capture  them,  unless  the 
force  of  numbers  rendered  the  task  quite  impossible. 
I  accordingly  resisted  the  enemy's  attack  with  all  the 
power  I  could. 

The  battle  raged  until  it  became  dark  ;  and  I  think 
we  were  justified  in  being  satisfied  with  what  we  had 
achieved.  We  had  captured  sixteen  hundred  oxen 
and  forty  prisoners  ;  whilst  General  Fourie,  whom  I 
had  ordered  to  attack  the  camp  on  the  south,  had 
taken  several  prisoners  and  a  few  water-carts. 

We  remained  that  night  in  our  positions.  The 
small  number  of  burghers  I  had  at  my  disposal  made 
it  impossible  for  me  to  surround  the  English  camp. 

To  our  great  surprise,  the  following  morning,  we 
saw  that  the  English  had  gone.  About  twenty 
soldiers  had,  however,  remained  behind  ;  we  found 
them  hidden  along  the  banks  of  the  Riet  River  at  a 
short  distance  from  the  convoy.  We  also  discovered 
thirty-six  Kaffirs  on  a  ridge  about  three  miles  away. 
As  to  the  enemy's  camp,  it  was  entirely  deserted. 
Our  booty  was  enormous,  and  consisted  of  two  hun- 
dred heavily-laden  waggons,  and  eleven  or  twelve 
water-carts  and  trollies.  On  some  of  the  waggons  we 
found  klinkers,^  jam,  milk,  sardines,  salmon,  cases  of 
corned  beef,  and  other  such  provisions  in  great  vari- 
ety. Other  waggons  were  loaded  with  rum  ;  and  still 
others  contained  oats  and  horse  provender  pressed  into 
bales.  In  addition  to  these  stores,  we  took  one  field- 
piece,  which  the  English  had  left  behind.  It  was,  in- 
deed, a  gigantic  capture  ;  the  only  question  was  what 
to  do  with  it. 

Our  prisoners  told  us  that  columns  from  Belmont 

» Biscuits. 


33 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


might  be  expected  at  any  moment.  Had  these 
arrived  we  should  have  been  unable  to  hold  out 
against  them. 

By  some  means  or  other  it  was  necessary  to  get  the 
provisions  away,  not  that  we  were  then  in  any  great 
need  of  them  ourselves,  but  because  we  knew  that 
Lord  Roberts  would  be  put  in  a  grave  difficulty  if  he 
lost  all  this  food.  I  did  not  lose  a  moment's  time, 
but  at  once  ordered  the  burghers  to  load  up  the 
waggons  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  to  inspan.  It 
was  necessary  to  reload  the  waggons,  for  the  Eng- 
lish troops  had  made  use  of  the  contents  to  build 
schanzes  ;  and  excellent  ones  the  provisions  had  made. 

The  loading  of  the  waggons  was  simple  enough, 
but  when  it  came  to  inspanning  it  was  another  matter. 
The  Kaffir  drivers  alone  knew  where  each  span  had  to 
be  placed,  and  there  were  only  thirty-six  Kaffirs  left. 
But  here  the  fact  that  every  Boer  is  himself  a  handy 
conductor  and  driver  of  waggons  told  in  our  favour. 
Consequently  we  did  not  find  it  beyond  our  power  to 
get  the  waggons  on  the  move.  It  was,  however,  very 
tedious  work,  for  how  could  any  of  us  be  sure  that  we 
were  not  placing  the  after-oxen  in  front  and  the  fore- 
oxen  behind  ?  There  was  nothing  left  for  it  but  to 
turn  out  the  best  spans  of  sixteen  oxen  that  we  could, 
and  then  to  arrange  them  in  the  way  that  struck  us  as 
being  most  suitable.  It  was  all  done  in  the  most  hur- 
ried manner,  for  our  one  idea  was  to  be  off  as  quickly 
as  possible. 

Even  when  we  had  started  our  troubles  were  not  at 
an  end.  The  waggons  w^ould  have  been  a  hard  pull 
for  sixteen  oxen  properly  arranged ;  so  that  it  is  not 
surprising  that  our  ill-sorted  teams  found  the  work 
almost  beyond  their  strength.  Thus  it  happened  that 
we  took  a  very  long  time  to  cover  the  first  few  miles, 
as  we  had  constantly  to  be  stopping  to  re-arrange  the 
oxen„  But  under  the  supervision  of  Commandant 
Piet  Fourie,  whom  I  appointed  Conductor-in-Chief, 
matters  improved  from  hour  to  hour. 

34 


LORD  ROBERTS*  FORCES 


After  a  short  time  I  issued  orders  that  the  convoy 
should  proceed  over  Koffiefontein  to  Edenberg.  I 
then  divided  my  burghers  into  two  parties ;  the  first, 
consisting  of  two  hundred  men  with  the  Krupp  gun,  I 
ordered  to  proceed  with  the  convoy  ;  the  second,  con- 
sisting of  a  hundred  and  fifty  men  with  the  Maxim- 
Nordenfeldt,  I  took  under  my  own  command,  and  set 
out  with  them  in  the  direction  of  Paardenberg's  Drift. 

My  spies  had  informed  me  that  there  were  some 
fifty  or  sixty  English  troops  posted  about  eight  miles 
from  the  spot  where  we  had  captured  the  convoy. 
We  made  our  way  towards  them,  and  when  we  were 
at  a  distance  of  about  three  thousand  yards,  I  sent  a 
little  note  to  their  officer,  asking  him  to  surrender.  It 
was  impossible  for  his  troops  to  escape,  for  they  found 
themselves  threatened  on  three  sides. 

The  sun  had  just  gone  down  when  my  despatch- 
rider  reached  the  English  camp  ;  and  the  officer  in 
command  was  not  long  in  sending  him  his  reply, 
accompanied  by  an  orderly. 

"  Are  you  General  De  Wet  ?  "  the  orderly  asked  me. 
I  am,"  repHed  I. 

*^  My  officer  in  command,"  he  said  in  a  polite  but 
determined  voice,  wishes  me  to  tell  you  that  we  are 
a  good  hundred  men  strong,  that  we  are  well  provided 
with  food  and  ammunition,  and  that  we  hold  a  strong 
position  in  some  houses  and  kraals.  Every  moment 
we  are  expecting  ten  thousand  men  from  Belmont, 
and  we  are  waiting  here  with  the  sole  purpose  of  con- 
ducting them  to  Lord  Roberts." 

I  allowed  him  to  speak  without  interrupting  him  ; 
but  when  he  had  finished,  I  answered  him  in  quite  as 
determined  a  voice  as  he  had  used  to  me. 

I  will  give  you  just  enough  time  to  get  back  and 
to  tell  your  officer  in  command  that,  if  he  does  not 
surrender  at  once,  I  shall  shell  him  and  storm  his  posi- 
tion. He  will  be  allowed  exactly  ten  minutes  to  make 
up  his  mind — then  the  white  flag  must  appear." 

"  But  where  is  your  gun  ?  "  the  orderly  asked.  In 

35 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


reply  I  pointed  to  the  Maxim-Nordenfeldt,  which 
stood  a  few  hundred  paces  behind  us,  surrounded  by 
some  burghers. 

"Will  you  give  us  your  word  of  honour,"  he  asked 
me  when  he  caught  sight  of  the  gun,  not  to  stir  from 
your  position  till  we  have  got  ten  miles  away  ?  That 
is  the  only  condition  on  which  we  will  abandon  our 
positions." 

I  again  allowed  him  to  finish,  although  his  demand 
filled  me  with  the  utmost  astonishment.  I  asked  my- 
self what  sort  of  men  this  English  officer  imagined 
the  Boer  Generals  to  be. 

I  demand  unconditional  surrender,"  I  then  said. 
**  I  give  you  ten  minutes  from  the  moment  you  dis- 
mount on  arriving  at  your  camp ;  when  those  ten 
minutes  have  passed  I  fire." 

He  slung  round,  and  galloped  back  to  his  camp, 
the  stones  flying  from  his  horse's  hoofs. 

He  had  hardly  dismounted  before  the  white  flag 
appeared.  It  did  not  take  us  long  to  reach  the  camp, 
and  there  we  found  fifty-eight  mounted  men.  These 
prisoners  I  despatched  that  evening  to  join  the  convoy. 

I  then  advanced  with  my  commando  another  six 
miles,  with  the  object  of  watching  Lord  Roberts' 
movements,  in  case  he  should  send  a  force  back  to 
retake  the  convoy  he  could  so  ill  spare.  But  the  fol- 
lowing day  we  saw  nothing  except  a  single  scouting 
party  coming  from  the  direction  of  Paardenberg's 
Drift.  This  proved  to  consist  of  the  hundred  burgh- 
ers whom  I  had  sent  with  Commandant  Lubbe  to 
General  Cronje's  assistance.  I  heard  from  Lubbe 
that  General  French  had  broken  through,  and  had  in 
all  probability  relieved  Kimberley  ;  and  that  General 
Cronje  was  retreating  before  Lord  Roberts  towards 
Paardeberg.  I  may  say  here  that  I  was  not  at  all 
pleased  that  Commandant  Lubbe  should  have  re- 
turned. 

On  account  of  Lubbe's  information,  I  decided  to 
advance  at  once  in  the  direction  of  Paardenberg's 

36 


LORD  ROBERTS'  FORCES 


Drift,  and  was  on  the  point  of  doing  so  when  I  re- 
ceived a  report  from  President  Steyn.  He  informed 
me  that  I  should  find  at  a  certain  spot  that  evening, 
close  to  Kofhefontein,  Mr.  Philip  Botha^  with  a  rein- 
forcement of  one  hundred  and  fifty  men.  This  report 
convinced  me  that  the  convoy  I  had  captured  would 
reach  Edenberg  Station  without  mishap,  and  accord- 
ingly I  went  after  it  to  fetch  back  the  gun  which  would 
no  longer  be  needed.  I  found  the  convoy  encamped 
about  six  miles  from  Kofhefontein.  Immediately 
after  my  arrival.  General  Jacobs,  of  Fauresmith,  and 
Commandant  Hertzog,*  of  Philippolis,  brought  the 
news  to  me  that  troops  were  marching  on  us  from 
Belmont  Station.  I  told  Jacobs  and  Hertzog  to  re- 
turn with  their  men,  two  or  three  hundred  in  number, 
to  meet  the  approaching  English. 

We  were  so  well  supplied  with  forage  that  our 
horses  got  as  much  as  they  could  eat.  I  had,  there- 
fore, no  hesitation  in  ordering  my  men  to  up-saddle 
at  midnight,  and  by  half-past  two  we  had  joined  Vice- 
Vechtgeneraal  Philip  Botha.  I  had  sent  him  word  to 
be  ready  to  move,  so  that  we  were  able  to  hasten  at 
once  to  General  Cronje's  assistance.  Our  combined 
force  amounted  to  three  hundred  men  all  told. 

»  Mr.  Philip  Botha  had  just  been  appointed  Vice-Vechtgeneraal. 
Brother  to  Judge  Hertzog. 


37 


PAARDEBERG  (CRONJE'S). 


CHAPTER  VI 


Paardeberg 

AN  hour  after  sunrise  we  off-saddled,  and  heard, 
from  the  direction  of  Paardeberg,  the  indescrib- 
able thunder  of  bombardment.  That  sound  gave  us 
all  the  more  reason  for  haste.  We  allowed  our  horses 
the  shortest  possible  time  for  rest,  partook  of  the  most 
hurried  of  breakfasts,  and  at  once  were  again  on  the 
move,  with  the  frightful  roar  of  the  guns  always  in  our 
ears. 

About  half-past  four  that  afternoon,  we  reached  a 
point  some  six  miles  to  the  east  of  Paardeberg,  and 
saw,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  M  odder  River,  four 
miles  to  the  north-east  of  the  mountain,  General 
Cronje's  laager.  It  was  surrounded  completely  by 
the  enemy,  as  a  careful  inspection  through  our  field- 
glasses  showed. 

Immediately  in  front  of  us  were  the  buildings  and 
kraals  of  Stinkfontein,  and  there  on  the  opposite  bank 
of  the  river  stood  Paardeberg.  To  the  left  and  to  the 
right  of  it  were  khaki-coloured  groups  dotted  every- 
where about — General  Cronje  was  hemmed  in  on  all 
sides,  he  and  his  burghers — a  mere  handful  compared 
with  the  encircling  multitude. 

What  a  spectacle  we  saw  !  All  round  the  laager 
were  the  guns  of  the  English,  belching  forth  death 
and  destruction,  while  from  within  it  at  every  moment, 
as  each  successive  shell  tore  up  the  ground,  there  rose 
a  cloud — a  dark  red  cloud  of  dust. 

It  was  necessary  to  act — but  how  ? 

We  decided  to  make  an  immediate  attack  upon  the 
nearest  of  Lord  Roberts'  troops,  those  which  were  sta- 

39 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


tioned  in  the  vicinity  of  Stinkfontein,  and  to  seize 
some  ridges  which  lay  about  two  and  a  half  miles 
south-east  of  the  laager. 

Stinkfontein  was  about  a  thousand  paces  to  the 
north  of  these  ridges,  and  perhaps  a  few  hundred 
paces  farther  from  where  Cronje  was  stationed. 

We  rode  towards  the  ridges,  and  when  we  were 
from  twelve  to  fourteen  hundred  paces  from  Stink- 
fontein, we  saw  that  the  place  was  occupied  by  a 
strong  force  of  British  troops. 

General  Botha  and  I  then  arranged  that  he  should 
storm  the  houses,  kraals  and  garden  walls  of  Stink- 
fontein, whilst  I  charged  the  ridges.  And  this  we 
did,  nothing  daunted  by  the  tremendous  rifle  fire 
which  burst  upon  us.  Cronje's  pitiable  condition  con- 
fronted us,  and  we  had  but  one  thought — could  we 
relieve  him  ? 

We  succeeded  in  driving  the  English  out  of  Stink- 
fontein, and  took  sixty  of  them  prisoners. 

The  enemy's  fire  played  on  us  unceasingly,  and  not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  we  occupied  good  positions, 
we  lost  two  men,  and  had  several  of  our  horses  killed 
and  wounded. 

We  remained  there  for  two  and  a  half  days — from 
the  22nd  to  the  25th  of  February — and  then  were 
forced  to  retire.  While  evacuating  our  positions, 
three  of  my  burghers  were  killed,  seven  wounded,  and 
fourteen  taken  prisoner. 

But  the  reader  will  justly  demand  more  details  as  to 
the  surrender  of  Cronje,  an  event  which  forms  one  of 
the  most  important  chapters  in  the  history  of  the  two 
Republics.  I  am  able  to  give  the  following  particu- 
lars. 

After  we  had  captured  the  positions  referred  to 
above,  I  gave  orders  that  the  Krupp  and  the  Maxim- 
Nordenfeldt  should  be  brought  up.  For  with  our 
hurried  advance,  the  oxen  attached  to  the  big  guns,  as 
well  as  some  of  the  burghers'  horses,  had  become  so 
fatigued,  that  the  guns  and  a  number  of  the  burghers 

40 


PAARDEBERG 


had  been  left  behind.  The  ridges  were  so  thickly 
strewn  with  boulders,  that  even  on  the  arrival  of  the 
guns,  it  was  impossible  to  place  them  in  position  until 
we  had  first  cleared  a  path  for  them.  I  made  up  my 
mind  to  turn  these  boulders  to  account  by  using  them 
to  build  schanzes,  for  I  knew  that  a  tremendous  bom- 
bardment would  be  opened  upon  our  poor  Krupp  and 
Maxim-Nordenfeldt  as  soon  as  they  made  themselves 
heard. 

During  the  night  we  built  these  schanzes,  and  be- 
fore the  sun  rose  the  following  morning,  the  guns 
were  placed  in  position. 

By  daybreak  the  English  had  crept  up  to  within  a 
short  distance  of  our  lines.  It  was  the  Krupp  and  the 
Maxim-Nordenfeldt  that  gave  our  answer. 

But  we  had  to  be  very  sparing  of  our  ammunition, 
for  it  was  almost  exhausted,  and  it  would  take  at  least 
five  days  to  get  a  fresh  supply  from  Bloemfontein. 

Our  arrival  on  the  previous  day  had  made  a  way  of 
escape  for  General  Cronje.  It  is  true  that  he  would 
have  been  obliged  to  leave  everything  behind  him,  but 
he  and  his  burghers  would  have  got  away  in  safety. 
The  British  had  retreated  before  our  advance,  thus 
opening  a  road  between  us  and  the  laager.  That  road 
was  made  yet  wider  by  the  fire  from  our  guns. 

But  General  Cronje  would  not  move.  Had  he 
done  so,  his  losses  would  not  have  been  heavy.  His 
determination  to  remain  in  that  ill-fated  laager  cost 
him  dearly. 

The  world  will  honour  that  great  general  and  his 
brave  burghers ;  and  if  I  presume  to  criticize  his  con- 
duct on  this  occasion,  it  is  only  because  I  believe  that 
he  ought  to  have  sacrificed  his  own  ideas  for  the  good 
of  the  nation,  and  that  he  should  have  not  been  coura- 
geous at  the  expense  of  his  country's  independence,  to 
which  he  was  as  fiercely  attached  as  I. 

Some  of  the  burghers  in  the  laager  made  their  es- 
cape, for,  on  the  second  day,  when  our  guns  had 
cleared  a  wide  path,  Commandants  Froneman  and  Pot- 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


gieter  (of  Wolmaranstadt),  with  twenty  men,  came 
galloping  out  of  the  laager  towards  us. 

Although  we  were  only  a  few  in  number,  the  British 
had  their  work  cut  out  to  dislodge  us.  First  they 
tried  their  favourite  strategy  of  a  flanking  movement, 
sending  out  strong  columns  of  cavalry,  with  heavy 
guns  to  surround  us.  It  was  necessary  to  prevent  the 
fulfilment  of  this  project.  I,  therefore,  removed  the 
Krupp  and  the  Maxim-Nordenfeldt  from  their  posi- 
tions, and  divided  our  little  force  into  three  portions. 
I  ordered  the  first  to  remain  in  their  position,  the  sec- 
ond was  to  proceed  with  the  Krupp  round  our  left 
wing,  while  I  despatched  the  third  party  to  hold  back 
the  left  wing  of  the  British.  I  had  no  wish  to  share 
General  Cronje's  unenviable  position. 

We  succeeded  in  checking  the  advance  of  the  en- 
emy's wings  ;  and  when  he  saw  that  we  were  not  to  be 
outflanked  he  changed  his  tactics,  and  while  still  re- 
taining his  wings  where  they  were,  in  order  to  keep 
our  men  occupied,  he  delivered  at  mid-day,  on  the 
20th,  an  attack  on  our  centre  with  a  strong  force  of 
infantry. 

The  result  of  this  was  that  the  British  gained  one  of 
our  positions,  that,  namely,  which  was  held  by  Veldt- 
cornet  Meyer,  an  officer  under  Commandant  Spruit. 
Meyer  was  entirely  unable  to  beat  off  the  attack,  and, 
at  nightfall,  was  compelled  to  retire  about  two  or  three 
hundred  paces,  to  a  little  ridge,  which  he  held  effec- 
tively. 

As  the  English  took  up  the  abandoned  position, 
they  raised  a  cheer,  and  Commandant  Spruit,  who  was 
ignorant  of  its  meaning,  and  believed  that  his  men 
were  still  in  possession,  went  there  alone. 
Hoe  gaat  het  f  "  ^  he  called  out. 
Hands  up  !  "  was  the  reply  he  received. 
There  was  nothing  left  for  the  Commandant  to  do 
but  to  give  himself  up.    The  soldiers  led  him  over  a 
ridge,  and  struck  a  light  to  discover  his  identity. 

"  How  is  it  with  you?  " 
42 


PAARDEBERG 


Finding  papers  in  his  pocket  which  showed  that  their 
prisoner  was  an  important  personage,  they  raised  cheer 
upon  cheer.^ 

I  heard  them  cheering,  and  thought  that  the  enemy 
were  about  to  attempt  another  attack,  and  so  gave 
orders  that  whatever  happened  our  positions  must  be 
held,  for  they  were  the  key  to  General  Cronje's  escape. 
However,  no  attack  was  delivered. 

Nobody  could  have  foreseen  that  two  thousand  in- 
fantry would  give  up  the  attack  on  positions  which 
they  had  so  nearly  captured,  and  we  all  expected  a 
sanguinary  engagement  on  the  following  morning. 
We  had  made  up  our  minds  to  stand  firm,  for  we 
knew  that  if  General  Cronje  failed  to  make  his  way 
out,  it  would  be  a  real  calamity  to  our  great  cause. 

Fully  expecting  an  attack,  we  remained  all  that 
night  at  our  posts.  Not  a  man  of  us  slept,  but  just 
before  dawn  we  heard  this  order  from  the  English 
lines  : 

Fall  in." 

What  can  be  the  meaning  of  this  ?  "  we  ask  one 
another. 

Lying,  sitting  or  standing,  each  of  us  is  now  at  his 
post,  and  staring  out  into  the  darkness,  expecting  an 
attack  every  moment.    We  hold  our  breath  and  listen. 

'  Eleven  or  twelve  days  after,  Commandant  Spruit  was  again  with  us.  When 
he  appeared,  he  seemed  to  us  like  one  risen  from  the  dead.  We  all  rejoiced,  not 
only  because  he  was  a  God-fearing  man,  but  also  because  he  was  of  a  lovable 
disposition.  I  heard  from  his  own  mouth  how  he  had  escaped.  He  told  me 
that  the  day  after  his  capture,  he  was  sent,  under  a  strong  escort,  from  Lord 
Roberts'  Headquarters  to  the  railway  station  at  Modder  River,  and  that  he 
started  from  there,  with  a  guard  of  six  men  on  his  road  to  Cape  Town.  During 
the  night  as  they  drew  near  De  Aar,  his  guards  fell  asleep,  and  our  brave  Com- 
mandant prepared  to  leave  the  train.  He  seized  a  favourable  opportunity  when 
the  engine  was  climbing  a  steep  gradient  and  jumped  off.  But  the  pace  was  fast 
enough  to  throw  him  to  the  ground,  though  fortunately  he  only  sustained  slight 
injury.  When  daylight  came  he  hid  himself.  Having  made  out  his  bearings 
he  began  to  make  his  way  back  on  the  following  night.  He  passed  a  house,  but 
dared  not  seek  admission,  for  he  did  not  know  who  its  occupants  might  be.  As 
he  had  no  food  with  him,  his  sufferings  from  hunger  were  great,  but  still  he 
persevered,  concealing  himself  during  the  day,  and  only  walking  during  the 
hours  of  darkness.  At  last  he  reached  the  railway  line  to  the  north  of  Coles- 
berg,  and  from  there  was  carried  to  Bloemfontein,  where  he  enjoyed  a  well- 
earned  rest.  In  the  second  week  of  March  he  returned  to  his  commando,  to  the 
great  delight  of  everybody. 


43 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Is  there  no  sound  of  approaching  footsteps  ?  And 
now  the  light  increases.  Is  it  possible  ?  Yes,  our 
eyes  do  not  deceive  us.    The  enemy  is  gone. 

Surprise  and  joy  are  on  every  face.  One  hears  on 
all  sides  the  exclamation,  If  only  Cronje  would  make 
the  attempt  now."  It  was  the  morning  of  the  25th  of 
February. 

But  the  enemy  were  not  to  leave  us  alone  for  long. 
By  nine  o'clock  they  were  advancing  upon  us  again, 
with  both  right  and  left  wing  reinforced.  I  had  only 
a  few  shots  left  for  the  Krupp,  and  thirty  for  the 
Maxim-Nordenfeldt,  and  this  last  ammunition  must 
now  be  expended  on  the  wings.  One  gun  I  de- 
spatched to  the  right,  the  other  to  the  left,  and  the 
English  were  checked  in  their  advance.  I  had  ordered 
the  gunners,  as  soon  as  they  had  fired  their  last  round 
to  bring  their  guns  into  safe  positions  in  the  direction 
of  Petrusberg.  Very  soon  I  observed  that  this  order 
was  being  executed,  and  thus  learnt  that  the  ammuni- 
tion had  run  out. 

The  burghers  who,  with  their  rifles,  had  attempted 
to  hold  back  the  wings,  now  having  no  longer  any 
support  from  the  big  guns,  were  unable  to  stand  their 
ground  against  the  overpowering  forces  of  the  enemy, 
and  shortly  after  the  guns  were  removed,  I  saw  them 
retreat. 

What  was  I  to  do  ?  I  was  being  bombarded  inces- 
santly, and  since  the  morning  had  been  severely  har- 
assed by  small-arm  fire.  All  this,  however,  I  could 
have  borne,  but  now  the  enemy  began  to  surround 
me.  It  was  a  hard  thing  to  be  thus  forced  to  abandon 
the  key  to  General  Cronje's  escape. 

In  all  haste  I  ordered  my  men  to  retire.  They  had 
seen  throughout  that  this  was  unavoidable,  and  had 
even  said  to  me  : 

If  we  remain  here,  General,  we  shall  be  surrounded 
with  General  Cronje." 

All  made  good  their  retreat,  with  the  exception  of 
Veldtcornet  Speller,  of  Wepener,  who,  to  my  great 

44 


PAARDEBERG 


regret,  was  taken  prisoner  there  with  fourteen  men. 
That  occurred  owing  to  my  adjutant  forgetting,  in 
the  general  confusion,  to  give  them  my  orders  to  re- 
treat. When  Speller  found  that  he,  with  his  fourteen 
men,  was  left  behind,  he  defended  himself,  as  I  heard 
later,  with  great  valour,  until  at  last  he  was  captured 
by  overpowering  numbers.  It  cost  the  English  a 
good  many  dead  and  wounded  to  get  him  out  of  his 
schanzes. 

Although  I  had  foreseen  that  our  escape  would  be 
a  very  difficult  and  lengthy  business,  I  had  not  thought 
that  we  should  have  been  in  such  danger  of  being 
made  prisoners.  But  the  English  had  very  speedily 
taken  up  positions  to  the  right  and  left,  with  guns 
and  Maxims,  and  for  a  good  nine  miles  of  our  retreat 
we  were  under  their  fire.  Notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  during  the  whole  of  this  time  we  were  also  harassed 
by  small-arm  fire,  we  lost — incredible  as  it  may  ap- 
pear— not  more  than  one  killed  and  one  wounded,  and 
a  few  horses  besides.  The  positions  which  we  had 
abandoned  the  British  now  occupied,  hemming  in 
General  Cronje  so  closely  that  he  had  not  the  slightest 
chance  of  breaking  through  their  lines. 

No  sooner  had  we  got  out  of  range  of  the  enemy's 
fire,  than  the  first  of  the  reinforcements,  which  we  had 
expected  from  Bloemfontein,  arrived,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Vechtgeneraal  Andreas  Cronje.  With  him 
were  Commandants  Thewnissen,  of  Winburg,  and 
Vilonel,  of  Senekal. 

A  council  was  at  once  held  as  to  the  best  method  of 
effecting  the  release  of  General  Cronje.  It  was  de- 
cided to  recapture  the  positions  which  I  had  aban- 
doned. But  now  the  situation  was  so  changed  that 
there  were  three  positions  which  it  was  necessary  for 
us  to  take.  We  agreed  that  the  attack  should  be  made 
by  three  separate  parties,  that  General  Philip  Botha, 
with  Commandant  Thewnissen,  should  retake  the  posi- 
tions which  we  had  abandoned  at  Stinkfontein,  Gen- 
eral Froneman  the  position  immediately  to  the  north 

45 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


of  these,  and  I,  with  General  Andreas  Cronje,  others 
still  further  north. 

The  attack  was  made  on  the  following  morning. 
General  Botha's  attempt  failed,  chiefly  owing  to  the 
fact  that  day  dawned  before  he  reached  his  position  ; 
a  hot  fight  ensued,  resulting  in  the  capture  of  Com- 
mandant Thewnissen  and  about  one  hundred  men. 
As  I  was  so  placed  as  to  be  unable  to  see  how  affairs 
were  developing,  it  is  difficult  for  me  to  hazard  an 
opinion  as  to  whether  Commandant  Thewnissen  was 
lacking  in  caution,  or  whether  he  was  insufficiently 
supported  by  General  Botha.  The  burghers  who  were 
present  at  the  engagement  accused  General  Botha, 
while  he  declared  that  Thewnissen  had  been  impru- 
dent. However  that  may  be,  we  had  failed  in  our 
essay.  The  position  had  not  been  taken,  and  Com- 
mandant Thewnissen,  wnth  a  hundred  whom  we  could 
ill  spare,  were  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  And  to 
make  matters  still  worse,  our  men  were  already  seized 
with  panic,  arising  from  the  now  hopeless  plight  of 
General  Cronje  and  his  large  force. 

I,  however,  was  not  prepared  to  abandon  all  hope 
as  yet.  Danie  Theron,  that  famous  captain  of  de- 
spatch-riders, had  arrived  on  the  previous  day  with  re- 
inforcements. I  asked  him  if  he  would  take  a  verbal 
message  to  General  Cronje — I  dare  not  send  a  written 
one,  lest  it  should  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  English. 
Proud  and  distinct  the  answer  came  at  once — the  only 
answer  which  such  a  hero  as  Danie  Theron  could 
have  given  : 

"  Yes,  General,  I  will  go." 

The  risk  which  I  was  asking  him  to  run  could  not 
have  been  surpassed  throughout  the  whole  of  our  san- 
guinary struggle. 

I  took  him  aside,  and  told  him  that  he  must  go  and 
tell  General  Cronje  that  our  fate  depended  upon  the 
escape  of  himself  and  of  the  thousands  with  him,  and 
that,  if  he  should  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands,  it  would 
be  the  death-blow  to  all  our  hopes.    Theron  was  to 

46 


PAARDEBERG 


urge  Cronje  to  abandon  the  laager,  and  everything 
contained  in  it,  to  fight  his  way  out  by  night,  and  to 
meet  me  at  two  named  places,  where  I  would  protect 
him  from  the  pursuit  of  the  English. 

Danie  Theron  undertook  to  pass  the  enemy's  lines, 
and  to  deliver  my  message.  He  started  on  his  errand 
on  the  night  of  the  25th  of  February. 

The  following  evening  I  went  to  the  place  of  meet- 
ing, but  to  my  great  disappointment  General  Cronje 
did  not  appear. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  of  February  Theron 
returned.  He  had  performed  an  exploit  unequalled 
in  the  war.  Both  in  going  and  returning  he  had 
crawled  past  the  British  sentries,  tearing  his  trousers 
to  rags  during  the  process.  The  blood  was  running 
from  his  knees,  where  the  skin  had  been  scraped  off. 
He  told  me  that  he  had  seen  the  General,  who  had 
said  that  he  did  not  think  that  the  plan  which  I  had 
proposed  had  any  good  chance  of  success. 

At  ten  o'clock  that  day.  General  Cronje  surrendered. 
Bitter  was  my  disappointment.  Alas!  my  last  attempt 
had  been  all  in  vain.  The  stubborn  General  would 
not  listen  to  good  advice. 

I  must  repeat  here  what  I  have  said  before,  that  as 
far  as  my  personal  knowledge  of  General  Cronje  goes, 
it  is  evident  to  me  that  his  obstinacy  in  maintaining 
his  position  must  be  ascribed  to  the  fact  that  it  was 
too  much  to  ask  him — intrepid  hero  that  he  was — to 
abandon  the  laager.  His  view  was  that  he  must  stand 
or  fall  with  it,  nor  did  he  consider  the  certain  conse- 
quences of  his  capture.  He  never  realized  that  it 
would  be  the  cause  of  the  death  of  many  burghers,  and 
of  indescribable  panic  throughout  not  only  all  the 
laagers  on  the  veldt,  but  even  those  of  Colesberg, 
Stormberg  and  Ladysmith.  If  the  famous  Cronje 
were  captured,  how  could  any  ordinary  burgher  be  ex- 
pected to  continue  his  resistance  ? 

It  may  be  that  it  was  the  will  of  God,  who  rules  the 
destinies  of  all  nations,  to  fill  thus  to  the  brim  the  cup 

47 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


which  we  had  to  empty,  but  this  consideration  does  not 
excuse  General  Cronje's  conduct.  Had  he  but  taken 
my  advice,  and  attempted  a  night  attack,  he  might  have 
avoided  capture  altogether. 

I  have  heard  men  say  that  as  the  General's  horses 
had  all  been  killed,  the  attempt  which  I  urged  him  to 
make  must  have  failed — that  at  all  events  he  would 
have  been  pursued  and  overtaken  by  Lord  Roberts' 
forces.  The  answer  to  this  is  not  far  to  seek.  The 
English  at  that  time  did  not  employ  as  scouts  Kaffirs 
and  Hottentots,  who  could  lead  them  by  night  as  well 
as  by  day.  Moreover,  with  the  reinforcements  I  had 
received,  I  had  about  sixteen  hundred  men  under  me, 
and  they  would  have  been  very  useful  in  holding  back 
the  enemy,  until  Cronje  had  made  his  escape. 

No  words  can  describe  my  feelings  when  I  saw  that 
Cronje  had  surrendered,  and  noticed  the  result  which 
this  had  on  the  burghers.  Depression  and  discourage- 
ment were  written  on  every  face.  The  effects  of  this 
blow,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say,  made  themselves  appar- 
ent to  the  very  end  of  the  war. 


48 


CHAPTER  VII 


The  Wild  Flight  from  Poplar  Grove 

THE  surrender  of  General  Cronje  only  made  me 
all  the  more  determined  to  continue  the  strug- 
gle, notwithstanding  the  fact  that  many  of  the  burgh- 
ers appeared  to  have  quite  lost  heart.  I  had  just  been 
appointed  Commander-in-Chief,  and  at  once  set  my 
hand  to  the  work  before  me. 

Let  me  explain  how  this  came  about. 
As  I  have  already  said,  General  C.  J.  Wessels  had 
been  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  at  Kimberley. 
In  the  month  of  January  he  was  succeeded  by  Mr.  J. 
S.  Ferreira,  who  at  once  proceeded  to  make  Kimberley 
his  headquarters.  On  the  relief  of  that  town,  one  part 
of  the  besieging  force  went  to  Viertienstroomen,  an- 
other in  the  direction  of  Boshof,  while  a  small  party, 
in  which  was  the  Commander-in-Chief  himself,  set  out 
towards  Koedoesrand,  above  Paardeberg. 

It  was  while  I  was  engaged  in  my  efforts  to  relieve 
Cronje,  that  a  gun  accident  occurred  in  which  General 
Ferreira  was  fatally  wounded.  Not  only  his  own 
family,  but  the  whole  nation,  lost  in  him  a  man  whom 
they  can  never  forget.  I  received  the  sad  news  the 
day  after  his  death,  and,  although  the  place  of  his 
burial  was  not  more  than  two  hours'  ride  from  my 
camp,  I  was  too  much  occupied  with  my  own  affairs 
to  be  able  to  attend  his  funeral. 

On  the  following  day  I  received  from  President 
Steyn  the  appointment  of  Vice-Commander-in-Chief. 
I  had  no  thought  of  declining  it,  but  the  work  which 
it  would  involve  seemed  likely  to  prove  anything  but 
easy.  To  have  the  chief  command,  and  at  such  a 
time  as  this !    But  I  had  to  make  the  best  of  it. 

49 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


I  began  by  concentrating  my  commandos,  to  the 
best  of  my  ability,  at  Modderrivierpoort  (Poplar 
Grove),  ten  miles  east  of  the  scene  of  Cronje's  sur- 
render. I  had  plenty  of  time  to  effect  this,  for  Lord 
Roberts  remained  inactive  from  the  24th  of  February 
to  the  7th  of  March,  in  order  to  rest  a  little  after  the 
gigantic  task  he  had  performed  in  capturing  Cronje's 
laager.  His  thoughts  must  have  been  busy  during 
that  period  with  even  more  serious  matters  than  the 
care  of  his  weary  troops  ;  for,  if  we  had  had  two  hun- 
dred killed  and  wounded,  he  must  have  lost  as  many 
thousands. 

Those  few  days  during  which  our  enemy  rested 
were  also  of  advantage  to  me  in  enabling  me  to  dis- 
pose of  the  reinforcements,  which  I  was  now  receiving 
every  day,  and  from  almost  every  quarter. 

While  I  was  thus  engaged,  I  heard  that  General 
Duller  had  relieved  Ladysmith  on  the  ist  of  March, 
that  General  Gatacre  had  taken  Stormberg  on  the  5th, 
and  that  General  Brabant  was  driving  the  Boers  be- 
fore him. 

These  were  the  first  results  of  General  Cronje's  sur- 
render. 

But  that  fatal  surrender  was  not  only  the  undoing 
of  our  burghers ;  it  also  reinforced  the  enemy,  and 
gave  him  new  courage.  This  was  evident  from  the 
reply  which  Lord  Salisbury  made  to  the  peace  pro- 
posals made  by  our  two  Presidents  on  March  5th. 
But  more  of  this  anon. 

Our  last  day  at  Poplar  Grove  was  signalized  by  a 
visit  paid  to  us  by  President  Kruger,  the  venerable 
chief  of  the  South  African  Republic.  He  had  trav- 
elled by  rail  from  Pretoria  to  Bloemfontein  ;  the  re- 
maining ninety-six  miles  of  the  journey  had  been  ac- 
complished in  a  horse-waggon  —  he,  whom  we  all 
honoured  so  greatly,  had  been  ready  to  undergo  even 
this  hardship  in  order  to  visit  us. 

The  President's  arrival  was,  however,  at  an  unfort- 
unate moment.  It  was  March  the  7th,  and  Lord  Rob- 

50 


WILD  FLIGHT  FROM  POPLAR  GROVE 


erts  was  approaching.  His  force,  extending  over  ten 
miles  of  ground,  was  now  preparing  to  attack  my 
burghers,  whom  I  had  posted  at  various  points  along 
some  twelve  miles  of  the  bank  of  the  Modder  River. 
It  did  not  seem  possible  for  the  old  President  even 
to  outspan,  for  I  had  received  information  that  the 
enemy's  right  wing  was  already  threatening  Petrus- 
burg.  But  as  the  waggon  had  travelled  that  morning 
over  twelve  miles  of  a  heavy  rain-soaked  road,  it  was 
absolutely  necessary  that  the  horses  should  be  out- 
spanned  for  rest.  But  hardly  had  the  harness  been 
taken  off  the  tired  animals  when  a  telegram  arrived, 
saying  that  Petrusburg  was  already  in  the  hands  of 
the  English.  President  Kruger  was  thus  compelled 
to  return  without  a  moment's  delay.  I  saw  him  into 
his  waggon,  and  then  immediately  mounted  my  horse, 
and  rode  to  the  positions  where  my  burghers  were 
stationed. 

Again  I  was  confronted  with  the  baleful  influence 
of  Cronje's  surrender.  A  panic  had  seized  my  men. 
Before  the  English  had  even  got  near  enough  to  shell 
our  positions  to  any  purpose,  the  wild  flight  began. 
Soon  every  position  was  evacuated.  There  was  not 
even  an  attempt  to  hold  them,  though  some  of  them 
would  have  been  almost  impregnable.  It  was  a  flight 
such  as  I  had  never  seen  before,  and  shall  never  see  again. 

I  did  all  that  I  could,  but  neither  I  nor  my  officers 
were  able  to  prevent  the  burghers  from  following 
whither  the  waggons  and  guns  had  already  preceded 
them.  I  tried  every  means.  I  had  two  of  the  best 
horses  that  a  man  could  wish  to  possess,  and  I  rode 
them  till  they  dropped.  All  was  in  vain.  It  was 
fortunate  for  us  that  the  advance  of  the  English  was 
not  very  rapid.  Had  it  been  so,  everything  must 
have  fallen  into  their  hands. 

In  the  evening  we  came  to  Abraham's  Kraal,  a 
farm  belonging  to  Mr.  Charles  Ortel,  some  eighteen 
miles  from  Poplar  Grove.  The  enemy  were  encamped 
about  an  hour  and  a  half's  ride  from  us. 

51 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


The  next  morning  the  burghers  had  but  one  desire, 
and  that  was  to  get  away.  It  was  only  with  the  greatest 
difficulty  that  I  succeeded  in  persuading  them  to  go 
into  position.  I  then  hastened  to  Bloemfontein,  in 
order  to  take  counsel  with  the  Government  about  our 
affairs  generally,  and  especially  to  see  what  would  be 
the  most  suitable  positions  to  occupy  for  the  defence 
of  the  capital.  Judge  Hertzog  and  I  went  out  to- 
gether to  inspect  the  ground  ;  we  placed  a  hundred 
men  in  the  forts,  with  Kaffirs  to  dig  trenches  and 
throw  up  earthworks. 

I  was  back  at  Abraham's  Kraal  by  nine  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  March  the  i8th.  I  found  that  our 
forces  had  been  placed  in  position  by  Generals  De  la 
Rey,  Andreas  Cronje,  Philip  Botha,  Froneman  and 
Piet  de  Wet,  the  last-named  having  arrived  with  his 
commandos  from  Colesberg  a  few  days  before  the  rout 
at  Poplar  Grove. 

We  had  not.  long  to  wait  before  fighting  began, 
fighting  confined  for  the  most  part  to  the  artillery. 
The  English  shells  were  at  first  directed  against  Abra- 
ham's Kraal,  which  was  subjected  to  a  terrific  bom- 
bardment ;  later  on  they  turned  their  guns  upon  Riet- 
fontein,  where  the  Transvaalers  and  a  part  of  the  Free 
State  commandos,  under  General  De  la  Rey,  were 
posted.  The  attack  upon  these  positions  was  fierce 
and  determined  ;  but  De  la  Rey's  burghers,  though 
they  lost  heavily,  repulsed  it  with  splendid  courage. 
I  will  not  say  more  of  this.  It  is  understood  that 
General  De  la  Rey  will  himself  describe  what  he  and 
his  men  succeeded  in  accomplishing  on  that  occasion. 

From  ten  in  the  morning  until  sunset  the  fight  con- 
tinued, and  still  the  burghers  held  their  positions. 
They  had  offered  a  magnificent  resistance.  Their 
conduct  had  been  beyond  all  praise,  and  it  was  hard 
to  believe  that  these  were  the  same  men  who  had  fled 
panic-stricken  from  Poplar  Grove.  But  with  the  set- 
ting of  the  sun  a  change  came  over  them.  Once 
more  panic  seized  them;  leaving  their  positions,  they 

52 


WILD  FLIGHT  FROM  POPLAR  GROVE 


retreated  in  all  haste  towards  Bloemfontein.  And 
now  they  were  only  a  disorderly  crowd  of  terrified 
men  blindly  flying  before  the  enemy. 

But  it  was  Bloemfontein  that  lay  before  them,  and 
the  thought  that  his  capital  was  in  peril  might  well 
restore  courage  in  the  most  disheartened  of  our 
burghers.  I  felt  that  this  would  be  the  case,  and  a 
picture  arose  before  me  of  our  men  holding  out,  as 
they  had  never  done  before. 

Before  going  further  I  must  say  a  few  words  about 
the  peace  proposals  which  our  Presidents  made  to  the 
English  Government  on  the  5th  of  March.  They  called 
God  to  witness  that  it  was  for  the  independence  of  the 
two  Republics,  and  for  that  alone,  that  they  fought,  and 
suggested  that  negotiations  might  be  opened  with  the 
recognition  of  that  independence  as  their  basis. 

Lord  Salisbury  replied  that  the  only  terms  he  would 
accept  were  unconditional  surrender.  He  asserted,  as 
he  did  also  on  many  subsequent  occasions,  that  it  was 
our  ultimatum  that  had  caused  the  war.  We  have 
always  maintained  that  in  making  this  assertion  he 
misrepresented  the  facts,  to  use  no  stronger  term.^ 

Naturally  our  Government  would  not  consent  to 
such  terms,  and  so  the  war  had  to  proceed. 

It  was  decided  to  send  a  deputation  to  Europe. 
This  deputation,  consisting  of  Abraham  Fissher,^  Cor- 
nelius H.  Wessels,^  and  Daniel  Wolmarans,^  sailed 
from  Delagoa  Bay.^ 

*  This  correspondence  will  be  found  in  Chapter  XXX. 

'  Member  of  the  Free  State  Volksraad  and  Executive  Council. 
Member  of  the  Free  State  Volksraad  and  Executive  Council,  and  also  Presi- 
dent of  the  Volksraad. 

*  Member  of  the  first  Volksraad  of  the  South  African  Republic. 

^  This  harbour,  then  the  only  harbour  in  South  Africa  open  to  us,  was  subse- 
quently forbidden  us  by  the  Portuguese  Government,  whose  officials  even  went 
so  far  as  to  arrest  eight  hundred  of  our  burghers  (who,  for  want  of  horses,  had 
taken  refuge  in  Portuguese  territory),  and  to  send  them  to  Portugal.  The  ports 
of  German  West  Africa  cannot  be  counted  among  those  which  were  available 
for  us.  Not  only  were  they  too  far  from  us  to  be  of  any  service,  but  also,  in 
order  to  reach  them,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  go  through  English  ter- 
ritory, for  they  were  separated  from  us  by  Griqualand  West,  Bechuanaland,  and 
isolated  portions  of  Cape  Colony.  We  had,  therefore,  during  the  latter  portion 
of  the  war,  to  depend  for  supplies  upon  what  little  we  were  able  to  capture  from 
the  enemy. 

53 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


The  reader  may  ask  the  object  which  this  deputa- 
tion had  in  view.  Was  it  that  our  Governments  relied 
on  foreign  intervention  ?  Emphatically,  no  !  They 
never  thought  of  such  a  thing.  Neither  in  his  ha- 
rangue to  the  burghers  at  Poplar  Grove,  nor  in  any  of 
his  subsequent  speeches,  did  President  Steyn  give  any 
hint  of  such  an  intention.  The  deputation  was  sent 
in  order  that  the  whole  world  might  know  the  state 
of  affairs  in  South  Africa.  It  fulfilled  its  purpose, 
and  was  justified  by  its  results.  It  helped  us  to  win 
the  sympathy  of  the  nations. 

But  I  must  return  to  my  narrative. 

A  few  days  before  the  flight  from  Poplar  Grove,  I 
had  appointed  Danie  Theron  captain  of  a  scouting 
party.  I  now  left  him  and  his  corps  behind,  with  in- 
structions to  keep  me  informed  of  Lord  Roberts'  move- 
ments, and  proceeded  myself  to  Bloemfontein.  There 
I  disposed  the  available  forces  for  defence,  and  kept 
them  occupied  in  throwing  up  schanzes.  These  scha7i' 
zes  were  erected  to  the  west  and  south  of  the  town, 
and  at  distances  of  from  four  to  six  miles  from  it. 

On  the  evening  of  the  12th  of  March,  Lord  Rob- 
erts appeared,  and  a  few  skirmishes  ensued  south  of 
the  town,  but  no  engagement  of  any  importance  took 
place.  We  awaited  the  morrow  with  various  forebod- 
ings. 

For  myself,  I  beheved  that  that  13th  of  March  should 
see  a  fight  to  the  finish,  cost  what  it  might  !  for  if 
Bloemfontein  was  to  be  taken,  it  would  only  be  over 
our  dead  bodies. 

With  this  before  my  eyes,  I  made  all  necessary  ar- 
rangements, riding  at  nightfall  from  position  to  po- 
sition, and  speaking  both  to  the  officers  and  to  the 
private  burghers.  They  must  play  the  man,  I  told 
them,  and  save  the  capital  at  any  cost.  An  excellent 
spirit  prevailed  amongst  them  ;  on  every  face  one  could 
read  the  determination  to  conquer  or  to  die. 

But  when,  about  an  hour  before  midnight.  I  reached 
the  southern  positions.  I  heard  a  very  different  story. 

54 


WILD  FLIGHT  FROM  POPLAR  GROVE 


They  told  me  there  that  Commandant  Weilbach  had 
deserted  his  post  early  in  the  evening.  What  was  I 
to  do  ?  It  was  impossible  to  search  for  him  during 
the  night,  and  I  was  compelled  to  take  burghers  away 
from  other  commandos,  and  to  place  them  in  the 
abandoned  positions.  On  their  arrival  there,  they  dis- 
covered that  no  sooner  had  Weilbach  failed  us  than 
the  enemy  had  seized  his  post — the  key  to  Bloemfon- 
tein  !  We  did  all  that  we  could,  but  our  situation  had 
been  rendered  hopeless  by  the  action  of  a  Command- 
ant who  ought  to  have  been  dismissed  out  of  hand  for 
his  conduct  at  Poplar  Grove. 

That  night  I  did  not  close  an  eye. 

*        *        *        *  * 

The  morning  of  the  13th  of  March  dawned. 

Hardly  had  the  sun  risen,  when  the  English  in  the 
entrenchments  which  Commandant  Weilbach  had  de- 
serted, opened  a  flank  fire  on  our  nearest  positions. 

First  one  position  and  then  another  was  abandoned 
by  our  burghers,  who  followed  one  another's  example 
like  sheep  ;  few  made  any  attempt  to  defend  their 
posts,  and  in  spite  of  my  efforts  and  those  of  the 
officers  under  me,  they  retreated  to  the  north. 

Thus,  without  a  single  shot  being  fired,  Bloemfon- 
tein  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  English. 


55 


CHAPTER  VIII 


The  Burghers  Receive  Permission  to 
Return  to  their  Homes 

THUS  Bloemfontein  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
the  English ;  but  whatever  valuables  it  contained 
were  spared  by  the  enemy.  I  did  not  myself  consider 
the  place  much  superior  to  any  other  town,  and  I 
would  not  have  thought  it  a  matter  of  any  great  im- 
portance if  it  had  been  destroyed.  Still,  I  felt  it  to 
be  very  regrettable  that  the  town  should  have  been  sur- 
rendered without  a  shot. 

How  can  I  describe  my  feelings  when  I  saw  Bloem- 
fontein in  the  hands  of  the  English  ?  It  was  enough 
to  break  the  heart  of  the  bravest  man  amongst  us. 
Even  worse  than  the  fall  of  our  capital  was  the  fact 
that,  as  was  only  to  be  expected,  the  burghers  had  be- 
come entirely  disheartened  ;  and  it  seemed  as  if  they 
were  incapable  now  of  offering  any  further  resistance. 
The  commandos  were  completely  demoralized.  In- 
deed !  the  burghers  from  Fauresmith  and  Jacobsdal 
had  already  returned  home  from  Poplar  Grove  with- 
out asking  for  permission  to  do  so  ;  and  now  all  the 
others  were  hurrying  back  in  the  greatest  disorder  to 
their  own  districts. 

I  felt  sure  that  Lord  Roberts'  troops  would  remain 
for  some  time  in  the  capital,  in  order  to  obtain  the 
rest  they  must  have  sorely  needed.  And  I  now  asked 
myself  what  I  could  do  whilst  the  English  were  re- 
maining inactive.  For  notwithstanding  all  that  had 
happened,  I  had  not  for  a  single  moment  the  thought 
of  surrender.  It  seemed  to  me  that  my  best  course 
was  to  allow  the  burghers,  who  had  now  been  away 

S6 


THE  BURGHERS  RETURN  HOME 


from  their  families  for  six  months,  an  opportunity  to 
take  breath !  ^ 

After  everything  had  been  arranged  I  went  to 
Brandfort  and  thence  to  Kroonstad,  at  which  place  I 
was  to  meet  President  Steyn,  who  had  left  Bloemfon- 
tein  the  evening  before  it  fell. 

On  my  road  to  Kroonstad  I  fell  in  with  General  P. 
J.  Joubert,  who  had  come  to  the  Free  State,  hoping 
to  be  able  to  discover  some  method  for  checking  the 
advance  of  Lord  Roberts.  He  was  anything  but 
pleased  to  hear  that  I  had  given  my  men  permission 
to  remain  at  home  till  the  25th  of  March. 

**  Do  you  mean  to  tell  me,"  he  asked,  that  you  are 
going  to  give  the  Enghsh  a  free  hand,  whilst  your  men 
take  their  hoHdays  ?  " 

I  cannot  catch  a  hare.  General,  with  unwilling 
dogs,"  I  made  reply. 

But  this  did  not  satisfy  the  old  warrior  at  all.  At 
last  I  said  : 

You  know  the  Afrikanders  as  well  as  I  do.  Gen- 
eral. It  is  not  our  fault  that  they  don't  know  what 
discipline  means.  Whatever  I  had  said  or  done,  the 
burghers  would  have  gone  home  ;  but  I'll  give  you  my 
word  that  those  who  come  back  will  fight  with  re- 
newed courage." 

I  knew  very  well  that  there  were  some  who  would 
not  return,  but  I  preferred  to  command  ten  men  who 
were  willing  to  fight,  rather  than  a  hundred  who  shirked 
their  duties. 

Meanwhile  President  Steyn  had  proclaimed  Kroon- 

>  The  men  I  still  had  with  me  belonged  to  commandos  from  Bloemfontein, 
Ladybrand,  Wepener,  Ficksburg,  Bethlehem  and  Winburg.  They  were  respec- 
tively under  Commandants  Piet  Fourie,  Crowther,  Fouche,  De  Villiers,  Michal 
Prinsloo  and  Vilonel ;  and  these  Commandants  took  orders  from  Vechtgeneraals 
J.  B.  Wessels,  A.  P.  Cronje,  C.  C.  P>oneman,  W.  Kolbe  and  Philip  Botha. 

The  Colesberg  and  Stormberg  commandos  had  received  the  order  to  go 
northwards  in  the  direction  of  Thaba'  Nchu  and  Ladybrand.  These  commandos 
also  had  been  panic-stricken  since  General  Cronje' s  surrender. 

The  Kroonstad,  Heilbron,  Harrismith  and  Vrede  burghers,  under  Comman- 
der-in-Chief Prinsloo,  were  directed  to  remain  where  they  were,  and  guard 
the  Drakensberg. 

General  De  la  Rey  followed  my  example,  and  gave  his  men  permission  to 
return  home  for  some  time. 

57 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


stad  as  the  seat  of  the  Government,  so  that  in  future 
all  matters  were  to  be  settled  there. 

On  March  20th,  1900,  a  war  council  was  held,  which 
was  attended  by  from  fifty  to  sixty  officers.  President 
Steyn  presided  ;  and  there  sat  beside  him  that  simple 
statesman,  grown  grey  in  his  country's  service — Presi- 
dent Kruger. 

The  chief  officers  at  this  council  were  Commandant 
General  Joubert,  Generals  De  la  Rey,  Philip  Botha, 
Froneman,  C.  P.  Cronje,  J.  B.  Wessels,  and  myself. 
A  number  of  the  members  of  both  Governments  also 
put  in  an  appearance  at  this  meeting. 

Do  not  let  it  be  imagined  that  the  object  we  had  in 
view  was  to  come  to  an  agreement  on  any  peace  pro- 
posal made  by  the  English.  Nothing  could  have  been 
further  from  our  minds  than  this.  Lord  Salisbury's 
letter  to  our  two  Presidents,  demanding  unconditional 
surrender,  had  rendered  any  thought  of  peace  impossi- 
ble. On  the  contrary,  we  were  concerned  to  discover 
the  best  method  of  continuing  the  war.  We  knew,  I 
need  scarcely  say,  that  humanly  speaking  ultimate  vic- 
tory for  us  was  out  of  the  question — that  had  been 
clear  from  the  very  beginning.  For  how  could  our 
diminutive  army  hope  to  stand  against  the  overwhelm- 
ing numbers  at  the  enemy's  command  ?  Yet  we  had 
always  felt  that  no  one  is  worthy  of  the  name  of  man 
who  is  not  ready  to  vindicate  the  right,  be  the  odds 
what  they  may.  We  knew  also,  that  the  Afrikanders, 
although  devoid  of  all  military  discipline,  had  the  idea 
of  independence  deeply  rooted  in  their  hearts,  and  that 
they  were  worthy  to  exist  as  a  Free  Nation  under  a 
Republican  form  of  Government. 

I  shall  not  enter  upon  all  that  happened  at  that 
meeting.  I  shall  merely  note  here  that  besides  decid- 
ing to  continue  the  war  more  energetically  than  ever, 
we  agreed  unanimously  that  the  great  waggon-camps 
should  be  done  away  with,  and  that  henceforth  only 
horse-commandos  should  be  employed.  The  sad  expe- 
rience we  had  gained  from  six  months'  warfare,  and 


THE  BURGHERS  RETURN  HOME 


more  especially  the  great  misfortune  that  had  over- 
taken the  big  waggon-camp  of  General  Cronje,  were 
our  reasons  for  this  new  regulation.^ 

I  left  the  meeting  firmly  determined  that,  come 
what  might,  I  should  never  allow  another  waggon- 
camp.  But,  as  the  reader  will  see  before  he  has  con- 
cluded the  perusal  of  these  pages,  it  was  not  until 
many  months  had  elapsed  that  the  waggons  were 
finally  suppressed.  All  the  mischief  that  they  were 
destined  to  bring  upon  the  African  Nation  was  not 
yet  completed. 

One  of  the  effects  of  this  council  was  to  produce  an 
unusually  good  spirit  among  the  officers  and  burghers. 
There  was  only  one  thought  in  my  mind,  and  only 
one  word  on  every  tongue  :     FORWARD  !  " 

I  proceeded  from  Kroonstad  to  the  railway  bridge 
at  Zand  River,  and  remained  there  until  the  25th  of 
March,  when  the  commandos  reassembled.  What  I 
had  foreseen  occurred.  The  burghers  were  different 
men  altogether,  and  returned  with  renewed  courage 
to  the  fight.  They  streamed  in  such  large  numbers 
on  this  and  the  following  days,  that  my  highest  hopes 
were  surpassed.  It  is  true  that  certain  burghers  had 
remained  behind.  Such  was  the  case  with  the  men 
from  Fauresmith  and  Jacobsdal,  and  with  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  commandos  from  Philippolis,  Smith- 

1  This  council  also  enacted  that  officers  should  be  very  chary  in  accepting 
doctors'  certificates.  The  old  law  had  laid  it  down  that  if  a  burgher  produced 
a  medical  certificate,  declaring  him  unfit  for  duty,  he  should  be  exempted  from 
service.  That  there  had  been  a  grave  abuse  of  this  was  the  experience  of  almost 
every  officer.  There  were  several  very  dubious  cases ;  and  it  was  curious  to 
note  how  many  sudden  attacks  of  heart  disease  occurred — if  one  were  to  credit 
the  medical  certificates.  I  remember  myself  that  on  the  7th  of  March,  when 
the  burghers  fled  from  Poplar  Grove,  I  had  thrust  upon  me  suddenly  eight  sep- 
arate certificates,  which  had  all  been  issued  that  morning,  each  declaring  that 
some  burgher  or  other  was  sufi"ering  from  disease  of  the  heart.  When  the  eighth 
was  presented  to  me,  and  I  found  that  it  also  alleged  the  same  complaint,  I  lost 
all  patience,  and  let  the  doctor  know  that  was  quite  enough  for  one  day. 
When  this  question  of  certificates  was  discussed  at  the  council,  I  suggested  in 
Joke  that  no  certificate  should  be  accepted  unless  it  was  signed  by  three  old 
women,  as  a  guarantee  of  good  faith.  The  system  had  indeed  been  carried  to 
such  lengths,  and  certificates  had  been  issued  right  and  left  in  such  a  lavish 
manner,  that  one  almost  suspected  that  the  English  must  have  had  a  hand  ^ 
in  it ! 


59 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


field,  Wepener,  and  Bloemfontein.  But  with  these 
bur2:hers  I  was  unable  to  deal  on  account  of  Lord 
Roberts'  Proclamations,  which  made  it  impossible  for 
me  to  compel  the  burghers  to  join  the  commando  ; 
and  I  decided  that  I  had  better  wait  until  I  had  done 
some  good  work  with  the  men  I  had,  before  I  made 
any  attempt  to  bring  the  others  back  to  the  com- 
mando. 

On  the  25th  of  March  we  went  to  Brandfort.  The 
arrival  of  the  burghers  at  the  village  doubled  and  even 
trebled  its  population.  I  was  forced  to  close  the 
hotels,  as  I  discovered  that  my  men  were  being  sup- 
plied with  drink.  From  this  I  do  not  wish  the  reader 
to  infer  that  the  Afrikanders  are  drunkards,  for  this  is 
far  from  being  the  case.  On  the  contrary,  when  com- 
pared with  other  nations,  they  are  remarkable  for  their 
sobriety,  and  it  is  considered  by  them  a  disgrace  for  a 
man  to  be  drunk. 


60 


CHAPTER  IX 


Sanaa's  Post 

ON  the  28th  of  March  a  council  of  war  was  held. 
The  first  business  transacted  referred  to  disci- 
plinary matters ;  the  council  then  proceeded  to  lay 
down  the  conditions  under  which  the  commandos  were 
to  operate.  It  was  decided  that  General  De  la  Rey 
with  his  Transvaalers  should  remain  at  Brandfort  with 
certain  Free  State  commandos  under  General  Philip 
Botha,  and  that  the  remaining  troops,  under  my  com- 
mand, should  withdraw  in  the  evening. 

Great  was  the  curiosity  of  the  officers  and  burghers 
concerning  our  movements,  but  no  man  learnt  any- 
thing from  me.  I  was  determined  that  in  future  my 
plans  should  be  kept  entirely  secret.  Experience  had 
taught  me  that  whenever  a  commanding  officer  allows 
his  intentions  to  become  public  something  is  sure  to 
go  wrong,  and  I  made  up  my  mind  to  hold  the  reins 
of  discipline  with  a  firmer  hand. 

It  is,  of  course,  true  that  scarcely  anything  could  be 
done  without  the  free  co-operation  of  the  burghers. 
They  joined  the  commando  when  they  wished,  or,  if 
they  preferred  it,  stayed  away.  But  now  I  intended 
that  the  men  who  joined  the  commando  should  be 
under  a  far  stricter  discipline  than  formerly,  and  suc- 
cess rewarded  my  efforts. 

We  left  Brandfort  on  the  same  evening.  My  ob- 
ject was  to  surprise  the  little  garrison  at  Sanna's  Post, 
which  guarded  the  Bloemfontein  Water  Works,  and 
thus  to  cut  off  the  supply  of  water  from  that  town. 

I  started  in  the  direction  of  Winburg,  so  as  to 
throw  every  one  off  the  scent.    On  all  sides  one  heard 

61 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


the  question,  ''Where  are  we  really  going?  What 
can  we  have  to  do  at  Winburg  ?  '* 

The  following  day  I  concealed  my  commando,  and 
that  evening  some  spies,  on  whom  I  could  rely,  and 
who  were  aware  of  my  secret  intentions,  brought  me 
all  the  information  I  required. 

At  this  point  I  had  a  great  deal  of  trouble  with 
Commandant  Vilonel.  It  appeared  that,  notwith- 
standing the  express  interdiction  of  the  council  of  war, 
there  were  some  thirty  waggons,  belonging  to  burgh^ 
ers  from  Winburg  who  were  under  his  orders.  I  re- 
minded him  of  the  decision  to  which  the  council  had 
come  ;  but  he  replied  that  he  did  not  wish  his  burgh- 
ers to  have  to  undergo  the  hardship  of  travelling  with- 
out waggons.  We  started  that  evening,  and,  sure 
enough,  there  he  was  with  his  lumber  following  be- 
hind us. 

I  gave  him  notice  in  writing  the  next  morning  that 
he  must  send  back  the  waggons  that  very  night  when 
we  were  on  the  march.  This  provoked  from  him  a 
written  request  that  a  war  council  should  be  sum- 
moned to  revise  the  decision  come  to  at  Kroonstad. 
I  answered  that  I  absolutely  declined  to  do  any  such 
thing. 

In  the  course  of  that  day  I  received  a  number  of 
reports.  I  was  informed  that  General  Olivier  was 
driving  General  Broadwood  from  Ladybrand  towards 
Thaba'  Nchu.  A  little  later  I  heard  from  General 
Froneman  and  Commandant  Fourie  how  matters 
stood  at  Sauna's  Post.  I  had  disclosed  my  plan  to 
them,  and  sent  them  out  to  reconnoitre.  There  were 
— so  they  told  me — according  to  their  estimation, 
about  two  hundred  English  troops  which  were  sta- 
tioned in  such  and  such  positions. 

I  at  once  summoned  Generals  A.  P.  Cronje,  J.  B. 
Wessels,  C.  C.  Froneman,  and  Piet  de  Wet,  and  took 
council  with  them,  telling  them  of  my  plans  and  en- 
joining strict  secrecy.  I  then  gave  orders  that  Com- 
mandant P.  Fourie  and  C.  Nel,  with  their  burghers, 

62 


SANNA'S  POST. 


B 


A.  '$foemfonte!n.., 

B.  Boesmdns  Kap^ 

C.  Pretoffus'  farm. 
n.  Waterworks. 

E.  Station  ()uildings,-fX/&ition  British  took  on 
returning  from  Kaorn  Spruit. 

F.  Position  of  frone/iiORtCronje  &  Piet  Oe  Wet. 

G.  Thaba  'Nchu. 

H.  Springfield  -  P.  Lynch's  Farm. 

I.  Koorn:Spruit,  in  the  Drift  of  whick  J 
.Get.  Dt  Wet  end  his  burgher^  stood. 

J.  Madder*  River. 


FROM  A  SKETCH  BY  THE  AUTHOR. 


«3 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


three  hundred  and  fifty  in  number,  should  proceed 
under  my  command  to  Koorn  Spruit,  and  be  there 
before  break  of  day. 

We  settled  that  Generals  Cronje,  Wessels,  Frone- 
man,  and  Piet  De  Wet  should  proceed  with  the  re- 
maining burghers,  numbering  eleven  hundred  and  fifty, 
to  the  ridges  east  of  the  Modder  River,  right  opposite 
Sauna's  Post.  They  were  to  take  with  them  the  guns, 
of  which  we  had  four  or  five,  and  bombard  Sauna's 
Post  as  soon  as  it  was  light. 

The  English,  I  expected,  would  retreat  to  Bloem- 
fontein,  and  then  from  my  position  in  Koorn  Spruit 
I  should  be  able  to  decimate  them  as  they  passed  that 
ravine.  I  had  sent  a  large  number  of  burghers  with 
the  four  generals  so  that  our  force  might  be  sufficiently 
strong  to  turn  General  Broadwood,  in  case  he  should 
hear  that  there  was  fighting  at  Sauna's  Post  and  come 
up  to  reinforce  the  garrison. 

Here  again  I  had  trouble  with  Commandant  Vil- 
onel.  I  had  little  time  to  argue — the  sun  was  already 
setting,  and  we  had  to  be  off  at  once.  I  had  declined 
to  allow  a  single  waggon  to  go  with  me,  but  the  Com- 
mandant declared  that  he  would  not  abide  by  the  de- 
cision of  the  council  of  war.  He  also  refused  to  allow 
his  burghers  to  go  into  positions  which  he  himself  had 
not  reconnoitred.  He  asked  that  the  attack  should 
be  postponed  until  he  had  examined  Sauna's  Post 
through  his  telescope. 

My  patience  was  now  at  an  end.  I  told  Command- 
ant Vilonel  that  he  must  obey  my  orders,  and  that  if 
he  did  not  do  so  I  should  dismiss  him,  unless  he  him- 
self resigned.  He  preferred  to  resign.  My  secretary 
procured  paper,  and  the  Commandant  wrote  out  his 
resignation,  I  at  once  gave  him  his  dismissal,  and 
felt  that  a  weight  had  been  taken  off  my  shoulders 
now  that  I  was  free  from  so  wrong-headed  an  officer. 

There  was  no  time  now  for  the  burghers  to  elect  a 
new  Commandant  in  the  usual  way.  I  therefore  as- 
sembled the  Winburg  commando,  and  told  them  that 

64 


SANNA^S  POST 


Vilonel  had  resigned,  that  an  opportunity  of  choosing 
a  substitute  should  be  given  to  them  later  on,  but  that 
in  the  meanwhile  I  should  appoint  Veldtcornet  Gert 
Van  der  Merve.  Nobody  had  anything  to  say  against 
Gerie,"  who  was  a  courageous  and  amiable  man  ;  and, 
after  he  had  given  orders  that  the  waggons  should  be 
sent  home,  we  continued  our  march. 

1  met  some  of  my  spies  at  a  rendezvous  which  I  had 
giv^n  them  on  the  road  to  the  Water  Works,  and 
learnt  from  them  that  the  force  under  General  Broad- 
wood  had  come  that  evening  from  the  direction  of 
Lady  brand  and  now  occupied  Thaba  Nchu. 

I  had  ordered  my  generals  to  take  up  positions  op- 
posite Sanna's  Post  and  east  of  the  Modder  River. 
I  now  left  them  and  rode  on  to  Koorn  Spruit,  not 
knowing  that  General  Broadwood  had  left  Thaba' 
Nchu  after  nightfall  and  had  proceeded  to  the  Water 
Works.  My  advance  was  made  as  quietly  as  possible, 
and  as  soon  as  we  reached  Koorn  Spruit  I  hid  my 
burghers  in  the  ravine,  placing  some  to  the  right  and 
some  to  the  left  of  the  drift  ^  on  the  road  from  Thaba' 
Nchu  and  Sanna's  Post  to  Bloemfontein. 

As  soon  as  it  became  light  enough  to  see  anything 
we  discovered  that  just  above  the  spruit  ^  stood  a  wag- 
gon, with  some  Kaffirs  and  a  number  of  sheep  and 
cattle  beside  it.  The  Kaffirs  told  us  that  the  waggon 
belonged  to  one  of  the  ''hands-uppers"  from  Thaba' 
Nchu,  and  that  they  had  been  ordered  to  get  it  down 
to  Bloemfontein  as  quickly  as  possible  and  to  sell  it  to 
the  English.  The  owner  of  the  sheep  and  of  the  cat- 
tle, they  said,  was  with  General  Broadwood,  whose 
troops  had  just  arrived  at  Sanna's  Post. 

The  light  grew  brighter,  and  there,  three  thousand 
paces  from  us,  was  Broadwood's  huge  force. 

I  had  only  three  hundred  and  fifty  men  with  me  ; 
the  other  generals,  to  the  east  of  the  Modder  River, 
had  not  more  than  eleven  hundred  and  fifty  between 
them. 


» Ford. 


'  Water-course  or  ravine. 

6s 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


The  numbers  against  us  were  overwhelming,  but  I 
resolved  to  stand  my  ground ;  and,  fortunately,  the 
positions  which  I  had  chosen  were  much  to  our  ad- 
vantage— there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  concealing 
my  burghers  and  their  horses. 

I  ordered  that  every  one  should  still  remain  hidden, 
even  when  our  party  to  the  east  of  the  Modder  River 
began  to  shoot,  and  that  not  a  round  was  to  be  fired 
until  I  gave  the  command. 

General  Broadwood  was  preparing  to  strike  camp. 
It  was  then  that  I  told  my  men  to  allow  the  British 
troops  to  get  to  close  quarters  and  ''hands-up"  them, 
without  wasting  a  single  bullet. 

Then  our  guns  began  to  fire. 

The  result  was  a  scene  of  confusion.  Towards  us, 
over  the  brow  of  the  hill,  came  the  waggons  pell-mell, 
with  a  few  carts  moving  rapidly  in  front.  When  the 
first  of  these  reached  the  spruit  its  occupants — a  man 
with  a  woman  beside  him — became  aware  that  some- 
thing was  wrong. 

I  was  standing  at  the  top  of  the  drift  with  Com- 
mandants Fourie  and  Nel.  I  immediately  ordered 
two  of  my  adjutants  to  mount  the  cart  and  to  sit  at 
the  driver's  side. 

The  other  carts  came  one  after  the  other  into  the 
drift,  and  I  ordered  them  to  follow  close  behind  the 
first  cart,  at  the  same  time  warning  the  occupants  that  if 
they  gave  any  signal  to  the  enemy,  they  would  be  shot. 

The  carts  were  filled  with  English  from  Thaba' 
Nchu.  I  was  very  glad  that  the  women  and  children 
should  thus  reach  a  place  of  safety,  before  the  fighting 
began. 

So  speedily  did  the  carts  follow  each  other  that  the 
English  had  no  suspicion  of  what  was  occurring,  and 
very  shortly  the  soldiers  began  to  pour  into  the  drift 
in  the  greatest  disorder.  As  soon  as  they  reached  the 
stream  they  were  met  by  the  cry  of  "  Hands  up  ! " 

Directly  they  heard  the  words,  a  forest  of  hands 
rose  in  the  air. 

66 


SANNA'S  POST 


More  troops  quickly  followed,  and  we  had  disarmed 
two  hundred  of  them  before  they  had  time  to  know 
what  was  happening.  The  discipline  among  the 
burghers  was  fairly  satisfactory  until  the  disarming 
work  began.  If  my  men  had  only  been  able  to  think 
for  themselves,  they  would  have  thrown  the  rifles  on 
the  bank  as  they  came  into  their  hands,  and  so  would 
have  disarmed  far  more  of  the  English  than  they  suc- 
ceeded in  doing.  But,  as  it  was,  the  burghers  kept  on 
asking : 

Where  shall  I  put  this  rifle,  General  ?  What  have 
I  to  do  with  this  horse  ?  " 

That  the  work  should  be  delayed  by  this  sort  of 
thing  sorely  tried  my  hasty  temper. 

Very  soon  the  enemy  in  the  rear  discovered  that 
there  was  something  wrong  in  the  drift,  for  one  of 
their  officers  suddenly  gave  orders  that  the  troops 
should  fall  back.  But  in  the  meantime,  as  I  have 
already  stated,  we  had  disarmed  two  hundred  men  ; 
while,  about  a  hundred  paces  from  us  on  the  banks  of 
the  spruit  stood  five  of  their  guns,  and  more  than  a 
hundred  of  their  waggons,  in  one  confused  mass.  A 
little  further  off — two  or  three  hundred  paces,  perhaps 
— two  more  of  the  enemy's  guns  had  halted. 

The  English  fell  back  some  thirteen  hundred  yards, 
to  the  station  on  the  Dewetsdorp-Bloemfontein  rail- 
way. I  need  scarcely  say  that  we  opened  a  terrific 
fire  on  them  as  they  retreated.  When  they  reached 
the  station,  however,  the  buildings  there  gave  them 
considerable  protection.  I  little  knew  when  I  voted 
in  the  Volksraad  for  the  construction  of  this  line,  that 
I  was  voting  for  the  building  of  a  station  which  our 
enemies  would  one  day  use  against  us. 

An  attempt  was  made  by  the  English  to  save  the 
five  guns,  but  it  was  far  beyond  their  powers  to  do  so. 
They  did  succeed,  however,  in  getting  the  other  two 
guns  away,  and  in  placing  them  behind  the  station 
buildings.  From  there  they  severely  bombarded  us 
with  shrapnel  shell. 

67 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


While  the  English  troops  were  running  to  find 
cover  in  the  buildings,  they  suffered  very  heavily  from 
our  fire,  and  the  ground  between  the  station  and  the 
spruit  was  soon  strewn  with  their  dead  and  wounded, 
lying  in  heaps.  But  having  arrived  at  the  railway 
they  rallied,  and  posting  themselves  to  the  right  and 
left  of  the  station,  they  fired  sharply  on  us. 

The  eleven  hundred  and  fifty  burghers  who  were  to 
the  east  of  the  M odder  River  now  hurried  up  to  my 
assistance.  But  unfortunately,  when  they  attempted 
to  cross  the  river,  they  found  that  the  Water-Works 
dam  had  made  it  too  deep  to  ford.  So  they  pro- 
ceeded up  stream  over  some  very  rough  ground,  being 
much  inconvenienced  by  the  dongas  which  they  had 
to  cross.  When  they  had  covered  three  miles  of  this 
they  were  again  stopped,  for  an  impassable  donga 
blocked  the  way.  They  had  therefore  to  retrace  their 
steps  to  the  place  whence  they  had  started.  Ulti- 
mately they  crossed  the  river  below  the  dam,  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  waggon-drift. 

This  delay  gave  General  Broadwood  a  good  three 
hours  in  which  to  tackle  us.  And  had  it  not  been  for 
the  excellent  positions  we  had  taken  on  the  banks  of 
the  spruit,  we  would  have  been  in  a  very  awkward 
predicament.  But,  as  it  was,  only  two  of  my  men 
were  hit  during  the  whole  of  that  time. 

As  soon  as  our  reinforcements  had  crossed  the 
river.  General  Broadwood  was  forced  to  retire ; 
and  his  troops  came  hurrying  through  Koorn  Spruit 
both  on  the  right  and  on  the  left  of  our  position. 
We  fired  at  them  as  they  passed  us,  and  took  several 
more  prisoners.  Had  I  but  commanded  a  larger 
force,  I  could  have  captured  every  man  of  them. 
But  it  was  impossible,  with  my  three  hundred  and 
fifty  men,  to  surround  two  thousand. 

Our  men  on  the  Modder  River  now  attacked  the 
enemy  with  the  greatest  energy,  and  succeeded  in  put- 
ting them  to  flight,  thus  bringing  the  battle  to  an  end. 

The  conduct  of  my  burghers  had  been  beyond 

68 


SANNA'S  POST 


praise.  I  had  never  seen  them  more  intrepid.  Calm 
and  determined,  they  stood  their  ground,  when  the 
enemy  streamed  down  upon  them  like  a  mighty  river. 
Calm  and  determined  they  awaited  their  arrival,  and 
disarmed  them  as  they  came.  It  was  a  fresh  proof  to 
me  of  the  courage  of  the  Afrikander,  who  indeed,  in 
my  judgment,  is  in  that  quality  surpassed  by  no  one. 

Our  loss  was  three  killed  and  five  wounded. 
Among  the  latter  was  Commandant  General  Van  der 
Merve,  who,  although  very  seriously  injured,  fortu- 
nately recovered.  I  had  no  time  myself  to  note  the 
enemy's  losses,  but,  from  their  own  report,  it  amounted 
to  three  hundred  and  fifty  dead  and  wounded.  We 
captured  four  hundred  and  eighty  prisoners,  seven 
guns,  and  one  hundred  and  seventeen  waggons. 

Here  again  I  had  the  greatest  trouble  in  unravelling 
the  medley.  Many  of  the  horses,  mules  and  oxen  had 
been  killed,  whilst  some  of  the  waggons  were  broken. 
Everything  was  in  a  state  of  indescribable  confusion, 
and  at  any  moment  a  force  might  arrive  from  Bloem- 
fontein. 

But,  fortunately,  no  reinforcement  appeared.  Our 
burghers  who  had  pursued  the  retreating  English, 
saw,  at  about  twelve  o'clock,  a  body  of  mounted 
troops  approaching  from  Bloemfontein.  But  this 
force  at  once  came  to  a  halt,  remaining  at  the  spot 
where  we  had  first  seen  it.-^ 

1  I  may  note  here  that  it  seemed  very  strange  to  me  and  to  all  whose  opinion 
I  asked,  that  Lord  Roberts,  with  his  sixty  thousand  men,  sent  no  reinforce- 
ments from  Bloemfontein.  The  battle  had  taken  place  not  more  than  seventeen 
miles  from  the  capital,  and  it  had  lasted  for  four  hours  ;  so  that  there  had  been 
ample  time  to  send  help.  The  English  cannot  urge  in  excuse  that,  owing  to  our 
having  cut  the  telegraph  wire,  Lord  Roberts  could  know  nothing  of  General 
Broadwood's  position.  The  booming  of  the  guns  must  have  been  distinctly 
heard  at  Bloemfontein,  as  it  was  a  still  morning.  In  addition  to  this  plain 
warning,  the  English  had  an  outpost  at  Borsmanskop,  between  Koorn  Spruit 
and  Bloemfontein.  I  do  not  mention  these  things  with  the  object  of  throwing 
an  unfavourable  light  upon  Lord  Roberts'  conduct,  but  merely  to  show  that  even 
in  the  great  English  Army,  incomprehensible  irregularities  were  not  unknown, 
and  irregularities  of  such  a  character  as  to  quite  put  in  the  shade  the  bungles  we 
were  sometimes  guilty  of.  But  the  Republics,  young  though  they  were,  never 
thought  of  boasting  about  the  order,  organization,  or  discipline  of  their  armies ; 
on  the  contrary  they  were  perhaps  a  little  inclined  to  take  too  lenient  a  view 
when  irregularities  occurred. 

69 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 

When  everything  was  over  a  party  of  troops  from 
General  Olivier's  commando  arrived  on  the  scene  of 
the  recent  operations.  They  had  been  following  Gen- 
eral Broadwood,  and  on  hearing  the  firing  that  morn- 
ing, had  hastened  in  our  direction,  maintaining  on  their 
arrival,  that  it  was  quite  impossible  for  them  to  have 
come  any  sooner. 


70 


CHAPTER  X 


Four  Hundred  and  Seventy  English  taken 
Prisoner  at  Reddersburg 

IN  the  evening  of  the  day  on  which  the  events  de- 
scribed in  the  last  chapter  occurred,  I  handed  over 
the  command  to  Generals  Piet  de  Wet  and  A.  P. 
Cronje,  and  taking  with  me  three  of  my  staff,  rode  to 
Donkerpoort,  in  the  direction  of  Dewetsdorp,  on  a 
reconnoitring  expedition. 

Early  the  following  morning  I  came  to  a  farm  called 
Sterkfontein,  where,  at  noon,  I  received  the  news  that 
a  party  of  English,  coming  from  Smithfield,  had  occu- 
pied Dewetsdorp. 

It  was  thirty  miles  from  Sterkfontein  to  my  com- 
mando, but,  notwithstanding  this,  I  sent  an  order  that 
1,500  men,  under  Generals  J.  B.  Wessels,  C.  C.  Frone- 
man  and  De  Villiers,  should  come  up  with  all  haste 
and  bring  three  guns  with  them. 

During  the  time  that  must  necessarily  elapse  before 
the  arrival  of  this  force,  I  sent  men  out  to  visit  the 
farms  of  those  burghers  who  had  gone  home  after  the 
fall  of  Bloemfontein,  with  orders  to  bring  them  back 
to  the  front. 

By  the  evening  of  the  ist  of  April  I  had  all  the 
men  of  the  district  together ;  but  it  was  then  too  late 
to  make  a  start. 

At  ten  o'clock  the  following  morning  the  English 
left  Dewetsdorp,  and  marched  towards  Reddersburg. 
Directly  I  received  news  of  this,  I  sent  word  to  the 
Generals,  that  they  must  hasten  to  Reddersburg  ;  while 
I,  with  the  men  who  had  rejoined,  made  my  way  to 
the  north,  so  as  to  take  up  a  position  on  the  enemy*s 

71 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


flank.  I  had  with  me  one  hundred  and  ten  tiien  in  all. 
Many  of  them  were  without  rifles,  having  given  up 
their  arms  at  Bloemfontein.  Others  were  provided 
with  serviceable  achterlaaiers,  but  had  little  or  no  am- 
munition, because  they  had  already  fired  off  their  car- 
tridges in  mere  wantonness  in  the  belief  that  they 
might  have  to  give  up  their  rifles  any  day.  My  hand- 
ful of  burghers  were  thus  as  good  as  unarmed. 

During  our  march  I  kept  the  English  continually 
under  surveillance.  They  were  unable  to  advance 
very  rapidly,  as  the  bulk  of  their  force  was  made  up  of 
infantry.  But  they  were  too  far  ahead  for  the  com- 
mandos whom  I  had  sent  in  pursuit  to  be  able  to  get  at 
them  ;  and  for  me,  with  the  handful  of  almost  un- 
armed burghers  which  I  commanded,  to  have  at- 
tempted an  attack  would  have  been  worse  than  folly. 

On  the  evening  of  the  2nd  of  April,  the  English 
encamped  on  the  hill  to  the  west  of  a  farm  called 
Oollogspoort ;  whilst  we  off-saddled  to  the  north  of 
them,  on  Mr.  Van  der  Walt's  farm.  The  enemy, 
however,  was  not  aware  of  the  position  of  our  laager. 

The  following  morning,  at  four  o'clock,  I  sent  a 
third  report  to  the  commandos.  They  had  been  some 
way  on  the  road  to  Dewetsdorp,  and  thus,  far  out  of 
the  course  to  Reddersburg,  w^hen  my  second  report 
reached  them  ;  and  now  my  despatch  rider  met  only 
Generals  Froneman  and  De  Villiers  with  seven  hun- 
dred men  and  three  guns,  and  was  too  late  to  prevent 
General  Wessels  from  going  on  to  Dewetsdorp. 

Shortly  after  sunrise  General  Froneman  received  my 
report.  He  had  been  riding  all  night  through  without 
stopping,  and  many  of  his  horses  were  already  tired 
out.  But  as  my  order  was  that  the  Generals  were  to 
leave  behind  those  who  were  unable  to  proceed,  and 
to  hasten  on  at  once  without  so  much  as  off-saddling, 
he  did  not  wait  to  be  told  twice,  but  pushing  forward 
with  all  speed,  arrived  on  the  3rd  of  April  at  Schwars- 
kopjes  on  the  Kaffir  River.  He  had  left  Sauna's 
Post  on  the  afternoon  of  the  previous  day. 

72 


ENGLISH  TAKEN  PRISONER 


Those  who  consider  that  he  was  marching  with 
seven  hundred  men  and  three  Krupp  guns,  and  that 
his  horses  were  so  exhausted  that  some  of  them  had 
to  be  left  behind,  will  agree  with  me  that  he  did  a 
good  day's  work  in  those  twenty-four  hours. 

Fortunately  for  us,  it  was  not  at  that  time  the  habit 
of  the  English  to  start  on  their  march  before  the  sun 
had  risen.  And,  by  another  lucky  chance,  our  oppo- 
nents were  off  their  guard,  and  quite  unsuspicious  of 
attack,  although  they  must,  undoubtedly,  have  heard 
something  of  what  had  happened  at  Sauna's  Post. 

General  Froneman  gave  me  to  understand  that  it 
was  necessary  to  off-saddle  the  horses,  and  to  give  them 
a  long  rest,  as  he  had  been  riding  without  any  break 
since  the  previous  evening. 

However  necessary  it  may  be,"  I  replied,  it  is  im- 
possible ;  "  and  I  pointed  out  to  him  that  if  we  were  to 
delay,  the  English  would  occupy  the  ridge  between 
Muishondsfontein  and  Mostertshoek,  and  thus  obtain 
the  best  position.  I,  therefore,  ordered  the  men  to 
proceed  with  all  speed,  and  to  leave  behind  those  who 
could  not  go  on.    The  General  did  not  appear  to  be 

links  "  ^  at  this,  but  called  out  with  his  loud  voice, 

Come  on,  burghers  !  " 

We  were  fortunate  in  being  able  to  keep  up  with 
the  enemy  by  riding  along  a  little  plain,  which  was 
hidden  from  them  by  an  intervening  hill.  Our  course 
ran  in  a  direction  parallel  to  their  line  of  march,  and 
at  a  distance  of  about  six  miles  from  it.  But  un-, 
luckily,  the  English  were  the  first  to  reach  the  ridge. 
When  we  appeared  at  the  point  where  the  hill  which 
had  concealed  us  from  them  came  to  an  end,  their 
vanguard  had  just  passed  the  eastern  end  of  the  ridge 
at  which  we  were  both  aiming  ;  and  we  had  still  some 
four  or  five  miles  to  go  before  we  could  reach  it. 

I  saw  that  the  enemy  was  not  strong  enough  to  oc- 
cupy the  whole  ridge,  so  I  at  once  gave  orders  to  Gen- 
eral De  Villiers  to  advance,  and  to  seize  the  western  end 

» Vexed. 

73 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


at  a  point  just  above  the  farmstead  of  Mostertshoek. 
The  enemy,  observing  this  manoeuvre,  took  up  their 
position  on  the  eastern  extremity  of  the  ridge. 
Whereupon  I  divided  the  remaining  burghers  into 
small  companies,  with  orders  to  occupy  kopjes  from 
six  to  seven  hundred  paces  still  further  to  the  east  ; 
leaving  to  myself  and  Commandant  Nel  the  task  of 
seizing  a  small  ridge  which  lay  south-east  of  the  Eng- 
lish lines. 

All  these  positions  would  have  to  be  taken  under 
fire,  and  before  making  the  attempt  I  sent  the  follow- 
ing note  to  the  British  Commanding  Officer : — 

"  Sir  — 

"  I  am  here  with  five  hundred  men,  and  am  every  moment 
expecting  reinforcements  with  three  Kmpps,  against  which  you  will 
not  be  able  to  hold  out.  I  therefore  advise  you,  in  order  to  prevent 
bloodshed,  to  surrender." 

I  sent  this  note  post  haste,  and  then  rested  a  little 
while  awaiting  the  return  of  the  despatch  rider. 

And  now  a  shameful  incident  occurred.  The  mes- 
senger had  received  the  answer  to  my  letter,  and  had 
covered  about  a  hundred  paces  on  his  way  back,  when 
the  enemy  opened  so  heavy  a  fire  upon  him  that  it  is 
inexplicable  how  he  managed  to  come  through  un- 
scathed. 

The  answer  which  he  brought  from  the  officer  was 
in  the  following  terms: — 
"  I'm  d  d  if  I  surrender 

I  at  once  ordered  my  men  to  rush  the  positions 
which  I  had  already  pointed  out  to  them  ;  and  not- 
withstanding the  fierce  opposition  of  the  enemy,  they 
succeeded  in  carrying  out  my  orders. 

But  although  we  had  thus  gained  very  good  posi- 
tions, those  which  the  English  held  were  quite  as 
good,  and  perhaps  even  better,  except  for  the  fact  that 
they  were  cut  off  from  the  water.  However,  when 
they  had  first  become  aware  of  our  presence — that  is, 
while  they  were  at  Muishondsfontein — they  had  taken 
the  precaution  of  filling  their  water-bottles. 

74 


ENGLISH  TAKEN  PRISONER 


Our  guns  did  not  arrive  until  so  late  in  the  after- 
noon that  only  a  few  shots  could  be  fired  before  it  be- 
came dark. 

Acting  upon  my  orders,  the  burghers  kept  such 
good  watch  during  the  night  that  escape  was  impossi- 
ble for  the  English.  I  also  sent  a  strong  guard  to  a 
point  near  Reddersburg,  for  I  had  heard  that  a  rein- 
forcement of  from  thirteen  hundred  to  two  thousand 
British  troops  had  come  from  the  direction  of  Botha- 
thanie  railway  station,  and  were  now  encamped  at 
Reddersburg. 

I  had  begun  operations  with  only  four  hundred  men 
under  me,  but  before  the  sun  rose  on  the  following 
day  my  force  had  been  doubled  by  the  addition  of 
those  who  had  been  compelled  to  remain  behind  and 
rest  their  tired  horses. 

On  the  previous  evening  it  had  seemed  to  me  highly 
improbable  that  we  should  be  able  to  storm  the  ridge 
in  the  morning.  I  had  expected  that  the  force  at  Red- 
dersburg— which  lay  only  about  four  or  five  miles 
from  Mostertshoek — would  have  seen  the  fight  in 
progress,  or  heard  the  cannonading,  and  would  have 
hastened  to  the  assistance  of  their  comrades.^  Never- 
theless, I  had  given  orders  that  as  soon  as  it  was  day- 
light, every  one  must  do  his  utmost  to  force  the  Eng- 
lish to  surrender. 

It  was  now  rapidly  growing  lighter,  and  I  ordered 
the  gunners  to  keep  up  a  continuous  fire  with  our  three 
Krupps.  This  they  did  from  half-past  five  until  eleven 
o'clock,  and  then  the  enemy  hoisted  the  white  flag. 

*  I  have  never  been  able  to  understand  why  the  great  force,  stationed  at  Red- 
dersburg, made  no  attempt  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  unfortunate  victims  at  Mos- 
tertshoek, Their  conduct  seems  to  me  to  have  been  even  more  blameworthy 
than  the  similar  negligence  which  occurred  at  Sanna's  Post.  They  were  not 
more  than  five  miles  off,  and  could  watch  the  whole  engagement — and  yet  they 
never  stirred  a  foot  to  come  and  help  their  comrades.  And  it  was  fortunate  for 
us  that  it  was  so,  for  we  should  have  stood  no  chance  at  all  against  a  large  force. 

To  oppose  successfully  such  bodies  of  men  as  our  burghers  had  to  meet  dur- 
ing this  war  demanded  rapidity  of  action  more  than  anything  else.  We  had  to 
be  quick  at  fighting,  quick  at  reconnoitring,  quick  (if  it  became  necessary)  at  fly- 
ing !  This  was  exactly  what  I  myself  aimed  at,  and  had  not  so  many  of  our 
burghers  proved  false  to  their  own  colours,  England — as  the  great  Bismarck 
foretold — would  have  found  her  grave  in  South  Africa, 

75 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


My  men  and  I  galloped  towards  the  English,  and 
our  other  two  parties  did  the  same.  But  before  we 
reached  them,  they  again  began  to  shoot,  killing  Veldt- 
cornet  Du  Plessis,  of  Kroonstad.  This  treacherous  act 
enraged  our  burghers,  who  at  once  commenced  to  fire 
with  deadly  effect. 

Soon  the  white  flag  appeared  above  almost  every 
stone  behind  which  an  Englishman  lay,  but  our  men 
did  not  at  once  cease  firing.  Indeed!  I  had  the 
greatest  difficulty  in  calm.ing  them,  and  in  inducing 
them  to  stop,  for  they  were,  as  may  well  be  imagined, 
furious  at  the  misuse  of  the  white  flag. 

Strewn  everywhere  about  on  the  ground  lay  the 
English  killed  and  wounded.  According  to  the  offi- 
cial statement,  they  had  a  hundred  casualties,  the 
commanding  officer  himself  being  amongst  the  killed. 

We  took  four  hundred  and  seventy  prisoners  of 
war,  all  of  them  belonging  to  the  Royal  Irish  Rifles 
and  the  Mounted  Infantry.  But  I  cared  nothing  to 
what  regiment  they  belonged  or  what  was  the  rank  of 
the  officer  in  command.  Throughout  the  whole  war 
I  never  troubled  myself  about  such  matters. 

Our  loss,  in  addition  to  Veldtcornet  Du  Plessis, 
whose  death  I  have  just  described,  was  only  six 
wounded. 

I  had  no  longer  any  need  to  fear  a  reinforcement 
from  Reddersburg,  but  nevertheless  there  was  no  time 
to  be  lost,  for  I  had  just  heard  from  a  prisoner  of  war 
that  a  telegram  had  been  sent  from  Devvetsdorp  to  the 
garrison  at  Smithfield,  bidding  them  consult  their  own 
safety  by  withdrawing  to  Aliwal  North.  I  made  up 
my  mind  to  capture  that  garrison  before  it  could  de- 
camp. I  waited  until  I  saw  that  the  English  ambu- 
lances were  busy  with  their  wounded,  and  then  with 
all  speed  rode  off. 

As  the  direct  road  might  prove  to  be  held  by  Lord 
Roberts,  I  caused  the  prisoners  of  war  to  be  marched 
to  Winburg  via  Thaba'  Nchu.  From  thence  they  were 
to  be  sent  forward  by  rail  to  Pretoria. 

_76_ 


CHAPTER  XI 


An  Unsuccessful  Siege 

MY  object  now  was  to  reach  Smithfield.  We  set 
out  at  once  and  late  in  the  evening  I  divided 
my  commandos  into  two  parties.  The  first,  some  five 
hundred  men  in  all,  consisted  chiefly  of  Smithfield 
burghers  under  Commandant  Swanepoel,  of  Yzervark- 
fontein,  but  there  were  also  some  Wepener  men 
amongst  them.  I  gave  General  Froneman  the  com- 
mand over  this  party,  and  ordered  him  to  proceed 
without  delay  and  attack  the  small  English  garrison 
at  Smithfield.  With  the  second  party  I  rode  off  to 
join  the  burghers  who  were  under  General  J.  B.  Wes- 
sels. 

I  came  up  with  Wessels*  division  on  the  6th  of  April 
at  Badenhorst,  on  the  road  from  Dewetsdorp  to  Wep-  ' 
ener.  Badenhorst  lies  at  a  distance  of  some  ten  miles 
from  a  ford  on  the  Caledon  River,  called  Tammers- 
bergsdrift,  where  Colonel  Dalgety,  with  the  highly 
renowned  C.M.R.^  and  Brabant's  Horse  were  at  that 
time  stationed.  I  call  them  "  highly  renowned  "  to  be 
in  the  fashion,  for  I  must  honestly  avow  that  I  never 
could  see  for  what  they  were  renowned. 

During  the  fight  at  Mostertshoek  on  the  previous 
day  I  had  kept  them  under  observation,  with  the  result 
that  I  learnt  that  they  had  entrenched  themselves 
strongly,  and  that  they  numbered  about  sixteen  hun- 
dred men,  though  this  latter  fact  was  a  matter  of  indif- 
ference to  me.  The  history  of  Ladysmith,  Mafeking, 
and  Kimberley,  however,  served  me  as  a  warning,  and 
I  asked  myself  whether  it  would  be  better  to  besiege 

*  Cape  Mounted  Rifles. 

77 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


the  wolf  or  to  wait  and  see  if  he  would  not  come  out 
of  his  lair. 

But  the  wolf,  on  this  occasion,  was  not  to  be  enticed 
out  on  any  pretext ;  and  moreover  it  was  probable 
that  Lord  Roberts  would  be  able  to  send  a  relieving 
force  from  Bloemfontein  ;  so  I  decided  to  attack  at 
once.  First,  however,  I  despatched  some  of  my  best 
scouts  in  the  direction  of  Bloemfontein  and  Redders- 
burg,  while  I  ordered  the  commandos  under  Generals 
Piet  de  Wet  and  A.  P.  Cronje  to  take  up  positions  to 
the  east  and  south-east  of  the  capital. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  April  I  made  an 
attack  on  two  points :  one  to  the  south-west,  the 
other  to  the  south-east  of  Dalgety's  fortifications, 
opening  fire  on  his  troops  at  distances  of  from  five  to 
fifteen  hundred  paces.  I  dare  not  approach  any  nearer 
for  lack  of  suitable  cover.  The  place  was  so  strongly 
fortified  that  many  valuable  lives  must  have  been  sac- 
rificed, had  I  been  less  cautious  than  I  was. 

After  a  few  days  I  received  reinforcements,  and  was 
thus  enabled  to  surround  the  English  completely.  But 
their  various  positions  were  so  placed  that  it  was  im- 
possible for  me  to  shell  any  of  them  from  both  sides, 
and  thus  to  compel  their  occupants  to  surrender. 

Day  succeeded  to  day,  and  still  the  siege  continued. 

Before  long  we  had  captured  some  eight  hundred  of 
the  trek-oxen,  and  many  of  the  horses  of  the  enemy. 
Things  were  not  going  so  badly  for  us  after  all  ;  and 
we  plucked  up  our  courage,  and  began  to  talk  of  the 
probability  of  a  speedy  surrender  on  the  part  of  the 
English. 

To  tell  the  truth,  there  was  not  a  man  amongst  us 
who  would  have  asked  better  than  to  make  prisoners 
of  the  Cape  Mounted  Rifles  and  of  Brabant's  Horse. 
They  were  Afrikanders,  and  as  Afrikanders,  although 
neither  Free-Staters  nor  Transvaalers,  they  ought,  in 
our  opinion,  to  have  been  ashamed  to  fight  against  us. 

The  English,  we  admitted,  had  a  perfect  right  to 
hire  such  sweepings,  and  to  use  them  against  us,  but 

78 


AN  UNSUCCESSFUL  SIEGE 


we  utterly  despised  them  for  allowing  themselves  to 
be  hired.  We  felt  that  their  motive  was  not  to  ob- 
tain the  franchise  of  the  Uitlanders,  but — five  shillings 
a  day  !  And  if  it  should  by  any  chance  happen  that 
any  one  of  them  should  find  his  grave  there — well,  the 
generation  to  come  would  not  be  very  proud  of  that 
grave.  No  !  it  would  be  regarded  with  horror  as  the 
grave  of  an  Afrikander  who  had  helped  to  bring  his 
brother  Afrikanders  to  their  downfall. 

Although  I  never  took  it  amiss  if  a  colonist  of  Na- 
tal or  of  Cape  Colony  was  unwilling  to  fight  with  us 
against  England,  yet  I  admit  that  it  vexed  me  greatly 
to  think  that  some  of  these  colonists,  for  the  sake  of  a 
paltry  five  shillings  a  day,  should  be  ready  to  shoot 
down  their  fellow-countrymen.  Such  men,  alas  !  there 
have  always  been,  since,  in  the  first  days  of  the  hu- 
man race,  Cain  killed  his  brother  Abel.  But  Cain 
had  not  long  to  wait  for  his  reward  ! 

Whilst  we  were  besieging  these  Afrikanders,  news 
came  that  large  columns  from  Reddersburg  and  Bloem- 
fontein  were  drawing  near.  So  overwhelming  were 
their  numbers  that  the  commandos  of  Generals  A.  P. 
Cronje  and  Piet  de  Wet  were  far  too  weak  to  hold 
them  in  check,  and  I  had  to  despatch  two  reinforc- 
ing parties,  the  first  under  Commandant  Fourie,  the 
second  under  General  J.  B.  Wessels. 

General  Froneman  had  now  returned  from  Smith- 
field,  whither  I  had  sent  him  to  attack  the  garrison. 
He  told  me  that  he  had  been  unable  to  carry  out 
my  orders,  for,  on  his  arrival  at  Smithfield,  he  had 
discovered  that  the  garrison — which  had  only  con- 
sisted of  some  two  or  three  hundred  men — had  just 
departed.  He  learnt,  however,  that  it  was  still  pos- 
sible to  overtake  it  before  it  reached  Aliwal  North. 
Unfortunately,  he  was  unable  to  persuade  Commandant 
Swanepoel,  who  was  in  command  of  the  burghers,  to 
pursue  the  retreating  troops.  He  therefore  had  to 
content  himself  with  the  fifteen  men  he  had  with  him. 
He  came  in  sight  of  the  enemy  at  Branziektekraal, 

79 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


two  hours  from  Aliwal  North  ;  but  with  the  mere 
handful  of  men,  which  was  all  that  he  had  at  his  com- 
mand, an  attack  upon  them  was  not  to  be  thought  of, 
and  he  had  to  turn  back. 

His  expedition,  however,  had  not  been  without 
good  result,  for  he  returned  with  about  five  hundred 
of  those  burghers  who  had  gone  home  after  our  com- 
mandos had  left  Stormberg. 

We  had  to  thank  Lord  Roberts  for  this  welcome 
addition  to  our  forces.  The  terms  of  the  proclama- 
tion in  which  Lord  Roberts  had  guaranteed  the  prop- 
erty and  personal  liberty  of  the  non-combatant 
burghers  had  not  been  abided  by.  In  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Bloemfontein,  Reddersburg,  and  Dewetsdorp, 
and  at  every  other  place  where  it  was  possible,  his  troops 
had  made  prisoners  of  burghers  who  had  remained 
quietly  on  their  farms.  The  same  course  of  action 
had  been  pursued  by  the  column  which  fell  into  our 
hands  at  Mostertshoek — I  myself  had  liberated  David 
Strauss  and  four  other  citizens  whom  I  had  found 
there.  While  peacefully  occupied  on  their  farms  they 
had  been  taken  prisoners  by  the  English  column, 
which  was  then  on  its  way  from  Dewetsdorp  to  Red- 
dersburg. 

This  disregard  of  his  proclamations  did  not  increase 
the  respect  which  the  burghers  felt  for  Lord  Roberts. 
They  felt  that  the  word  of  the  English  was  not  to  be 
trusted,  and,  fearing  for  their  own  safety,  they  returned 
to  their  commandos.  I  sent  President  Steyn  a  tele- 
gram, informing  him  that  our  burghers  were  rejoining, 
and  adding  that  Lord  Roberts  was  the  best  recruiting 
sergeant  I  had  ever  had  ! 

General  Froneman  and  the  men  whom  he  had  col- 
lected soon  found  work  to  do.  The  enemy  was  ex- 
pecting a  reinforcement  from  Aliwal  North,  and  I 
sent  the  General,  with  six  hundred  troops,  to  oppose 
it.  He  came  into  touch  with  it  at  Boesmanskop,  and 
a  slight  skirmish  took  place. 

In  the  meanwhile  I  received  a  report  from  General 

80 


AN  UNSUCCESSFUL  SIEGE 


Piet  de  Wet,  who  was  at  Dewetsdorp,  notifying  me 
that  the  English  forces  outnumbered  his  own  so  enor- 
mously that  he  could  not  withstand  their  advance. 
He  suggested  that  I  ought  at  once  to  relinquish  the 
siege  and  proceed  in  the  direction  of  Thaba'  Nchu. 

I  also  received  discouraging  news  from  General  Piet 
Fourie,  who  had  had  a  short  but  severe  engagement 
with  the  troops  that  were  coming  from  Bloemfontein, 
and  had  been  compelled  to  give  way  before  their 
superior  forces. 

Piet  de  Wet's  advice  appealed  to  me  all  the  more 
strongly  since  reinforcements  were  pouring  in  upon  the 
enemy  from  all  sides.  But  I  was  of  opinion  that  I 
ought  to  go  with  a  strong  force  after  the  enemy  in  the 
direction  of  Norvalspont,  as  I  was  convinced  that  it 
was  no  longer  possible  to  check  their  advance.  But 
General  Piet  de  Wet  differed  from  me  on  this  point, 
and  held  that  we  ought  to  keep  in  front  of  the  Eng- 
lish, and  I  was  at  last  compelled  to  give  in  to  him. 

Accordingly  1  issued  orders  to  General  Froneman 
to  desist  from  any  further  attack  upon  the  reinforce- 
ment with  which  he  had  been  engaged,  and  to  join 
me.    When  he  arrived  I  fell  back  on  Thaba'  Nchu. 

My  siege  of  Colonel  Dalgety,  with  his  Brabant's 
Horse  and  Cape  Mounted  Rifles,  had  lasted  for  six- 
teen days.  Our  total  loss  was  only  five  killed  and 
thirteen  wounded.  The  English,  as  I  learnt  from 
prisoners,  had  suffered  rather  severely. 


8i 


CHAPTER  XII 


The  English  Swarm  over  our  Country 

ON  April  25th  we  arrived  at  Alexandrie,  six  miles 
from  Thaba'  Nchu.  The  latter  place  was  al- 
ready occupied  by  English  outposts.  General  Philip 
Botha  now  joined  me  ;  he  had  been  engaging  the 
enemy  in  the  triangle  formed  by  Brandfort,  Bloem- 
fontein  and  Thaba'  Nchu.  My  commandos  num- 
bered some  four  thousand  men,  and  I  decided  that  it 
was  time  to  concentrate  my  forces. 

Lord  Roberts  was  about  to  carry  out  the  plans 
which  he  had  formed  at  Bloemfontein,  namely,  to 
outflank  us  with  large  bodies  of  mounted  troops.  He 
attempted  to  do  this  to  the  north-east  of  Thaba'  Nchu, 
but  at  first  was  not  successful.  On  a  second  attempt, 
however,  he  managed,  after  a  fierce  fight,  to  break 
through  our  lines.  It  was  during  this  action  that 
Commandant  Lubbe  was  shot  in  the  leg,  and  had  the 
misfortune  to  be  taken  prisoner.  At  Frankfort  also, 
Lord  Roberts  met  with  success,  and  General  De  la 
Rey  was  forced  to  retreat  northwards. 

I  was  now  firmly  convinced,  although  I  kept  the  be- 
lief to  myself,  that  the  English  would  march  to 
Kroonstad  ;  and  I  could  see,  more  clearly  than  ever, 
the  necessity  of  operating  in  their  rear.  I  had  sug- 
gested to  President  Steyn  when  he  had  visited  us  at 
Alexandrie,  that  I  should  proceed  to  Norvalspont,  or 
even  into  Cape  Colony,  but  he  was  against  any  such 
project.  This,  however,  was  not  because  he  disap- 
proved of  my  suggestion  in  itself,  but  because  he 
feared  that  the  Transvaalers  might  say  that  the  Free- 
Staters,  now   that   their   own  country  was  in  the 

82 


ENGLISH  SWARM  OVER  OUR  COUNTRY 


enemy's  hands,  were  going  to  leave  them  in  the  lurch. 
Yet  in  spite  of  his  opposition,  I  had  ultimately  to 
carry  out  my  own  ideas,  for,  even  if  I  was  misunder- 
stood, I  had  to  act  as  I  thought  best.  I  can  only  say 
that  each  man  of  us  who  remained  true  to  our  great 
cause  acted  up  to  the  best  of  his  convictions.  If 
the  results  proved  disastrous,  one  had  best  be  silent 
about  them.    There  is  no  use  crying  over  spilt  milk. 

We  now  pushed  our  commandos  forward  to  Zand 
River.  At  Tabaksberg  General  Philip  Botha  had  a 
short  but  severe  engagement  with  Lord  Roberts'  ad- 
vanced columns.  I  was  the  last  of  the  Generals  to 
leave  Thaba'  Nchu. 

I  was  very  anxious  to  prevent  the  **  granary  "  ^  of 
the  Orange  Free  State  from  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  English  ;  with  this  object  in  view,  I  left  behind 
me  at  Korannaberg  General  De  Villiers,  with  Com- 
mandants De  Villiers,  of  Ficksburg,  Crowther,  of 
Ladybrand,  Roux,  of  Wepener,  and  Potgieter,  of 
Smithfield,  and  ordered  the  General  to  carry  on  oper- 
ations in  the  south-eastern  districts  of  the  Free  State. 

This  valiant  General  did  some  fine  work,  and  fought 
splendidly  at  Gouveneurskop  and  Wonderkop,  in- 
flicting very  serious  losses  upon  the  English.  But 
nevertheless  he  had  to  yield  to  the  superior  num- 
bers of  the  enemy,  who  ultimately  gained  possession 

1  This  "granary"  lay  in  the  Ladybrand,  Ficksburg  and  Bethlehem  districts, 
and  not  only  supplied  the  Free  State,  but  also  the  greater  part  of  the  Transvaal. 
If  the  districts  of  Wepener,  Rouxville,  Bloemfontein,  and  Thaba'  Nchu  be  in- 
cluded, this  "granary"  was  the  source  of  a  very  large  yield  of  corn,  and  there 
had  been  an  especially  rich  harvest  that  year.  As  the  men  were  away  on  com- 
mando, the  Kaffirs  reaped  the  corn  under  the  supervision  of  the  Boer  women ; 
and  where  Kaffirs  were  not  obtainable  the  women  did  the  work  with  their  own 
hands,  and  were  assisted  by  their  little  sons  and  daughters.  The  women  had 
provided  such  a  large  supply,  that  had  not  the  English  burnt  the  corn  by  the 
thousand  sacks,  the  war  could  have  been  continued.  It  was  hard  indeed  for 
them  to  watch  the  soldiers  flinging  the  corn  on  the  ground  before  their  horses' 
hoofs.  Still  harder  was  it  to  see  that  which  had  cost  them  so  much  labour 
thrown  into  the  flames. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  English,  in  order  to  destroy  our  crops,  had  let 
their  horses  and  draught  oxen  loose  upon  the  land,  there  was  still  an  abundant 
harvest — perhaps  the  best  that  we  had  ever  seen.  And  so  it  happened  that 
whilst  the  men  were  at  the  front,  the  housewives  could  feed  the  horses  in  the 
stable.  But  Tord  Roberts,  acting  on  the  advice  of  unfaithful  burghers,  laid  his 
hand  upon  the  housewives'  work,  and  burnt  the  grain  that  they  had  stored 

83 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


of  the  **  granary  "  districts.  But  he  made  them  pay 
for  it  dearly. 

General  De  Villiers  followed  the  English  to  Senekal 
and  Lindley,  and  at  Biddulphsberg,  near  the  first 
named  village,  he  again  engaged  them  successfully, 
killing  and  wounding  many  of  them.  But  a  grave 
misfortune  overtook  us  here,  for  the  General  received 
a  dangerous  wound  on  the  head. 

There  was  still  another  most  deplorable  occurrence. 
In  some  way  or  other  the  grass  caught  fire  ;  and  as  it 
was  very  dry,  and  a  high  wind  was  blowing,  the  flames 
ran  along  the  ground  to  where  many  of  the  English 
wounded  were  lying.  There  was  no  time  to  rescue 
them  ;  and  thus  in  this  terrible  manner  many  a  poor 
fellow  lost  his  life. 

General  De  Villiers'  wound  was  so  serious,  that  the 
only  course  open  was  to  ask  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  Senekal  garrison  to  let  him  have  the  benefit  of 
the  English  doctors'  skill.  This  request  was  willingly 
granted,  and  De  Villiers  was  placed  under  the  care  of  the 
English  ambulance.    Sad  to  say,  he  died  of  his  wound. 

Some  time  later  I  was  informed  that  the  man  who 
had  carried  the  request  into  Senekal  was  ex-Comman- 
dant Vilonel,  who  was  then  serving  as  a  private 
burgher.  A  few  days  later  he  surrendered,  so  that 
one  naturally  inferred  that  he  had  arranged  it  all  dur- 
ing his  visit  to  Senekal. 

Shortly  after  he  had  given  up  his  arms,  he  sent  a 
letter  to  one  of  the  Veldtcornets,  asking  him  to  come 
to  such  and  such  a  spot  on  a  certain  evening,  to  meet 
an  English  officer  and  himself.  The  letter  never 
reached  the  hands  of  the  person  to  whom  Vilonel  had 
addressed  it ;  and  instead  of  the  Veldtcornet,  it  was 
Captain  Pretorius  wnth  a  few  burghers,  who  went  to 
the  appointed  place.  The  night  was  so  dark  that  it 
was  impossible  to  recognize  anybody. 

Where  is  Veldtcornet  ?"  asked  Mr.  Vilonel. 

You  are  my  prisoner,"  was  Captain  Pretorius'  re- 
ply, as  he  took  Vilonel's  horse  by  the  bridle. 

84 


ENGLISH  SWARM  OVER  OUR  COUNTRY 


Treason  !  treason  !  "  cried  poor  Vilonel. 

They  brought  him  back  to  the  camp,  and  sent  him 
thence  to  Bethlehem.  A  court-martiaP  was  shortly 
afterwards  held  at  that  town,  and  he  was  condemned 
to  a  long  term  of  imprisonment. 

In  the  place  of  General  De  Villiers  I  appointed 
Deacon  Paul  Roux  as  Vechtgeneraal.  He  was  a  man 
in  whom  I  placed  absolute  confidence.  As  a  minister 
of  religion  he  had  done  good  service  among  the  com- 
mandos, and  in  the  fiercest  battles  he  looked  after  the 
wounded  with  undaunted  courage.  His  advice  to  the 
officers  on  matters  of  war  had  also  been  excellent,  so 
that  he  was  in  every  way  a  most  admirable  man.  But 
his  fighting  career  unfortunately  soon  came  to  an  end, 
for  he  was  taken  prisoner  in  a  most  curious  way  near 
Naauwpoort,  when  Prinsloo  surrendered. 

I  must  now  retrace  my  steps,  and  give  some  account 
of  what  I  myself  had  been  doing  during  this  time. 

I  proceeded  to  the  west  of  Doornberg,  and  only 
halted  when  I  reached  the  Zand  River.  What  memo- 
ries does  the  name  of  that  river  bring  back  to  me  !  It 
was  on  its  banks  that  in  1852  the  English  Govern- 
ment concluded  a  Convention  with  the  Transvaal — 
only  to  break  it  when  Sir  Theophilus  Shepstone  an- 
nexed that  country  on  the  12th  of  April,  1877.  But 
this  Convention  was  re-established  by  Gladstone — 
greatest  and  noblest  of  English  statesmen — when  he 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  South  African 
Republic. 

Here  on  the  banks  of  this  river,  which  was  so 
pregnant  with  meaning,  we  should  stand,  so  I  thought, 
and  hold  the  English  at  bay.  But  alas!  the  name 
with  all  its  memories  did  not  check  the  enemy's  ad- 
vance. 

On  the  loth  of  May  Lord  Roberts  attacked  us  with 
his  united  forces  ;  and  although  his  losses  were  heavy, 
he  succeeded  in  breaking  through  our  lines  near  Ven- 

^  This  Court  was  not  composed  of  officers,  but  consisted  of  three  persons, 
one  of  whom  was  a  lawyer. 

■8s 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


tersburg,  at  two  points  which  were  held  by  General 
Froneman.  And  thus  the  English  were  free  to  ad- 
vance on  Kroonstad. 

I  gave  orders  to  my  commando  to  move  on  to 
Doornkop,  which  lies  to  the  east  of  Kroonstad.  I 
myself,  with  Commandant  Nel  and  some  of  his  adju- 
tants, followed  them  when  the  sun  had  set.  We  rode 
the  whole  of  that  night,  and  reached  the  township  on 
the  following  morning.  We  immediately  arranged  that 
the  Government  should  withdraw  from  Kroonstad, 
and  that  very  day  it  was  removed  to  Heilbron.  Presi- 
dent Steyn,  however,  did  not  go  to  Heilbron,  but  paid 
a  visit  to  General  PhiHp  Botha,  whose  commando  had 
held  back  the  English  outposts  some  six  miles  from 
Kroonstad. 

The  President,  before  leaving  the  town,  had  sta- 
tioned police  on  the  banks  of  the  Valsch  River  w^ith 
orders  to  prevent  burghers  from  entering  the  dorp^; 
he  had  only  just  crossed  the  drift  before  my  arrival. 
I  came  upon  some  burghers  who,  as  they  had  been 
ordered,  had  off-saddled  at  the  south  side  of  the  river, 
and  I  asked  them  if  they  had  seen  the  President.  As 
they  were  Transvaalers,  they  answered  my  question  in 
the  negative. 

But  has  nobody  on  horseback  crossed  here  ?"  I  said. 

"  Oh,  yes !  the  Big  Constable  ^  crossed,"  one  of  them 
replied.    ''And  he  told  us  not  to  pass  over  the  drift." 

*'What  was  he  Hke?"  I  inquired. 

"He  was  a  man  with  a  long  red  beard." 

I  knew  now  who  the  Big  Constable  "  had  been  ; 
and  when  I  afterwards  told  the  President  for  whom  he 
had  been  taken,  he  was  greatly  amused. 

General  Philip  Botha  discussed  the  state  of  affairs 
with  me,  and  we  both  came  to  the  conclusion  that  if 
Lord  Roberts  attacked  us  with  his  united  forces,  his 
superior  numbers  would  render  it  impossible  for  us  to 
hold  our  disadvantageous  positions  round  Kroonstad. 
We  had  also  to  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that 


^  Township.  ^  Police  Agent. 

86 


ENGLISH  SWARM  OVER  OUR  COUNTRY 


my  commando  could  not  reach  the  town  before  the 
following  day.  Whilst  we  were  still  talking,  news  ar- 
rived that  there  was  a  strong  force  of  cavalry  on  the 
banks  of  the  Valsch  River,  six  miles  from  Kroonstad, 
and  that  it  was  rapidly  approaching  the  town. 

On  hearing  this,  I  hastened  back  to  the  south  of 
the  township,  where  a  body  of  Kroonstad  burghers 
had  off-saddled,  and  I  ordered  them  to  get  into  their 
saddles  immediately,  and  ride  with  me  to  meet  the 
enemy.  In  less  time  than  it  takes  to  describe  it,  we 
were  off.  As  we  drew  near  to  the  English  we  saw 
they  had  taken  up  a  very  good  position.  The  sun 
had  already  set,  and  nothing  could  be  done  save  to 
exchange  a  few  shots  with  the  enemy.  So,  after  I 
had  ordered  my  men  to  post  themselves  on  the 
enemy's  front  till  the  following  morning,  I  rode  back 
to  Kroonstad. 

When  I  arrived  there,  I  found  that  the  last  of  the 
Transvaal  commandos  had  already  retreated  through 
the  town  and  made  for  the  north.  I  at  once  sent 
orders  to  the  burghers,  whom  I  had  just  left,  to  aban- 
don their  positions,  and  to  prepare  themselves  to  de- 
part by  train  to  Rhenosterriviersbrug. 

At  Kroonstad  there  was  not  a  single  burgher  left. 
Only  the  inhabitants  of  the  township  remained,  and 
they  were  but  too  ready  to  "hands-up." 

One  of  these,  however,  was  of  a  different  mould, 
I  refer  to  Veldtcornet  Thring,  who  had  arrived  with 
me  at  Kroonstad  that  morning,  but  who  had  suddenly 
fallen  ill.  On  the  day  following  he  was  a  prisoner  in 
the  hands  of  the  English. 

Thring  was  an  honourable  man  in  every  way.  Al- 
though an  Englishman  by  birth,  he  was  at  heart  an 
Afrikander,  for  he  had  accepted  the  Orange  Free 
State  as  his  second  fatherland.  Like  many  another 
Englishman,  he  had  become  a  fellow-citizen  of  ours, 
and  had  enjoyed  the  fat  of  the  land.  But  now,  trusty 
burgher  that  he  was,  he  had  drawn  his  sword  to  de- 
fend the  burghers'  rights. 

87 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


His  earliest  experiences  were  with  the  Kroonstad 
burghers,  who  went  down  into  Natal ;  later  on  he 
fought  under  me  at  Sauna's  Post  and  Mostertshoek, 
and  took  part  in  the  siege  of  Colonel  Dalgety  at  Jam- 
mersbergsdrift.  He  had  stood  at  my  side  at  Thaba' 
Nchu  and  on  the  banks  of  the  Zand  River.  I  had 
always  found  him  the  most  willing  and  reliable  of  offi- 
cers, and  he  had  won  the  respect  and  trust  of  every 
man  who  knew  him. 

He  was  faithful  to  the  end.  Although  he  might 
well  have  joined  our  enemies,  he  preferred  to  set  the 
seal  of  fidelity  upon  his  life  by  his  imprisonment. 
Long  may  he  live  to  enjoy  the  trust  of  the  Afrikander 
people ! 

I  remained  late  that  evening  in  the  town.  It  was 
somewhat  risky  to  do  so,  as  the  place  was  full  of  Eng- 
lish inhabitants,  and  of  Afrikanders  who  did  not  fa- 
vour our  cause.  In  fact,  I  was  surrounded  by  men 
who  would  have  been  only  too  pleased  to  do  me  an 
injury. 

I  said  farewell  to  Kroonstad  at  ten  o'clock  that  night, 
and  was  carried  to  Rhenosterriviersbrug,  thirty-four 
miles  from  Kroonstad,  by  the  last  train  that  left  the 
town.  But  before  I  departed,  I  took  care  that  the 
bridge  over  the  Valsch  River  should  be  destroyed  by 
dynamite. 

In  the  meantime,  those  portions  of  the  Heilbron 
and  Kroonstad  commandos  which  had  gone  into  Na- 
tal at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  received  orders  to  leave 
the  Drakensberg.  Obeying  these  orders  they  joined 
me,  and,  with  my  other  troops,  had  occupied  splendid 
positions  on  either  side  of  the  railway  line.  Comman- 
dant General  Louis  Botha  was  also  there  with  his 
Transvaal  burghers,  having  arrived  in  the  Free  State 
a  few  days  previously.  Captain  Danie  Theron  was 
still  with  me  as  my  trustworthy  scout,  and  he  con- 
stantly kept  me  informed  of  Lord  Roberts'  move- 
ments. 

For  a  few  days  Lord  Roberts  remained  at  Kroon- 

88 


ENGLISH  SWARM  OVER  OUR  COUNTRY 


stad,  but  about  the  i8th  of  May  he  again  began  to 
move  his  enormous  forces.  He  sent  out  four  divis- 
ions. The  first  he  despatched  from  Kroonstad  to  Heil- 
bron  ;  the  second  from  Lindley  to  the  same  destina- 
tion ;  the  third  from  Kroonstad  to  Vredefort  and  Parijs, 
and  the  fourth  from  Kroonstad  along  the  railway  line. 

The  two  Governments  had  agreed  that  Comman- 
dant General  Louis  Botha  should  cross  the  Vaal  River, 
and  that  we  Free-Staters  should  remain  behind  in  our 
own  country.  And  this  was  carried  out,  with  our  full 
approval. 

The  Governments  had  also  decided  that  even  if  the 
English  entered  the  Transvaal,  the  Free  State  com- 
mandos were  not  to  follow  them.  I  had  long  ago 
wished  that  something  of  this  nature  should  be  ar- 
ranged, so  that  we  might  not  only  have  forces  in  front 
of  the  enemy,  but  also  in  their  rear.  Thus  the  orders 
of  the  Governments  exactly  coincided  with  my  desires. 

Lest  any  one  should  think  that  the  Transvaalers  and 
the  Free  -  Staters  separated  here  on  account  of  a 
squabble,  or  because  they  found  that  they  could  not 
work  harmoniously  together,  let  me  state  that  this  de- 
cision was  arrived  at  for  purely  strategic  reasons.  We 
had  now  been  reduced  to  a  third  of  the  original  num- 
ber of  forty-five  thousand  burghers  with  which  we  had 
started  the  campaign.  This  reduction  was  due  partly 
to  Cronje's  surrender,  and  partly  to  the  fact  that  many 
of  our  men  had  returned  to  their  farms.  How,  then, 
could  we  think  of  making  a  stand,  with  our  tiny 
forces,  against  two  hundred  and  forty  thousand  men, 
with  three  or  four  hundred  guns?  All  we  could  do 
was  to  make  the  best  of  every  little  chance  we  got  of 
hampering  the  enemy.  If  fortune  should  desert  us,  it 
only  remained  to  flee. 

To  flee — what  could  be  more  bitter  than  that  ?  Ah  ! 
many  a  time  when  I  was  forced  to  yield  to  the  enemy, 
I  felt  so  degraded  that  I  could  scarcely  look  a  child 
in  the  face  !  Did  I  call  myself  a  man  ?  I  asked  my- 
self, and  if  so,  why  did  I  run  away  ?    No  one  can 

89 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


guess  the  horror  which  overcame  me  when  I  had  to 
retreat,  or  to  order  others  to  do  so — there  !  I  have 
poured  out  my  whole  soul.  If  I  did  fly,  it  was  only 
because  one  man  cannot  stand  against  twelve. 

After  the  Transvaalers  had  crossed  the  Vaal  River, 
I  took  twelve  hundred  men  to  Heilbron,  where  there 
was  already  a  party  of  my  burghers.  General  Roux 
with  other  Free-Staters  was  stationed  east  of  Senekal, 
and  the  remainder  of  our  forces  lay  near  Lindley.  But 
the  commandos  from  Vrede  and  Harrismith,  with 
part  of  the  Bethlehem  commando,  still  remained  as 
watchers  on  the  Drakensberg. 

When  I  arrived  at  Heilbron,  late  at  night,  I  re- 
ceived a  report  that  fighting  was  taking  place  on  the 
Rhenoster  River,  between  Heilbron  and  Lindley,  and 
that  General  J.  B.  Wessels  and  Commandant  Steene- 
kamp  had  been  driven  back.  But  on  the  following 
morning,  when  the  outposts  came  in,  they  stated  that 
they  had  seen  nothing  of  this  engagement.  I  imme- 
diately sent  out  scouts,  but  hardly  had  they  gone,  be- 
fore one  of  them  came  galloping  back  with  the  news 
that  the  enemy  had  approached  quite  close  to  the 
town.  It  was  impossible  for  me  to  oppose  a  force  of 
five  or  six  thousand  men  on  the  open  plain  ;  and  I 
could  not  move  to  suitable  positions,  for  that  would 
involve  having  the  women  and  children  behind  me 
when  the  enemy  were  bombarding  me.  I  had  there- 
fore to  be  off  without  a  moment's  delay.  I  had  not 
even  time  to  send  my  wife  and  my  children  into  a  place 
of  safety. 

Our  whole  stock  of  ammunition  was  on  the  rail  at 
Wolvehoek.  I  had  given  orders  to  Mr.  Sarel  Wessels, 
who  had  charge  of  the  ammunition,  to  hold  himself 
in  readiness  to  proceed  with  it  by  rail,  through  the 
Transvaal,  to  Greylingstad  as  soon  as  he  received  or- 
ders to  do  so. 

But  now  the  ammunition  could  not  remain  there, 
as  Sir  Redvers  Buller  was  gaining  ground  day  by  day 
towards  the  veldt  on  the  Natal  frontier  and  the  am- 

90 


ENGLISH    SWARM  OVER  OUR  COUNTRY 


munition  would  thus  be  in  danger  of  being  taken. 
Therefore  there  was  nothing  left  for  me  but  to  get  it 
through  by  way  of  Greylingstad  Station.  It  had  to 
be  done,  and, — I  had  no  carriages  by  which  I  could 
convey  it,  as  I  had  not  sufficient  hands  to  take  carriages 
from  the  trucks.^  'There  was  only  one  way  (course) 
open  ;  the  commandos  from  Smithfield,  Wepener  and 
Bethulie  still  had,  contrary  to  the  Kroonstad  resolu- 
tion, carriages  with  them  at  Frankfort ;  I  hastened  to 
that  village  and  sent  the  necessary  number  of  these 
carriages  under  a  strong  escort,  to  fetch  the  ammuni- 
tion from  Greylingstad. 

In  order  to  do  this  responsible  work  I  required  a 
man  whom  I  could  trust.  Captain  Danie  Theron 
was  no  longer  with  me,  because  he,  being  a  Transvaaler, 
had  gone  with  General  Louis  Botha.  But  there  was 
another  :  Gideon  J.  Scheepers.^  To  him  I  entrusted 
the  task  of  reconnoitring  the  British,  so  that  the  car- 
riages which  were  going  to  fetch  the  ammunition 
could  do  in  safety  what  they  were  required  to  do,  and 
I  knew  that  he  would  do  it. 

*  Railway  trucks. 

Everyone  will  know  him,  this  brave  man  of  pure  Afrikander  blood,  subse- 
quently  a  famous  Commander,  a  martyr.  I  appointed  him  Captain  of  Scouts, 
and  from  the  moment  that  he  commenced  his  work  I  saw  that  a  Dian  had  come 
forward.  It  was  sad  to  think  in  what  manner  such  a  man  was  deprived  of  his 
life.  I  shall  speak  more  of  him  later  on,  for,  as  our  proverb  says,  "I  had 
eaten  too  much  salt  "  to  pass  over  his  career  unnoticed. 


91 


CHAPTER  XIII 


Our  Position  at  the  End  of  May,  1900 

ONCE  more  it  became  necessary  that  the  seat  of 
Government  should  be  changed,  and  towards 
the  latter  part  of  May  our  administrative  headquarters 
were  established  at  a  place  between  Frankfort  and 
Heilbron.  The  object  of  our  Government  in  choos- 
ing this  position  was  to  be  able  to  keep  up  telegraphic 
communication  with  the  Transvaal.  And  their  choice 
was  soon  to  be  justified,  for  after  Johannesburg  had 
been  taken  on  May  31st  and  Pretoria  on  July  5th, 
the  only  telegraphic  connexion  between  the  Free 
State  and  the  South  African  Republic  was  via  Frank- 
fort, Greylingstad  and  Middlesburg.  The  terminus, 
at  the  Transvaal  end,  was  situated  not  far  from 
Pretoria. 

But,  for  the  moment,  it  looked  as  if  fortune  were 
again  going  to  smile  on  us,  after  our  long  spell  of  ill 
luck.  On  May  the  31st  Lindley  and  its  garrison  of 
Yeomanry  fell  into  the  hands  of  General  Piet  de  Wet. 
The  Yeomanry  lost  heavily,  and  five  hundred  of  them, 
including,  as  I  was  told,  several  noblemen,  were  taken 
prisoner.  These  were  the  last  prisoners  of  war  that 
we  were  able  to  send  into  the  South  African  Republic. 
Soon  afterwards,  when  Pretoria  was  on  the  point  of 
falling  into  the  enemy's  hands,  the  prisoners  there  had 
to  be  sent  further  east,  but — owing  either  to  the 
stupidity  of  the  Transvaal  Government,  or  to  the 
treachery  of  the  guards — a  great  many  of  them  were 
left  behind  for  Lord  Roberts  to  release  and  re-arm 
against  us.  Our  burghers  grumbled  much  at  this, 
and  blamed  the  negligence  of  the  Transvaalera 

92 


OUR  POSITION  AT  END  OF  MAY,  1900 


Before  we  had  had  time  to  get  the  captured  Yeo- 
manry through  into  the  Transvaal,  Sir  Redvers  Buller 
had  forced  his  way  over  the  Natal  frontier,  crossing 
the  Drakensberg  between  Botha's  Pass  and  Laing's 
Nek.  This  event,  which  happened  on  June  the  1 7th, 
caused  yet  another  panic  among  our  commandos. 

''We  are  now,"  they  said,  ''surrounded  on  all  sides. 
Resistance  and  escape  are  equally  impossible  for  us." 

Never  during  the  whole  course  of  the  war  were 
President  Steyn  and  I  so  full  of  care  and  anxiety  as 
at  this  time.  With  Buller  across  our  frontier,  and  the 
enemy  within  the  walls  of  Johannesburg  and  Pretoria, 
it  was  as  much  as  we  could  do  to  continue  the  contest 
at  all.  However  brave  and  determined  many  of  our 
burghers  and  officers  might  be,  and,  in  fact,  were,  our 
numerical  weakness  was  a  fact  that  was  not  to  be 
got  over,  and  might  prove  an  insuperable  obstacle  to 
our  success.  Moreover,  the  same  thing  was  now  go- 
ing on  in  the  Transvaal  after  the  capture  of  Pretoria, 
as  we  had  witnessed  in  the  Free  State  after  the  fall  of 
Bloemfontein — nearly  all  the  burghers  were  leaving 
their  commandos  and  going  back  to  their  farms. 
Plenty  of  officers,  but  no  troops  !  This  was  the  pass 
to  which  we  were  come. 

It  was  only  the  remembrance  of  how  the  tide  had 
turned  in  the  Free  State  that  gave  us  the  strength  to 
hold  out  any  longer. 

President  Steyn  and  I  sent  telegram  after  telegram 
to  the  Government  and  to  the  chief  officers,  encour- 
aging them  to  stand  fast.  Meanwhile  the  two  Gen- 
erals, De  la  Rey  and  Louis  Botha,  were  giving  us  all 
a  splendid  example  of  fortitude.  Gazing  into  the 
future  unmoved,  and  facing  it  as  it  were  with  clenched 
teeth,  they  prosecuted  the  war  with  invincible  deter- 
mination. 

*         *         -jt         *  * 

That  the  reader  may  the  better  appreciate  the  actual 
condition  of  our  affairs  at  this  time,  I  think  it  well 
to  make  a  short  statement  as  to  the  various  districts 

93 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


of  the  Orange  Free  State,  and  the  number  of  men 
in  each  on  whom  we  could  still  rely  ! 

The  burghers  of  Philippolis  and  Kaapstad  had 
surrendered  en  masse  to  the  English.  In  the  first 
named  of  these  districts,  only  Gordon  Eraser  and 
Norval,  in  the  second  only  Cornelius  du  Preez  and 
another,  whose  name  has  escaped  my  memory,  re- 
mained loyal  to  our  cause.  I  mention  these  men 
here,  because  their  faithfulness  redounds  to  their  ever- 
lasting honour. 

In  the  district  of  Boshof,  we  could  still  reckon  on 
Veldtcornet  Badenhorst,^  and  twenty-seven  men. 

Jacobsdal  was  represented  by  Commandant  Preto- 
rius  (who  had  succeeded  Commandant  Lubbe,  after 
the  latter  had  been  wounded  and  taken  prisoner  at 
Tabaksberg),  and  forty  men. 

In  the  district  of  Fauresmith,  Commandant  Visser 
and  some  seventy  men  had  remained  faithful. 

In  Bethulie,  Commandant  Du  Plooij,  with  nearly  a 
hundred  men,  were  still  in  arms. 

Bloemfontein  was  represented  by  Commandant  Piet 
Fourie  and  two  hundred  burghers. 

The  commandos  of  Rouxville,  Smithfield,  Wepener 
and  Ladybrand,  fell  far  short  of  their  full  comple- 
ment of  men,  as  a  great  number  had  remained  behind 
at  home. 

Of  the  burghers  from  Winburg,  Kroonstad  and 
Heilbron,  many  had  already  laid  down  their  arms,  and 
the  drain  upon  our  troops  in  these  districts  was  still 
continuing. 

None  of  the  burghers  belonging  to  the  districts  of 
Ficksburg,  Bethlehem,^  Harrismith  and  Vrede  had 
yet  surrendered — their  turn  was  to  come. 

All  told,  we  were  8,000  burghers. 

After  my  men  had  gone  northwards,  those  burghers 
of  Hoopstad,  Jacobsdal,  Fauresmith,  Philippolis,  Be- 

^  Afterwards  Commandant,  and,  still  later,  Assistant  Commander-in-Chief. 
'  At  the  conclusion  of  peace  it  was  the  Bethlehem  commando  which  had  the 
greatest  number  of  burghers  under  arms. 

94 


OUR  POSITION  AT  END  OF  MAY,  1900 

thulie,  Smithfield,  Rouxville,  Wepener,  Bloemfontein 
and  the  southern  part  of  Ladybrand,  who  had  laid 
down  their  arms  and  remained  at  home  between  the 
beginning  of  March  and  the  end  of  May,  were  left 
undisturbed  by  Lord  Roberts — so  far  as  their  private 
liberty  was  concerned. 


I  was  now  camped  at  Frankfort,  waiting  for  the 
ammunition,  which  ought  to  have  already  arrived 
from  Greylingstad  Station.  It  was  about  this  time 
that  the  Government  decided,  on  the  recommendation 
of  some  of  the  officers,  that  the  rank  of  Vechtgeneraal 
should  be  abolished.  In  consequence  of  this  decision 
all  the  officers  of  that  rank  resigned.  I  did  not  ap- 
prove of  this  course  of  action,  and  obtained  from  the 
Government  the  rank  of  Assistant  Commander-in- 
Chief.  I  was  thus  able  to  re-appoint  the  old  Vecht- 
generaals,  Piet  de  Wet,  C.  C.  Froneman,  Philip  Botha 
and  Paul  Roux,  and  I  at  once  proceeded  to  do  so. 


95 


CHAPTER  XIV 


Roodewal 


HE  ammunition  arrived  safely,  and  towards  the 


J[  end  of  May  I  made  my  way  to  a  certain  hill, 
some  twelve  miles  from  Heilbron,  to  which  we  had 
given  the  name  of  Presidentskopje,  and  where  Com- 
mandants Steenekamp  and  J.  H.  Olivier  were  posted. 

Here  I  left  the  greater  part  of  my  commandos.  But 
I  myself,  on  the  2nd  of  June,  set  out  in  the  direction 
of  Roodewal  Station,  taking  with  me  six  hundred 
burghers,  mounted  on  the  best  horses  that  were  to  be 
obtained.  I  reached  the  farm  of  Leeuwfontein  the 
same  night,  and  found  it  an  excellent  place  in  which 
to  hide  my  men  out  of  sight  of  the  Heilbron  garrison. 
The  farm  stood  about  nine  miles  to  the  south  of  that 
town. 

The  following  evening  we  moved  on  as  far  as 
Smithsdrift,  which  is  a  drift  on  the  road  from  Heil- 
bron to  Kroonstad.    There  again  I  concealed  my  men. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  next  day,  June  the  4th, 
news  was  brought  me  that  a  convoy  was  on  its  way 
to  Heilbron  from  Rhenoster  River.  This  convoy  en- 
camped that  evening  at  the  distance  of  a  mile  from  the 
farm  of  Zwavelkrans  ;  the  spot  chosen  was  about  five 
hundred  paces  from  the  Rhenoster  River,  and  quite 
unprotected. 

Before  sunrise  I  sent  a  party  of  burghers  down  to 
the  river,  some  five  hundred  paces  from  where  the 
convoy  was  encamped,  and  by  daybreak  we  had  en- 
tirely surrounded  the  enemv. 

No  sooner  had  the  sun  appeared  than  I  despatched 
a  burgher  with  a  white  flag  to  the  English  officer  in 


ROODEWAL. 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


command.  I  ordered  my  messenger  to  inform  the 
officer  that  he  was  surrounded,  that  escape  was  out  of 
the  question,  and  that  if  he  wished  to  avoid  unneces- 
sary bloodshed,  his  only  course  was  to  surrender. 

On  hearing  this  one  of  their  men  came  to  me  with 
the  object  of  demanding  certain  conditions.  It  goes 
without  saying  that  my  answer  was — "  Unconditional 
surrender !  " 

He  asked  for  time  to  communicate  this  to  the  officer 
in  command.  I  granted  this  request,  and  he  returned 
to  the  convoy. 

We  were  not  left  in  suspense  for  long.  The  white 
flag  was  hoisted  almost  immediately,  and  two  hundred 
BergschotteUy  ^  with  fifty-six  heavily  laden  waggons, 
fell  into  our  hands. 

Fortunately,  all  this  occurred  out  of  sight  of 
Roodewal  Station  and  Heilbron,  and,  as  not  a  single 
shot  had  been  fired,  I  had  no  reason  so  far  to  fear  that 
there  was  any  obstacle  in  the  way  of  my  main  project — 
the  capture  of  the  valuable  booty  at  Roodewal. 

I  at  once  returned  with  my  capture  to  the  spot 
where  we  had  been  the  previous  night.  General 
Philip  Botha  conducted  the  prisoners  and  the  booty 
fo  the  President's  camp,  returning  to  our  laager  on  the 
following  morning. 

On  the  evening  of  the  6th  of  June  I  started  on  my 
road  to  Roodewal.  At  Walfontein  I  divided  my 
troops  into  three  parties.  The  first  party,  consisting 
of  three  hundred  men  with  one  Krupp,  I  despatched 
under  Commandant  Steenekamp  to  Vredefort  Road 
Station,  with  orders  to  attack  it  the  following  day  at 
sunrise.  General  Froneman,  with  Commandants  Nel 
and  Du  Plooij,  were  in  command  of  the  second  party, 
which  consisted  of  three  hundred  burghers,  with  two 
Krupps  and  one  quick-firing  gun.  My  orders  were 
that,  at  daybreak,  they  were  to  attack  an  English  camp 
which  was  lying  a  mile  to  the  north  of  the  railway 
station  at  Rhenoster  River,  and  close  to  some  brick- 

*  Highlanders. 
98 


ROODEWAL 


coloured  ridges.  The  third  party  I  commanded  my- 
self. It  consisted  of  Commandant  Fourie  and  eighty 
burghers,  with  one  Krupp ;  and  with  this  force  I 
pushed  on  to  Roodewal  Station. 

At  Doorndraai  I  left  behind  me  a  few  waggons, 
with  twenty  men  to  guard  them.  I  had  previously 
stationed  a  hundred  burghers  there,  with  the  object  of 
keeping  in  touch  with  the  enemy. 

The  information  which  Captain  Scheepers  had 
gained  while  scouting  was  amply  sufficient  to  show 
me  how  the  land  lay. 

Although  I  had  heard  that  there  were  not  more  than 
fifty  of  the  enemy  at  Vredefort  Road  Station,  I  had 
nevertheless  sent  three  hundred  burghers  there.  This 
was  because  I  was  aware  that  the  main  English  force 
lay  to  the  north  of  the  station,  so  that  these  fifty  men 
might  be  reinforced  at  the  shortest  possible  notice. 
The  numbers  which  General  Froneman  had  to  en- 
counter were  much  greater,  and  the  enemy  held  safe 
positions.  But  as  General  Froneman  was  himself 
able  to  take  quite  as  good  positions,  I  only  gave  him 
the  same  number  of  troops  as  I  had  assigned  to  Com- 
mandant Steenekamp.  I  also  gave  orders  that  two 
guns  should  proceed  with  him. 

I  was  informed  that  there  were  only  one  hundred 
of  the  English  at  Roodewal,  but  that  these  hundred 
were  very  securely  entrenched.  My  information  was, 
however,  at  fault,  for  I  discovered  later  on  that  there 
were  at  least  double  that  number. 

I  arrived  at  Roodewal  very  early  in  the  morning  of 
the  7th  of  June.  I  brought  my  men  up  to  within 
eight  hundred  paces  of  the  station,  and  ordered  them 
to  unharness  the  horses  which  were  attached  to  the 
Krupp,  and  to  place  it  in  position. 

But  listen  !  There  is  the  crack  of  rifles  in  the  dis- 
tance !  That  must  be  the  sound  of  the  enemy's  fire 
on  General  Froneman.  Again,  and  yet  again,  the 
sound  meets  my  ears.    Then  all  is  quiet  once  more. 

It  was  still  two  hours  before  the  sun  would  rise,  and 

99 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


I  took  full  advantage  of  the  opportunities  which  the 
darkness  gave  me.  I  ordered  four  of  my  burghers  to 
approach  as  close  to  the  station  as  was  possible,  and 
to  find  out  everything  they  could  about  the  enemy's 
position.  Following  my  directions,  they  crept  with 
extreme  caution  towards  the  English  lines,  until  only 
a  hundred  paces  separated  them  from  the  station. 
They  returned  before  it  was  light,  and  brought  back 
word  that  unless  the  enemy  had  thrown  up  unusually 
high  schanzes,  there  must  be  an  untold  quantity  of 
provisions  piled  up  there.  Everything  had  been  very 
quiet,  and  they  had  seen  no  one  stirring. 

The  day  now  began  to  dawn,  and  as  soon  as  it  was 
light  I  sent  a  message  to  the  enemy  demanding  their 
surrender.    The  answer  came  back  at  once.    On  the 
back  of  my  note  these  words  had  been  written  : 
We  refuse  to  surrender." 

I  instantly  opened  a  hot  fire  upon  them,  bringing 
the  Krupp  as  well  as  the  Mausers  into  action.  But 
the  reply  of  the  enemy  was  no  less  severe. 

We  had  no  cover.  There  was  only  a  shallow  pan^ 
— so  shallow  that  it  scarcely  afforded  protection  to  the 
horses'  hoofs  !  A  thousand  paces  to  the  north-west 
of  the  railway  I  had  observed  a  deep  pan  where  the 
horses  would  have  had  better  cover,  but  even  there 
our  men  would  have  been  just  as  exposed  as  they  now 
were.  I  had  decided  against  taking  up  my  position 
in  this  pail,  because  I  should  have  been  obliged  to 
cross  the  line  to  reach  it,  and  in  doing  so  should  have 
run  the  risk  of  being  observed  by  the  English. 

Thus  it  was  that  the  burghers  were  compelled  to  lie 
flat  down  in  order  to  afford  as  little  mark  as  possible 
to  the  enemy.  But  the  men  who  served  the  Krupp 
were  naturally  unable  to  do  this ;  and,  seeing  that  the 
gun  must  be  moved,  I  gave  this  order :  Inspan  the 
gun,  gallop  it  three  thousand  paces  back  ;  then  blaze 
away  again  as  fiercely  as  you  can  ! " 

Under  a  hail  of  bullets  the  horses  were  attached  to 

^  A  pond  which  only  contains  water  during  "the  rains." 
lOO 


ROODEWAL 


the  gun.  Whilst  this  was  being  done,  I  ordered  my 
men  to  fire  upon  the  English  entrenchments  with 
redoubled  energy,  and  thus,  if  possible,  prevent  the 
enemy  from  taking  careful  aim. 

Incredible  though  it  may  appear,  Captain  Muller 
got  the  gun  away  without  a  single  man  or  horse  being 
hit.  When  he  had  covered  three  thousand  paces,  he 
halted,  and  turning  the  Krupp  on  the  enemy,  he  shelled 
them  with  good  effect. 

At  about  ten  o'clock,  General  Froneman  succeeded 
in  forcing  the  English  troops  which  he  had  attacked  to 
surrender.  I  therefore  ordered  the  two  Krupps  which 
he  had  with  him  to  be  brought  up  with  the  utmost 
despatch.  At  half-past  seven  they  arrived,  and  imme- 
diately opened  fire  on  the  English. 

When  the  enemy  had  been  under  the  fire  of  three 
guns  and  eighty  Mausers  for  an  hour,  they  thought  it 
best  to  hoist  the  white  flag.  W^e  accordingly  ceased 
firing,  and  I  rode  out  towards  the  station.  Before  I 
had  reached  it,  I  was  met  by  two  of  the  officers.  They 
told  me  that  they  were  willing  to  surrender,  on  condi- 
tion that  they  were  allowed  to  retain  their  private 
property  and  the  mail  bags,  for  it  appeared  that  there 
were  two  English  mails  under  their  charge. 

I  replied  that  so  far  as  their  private  belongings  were 
concerned,  they  were  welcome  to  keep  them,  as  I  never 
allowed  the  personal  property  of  my  prisoners  to  be 
tampered  with  in  my  presence.^  But  I  told  them  that 
the  letters  were  a  different  matter,  and  that  I  could  not 
allow  them  to  reach  their  destination — unless  they  were 
directed  to  a  bonfire  ! 

There  was  nothing  left  for  the  officers  to  do,  except 
to  agree  to  my  terms  then  and  there  ;  for  had  they  hes- 
itated even  for  a  moment,  I  should  certainly  have 
stormed  the  station. 

*  The  Uitschudden  (stripping)  of  the  enemy  had  not  become  necessary  at  that 
date.  I  can  say  for  myself  that  when,  at  a  later  period,  it  came  into  practice,  I 
never  witnessed  it  with  any  satisfaction.  Yet  what  could  the  burghers  do  but 
help  themselves  to  the  orisoners'  clothing,  when  England  had  put  a  stop  to  our 
imports,  and  cut  off  all  our  supplies? 

lOI 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


But  they  wisely  surrendered. 

On  our  arrival  at  the  station,  we  were  all  filled  with 
wonder  at  the  splendid  entrenchments  the  English  had 
constructed  from  bales  of  cotton,  blankets  and  post- 
bags.  These  entrenchments  had  been  so  effectual 
that  the  enemy's  loss  was  only  twenty-seven  killed 
and  wounded — a  remarkably  small  number,  when  it 
is  remembered  that  we  took  two  hundred  of  them 
prisoners. 

I  had  expected  that  our  booty  would  be  large,  and 
my  expectations  were  more  than  realized.  To  begin 
with,  there  were  the  bales  of  clothing  that  the  Eng- 
lish had  used  as  entrenchments.  Then  there  were 
hundreds  of  cases  of  necessaries  of  every  description. 
Of  ammunition,  also,  there  was  no  lack,  and  amongst 
it  there  were  projectiles  for  the  Naval  guns,  with 
which  Lord  Roberts  had  intended  to  bombard  Pre- 
toria. 

Some  of  the  burghers  attempted  to  lift  these  gigan- 
tic shells,  but  it  took  more  than  one  man  to  move 
them. 

I  read  in  the  newspapers  afterwards  that  I  had  in- 
flicted a  loss  of  three  quarters  of  a  million  sterling  on 
the  English  Government — let  that  give  the  extent  of 
my  capture. 

But  at  that  moment  we  did  not  realize  how  much 
harm  we  had  done  to  them.  We  had  little  time  for 
anything  which  did  not  directly  forward  our  cause.  I 
was,  however,  very  sorry  that  I  could  not  carry  away 
with  me  the  blankets  and  boots  which  we  found  in 
large  quantities,  for  they  would  have  been  most  valu- 
able for  winter  use.  But  there  was  no  time  for  this, 
as  the  English  held  the  railway  and  could  at  any  mo- 
ment bring  up  reinforcements  from  Bloemfontein, 
from  Kroonstad,  or  from  Pretoria.  So,  as  I  could  not , 
take  the  booty  away  with  me,  I  was  obliged  to  consign 
it  to  the  flames. 

But  before  I  did  this  I  gave  the  burghers  permission 
to  open  the  post-bags,  and  to  take  what  they  liked  out 

I02 


ROODEWAL 


of  them.  For  in  these  bags  there  were  useful  articles 
of  every  description,  such  as  underclothing,  stockings, 
cigars  and  cigarettes. 

Very  soon  every  one  was  busy  with  the  post-bags — 
as  if  each  burgher  had  been  suddenly  transformed  into 
a  most  zealous  postmaster  ! 

Whilst  my  men  were  thus  pleasantly  occupied,  two 
prisoners  asked  me  if  I  would  not  allow  them  also  to 
open  the  post-bags,  and  to  investigate  their  contents. 
I  told  them  to  take  just  what  they  fancied,  for  every- 
thing that  was  left  would  be  burnt. 

It  was  a  very  amusing  sight  to  see  the  soldiers  thus 
robbing  their  own  mail !  They  had  such  a  large  choice 
that  they  soon  became  too  dainty  to  consider  even  a 
plum-pudding  worth  looking  at ! 

Although  I  had  ordered  my  men  to  wreck  the 
bridges  both  to  the  north  and  to  the  south  of  us,  I 
still  did  not  feel  secure — any  delay  on  our  part  was 
fraught  with  danger,  and  the  sooner  we  were  off  the 
better. 

But  before  we  could  start,  I  had  to  find  some 
method  of  removing  the  ammunition  which  I  wished 
to  take  with  me.  Since  I  possessed  no  waggons  avail- 
able for  this  purpose,  my  only  course  was  to 
order  my  burghers  to  carry  away  the  quantity  re- 
quired. But  my  burghers  were  busily  engaged  in 
looting. 

Those  who  have  had  any  experience  of  our  com- 
mandos will  not  need  to  be  told  that  it  was  a  difficult 
task  to  get  any  men  to  help  me  in  the  work.  I  did 
succeed,  however,  in  dragging  a  few  of  the  burghers 
away  from  the  post-bags.  But  the  spirit  of  loot  was 
upon  them,  and  I  was  almost  powerless.  Even  when 
I  had  induced  a  burgher  to  work,  he  was  off  to  the 
post-bags  again  the  instant  my  back  was  turned,  and  I 
had  to  go  and  hunt  him  up,  or  else  to  find  some  other 
man  to  do  the  work.  Yet,  in  spite  of  this,  I  suc- 
ceeded in  removing  the  gun  and  Lee-Metford  ammu- 
nition.   We  carried  away  some  six  hundred  cases  of 

103 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


this  ammunition,^  and  hid  it  at  a  spot  about  three  hun- 
dred paces  from  the  station. 

When  the  sun  set,  the  burghers  were  again  on  the 
march.    But  what  a  curious  spectacle  they  presented  ! 

Each  man  had  loaded  his  horse  so  heavily  with 
goods  that  there  was  no  room  for  himself  on  the 
saddle ;  he  had,  therefore,  to  walk,  and  lead  his  horse 
by  the  bridle.  And  how  could  it  be  otherwise  ?  For 
the  burghers  had  come  from  a  shop  where  no  money 
was  demanded,  and  none  paid  ! 

But  the  most  amusing  thing  of  all  was  to  watch  the 

Tommies "  when  I  gave  them  the  order  to  march. 
The  poor  Veldtcornet,  who  was  entrusted  with  the 
task  of  conducting  them  to  our  camp,  had  his  hands 
full  when  he  tried  to  get  them  away  from  the  booty; 
and  when  at  last  he  succeeded,  the  soldiers  carried 
such  enormous  loads,  that  one  could  almost  fancy  that 
every  man  of  them  was  going  to  open  a  store.  But 
they  could  not  carry  such  burdens  for  long,  and  soon 
they  were  obliged  to  diminish  their  bulk,  thus  leaving 
a  trail  of  parcels  to  mark  the  road  they  had  taken  ! 

And  now  it  was  time  for  the  fire  to  do  its  work, 
and  I  ordered  fifteen  men  to  set  the  great  heap  of 
booty  alight.  The  flames  burst  out  everywhere  simul- 
taneously— our  task  was  completed. 

In  an  instant  we  had  mounted  our  horses  and  were 
off. 

When  we  had  covered  fifteen  hundred  paces,  we 
heard  the  explosion  of  the  first  shells,  and  wheeled 
round  to  view  the  conflagration.  The  night  was  very 
dark,  and  this  rendered  the  sight  that  met  our  eyes 
still  more  imposing.  It  was  the  most  beautiful  dis- 
play of  fireworks  that  I  have  ever  seen. 

One  could  hear,  between  the  thunder  of  the  big 
bombs,  the  dull  report  of  exploding  cordite.  Mean- 
while the  dark  sky  was  resplendent  with  the  red  glow 
of  the  flames. 

'  At  this  time  the  burghers  were  beginning  to  use  tlie  rifles  which  they  had 
taken  from  the  enemy, 

104 


ROODEWAL 


I  must  now  give  some  description  of  General 
Froneman's  engagement  to  the  north  of  Rhenoster- 
riviersbrug.^ 

The  firing  we  had  heard  before  sunrise  came  from 
the  English  outposts,  as  they  were  retreating  to  their 
camp.  The  burghers  and  the  Enghsh  had  both 
seized  positions  on  small  hills  and  in  abandoned  Kaffir 
kraals.^ 

Although  the  English  had  very  good  positions,  and 
out-numbered  our  men  by  two  to  one,  they  found  it 
impossible  to  hold  out  against  our  fire.  They  had  no 
guns,  whilst  we  possessed,  as  the  reader  knows,  two 
Krupps  and  a  quick-firing  gun,  which  latter  had  the 
same  effect  as  a  Maxim-Xordenfeldt.  Thus  the 
enemy  was  forced  to  surrender ;  and  five  hundred  of 
them  were  taken  prisoner,  among  whom  were  Cap- 
tain Wyndham  Knight  and  several  other  officers. 
Their  casualties  amounted  to  the  larcre  total  of  one 
hundred  and  seventy  killed  and  wounded,  Colonel 
Douglas  being  one  of  the  killed. 

Commandant  Steenekamp  had  also  met  with  suc- 
cess, for  he  had  captured  the  English  camp  at  Vrede- 
fortweg  Station,  and  taken  thirty  prisoners,  w^ithout 
firing  a  shot. 

Thus  we  had  made  eight  hundred  of  the  enemy  our 
prisoners,  and  destroyed  an  enormous  amount  of  their 
ammunition,  and  this  with  scarcely  any  loss  on  our 
side.  At  Roodewal  only  two  of  my  men  had  been 
wounded,  whilst  General  Froneman  had  lost  but  one 
killed — a  burgher  named  Myringen — and  two  slightly 
wounded. 

It  had  been  a  wonderful  day  for  us — a  day  not  easily 
forgotten. 

We  were  deeply  thankful  for  our  success.  Our 
only  regret  was  that  it  had  been  impossible  for  us  to 
keep  more  of  the  clothing  and  ammunition.  But 
although  we  had  not  been  able  to  retain  it,  neither  had 

*  Rhenoster  River  bridge. 

"  These  dated  back  to  the  time  of  Moselekatze  (Umzilygazi). 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


the  enemy.  It  was  winter,  and  we  had  managed  to 
burn  their  warm  clothing.  The  EngHsh  would  cer- 
tainly feel  the  want  of  it ;  and  some  time  must  elapse 
before  they  could  receive  a  fresh  supply  from  Europe. 

Undoubtedly  Lord  Roberts  would  be  very  angry 
with  me ;  but  I  consoled  myself  with  the  thought  that 
his  anger  would  soon  blow  over.  I  felt  sure  that  after 
calm  consideration  he  would  acknowledge  that  I  had 
been  altogether  within  my  rights,  and  that  he  had  been 
rather  unwise  in  heaping  together  at  one  place  so  large 
a  quantity  of  insufficiently  protected  stores.  He 
should  have  kept  his  supplies  at  Kroonstad,  or,  better 
still,  at  Bloemfontein,  until  he  had  reconstructed  all 
the  railway  bridges  which  we  had  blown  up  on  the 
line  to  Pretoria.  Lord  Roberts  had  already  begun  to 
trust  the  Free-Staters  too  much  ;  and  he  had  forgotten 
that,  whatever  else  we  may  have  been  thinking  about, 
never  for  a  single  moment  had  we  thought  of  surren- 
dering our  country. 

I  received  a  report  the  following  day  that  thirty 
English  troops  had  been  seen  eight  miles  to  the  west 
of  Roodewal,  and  moving  in  the  direction  of  Kroon- 
stad. I  despatched  General  Froneman  with  thirty  of 
the  burghers  to  fetch  them  in. 

The  next  day,  which  was  the  9th  of  June,  I  went 
with  our  prisoners  to  within  three  miles  of  the  railway, 
and  left  them  there  under  Veldtcornet  De  Vos,^  order- 
ing him  to  conduct  them  the  rest  of  the  way. 

It  was  now  my  duty  to  bring  away  the  ammunition 
which  I  had  left  at  Roodewal  and  to  put  it  into  some 
safe  place.  With  this  in  view,  I  sent  the  Comman- 
dants, when  night  had  fallen,  to  Roodewal,  each  with 
two  waggons,  and  ordered  them  to  bring  it  to  my  farm 
at  Roodepoort,  which  was  three  miles  away  from  the 
railway  bridge  over  the  Rhenoster  River. 

There  was  a  ford  near  my  farm  with  sandy  banks ; 
and  I  told  the  Commandants  to  bury  the  ammunition  * 
in  this  sand,  on  the  south  side  of  the  river,  and  to  ob- 

1  He  was  afterwards  appointed  Commandant. 
106 


ROODEWAL 


literate  all  traces  of  what  they  had  done  by  crossing 
and  re-crossing  the  spot  with  the  waggons.  I  found 
out  subsequently  that  the  Commandants  had  left  some 
of  the  ammunition  behind  at  Roodewal. 

Before  I  conclude  this  chapter  I  have  to  record  an 
event  which  filled  me  with  disgust. 

Veldtcornet  Hans  Smith,  of  Rouxville,  contrived  to 
have  a  conversation  with  Captain  Wyndham  Knight, 
who,  as  I  have  already  stated,  was  one  of  our  prisoners. 
The  Veldtcornet  obtained  from  him  a  free  pass  "  to 
Kroonstad  through  the  English  lines,  and  also  a  writ- 
ten request  to  the  British  authorities  there  to  allow 
him  and  twenty  burghers  to  proceed  without  hindrance 
to  Rouxville.  Alas  !  that  any  Free  State  officer 
should  be  capable  of  such  conduct ! 

Captain  Wyndham  Knight  will  be  held  in  high  es- 
teem by  all  who  truly  serve  their  country,  for  he  was 
a  man  who  never  deserted  the  cause  of  his  fatherland, 
no  matter  what  dangers  he  encountered. 

Veldtcornet  Hans  Smith  with  his  twenty  burghers 
decamped  on  the  night  of  the  loth  of  June,  but  some 
days  had  passed  before  I  discovered  the  mean  trick  he 
had  played. 

It  was  far  easier  to  fight  against  the  great  English 
army  than  against  this  treachery  among  my  own 
people,  and  an  iron  will  was  required  to  fight  against 
both  at  once.  But,  even  though  one  possessed  an  iron 
will,  such  events  caused  many  bitter  moments ;  they 
were  trials  which,  as  an  African  proverb  ^  says,  no 
single  man's  back  was  broad  enough  to  carry. 

*  Literally  the  proverb  runs  as  follows:  "There  are  some  trials  which  will 
not  sit  in  one  man's  clothes." 


107 


CHAPTER  XV 


I  Make  Lord  Kitchener's  Acquaintance 

ON  the  morning  of  June  the  loth  my  anticipations 
were  realized  by  the  approach  of  a  large  English 
force  from  Vredefortweg  and  Heilbron.  Commanded 
by  Lord  Kitchener,  and  numbering,  as  I  estimated, 
from  twelve  to  fifteen  thousand  men,  this  force  was 
intended  to  drive  us  from  the  railway  line. 

I  gave  orders  that  the  few  waggons  which  we  had 
with  us  should  proceed  in  the  direction  of  Kroonstad, 
to  the  west  of  the  line  ;  once  out  of  sight,  they  were  to 
turn  sharply  to  the  west,  and  continue  in  that  direction. 
This  manoeuvre,  I  hoped,  would  serve  to  mislead  the 
enemy,  who  was  on  the  look-out  for  us. 

So  much  for  the  waggons.  For  the  rest,  I  felt  that 
it  would  never  do  for  us  to  withdraw  without  having 
fired  a  shot,  and  I  therefore  got  my  men  into  position 
on  some  kopjes  (where  Captain  Wyndham  Knight 
had  been  four  days  previously,  and  which  lay  to  the 
north  of  Rhenosterriviersbrug)  on  my  farm  Roode- 
poort,  and  on  the  Honingkopjes. 

The  English,  with  their  well  known  predilection 
for  a  flank  attack  on  every  possible  opportunity,  halted 
for  an  hour,  and  shelled  our  positions  with  Lyddite 
and  other  guns.  This  did  not  have  the  desired  effect 
of  inspiring  terror  in  the  burghers  who  were  under  my 
command  at  Honingkopjes. 

Then  the  enemy  began  to  move.  I  saw  masses  of 
their  cavalry  making  for  a  piece  of  rising  ground  to 
the  north  of  Roodepoort.  As  the  burghers  there  were 
hidden  from  me,  I  was  unable  to  observe  from  where 
I  stood  the  effect  of  this  flank  movement.  Knowing 

io8 


I  MEET  LORD  KITCHENER 


that  if  they  were  able  to  give  way  and  to  retreat  along 
the  river  we  should  have  no  means  of  discovering  the 
fact  until  it  was  too  late  and  we  were  surrounded,  I 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  essential  for  me  to 
go  to  Roodepoort  to  assure  myself  that  the  cavalry 
had  not  yet  got  round.  But  it  was  most  important 
that  no  suspicion  of  the  danger  which  threatened  us 
should  be  aroused  in  the  burghers — anything  calcu- 
lated to  weaken  their  resistance  was  to  be  avoided  on 
such  an  occasion.  Accordingly  I  merely  told  them 
that  I  was  going  to  see  how  affairs  were  progressing 
at  Roodepoort,  and  that  in  the  meantime  they  must 
hold  their  position. 

I  rode  off,  and  discovered  that  the  English  were  al- 
ready so  close  to  our  troops  at  Roodepoort  that  fighting 
with  small  arms  had  begun.  I  had  just  reached  an 
eminence  between  Roodepoort  and  the  Honingkopjes 
when  I  saw  that  the  burghers  in  the  position  furthest 
towards  the  north-west  were  beginning  to  flee.  This 
was  exactly  what  I  had  feared  would  happen.  Imme- 
diately afterwards  the  men  in  the  centre  position,  and 
therefore  the  nearest  to  me,  followed  their  comrades' 
example.  I  watched  them  loosening  their  horses, 
which  had  been  tethered  behind  a  little  hill ;  they  were 
wild  to  get  away  from  the  guns  of  the  English  and 
from  the  advance  of  this  mighty  force. 

It  was  impossible  for  me  now  to  go  and  tell  the 
burghers  on  the  Honingkopjes  that  the  time  had  come 
when  they  too  must  retreat.  My  only  course  was  to 
order  the  men  near  me  not  to  effect  their  escape  along 
the  well  protected  banks  of  the  river,  but  to  the  south, 
right  across  the  stream,  by  a  route  which  would  be 
visible  to  burghers  on  the  Honingkopjes.  They 
obeyed  my  orders,  and  rode  out  under  a  heavy  gun 
and  rifle  fire,  without,  however,  losing  a  single  man. 
The  men  on  the  Honingkopjes  saw  them  in  flight, 
and  were  thus  able  to  leave  their  position  before  the 
enemy  had  a  chance  of  driving  them  into  the  river  or 
of  cutting  them  off  from  the  drift. 

109 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Unfortunately,  seven  burghers  from  Heilbron  were 
at  a  short  distance  from  the  others,  having  taken  up 
their  position  in  a  kliphok}  Fighting  hard  as  they 
were,  under  a  deafening  gun-fire  from  the  enemy,  who 
had  approached  to  within  a  few  paces  of  them,  they 
did  not  observe  that  their  comrades  had  left  their  posi- 
tions. Shortly  afterwards,  despairing  of  holding  the 
Idiphok  any  longer,  they  ran  down  to  the  foot  of  the 
hill  for  their  horses,  and  saw  that  the  rest  of  the  burgh- 
ers were  already  fleeing  some  eight  or  nine  hundred 
paces  in  front  of  them,  and  that  their  own  horses  had 
joined  in  the  flight.  There  was  now  only  one  course 
open  to  them — to  surrender  to  the  English.^ 

I  ordered  the  burghers  to  retreat  in  the  direction  of 
Kroonstad,  for  by  now  they  had  all  fled  from  Roode- 
poort  and  Honingkopjes — a  name  which,  since  that 
day,  has  never  sounded  very  sweet  to  me.^ 

During  the  morning  I  received  a  report  inform- 
ing me  that  there  were  large  stores  at  Kroonstad  be- 
longing to  the  English  Commissariat,  and  that  there 
was  only  a  handful  of  troops  to  protect  them.  I  had 
no  thought,  however,  of  attempting  to  destroy  the 
provisions  there,  for  I  felt  sure  that  the  British  troops, 
who  had  but  just  now  put  us  to  flight,  would  make  for 
Kroonstad.    They  would  know  that  the  stores  stood 

^  I.e.  the  ruins  of  Kafifir  stone  huts,  built  in  the  time  of  Moselekatze. 

'  Among  these  seven  burghers  were  Willie  Steyn,  Attie  Van  Niekerk,  and  a 
certain  young  Botha.  It  was  Steyn  and  Botha,  with  two  men  of  the  name  of 
Steytler,  and  two  other  Free-Staters  whose  names  I  have  forgotten,  who  man- 
aged to  escape  from  the  ship  that  lay  anchored  in  the  harbour  of  Ceylon.  They 
swam  a  distance  of  several  miles  to  a  Russian  ship,  by  which  they  were  carried 
to  one  of  the  Russian  ports,  where  they  received  every  hospitality.  I  shall 
always  be  grateful  to  the  Russians  for  this.  They  then  travelled  through  Ger  • 
many  into  Holland,  being  subsequently  conveyed  in  a  German  ship  to  German 
West  Africa.  Thence  they  made  their  way  through  Boesmansland  to  Cape  Col- 
ony, and,  after  many  adventures,  joined  General  Hermanns  Maritz's  commando. 
Botha,  unfortunately,  was  killed  in  a  skirmish  some  time  later.  What  will  the 
world  say  of  these  young  burghers  ?  Surely,  that  more  valiant  and  faithful  men 
than  they  have  never  lived.  I  regret  that  I  do  not  remember  the  names  of  all 
Willie  Steyn's  comrades.  I  travelled  with  him  by  train  from  the  Free  State  to 
Cape  Town,  where  I  had  to  join  General  Louis  Botha  and  J.  H.  De  la  Rey,  so 
as  to  accompany  them  to  Europe  on  my  nation's  behalf.  He  promised  then  to 
give  me  all  the  particulars  of  his  escape,  but  I  suppose  there  has  been  some  ob- 
stacle in  the  way. 

•  The  word  honing  means  honey. 

no 


I  MEET  LORD  KITCHENER 


in  need  of  a  stronger  guard,  and  moreover  they  would 
naturally  think  that  we  should  be  very  likely  to  make 
an  attack  at  a  point  where  the  defence  was  so  weak. 

Obviously,  under  these  circumstances,  it  would  never 
do  for  us  to  go  to  Kroonstad. 

Accordingly,  as  soon  as  darkness  came  on,  I  turned 
suddenly  to  the  west,  and  arrived  at  Wonderheuve  late 
at  night.  I  found  there  Veldtcornet  De  Vos  with  the 
prisoners  of  war. 

Meanwhile,  as  I  had  anticipated,  the  vast  English 
army  marched  up  along  thirty-four  miles  of  railway  to 
Kroonstad.  Lord  Kitchener,  as  I  heard  later  on,  ar- 
rived there  shortly  after  noon  on  the  following  day. 

We  left  Wonderheuve  early  in  the  morning,  and 
advanced  along  Rietspruit  until  we  reached  the  farm 
of  Vaalbank,  where  we  remained  until  the  evening  of 
the  next  day,  June  the  13th.  That  night  I  saw  clearly 
that  it  was  necessary  for  us  to  cross  the  line  if  we 
wanted  to  keep  ourselves  and  our  prisoners  out  of  the 
clutches  of  Lord  Kitchener ;  he  had  failed  to  find  us 
at  Kroonstad,  and  would  be  certain  to  look  for  us  in 
the  country  to  the  west  of  the  line. 

I  also  felt  myself  bound  to  wreck  this  line,  for  it 
was  the  only  railway  which  Lord  Roberts  could  now 
utilize  for  forwarding  the  enormous  quantities  of  stores 
which  his  vast  forces  required.^  I  resolved  therefore 
to  cross  it  at  Leeuwspruit,  north  of  Rhenoster  River 
bridge  (which  the  English  had  recently  repaired),  and 
then„  in  the  morning,  to  attack  the  English  garrisons 
which  had  again  occupied  Roodewal  and  Rhenoster 
River  bridge. 

I  had  given  orders  that  all  the  cattle  along  the  rail- 
way line  should  be  removed  ;  General  Louis  Botha 
had  made  the  same  regulation  in  regard  to  the  country 
round  Pretoria  and  Johannesburg.  If  only  our  orders 
had  been  carried  out  a  little  more  strictly,  and  if  only 
the  most  elementary  rules  of  strategy  had  been  ob- 
served in  our  efforts  to  break  the  English  lines  of 

*  At  that  time  the  Natal  and  Delagoa  Bay  railways  were  still  in  our  possession. 

Ill 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


communication,  Lord  Roberts  and  his  thousands  of 
troops  in  Pretoria  would  have  found  themselves  in  the 
same  plight  as  the  Samaritans  in  Samaria — they  would 
have  perished  of  hunger.  It  was  not  their  Com- 
mander-in-Chiefs skill  that  saved  them,  not  his  habit 
of  taking  into  account  all  possible,  eventualities — no, 
they  had  to  thank  the  disobedience  of  our  burghers 
for  the  fact  that  they  were  not  all  starved  to  death  in 
Pretoria. 

I  arranged  with  General  Froneman  that  he  should 
cross  the  line  at  the  point  I  had  already  selected,  that 
is  to  say,  north  of  Rhenoster  River  bridge,  and  that 
in  the  morning  he  should  attack,  from  the  eastern 
side,  the  English  who  were  posted  at  Leeuwspruit 
Bridge.  I,  in  the  meanwhile,  would  make  my  way 
with  a  Krupp  to  the  west  side  of  the  line,  and  having 
found  a  place  of  concealment  near  Roodepoort,  would 
be  ready  to  fall  upon  the  English  as  soon  as  I  heard 
that  the  other  party  had  opened  fire  on  them  from  the 
east. 

But  my  plan  was  to  come  to  nothing.  For  when, 
during  the  night,  Froneman  reached  the  line,  a  skir- 
mish took  place  then  and  there  with  the  English  out- 
posts at  Leeuwspruit  railway  bridge.  At  the  same 
time  a  train  arrived  from  the  south,  on  which  the 
burghers  opened  such  a  fierce  fire  that  it  was  speedily 
brought  to  a  standstill.  General  Froneman  at  once 
gave  orders  to  storm  the  train,  but  his  men  did  not 
carry  out  his  orders. 

Had  they  do7ie  so,  Lord  Kitchener  would  have  fallen 
into  our  hands  I 

Nobody  knew  that  he  was  in  the  train,  and  it  was 
only  later  that  we  heard  how,  when  the  train  stopped, 
he  got  a  horse  out  of  one  of  the  waggons,  mounted  it, 
and  disappeared  into  the  darkness  of  the  night. 

Shortly  afterwards  the  train  moved  on  again,  and  our 
great  opportunity  was  gone  ! 

General  Froneman  succeeded  in  overpowering  the 
garrison  at  the  railway  bridge,  and  took  fifty-eight 


I  MEET  LORD  KITCHENER 


prisoners.  He  then  set  fire  to  the  bridge,  which  was 
a  temporary  wooden  structure,  having  been  built  to 
replace  another  similar  one,  which  had  been  blown  up 
with  gunpowder. 

Three  hundred  Kaffirs  were  also  made  prisoners  on 
this  occasion.  They  protested  that  they  had  no  arms, 
and  had  only  been  employed  in  work  upon  the  rail- 
way line.  This  absence  of  rifles  was  their  saving. 
Possibly  they  had  really  been  in  possession  of  arms, 
and  had  thrown  them  away  under  cover  of  the  dark- 
ness ;  but  the  burghers  could  not  know  this,  and  there- 
fore acted  upon  the  principle  that  it  is  better  to  let 
ten  culprits  escape  than  to  condemn  an  innocent  man 
to  death. 

General  Froneman  went  on  towards  the  east  of 
Doorndraai.  He  was  very  well  satisfied  with  his 
bridge-burning  and  his  capture  of  prisoners,  and  in 
his  satisfaction  he  never  gave  thought  to  me. 

I  waited  in  my  hiding-place,  expecting  that,  as  we 
had  agreed,  the  firing  would  begin  from  the  east,  but 
nothing  happened.  1  did  not  care  to  make  an  attack 
on  my  own  account  from  the  west,  for  my  positions 
were  not  practicable  for  the  purpose,  and  being  short 
of  men,  I  feared  that  such  an  attempt  might  end  in 
disaster. 

It  was  now  ten  o'clock. 

A  few  English  scouts  appeared  on  the  scene,  and 
four  of  my  men  attacked  them.  One  of  the  enemy 
was  shot,  and  the  rest  taken  prisoners.  And  still  I 
did  not  hear  anything  from  General  Froneman. 

At  last  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  must  have- 
misunderstood  my  instructions.  If  that  were  the  case, 
I  must  do  the  best  I  could  myself.  Accordingly  I 
opened  fire  on  the  English  with  my  Krupp. 

Still  no  news  of  General  Froneman  ! 

Then  I  ordered  my  burghers  to  advance.  Our  first 
movement  was  over  the  nearest  rise  to  the  north-west ; 
we  halted  for  a  moment,  and  then  made  a  dash  for 
Leeuwspruit  Bridge — but  we  found  nothing  there. 

113 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Late  in  the  evening  I  met  General  Froneman,  and 
heard  from  him  the  narrative  which  I  have  given 
above. 

The  following  day  I  sent  well  on  to  twelve  hundred 
prisoners  of  war — including  Kaffirs — to  the  Presi- 
dent's camp,  which  lay  east  of  Heilbron.  We  then 
advanced  to  a  point  on  the  Rhenoster  River,  near 
Slootkraal,  remaining  in  concealment  there  until  the 
night  of  the  i6th  of  June.  The  following  morning 
we  occupied  some  ridges  at  Elandslaagte,  on  the  look- 
out for  a  large  English  force  which  was  marching 
from  Vredefortweg  to  Heilbron. 

My  intention  was  to  give  them  battle  at  Elands- 
laagte, and  to  hold  on  to  our  positions  there  as  long 
as  possible  ;  and  then,  if  we  could  not  beat  them  off, 
to  retire.  If  only  the  burghers  had  carried  out  my 
orders  strictly,  we  should  certainly  have  inflicted  heavy 
losses  on  the  English,  even  if  we  had  not  won  a  com- 
plete victory. 

The  English  had  not  sent  out  their  scouts  suf- 
ficiently far  in  advance,  and  came  riding  on,  suspecting 
nothing.  We  occupied  positions  on  the  right  and  left 
of  the  road  along  which  they  were  advancing,  and  my 
orders  were  that  the  burghers  should  let  the  troops 
get  right  between  our  ridges,  which  were  about  three 
hundred  paces  from  each  other,  and  then  fire  on  them 
from  both  sides  at  once. 

Instead  of  doing  this,  however,  the  burghers  began 
to  fire  when  the  English  were  five  hundred  paces  from 
them — before,  that  is  to  say,  they  had  got  anywhere 
near  the  door  of  the  trap  which  I  had  set  for  them. 

The  enemy  wheeled  round,  and  galloped  back  for 
about  fifteen  hundred  paces.  They  then  dismounted, 
and  fired  on  us.  But,  having  no  sort  of  cover,  they 
were  soon  compelled  to  mount  their  horses  again  and 
retire  to  their  ^uns,  which  were  about  three  thousand 
yards  from  us.  These  guns  now  opened  a  heavy  fire 
upon  our  ridges ;  we  replied  with  our  three  Krupps, 
with  which  we  made  such  good  practice  that  we  m.ight 

114 


I  MEET  LORD  KITCHENER 


have  been  able  to  hold  out  there  indefinitely,  had  not 
a  Lyddite  and  an  Armstrong  gun  happened  just  then 
to  arrive  from  Heilbron,  which  lay  about  ten  miles 
behind  us.  Thus  attacked  both  in  front  and  rear, 
there  was  nothing  to  do  but  retire.  Fortunately,  we 
had  not  lost  a  single  man. 

First  we  rode  in  a  southerly  direction,  but  as  soon 
as  we  got  into  cover  we  struck  off  to  the  east,  setting 
our  faces  towards  Heilbron. 

Then,  to  our  immense  relief,  the  sun  went  down. 
How  often  during  our  long  struggle  for  independence 
had  not  the  setting  of  the  sun  seemed  to  lift  a  leaden 
weight  from  my  shoulders!  If,  on  a  few  occasions, 
the  approach  of  night  has  been  to  our  disadvantage, 
yet  over  and  over  again  it  has  been  nothing  less  than 
our  salvation. 

We  got  back  safely,  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  to 
our  little  camp  near  Slootkraal,  and  there  remained  in 
hiding  until  the  following  day.  It  was  there  that 
Commandant  Nel  handed  in  his  resignation.  In  his 
place  the  burghers  of  Kroonstad  chose  Mr.  Frans  Van 
Aard  as  their  Commandant. 

That  night  we  set  out  for  Paardenkraal,  twenty 
miles  to  the  north-east  of  Kroonstad,  staying  there 
until  the  evening  of  the  19th. 

The  time  for  my  attack  on  the  railway  line  having 
now  come,  I  divided  my  men  into  three  parties  for 
that  purpose.  I  sent  on  Commandant  J.  H.  Olivier, 
who  had  joined  me  at  Paardenkraal,  to  Honingspruit 
Station,  General  Froneman  to  America  Siding,  while 
I  myself  made  my  way  to  Serfontein  Siding. 

At  daybreak  General  Froneman  wrecked  the  line 
near  America  Siding,  and  I  did  the  same  at  other 
places,  also  destroying  the  telegraph  poles.  Each  pole 
was  first  shot  through  with  the  Mauser,  and  then 
pulled  until  it  snapped  at  the  point  where  the  bullet 
had  pierced  it. 

Things  did  not  go  so  well  with  Commandant  Oli- 
vier.   He  attacked  the  station,  but,  unfortunately,  not 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 

so  early  as  had  been  arranged.  Consequently  he  was 
not  able  to  bring  his  gun  into  action  before  the  enemy 
had  observed  him.  When  I  came  up  to  him  there 
was  a  strong  English  reinforcement  from  Kroonstad 
close  at  hand.  We  had  too  few  men  with  us  to  be 
able  to  offer  resistance,  and  had  to  retreat,  returning  to 
Paardenkraal  at  nightfall. 


it6 


CHAPTER  XVI 


Bethlehem  is  Captured  by  the  English 

IT  was  at  this  time  that  I  decided  to  make  my  way 
to  Lindley,  which  had  been  retaken  by  the  Eng- 
lish a  few  days  after  General  Piet  de  Wet  had  capt- 
ured the  Yeomanry  in  that  town.  The  object  of  my 
journey  was  to  discover  if  it  were  not  possible  to  again 
seize  the  place.  On  the  21st  of  June  I  covered  half 
the  distance  to  Lindley,  and  the  following  day  I  ar- 
rived within  ten  miles  of  the  town. 

I  rode  round  the  town  with  Piet  de  Wet  the  next 
day,  in  order  to  find  out  our  best  method  of  attacking 
it. 

Commandant  Olivier  had  been  sent  by  me  that 
morning  in  the  direction  of  Kroonstad  to  oppose  a 
strong  English  column,  which  I  had  been  informed 
was  approaching.  But  my  plan  must  have  leaked  out 
in  some  way  or  other,  for  the  enemy  carefully  chose 
so  well  protected  a  route  that  they  gave  Commandant 
Olivier  no  chance  of  attacking  them.  Thus  the  fol- 
lowing morning  the  English  arrived  safely  at  Lindley, 
and  now  there  was  no  possibility  of  capturing  the 
town. 

In  the  meantime  President  Steyn's  laager  had  moved 
from  the  east  of  Heilbron  and  joined  us.  He  himself, 
with  the  members  of  the  Government,  had  gone  to 
Bethlehem.  General  Marthinus  Prinsloo  was  there 
too ;  he  had  resigned  his  post  of  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  commandos  which  guarded  the  Drakensberg. 
Commandant  Hattingh  of  Vrede  had  been  chosen  in 
his  place,  and  he  also  was  at  Bethlehem. 

A  difficulty  now  arose  as  to  Prinsloo^s  position- 

117 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


The  President  declared  that  Prinsloo  was  nothing  more 
than  a  private  burgher ;  but  Commandant  OHvier  was 
not  satisfied  with  this,  and  asked  that  there  might  be 
an  election  of  a  Commander-in-Chief.  This  request, 
however,  the  President  refused  to  grant. 

I  did  not  wish  the  office  of  Commander-in-Chief 
to  devolve  upon  myself,  for  I  knew  that  I  did  not 
possess  the  confidence  of  the  officers.  And  as  some 
eight  miles  to  the  east  of  Lindley  there  was  telegraphic 
communication  with  Bethlehem,  I  was  able  to  hold  a 
conversation  with  the  President  over  the  wires.  I 
accordingly  again  asked  him  to  permit  an  election. 
But  it  was  all  in  vain  ;  the  President  declined  to  allow 
an  election  to  take  place. 

I  now  took  matters  into  my  own  hands.  I  collected 
the  officers  together  with  the  object  of  holding  a  secret 
election.  Thus  I  should  discover  what  their  opinion 
of  me  might  be  as  chief  of  the  Free  State  forces.  I 
was  firmly  resolved  that  should  the  majority  of  the 
officers  be  against  me,  and  the  President  should  still 
refuse  his  consent  to  an  election,  that  I  would  send  in 
my  resignation,  and  no  longer  continue  to  hold  the 
post  of  Commander-in-Chief. 

Commander-in-Chief  Hattingh,  Vechtgeneraal  Roux, 
and  all  the  oldest  commandants  of  the  Free  State,  were 
present  at  this  meeting.  The  voting  was  by  ballot; 
and  the  result  was  that  there  were  two  votes  for 
General  Marthinus  Prinsloo,  one  for  General  Piet  de 
Wet,  and  twenty-seven  for  myself. 

I  at  once  wired  to  the  President,  and  told  him 
what  had  occurred.  He  was  ready  to  abide  by  the 
decision,  and  I  was  satisfied  now  that  I  knew  exactly 
where  I  stood.  Mr.  Marthinus  Prinsloo  was  also 
contented  with  the  turn  events  had  taken.  And  I 
must  say  this  of  him,  that  it  was  not  he  who  had 
insisted  on  an  election. 

It  soon  became  apparent  that  the  enemy's  object 
was  the  capture  of  Bethlehem.  The  English  forces 
round  Senekal  advanced  towards  Lindley,  and  having 

ii8 


BETHLEHEM  CAPTURED  BY  ENGLISH 


been  joined  by  the  troops  stationed  there,  had  pro- 
ceeded in  the  direction  of  Bethlehem ;  consequently 
a  very  large  British  force  was  marching  on  that  town. 

We  on  our  part  now  numbered  over  five  thousand 
men,  for  General  Roux  had  joined  us  with  some^  of 
his  burghers. 

The  English  were  unopposed  until  they  reached 
Elandsfontein,  but  there  a  battle  took  place  in  which 
big  guns  played  the  main  role,  although  there  was  also 
some  heavy  fighting  with  small  arms. 

In  this  engagement  Commandant  Michal  Prinsloo 
did  a  brave  deed.  I  arrived  at  his  position  just  after 
the  burghers  had  succeeded  in  shooting  down  the  men 
who  served  three  of  the  enemy's  guns.  With  a  hun- 
dred men  he  now  stormed  the  guns,  hoping  to  be  able 
to  bring  them  back  with  him  to  our  lines.  Whilst  he 
charged,  I  cannonaded  the  enemy,  with  a  Krupp  and 
fifteen  pound  Armstrong,  to  such  good  effect  that 
they  were  forced  to  retreat  behind  a  ridge.  In  this 
way  Commandant  Prinsloo  reached  the  guns  safely, 
but  he  had  no  horses  with  him  to  drag  them  back  to 
us.  He  could  do  nothing  but  make  the  attempt  to 
get  them  away  by  the  help  of  his  burghers,  and  this 
he  tried  to  accomplish  under  a  fierce  fire  from  the 
English.  But  he  would  still  have  succeeded  in  the 
endeavour,  had  not  unfortunately  a  large  force  of  the 
enemy  appeared  on  the  scene,  and  attacked  him  and 
his  hundred  burghers.  I  was  unable  to  keep  the  Eng- 
lish back,  for  both  my  guns  had  been  disabled.  The 
nipple  of  the  Armstrong  had  been  blown  away,  and — 
for  the  first  time — the  lock  of  the  Krupp  had  become 
jammed.  Had  it  not  been  for  this  mishap.  Comman- 
dant Prinsloo  would  certainly  have  been  able  to  re- 
move the  guns  to  the  c+^her  side  of  a  ridge,  whither 
teams  of  our  horses  were  cilready  approaching.  But, 
as  it  was,  he  had  to  hurry  away  as  fast  as  possible,  and 
leave  the  guns  behind. 


*  He  had  left  the  remainder  of  his  burghers  at  Witnek  and  at  Houtnek,  near 
Ficksburg, 

119 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


When  the  enemy  arrived  they  had  outflanked  us  so 
far  to  the  north,  that  we  had  nothing  open  to  us  but 
again  to  abandon  our  positions.  We  therefore  retired 
to  Blauwkop,  and  on  the  following  day  to  Bethle- 
hem. 

In  the  meantime  I  had  once  more  become  encum- 
bered with  a  large  waggon  camp,  which  proved  a 
source  of  great  danger.  During  the  last  few  weeks 
waggons  had  been  accumulating  round  me  without  at- 
tracting my  attention.  The  reason  that  the  burghers 
Iv^ere  so  anxious  to  bring  their  waggons  with  them, 
r^as  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  English,  when- 
ever they  arrived  at  one  of  our  farms,  always  took  the 
waggons  and  oxen.  The  Boers  felt  it  very  hard  to  be 
robbed  in  this  way  of  their  property  ;  and  they  hoped 
to  be  able  to  save  their  waggons  and  carts  by  taking 
them  to  the  commando. 

It  was  natural  for  them  to  wish  to  save  all  they 
could  ;  but  I  was  convinced  that  the  waggons  could 
only  be  saved  at  the  expense  of  our  great  cause.  But 
nobody  could  see  it  in  that  light.  And  as  I  could  only 
appeal  to  the  free  will  of  my  burghers,  I  dare  not  at- 
tempt to  get  rid  of  the  waggons  by  force.  If  I  had 
made  any  such  attempt,  serious  consequences  would 
certainly  have  followed,  even  if  a  revolt  had  not  en- 
sued. The  great  fault  of  the  burghers  was  disobe- 
dience, and  this  came  especially  to  the  fore  when  their 
possessions  were  in  jeopardy. 

I  now  made  up  my  mind  to  defend  the  town 
of  Bethlehem.  The  following  morning  I  went  with 
the  Generals  and  Commandants  to  reconnoitre  the 
country,  so  that  I  might  be  able  to  point  out  to 
each  of  them  the  position  that  I  wished  him  to  oc- 
cupy. 

Our  line  of  defence  began  at  the  south  of  Wol- 
huterskop  (a  kop  to  the  south-west  of  Bethlehem), 
and  extended  from  there  to  the  north-west  of  the 
town. 

When  I  had  given  my  instructions  to  the  officers, 

I20 


BETHLEHEM  CAPTURED  BY  ENGLISH 


they  returned  to  their  commandos,  which  were  sta- 
tioned behind  the  first  ridges  to  the  south  of  Bethle- 
hem, and  brought  them  to  the  positions  I  had  as- 
signed to  them. 

So  many  of  the  horses  were  exhausted,  that  a  large 
number  of  the  burghers  had  to  go  on  foot.  Such  of 
these  Voetgangers  ^  as  were  not  required  to  attend  to 
the  waggons,  I  placed  at  Wolhuterskop. 

When  I  had  done  this  I  gave  notice  to  the  inhab- 
itants of  Bethlehem,  that  as  the  dorp  would  be  de- 
fended, I  must  insist  on  the  women  and  children  leaving 
it  at  once.  It  was  not  long  before  a  number  of  women 
and  children,  and  even  a  few  men,  started  out  on  their 
way  to  Fouriesburg.  The  prisoner  Vilonel,  also,  was 
conducted  to  this  town. 

At  four  o'clock  that  afternoon  the  advance  guards 
of  the  enemy  approached ;  and  fifteen  of  their  scouts 
made  their  appearance  on  the  ridge  to  the  north  of 
the  town.  The  burghers  reserved  their  fire  until  these 
men  were  almost  upon  them.  Then  they  let  their 
Mausers  speak,  and  in  a  moment  there  were  nine 
riderless  horses.  The  other  six  English  made  their 
escape,  although  they  must  have  had  wounds  to  show 
for  their  rashness.^ 

Only  a  few  moments  had  passed  before  the  roar  of 
guns  was  mingled  with  the  crack  of  rifles,  and  the 
whole  air  was  filled  with  the  thunder  of  battle. 

Everywhere  the  burghers  fought  with  the  utmost 
valour ;  the  Voetgangers  on  Wolhuterskop  were  per- 
haps the  bravest  of  them  all.  Whenever  the  enemy 
approached  our  positions,  they  were  met  by  a  torrent 
of  bullets.    And  thus  the  day  came  to  a  close. 

But  the  next  day  a  large  force  of  English  appeared 
from  the  direction  of  Reitz.  This  had  come  from  the 
Transvaal,  and,  if  I  remember  rightly,  was  commanded 
by  General  Sir  Hector  Macdonald.    He  had  come 

*  Infantry. 

'  As  I  have  already  stated,  I  intend  to  write  on  another  occasion  a  book  deal- 
ing with  the  art  of  scouting ;  and  the  above  incident  will  there  form  a  striking 
proof  of  how  foolishly  the  English  scouts  did  their  work. 

121 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


up  and  joined  Generals  Clements,  Hunter,  Broad- 
wood  and  Paget,  with  the  object  of  once  and  for  all 
making  an  end  of  the  Free-Staters. 

Our  positions  were  now  exposed  to  a  most  terrific 
bombardment,  but  fortunately  without  any  serious 
consequences.  I  must  describe  here  the  fearful  havoc 
that  one  lyddite  shell  wrought.  It  fell  into  the  position 
held  by  Commandant  Steenekamp,  to  the  north-west 
of  Bethlehem,  and  struck  a  rock  behind  which  twenty- 
five  of  our  horses  were  standing.  Without  a  single 
exception  every  horse  was  killed  ! 

The  attack  was  pressed  with  the  greatest  vigour  on 
the  positions  held  by  Commandants  Van  Aard  and 
Piet  Fourie.  It  became  impossible  for  these  officers 
to  maintain  their  ground  ;  and,  at  about  twelve  o'clock, 
before  I  was  able  to  send  them  any  reinforcements, 
they  were  compelled  to  give  way. 

Thus  retreat  became  inevitable,  and  the  enemy  en- 
tered Bethlehem. 

One  of  our  guns  we  were  unable  to  remove ;  but 
before  we  withdrew  it  was  thrown  down  the  krans^ 
of  the  mountain,  and  broken  to  pieces. 

I  knew  at  the  time  the  number  the  English  had  lost, 
but  now  it  had  slipped  my  memory.  I  obtained  the 
information  from  a  man  named  Bland,  who  acted  as 
our  telegraphist.  He  had  tapped  the  telegraph  wire 
at  Zwingkrans,  and  before  General  Clements  had  de- 
tected that  he  was  not  communicating  with  Senekal, 
he  had  received  from  that  General  a  full  list  of  the 
English  killed  and  wounded. 

We  withdrew  our  commandos  in  a  southerly  direc- 
tion to  Retiefsnek,  whither  President  Steyn  and  the 
Government  had  already  preceded  us. 

*  Precipice. 


122 


CHAPTER  XVII 


The  Surrender  of  Prinsloo 

THE  English,  now  that  they  had  taken  Bethlehem, 
were  in  need  of  rest ;  and  this  was  especially 
the  case  with  General  Macdonald,  who  had  come  up 
by  forced  marches  from  the  far-off  Transvaal.  A 
short  breathing  space  was  also  a  great  benefit  to  us, 
for  we  had  many  preparations  to  make  in  view  of 
probable  events  in  the  near  future.  I  did  not  deceive 
myself  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  present  situation; 
now  that  all  of  us,  except  two  small  parties  at  Com- 
mandonek  and  Witnek,  had  retreated  behind  the  lofty 
Roodebergen,  I  could  see  that,  in  all  probability,  we 
must  before  long  be  annihilated  by  the  immense  forces 
of  the  enemy. 

The  Roodebergen,  which  now  separated  us  from  the 
English,  is  a  vast  chain  of  mountains,  extending  from 
the  Caledon  River  on  the  Basuto  frontier  to  Slabberts- 
nek,  then  stretching  away  to  Witzeshoek,  where  it 
again  touches  Basutoland.  The  passes  over  this  wild 
mountain  range  are  Commandonek,  Witnek,  Slab- 
bertsnek,  Retiefsnek,  Naauwpoort  and  Witzeshoek. 
These  are  almost  the  only  places  where  the  mountains 
can  be  crossed  by  vehicles  or  horses ;  and,  moreover, 
there  are  long  stretches  where  they  are  impassable 
even  to  pedestrians. 

It  is  plain  enough,  therefore,  that  nothing  would 
have  pleased  the  English  more  than  for  us  to  have  re- 
mained behind  the  Roodebergen.  If  those  Free-Staters 
— they  must  have  been  thinking — try  to  make  a  stand 
there,  it  will  be  the  last  stand  they  will  ever  make. 

123 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


And  the  English  would  have  been  quite  right  in  their 
anticipations.  To  have  stayed  where  we  then  were 
would,  without  doubt,  have  been  the  end  of  us.  There- 
fore, when  the  proposal  was  made  that  we  should  take 
positions  in  the  mountains,  I  opposed  it  as  emphati- 
cally as  I  could,  alleging  incontrovertible  arguments 
against  it.  It  was  then  decided  that  all  our  forces^ 
with  the  exception  of  a  small  watch,  should  issue  forth 
from  behind  the  mountains. 

We  also  arranged  to  divide  the  whole  of  the  com- 
mandos^ we  had  with  us  into  three  parts  : — 

I  was  in  supreme  command  of  the  first  division, 
which  was  to  march  under  the  orders  of  General  Botha. 
It  consisted  of  burghers  from  Heilbron,  under  Com- 
mandant Steenekamp,  and  of  Kroonstad  men,  under 
Commandant  Van  Aard.  Besides  these,  there  were 
also  five  hundred  men  from  Bethlehem,  under  Com- 
mandant Michal  Prinsloo ;  the  burghers  from  Boshof, 
under  Veldtcornet  Badenhorst ;  a  small  number  of 
Colonials  from  Griqualand,  under  Vice-Commandant 
Van  Zyl ;  and  some  Potchefstroom  burghers,  who  hap- 
pened to  be  with  us.  Further,  I  took  with  me,  for 
scouting  purposes,  Danie  Theron  and  his  corps  of 
eighty  men,  recruited  from  almost  every  nation  on  the 
face  of  the  earth  ;  Captain  Scheepers  and  his  men  also 
served  me  in  the  same  capacity. 

The  Government  and  its  officials  were  placed  under 
my  protection  ;  and  I  was  to  set  out,  on  July  the  15th, 
in  the  direction  of  Kroonstad-Heilbron. 

The  second  division  was  entrusted  to  Assistant  Com- 
mander-in-Chief Paul  Roux,  with  P.  J.  Fourie  and 
C.  C.  Froneman  as  Vechtgeneraals.  It  was  composed 
of  burghers  from  Fauresmith,  under  Commandant 
Visser ;  from  Bloemfontein,  under  Commandant  Du 
Plooij  ;  from  Wepener,  under  Commandant  Roux ; 
from  Smithfield,  under  Commandant  Potgieter ;  from 
Thaba'Nchu,  under  Commandant  J.  H.  Olivier ;  from 
Jacobsdal,  under  Commandant  H.  Pretorius ;  and  of 

»  The  Harrismith  and  Vrede  commandos  had  also  received  orders  to  join  us. 

124 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  PRINSLOO 


the  Deetje  Bloemfontein  commando,  under  Com- 
mandant Kolbe. 

This  force  was  to  wait  until  the  day  after  my  de- 
parture, that  is,  until  the  i6th,  and  then  proceed  in  the 
evening  in  the  direction  of  Bloemfontein.  From  the 
capital  it  was  to  go  south,  and  during  its  advance  it 
was  to  bring  back  to  the  commandos  all  those  burgh- 
ers in  the  southern  districts  who  had  remained  be- 
hind. 

General  Crowther  was  given  the  command  over  the 
third  division,  which  consisted  of  the  burghers  from 
Ficksburg,  under  Commandant  P.  De  Villiers ;  from 
Ladybrand,  under  Commandant  Ferreira  ;  from  Win- 
burg,  under  Commandant  Sarel  Harebroek ;  and 
from  Senekal,  under  Commandant  Van  der  Merve. 

This  division  was  to  start  on  the  i6th,  and  march- 
ing to  the  north  of  Bethlehem,  was  to  continue 
advancing  in  that  direction  until  it  fell  in  with  the 
commandos  from  Harrismith  and  Vrede  under  Com- 
mander-in-Chief Hattingh.  It  would  then  operate, 
under  his  directions,  in  the  north-eastern  districts. 

The  remainder  of  Commandant  Michal  Prinsloo's 
Bethlehem  men — that  is  to  say,  the  burghers  of  Witte- 
bergen — were  to  stay  behind  as  a  watch,  and  to  take 
orders  from  Mr.  Marthinus  Prinsloo.  This  watch 
was  divided  into  three  sections :  the  first  to  occupy  a 
position  at  Slabbertsnek,  the  second  at  Retiefsnek, 
and  the  third  at  Naauwpoort.  They  were  forbidden 
to  use  waggons ;  thus  if  the  enemy  should  appear  in 
overwhelming  numbers,  it  would  always  be  possible 
for  them  to  escape  across  the  mountains. 

My  reason  for  selecting  these  men  in  preference  to 
others,  was  that  they  belonged  to  the  district,  and  thus 
were  well  acquainted  with  every  foot  of  this  rough  and 
difficult  country.  Their  duties  were  simply  to  protect 
the  large  numbers  of  cattle  which  we  had  driven  on 
to  the  mountains,  and  I  anticipated  that  there  would 
be  no  difficulty  about  this,  for  now  that  all  our  com- 
mandos had  left  those  parts,  the  English  would  not 

125 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


think  It  worth  while  to  send  a  large  force  against  a 
mere  handful  of  watchers. 

Thus  everything  was  settled,  and  on  the  15th  of  July 
I  set  out  through  Slabbertsnek,  expecting  that  the 
other  generals  would  follow  me,  conformably  to  my 
orders  and  the  known  wishes  of  the  Government. 

But  what  really  happened  ? 

Immediately  after  my  departure,  some  of  the  of 
ficers,  displeased  that  Assistant  Commander-in-Chief 
Roux  should  have  been  entrusted  with  the  command, 
expressed  the  wish  that  another  meeting  should  be 
held  and  a  new  Assistant  Commander-in-Chief  elected. 
This  would  have  been  absolutely  illegal,  for  the  Volks- 
raad  had  decreed  that  the  President  should  be  empow- 
ered to  alter  all  the  commando-laws.  But  even  then, 
all  would  have  gone  well  if  Roux  had  only  stood  firm. 
Unfortunately,  however,  he  yielded,  and  on  July  the 
1 7th  a  meeting  was  called  together  at  which  Mr.  Mar- 
thinus  Prinsloo  was  chosen  Assistant  Commander-in- 
Chief.  He  had  a  bare  majority  even  at  the  actual 
meeting,  and  several  officers,  who  had  been  unable  to 
be  present,  had  still  to  record  their  votes. 

Not  only,  therefore,  had  Prinsloo  been  elected  ir- 
regularly, but  his  election,  such  as  it  was,  could  only 
be  considered  as  provisional.  Nevertheless,  for  the 
moment,  power  was  in  his  hands.  How  did  he  use  it  ? 

He  surrendered  unconditionally  to  the  English. 

On  the  17th  and  i8th  of  July  the  enemy  had  broken 
through  at  Slabbertsnek  and  Retiefsnek,  causing  the 
greatest  confusion  among  our  forces. 

Many  of  the  officers  and  burghers  were  for  an  im- 
mediate surrender,  as  appears  from  the  fact  that  the 
same  assembly  which,  in  defiance  of  the  law,  elected 
Mr.  Prinsloo  as  Commander-in-Chief,  also  decided,  by 
seventeen  votes  to  thirteen,  to  give  up  their  forces  to 
the  enemy.  But  this  decision  was  at  once  rescinded — 
an  act  of  policy  on  the  part  of  the  officers — and  it  was 
agreed  to  ask  for  an  armistice  of  six  days,  to  enable 
them  to  take  counsel  with  the  Government. 

126 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  PRINSLOO 


A  more  senseless  course  of  action  could  hardly  be 
imagined.  The  Boer  Army,  as  anybody  could  see, 
was  in  a  very  tight  place.  Did  its  ofificers  think  that 
the  English  would  be  so  foolish  as  to  grant  an  armis- 
tice at  such  a  time  as  this — when  all  that  the  burghers 
wanted  was  a  few  days  in  which  to  effect  their  escape  ? 
Either  the  officers  were  remarkably  short-sighted,  or 
.  .  .  something  worse. 

It  was  still  possible  for  the  commandos  to  retire  in 
the  direction  of  Oldenburg  or  of  Witzeshoek.  But 
instead  of  getting  this  done  with  all  speed,  Mr.  Prinsloo 
began  a  correspondence  with  General  Hunter  about 
this  ridiculous  armistice,  which  the  English  general  of 
course  refused  to  grant. 

It  was  on  July  the  29th,  1900,  that  Prinsloo,  with 
all  the  burghers  on  the  mountains,  surrendered  uncon- 
ditionally to  the  enemy. 

The  circumstances  of  this  surrender  were  so  sus- 
picious, that  it  is  hard  to  acquit  the  man  who  was  re- 
sponsible for  it  of  a  definite  act  of  treachery ;  and  the 
case  against  him  is  all  the  more  grave  from  the  fact 
that  Vilonel,  who  was  at  that  time  serving  a  term  of 
imprisonment  for  high  treason,  had  a  share  in  the 
transaction. 

Prinsloo's  surrender  included  General  Crowther, 
Commandants  Paul  De  Villiers,  Ferreira,  Joubert,  Du 
Plooij,  Potgieter,  Crowther,  Van  der  Merve,  and 
Roux  ;  and  about  three  thousand  men. 

The  most  melancholy  circumstance  about  the  whole 
affair  was  that,  when  the  surrender  was  made,  some  of 
the  burghers  had  reached  the  farm  of  Salamon  Raath, 
and  were  thus  as  good  as  free,  and  yet  had  to  ride  back, 
and  to  go  with  the  others  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

As  to  Roux,  the  deposed  Commander-in-Chief, 
there  is  a  word  to  be  added.  I  had  always  heard  that 
he  was  a  very  cautious  man,  and  yet  on  this  occasion 
he  acted  like  a  child,  going  in  person  to  General 
Hunter's  camp  to  protest  against  the  surrender,  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  he  (Roux),  and  not  Prinsloo,  that 

127 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


was  Commander-in-Chief.  One  can  hardly  believe  that 
he  really  thought  it  possible  thus  to  nullify  Prinsloo's 
act.  But  he  certainly  behaved  as  if  he  did,  and  his 
ingenuous  conduct  must  have  afforded  much  amuse- 
ment to  the  English  general. 

If  any  one  is  in  doubt  as  to  what  was  the  result  of 
General  Roux's  absurd  escapade,  I  have  only  to  say 
that  the  English  had  one  prisoner  the  more  ! 

Those  who  escaped  were  but  few.  Of  all  our  large 
forces,  there  were  only  Generals  Froneman,  Fourie 
and  De  Villiers  (of  Harrismith) ;  Commandants 
Hasebroek,  Olivier,  Visser,  Kolbe,  and  a  few  others ; 
a  small  number  of  burghers,  and  six  or  seven  guns, 
that  did  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  English. 

What,  then,  is  to  be  our  judgment  on  this  act  of 
Prinsloo  and  of  the  other  chief  officers  in  command 
of  our  forces  behind  the  Roodebergen  ? 

That  it  was  nothing  short  of  an  act  of  murder,  com- 
mitted on  the  Government,  the  country,  and  the 
nation,  to  surrender  three  thousand  men  in  such  a 
way.  Even  the  burghers  themselves  cannot  be  held 
to  have  been  altogether  without  guilt,  though  they 
can  justly  plead  that  they  were  only  obeying  orders. 

The  sequel  to  Prinsloo's  surrender  was  on  a  par 
with  it.  A  large  number  of  burghers  from  Harri- 
smith and  a  small  part  of  the  Vrede  commando, 
although  they  had  already  made  good  their  escape, 
rode  quietly  from  their  farms  into  Harrismith,  and 
there  surrendered  to  General  Sir  Hector  Macdonald. 
— One  could  gnash  one's  teeth  to  think  that  a  nation 
should  so  readily  rush  to  its  own  ruin ! 


28 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


I  am  Driven  into  the  Transvaal 

AS  I  have  already  stated,  I  led  my  commando,  on 
the  15th  of  July,  through  Slabbertsnek,  out  of 
the  mountain  district.  My  force  amounted  to  the 
total  of  two  thousand  six  hundred  burghers.  The 
Government  travelled  with  us,  and  also  alas !  four 
hundred  waggons  and  carts.  Whatever  I  did,  it 
seemed  as  if  I  could  not  get  rid  of  the  waggons ! 

That  night  we  reached  a  farm  six  miles  to  the  east 
of  Kaffirs  Kop  ;  during  our  march  we  passed  a  column 
of  the  enemy  that  had  left  Bethlehem  in  the  after- 
noon. 

On  the  following  day  I  came  into  contact  with 
some  English  troops,  who  were  marching  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Witnek.  They  sent  out  a  body  of  cavalry  to 
ascertain  what  our  plans  might  be.  It  was  very 
annoying  to  me  that  they  should  thus  discover  our 
whereabouts,  because  it  made  it  impossible  to  carry 
out  my  intention  of  attacking  one  or  other  of  the 
English  forces. 

However,  nothing  was  done  that  day,  as  neither  we 
nor  the  enemy  took  up  the  offensive. 

In  the  evening  we  pushed  on  to  the  east  of  Lind- 
ley,  and  the  following  day  remained  at  the  spot  we 
had  reached.  The  next  evening  we  marched  to  the 
farm  of  Riversdale  ;  and  the  night  of  the  i8th  found  us 
on  the  farm  of  Mr.  Thomas  Naud^,  to  the  north-west 
of  Lindley.  We  discovered  that  the  English  had  all 
left  this  village  and  gone  to  Bethlehem.  My  scouts 
reported  to  me,  the  following  day,  that  an  English 
force,  some  four  hundred  men  strong,  was  approach- 

129 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


ing  Lindley.  Need  I  say  that  these  men  had  to  be 
captured  ?  With  five  hundred  burghers  and  two  guns 
I  went  out  to  do  this.  When  I  was  only  a  short  dis- 
tance from  my  camp,  I  received  a  report  that  a  large 
force  of  cavalry,  numbering  seven  or  eight  thousand 
men,  had  arrived  on  the  scene  from  Bethlehem.  This 
compelled  me  to  abandon  the  idea  of  capturing  those 
four  hundred  men,  and,  instead,  to  try  to  escape  in  a 
westerly  direction  from  this  large  body  of  mounted 
troops. 

That  evening  we  reached  the  farm  of  Mr.  C.  Wes- 
sels,  at  Rivierplaats.  The  next  day  we  were  forced  to 
move  on,  for  the  mounted  troops  were  coming  nearer 
to  us.  They  marched,  however,  somewhat  more  to 
the  right  in  the  direction  of  Roodewal ;  whereas  I  went 
towards  Honingspruit,  and  halted  for  the  night  at  the 
farm  of  Paardenkraal. 

On  the  following  morning,  the  20th  of  July,  I  let 
the  commando  go  on,  whilst  I  stayed  behind  to  recon- 
noitre from  a  neighbouring  kop.  The  President,  and 
also  some  members  of  the  Government,  remained  with 
me.  We  had  the  opportunity  of  accepting  the  invita- 
tion of  Mr.  C.  Wessels  to  take  breakfast  at  his  house. 
It  was  there  that  General  Piet  de  Wet  came  to  me 
and  asked  if  I  still  saw  any  chance  of  being  able  to 
continue  the  struggle  ? 

The  question  made  me  very  angry,  and  I  did  not 
try  to  hide  the  fact. 

"  Are  you  mad  ?  "  M  shouted,  and  with  that  I  turned 
on  my  heel  and  entered  the  house,  quite  unaware  that 
Piet  de  Wet  had  that  very  moment  mounted  his  horse, 
and  ridden  away  to  follow  his  own  course. 

After  breakfast  we  climbed  the  kop ;  and  when  we 
had  made  our  observation  we  followed  after  the  laager. 
On  reaching  the  commando,  I  gave  orders  to  outspan 
at  twelve  o'clock. 

While  this  was  being  done  I  heard  from  my  sons 

*  T  put  down  here  the  very  words  I  used,  for  any  other  course  would  not  bo 
honest 

130 


I  AM  DRIVEN  INTO  THE  TRANSVAAL 


that  Piet  de  Wet  had  told  them  that  we  should  all  be 
captured  that  night  near  the  railway  line.  He  had  not 
known  that  it  was  my  intention  to  cross  the  railway 
that  night,  but  he  had  guessed  as  much  from  the  di- 
rection I  let  my  commando  take. 

At  two  o'clock  I  received  a  report  that  two  divis- 
ions of  English  troops  were  drawing  near.  One  di- 
vision was  six  miles  to  the  left,  and  the  other  eight 
miles  to  the  right  of  the  road  along  which  we  had 
come. 

I  gave  orders  immediately  that  the  laager  should 
break  up.  What  an  indescribable  burden  this  camp, 
with  four  hundred  and  sixty  waggons  and  carts,  was  to 
me  !  What  a  demoralizing  effect  it  had  upon  the 
burghers  !  My  patience  was  sorely  tried.  Not  only 
were  we  prevented  from  moving  rapidly  by  these 
hampering  waggons,  but  also,  should  we  have  to  fight, 
a  number  of  the  burghers  would  be  required  to  look 
after  them,  and  so  be  unable  to  fire  a  shot. 

We  marched  to  the  farm  of  Mr.  Hendrik  Serfon- 
tein,  on  Doornspruit,  and  whilst  I  was  there,  waiting 
for  darkness,  some  burghers,  who  were  not  my  scouts, 
brought  a  report  that  there  were  English  camps  both 
at  Honingspruit  and  at  Kaallaagte. 

This  alarmed  the  President  and  the  members  of  the 
Government,  because,  should  this  report  prove  true, 
we  should  be  unable  to  cross  the  railway  line  without 
hard  fighting,  and  besides  there  would  be  a  consider- 
able risk  of  being  taken  prisoner. 

For  myself,  I  did  not  pay  any  attention  to  these 
burghers.  I  relied  on  my  own  scouts,  and  I  waited 
for  their  reports.  I  knew  that  if  there  had  been  any 
truth  in  what  we  had  been  told,  that  I  should  have 
heard  the  news  already  from  the  men  whom  I  had 
sent  out  in  the  morning  in  that  direction.  At  last 
some  of  Captain  Scheepers'  men  appeared — he  was 
scouting  in  front,  and  Captain  Danie  Theron  in  the 
rear — and  reported  that  the  railway  line  was  clear, 
with  the  exception  that  at  Honingspruit  there  were 

131 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


half  a  dozen  tents,  and  four  in  the  Kaallaagte  *  to  the 
north  of  Serfontein,  and  a  few  small  outposts.  This 
information  came  as  a  great  relief  to  the  President 
and  the  members  of  the  Government. 

If  I  was  to  escape  from  the  large  force  which  was 
dogging  my  footsteps,  it  was  now  necessary  to  cross 
the  railway.  I  had  made  all  preparation  for  this 
move.  I  had  left  behind  me,  that  afternoon,  on  the 
banks  of  Doornspruit  a  commando  of  burghers,  with 
orders  to  keep  the  enemy  back  until  we  should  have 
crossed  the  line.  And  now  I  only  waited  until  the 
darkness  should  come  to  my  assistance. 

As  soon  as  the  night  came  I  ordered  the  waggons 
to  proceed  in  four  rows,  with  a  force  on  each  side,  and 
with  a  rearguard  and  vanguard.  Immediately  behind 
the  vanguard  followed  the  President  and  myself. 
When  we  were  about  twenty  minutes'  march  from  the 
railway  line  I  ordered  the  two  wings  of  my  force, 
which  were  about  three  miles  apart,  to  occupy  the  line 
to  the  right  and  left  of  Serfontein  Siding. 

Before  we  had  quite  reached  the  railway  I  ordered 
the  vanguard  to  remain  with  the  President,  whilst  I 
myself,  with  fifteen  men,  rode  on  to  cut  the  telegraph 
wire.  Whilst  we  were  engaged  in  this  task  a  train 
approached  at  full  speed  from  the  south.  I  had  no 
dynamite  with  me,  and  I  could  neither  blow  it  up  nor 
derail  it.  I  could  only  place  stones  on  the  line,  but 
these  were  swept  away  by  the  cowcatcher,  and  so  the 
train  passed  in  safety. 

I  had  forbidden  any  shooting,  for  an  engagement 
would  have  only  produced  the  greatest  confusion  in 
my  big  laager. 

Just  as  the  last  waggon  was  crossing  the  line,  I  re- 
ceived a  report  that  Captain  Theron  had  captured  a 
train  to  the  south  of  us.  Having  ordered  the  waggons 
to  proceed,  I  rode  over  to  see  what  had  happened. 
When  I  arrived  at  the  scene  of  action  I  found  that 
the  train  had  come  to  a  standstill  owing  to  the  break- 

Kaallaagte — a  barren  hollow. 
132 


I  AM  DRIVEN  INTO  THE  TRANSVAAL 


ing  down  of  the  engine,  and  that  on  this  the  English 
troops  had  at  once  opened  fire  on  my  men,  but  that  it 
had  not  been  long  before  the  enemy  surrendered. 
Four  of  the  English,  but  only  one  of  our  burghers, 
had  been  wounded. 

It  was  very  annoying  that  the  laager  was  so  far  off, 
but  it  was  impossible  to  carry  off  the  valuable  ammu- 
nition which  we  found  on  the  train. 

I  gave  orders  that  the  four  wounded  soldiers,  who 
were  under  the  care  of  the  conductor  of  the  train, 
should  be  taken  from  the  hut  in  which  I  had  found 
them,  and  placed  in  a  van  where  they  would  be  safe 
when  I  set  fire  to  the  train.  After  the  burghers  had 
helped  themselves  to  sugar,  coffee,  and  such  things, 
I  burned  everything  that  was  left.  My  ninety-eight 
prisoners  I  took  with  me. 

We  had  not  gone  far  when  we  heard  the  small  arm 
ammunition  explode  ;  but  I  cannot  say  that  the  sound 
troubled  me  at  all ! 

Thus  we  crossed  the  line  in  safety,  and  Piet  de 
Wet's  prediction  did  not  come  true.  He  knew  that 
we  had  a  large  force  behind  us,  and  believing  that  the 
railway  line  in  front  of  us  would  be  occupied  by  troops, 
he  had  said:  ''This  evening  you  will  all  be  captured 
on  the  railway  line."  Yet  instead  of  finding  ourselves 
captured,  we  had  taken  ninety-eight  prisoners,  and  de- 
stroyed a  heavily-laden  train  !  How  frequently  a  Higher 
Power  over-rules  the  future  in  a  way  we  least  expect ! 

That  night  we  reached  the  farm  of  Mahemsspruit. 
From  there  we  moved  on  to  the  Wonderheurel  ;  and 
on  the  22nd  of  July  we  arrived  at  the  farm  of  Vlak- 
kuil.  I  remained  here  for  a  day,  for  I  wished  to  find 
out  what  the  English  troops  (they  had  remained  where 
we  left  them  by  the  railway  line)  were  intending  to  do. 

Whilst  I  was  waiting  I  despatched  some  corn  on  a 
few  of  my  waggons  to  Mr.  Mackenzie's  mills  near 
Vredefort,  giving  orders  that  it  should  be  ground. 

During  the  afternoon  it  was  reported  to  me  that  a 
strong  column  of  English  were  marching  from  Rhe- 

133 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


nosterriviersbrug  to  Vredefort,  and  that  they  had 
camped  on  the  farm  Klipstapel,  some  eight  miles  from 
my  laager. 

Shortly  after  sunrise  the  following  morning  a  sec- 
ond report  was  brought  to  me.  It  appeared  that  the 
enemy  had  sent  out  a  force  to  capture  our  grain  wag- 
gons, and  had  nearly  overtaken  them. 

In  an  instant  we  were  in  our  saddles,  but  we  were 
too  late  to  save  our  corn. 

When  the  enemy  saw  us  they  halted  at  once  ;  and 
meanwhile  the  waggons  hurried  on,  at  their  utmost 
speed,  to  our  camp. 

The  English  numbered  between  five  and  six  hun- 
dred men,  whilst  we  were  only  four  hundred.  But 
although  we  were  the  smaller  force,  I  had  no  intention 
of  allowing  our  waggons  to  be  captured  without  a 
shot,  and  I  ordered  my  burghers  to  charge. 

It  was  an  open  plain  ;  there  was  no  possible  cover 
either  for  us  or  for  the  English.  But  we  could  not 
consider  matters  of  that  sort. 

The  burghers  charged  magnificently,  and  some  even 
got  to  within  two  hundred  paces  of  the  enemy.  They 
then  dismounted,  and,  lying  flat  upon  the  ground, 
opened  a  fierce  fire.  One  of  the  hottest  fights  one 
can  imagine  followed. 

Fortunately  a  few  paces  behind  the  burghers  there 
was  a  hollow,  and  here  the  horses  were  placed. 

After  an  hour's  fighting,  I  began  to  think  that  any 
moment  the  enemy  might  be  put  to  rout.  But  then 
something  happened  which  had  happened  very  often 
before — a  reinforcement  appeared. 

This  reinforcement  brought  two  guns  with  it  ;  thus 
nothing  was  left  to  me  but  retreat.  Our  loss  was  five 
killed  and  twelve  wounded.  What  the  loss  of  the 
English  was  I  do  not  know,  but  if  the  Kaffirs  who 
lived  near  there  are  to  be  trusted,  it  must  have  been 
considerable. 

In  the  evenmg  I  moved  my  camp  to  Rhenoster- 
poort ;  whilst  the  English  went  back  to  Klipstapel. 

134 


I  AM  DRIVEN  INTO  THE  TRANSVAAL 


And  now  the  English  concentrated  their  forces. 
Great  Army  Corps  gathered  round.  From  Bethle- 
hem and  Kroonstad  new  columns  were  constantly  ar- 
riving, until  my  force  seemed  nothing  in  comparison 
with  them. 

I  was  stationed  on  the  farm  of  Rhenosterpoort, 
which  is  situated  on  the  Vaal  River,  twenty  miles  from 
Potchefstroom.  At  that  town  there  was  a  strong  force 
of  the  enemy,  on  which  I  had  constantly  to  keep  my  eye. 

But,  notwithstanding  their  overpowering  numbers, 
it  seemed  as  if  the  English  had  no  desire  to  follow  me 
into  the  mountains  of  Rhenosterpoort.  They  had  a 
different  plan.  They  began  to  march  around  me,  send- 
ing troops  from  Vredefort  over  Wonderheurel  to  Rhe- 
noster  River,  and  placing  camps  all  along  the  river  as 
far  as  Baltespoort,  and  from  there  again  extending 
their  cordon  until  Scandinavierdrift  was  reached. 

We  were  forced  now  either  to  break  through  this 
cordon,  or  to  cross  the  Vaal  River  into  the  South  Af- 
rican Republic.  The  Free-Stater  preferred  to  remain 
in  his  own  country,  and  he  would  have  been  able  to 
do  so  had  we  not  been  hampered  by  a  big  ''waggon- 
camp  "  and  a  large  number  of  oxen.  As  these  were 
with  us,  the  Boers  found  it  hard  to  make  up  their 
minds  to  break  through  the  English  lines  as  a  horse- 
commando,  as  it  necessitated  leaving  all  these  waggons 
and  oxen  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  But  there  we 
were  between  the  cordon  and  the  Vaal  River. 

Almost  every  day  we  came  into  contact  with  the 
enemy's  outposts,  and  we  had  an  engagement  with 
them  near  Witkopjes  Rheboksfontein.  On  another 
occasion  we  met  them  on  different  terms,  in  Mr.  C.  J. 
Bornman's  house.  Some  of  his  "visitors"  were,  un- 
fortunately for  themselves,  found  to  be  English  scouts 
— and  became  our  prisoners. 

We  remained  where  we  were  until  the  2nd  of  Aug- 
ust. On  that  day  we  had  to  drink  a  cup  of  bitterness. 
It  was  on  the  2nd  of  August  that  I  received  the  news 
that  Prinsloo  had  surrendered  near  Naauwpoort. 

135 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


A  letter  arrived  from  General  Broadwood  in  which 
he  told  me  that  a  report  from  General  Marthinus 
Prinsloo  addressed  to  me  had  arrived  through  his  lines. 
The  bearer  of  it  was  General  Prinsloo's  secretary,  Mr. 
Kotze.  And  now  the  English  General  asked  me  if  I 
would  guarantee  that  the  secretary  should  be  allowed 
to  return,  after  he  had  given  me  particulars  of  the  re- 
port he  had  brought. 

Mr.  Prinsloo's  secretary  must  certainly  have  thought 
that  he  was  the  chosen  man  to  help  us  poor  lost  sheep, 
and  to  lead  us  safely  into  the  hands  of  the  English  ! 
But  I  cannot  help  thinking  that  he  was  rather  too 
young  for  the  task. 

I  had  a  strong  suspicion  that  there  must  have  been 
some  very  important  screw  loose  in  the  forces  which 
we  had  left  stationed  behind  the  Roodebergen,  for  on 
the  previous  day  I  had  received  a  letter  from  General 
Knox,  who  was  at  Kroonstad,  telling  me  that  General 
Prinsloo  and  his  commandos  had  surrendered. 

In  order  to  gain  more  information  I  gave  General 
Broadwood  my  assurance  that  I  would  allow  Mr. 
Prinsloo's  secretary  to  return  unhurt. 

When  I  had  done  this  the  President  and  some 
members  of  the  Government  rode  out  with  me  to 
meet  the  bearer  of  this  report.  We  did  not  wish  to 
give  him  any  opportunities  to  spy  out  our  positions. 
Half  way  between  the  English  lines  and  our  own  we 
met  him.    He  presented  us  with  this  letter : — 

Hunter's  Camp,  30M  July,  1900. 
To  THE  Commander-in-Chief,  C.  R.  de  Wet. 
Sir, — 

I  have  been  obliged,  owing  to  the  overwhelming 
forces  of  the  enemy,  to  surrender  unconditionally  with 
all  the  Orange  Free  State  laagers  here. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be,  Sir, 
Your  obedient  servant, 
M.  Prinsloo, 

Co  m  mandcr- in-  Ch  ief, 

136 


I  AM  DRIVEN  INTO  THE  TRANSVAAL 


I  sent  my  reply  in  an  unclosed  envelope.  It  ran  as 
follows: — 

In  the  Veldt,        August,  1900. 
To  Mr.  M.  Prinsloo. 
Sir, — 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  letter  dated  the  30th  of  last  month.  I  am  sur- 
prised to  see  that  you  call  yourself  Commander-in- 
Chief.  By  what  right  do  you  usurp  that  title  ?  You 
have  no  right  to  act  as  Commander-in-Chief. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be, 
C.  R.  DE  Wet, 
Commander -in-  Chief, 

Hardly  had  I  written  this  letter  before  two  men  on 
horseback  appeared.  They  proved  to  be  burghers  sent 
by  General  Piet  Fourie,  who  was  with  Prinsloo  at  the 
time  of  his  surrender.  These  burghers  brought  from 
Generals  Fourie,  Froneman,  and  from  Commandant 
Hasebroek  and  others,  a  fuller  report  of  the  surrender 
of  Prinsloo.  We  learnt  from  the  report  that  not  all 
of  the  burghers  had  surrendered,  but  that,  on  the  con- 
trary, some  two  thousand  had  escaped.  This  news 
relieved  our  minds. 

President  Steyn  and  myself  determined  to  despatch 
Judge  Hertzog  to  the  commandos  which  had  escaped, 
giving  him  instructions  to  bring  them  back  with  him 
if  possi.^e.  We  had  been  told  that  these  commandos 
were  somewhere  on  the  Wilgerivier,  in  the  district  of 
Harrismith. 

My  position  had  now  become  very  difficult.  It 
seemed,  as  far  as  I  could  discover,  that  there  were  five 
or  six  English  generals  and  forty  thousand  troops,  of 
which  the  greater  part  were  mounted,  all  of  them  try- 
ing their  best  to  capture  the  Government  and  me. 

My  force  numbered  two  thousand  five  hundred  men. 

On  the  afternoon  when  I  received  the  above-men- 
tioned letter,  there  was  still  a  way  of  escape  open  to 
me,  through  Parijs^  to  Potchefstroom.    This  road 

» Parijs  is  situated  on  the  Vaal  River. 
137 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


crossed  the  Vaal  River  at  Schoemansdrift,  and  then 
followed  the  course  of  the  stream  between  Parijs  and 
Vanvurenskloof.  It  was  now,  however,  somewhat 
unsafe,  for  that  same  afternoon  a  large  force  of  the 
enemy  was  marching  along  the  Vaal  River  from  Vrede- 
fort  to  Parijs.  These  troops  would  be  able  to  reach 
Vanvurenskloof  early  the  following  morning ;  whilst 
the  force  at  Potchefstroom,  which  I  have  already  men- 
tioned in  this  chapter,  would  also  be  able  to  arrive 
there  at  the  same  hour. 

I  led  my  burghers  that  evening  across  the  Vaal 
River  to  Venterskroon,  which  lies  six  miles  from 
Schoemansdrift.  The  following  morning  my  scouts 
reported  that  the  English  were  rapidly  approaching 
from  Potchefstroom  in  two  divisions ;  one  was  at 
Zandnek  :  the  other  had  already  reached  Roodekraal 
on  its  way  to  Schoemansdrift.  One  of  these  divisions, 
my  scouts  told  me,  might  be  turning  aside  to  Van- 
vurenskloof. 

Now  the  road  from  Venterskroon  passed  between 
two  mountain  chains  to  the  north  of  Vanvurenskloof  ; 
and  I  feared  that  the  English  would  block  the  way 
there.  I  had  to  avoid  this  at  all  costs,  but  I  had  hardly 
a  man  available  for  the  purpose.  The  greater  part  of 
my  burghers  were  still  to  the  south-east  and  south- 
west of  the  Vaal  River. 

There  was  nothing  left  for  me  to  do  except  to  take 
the  burghers  who  remained  with  me,  and,  whilst  the 
laager  followed  us  as  quickly  as  possible,  to  advance 
and  prevent  the  enemy  from  occupying  the  kloof. 
This  I  did,  and  took  a  part  of  my  men  to  Vanvurens- 
kloof, whilst  I  sent  another  body  of  burghers  to  Zand- 
nek. 

Everything  went  smoothly.  The  enemy  did  not 
appear  and  the  laager  escaped  without  let  or  hindrance 
■ — and  so  we  camped  at  Vanvurenskloof. 

I  must  have  misled  the  English,  for  they  certainly 
would  have  thought  that  I  would  come  out  by  the 
road  near  Roodekraal.    But  I  cannot  understand  why 

138 


I  AM  DRIVEN  INTO  THE  TRANSVAAL 


the  force  in  our  rear,  which  had  arrived  at  Parijs  the 
previous  evening,  remained  there  overnight,  nor  why, 
when  they  did  move  on  the  following  morning,  they 
marched  to  Lindequesdrift,  eight  miles  up  the  Vaal 
River,  and  not,  as  might  well  have  been  expected,  to 
Vanvurenskloof. 

The  burghers  whom  I  sent  in  the  direction  of 
Roodekraal  had  a  fight  with  the  enemy  at  Tijgerfon- 
tein.  A  heavy  bombardment  took  place  ;  and  my  men 
told  me  afterwards  that  the  baboons,  of  which  there 
were  a  large  number  in  these  mountains,  sprang  from 
cliff  to  cliff  screaming  with  fright — poor  creatures — as 
the  rocks  were  split  on  every  side  by  the  lyddite  shells. 

The  burghers  came  to  close  quarters  with  the  enemy, 
and  a  fierce  engagement  with  small  arms  took  place. 

It  appeared  later  that  the  enemy's  casualties 
amounted  to  more  than  a  hundred  dead  and  wounded. 
Our  loss  was  only  two  men. 

As  I  have  already  stated,  we  camped  at  Vanvurens- 
kloof. The  next  morning,  while  we  were  still  there, 
we  were  surprised  by  the  enemy — an  unpleasant  thing 
for  men  with  empty  stomachs. 

I  did  not  receive  any  report  from  my  scouts'  until 
the  English  were  not  more  than  three  thousand  paces 
from  us,  and  had  already  opened  fire  on  the  laager,  not 
only  with  their  guns,  but  also  with  their  rifles.  We  at 
once  took  the  best  positions  we  could  find;  and  mean- 
while the  waggons  got  away  as  quickly  as  possible. 
They  succeeded  in  getting  over  the  first  ridge,  and  thus 
gained  a  certain  amount  of  shelter,  whilst  we  kept  the 
English  busy. 

The  enemy  approached  nearer  and  nearer  to  us  with 
overpowering  forces.  Then  they  charged,  and  I  saw 
man  after  man  fall,  struck  down  by  our  merciless  fire. 

»  The  reason  why  Captain  Scheepers  was  so  late  in  sending  his  report  was 
because  he  himself  was  engaging  the  enemy  with  six  of  his  men  near  Zandnek, 
He  had  come  across  a  convoy  of  fourteen  waggons  and  thirty  men,  and  had, 
after  an  hour's  fight,  nearly  brought  them  to  the  point  of  surrendering,  when  re- 
inforcements arrived.  He  was  thus  forced  to  retire,  and  then  discovered  that 
the  enemy  were  approaching  our  laager ;  and  he  had  a  hair's  breadth  escape 
from  capture  in  bringing  me  the  report. 

139 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


We  were  quite  unable  to  hold  the  enemy  back,  and  so 
we  had  to  leave  our  positions,  having  lost  one  dead  and 
one  wounded. 

That  night  we  marched  ten  miles  to  the  east  of 
Gatsrand,  on  the  road  to  Frederiksstad  Station,  and 
the  following  morning  we  arrived  at  the  foot  of  the 
.mountain.  Here  we  outspanned  for  a  short  time,  but 
we  could  not  wait  long,  for  our  pursuers  were  follow- 
ing us  at  a  great  pace.  It  was  not  only  the  force  from 
the  other  side  of  Vanvurenskloof  with  which  we  had 
to  deal.  The  united  forces  of  the  English  had  now 
concentrated  from  different  points  with  the  purpose  of 
working  our  ruin. 

The  English  were  exceedingly  angry  that  we  had 
escaped  from  them  on  the  Vaal  River,  for  they  had 
thought  that  they  had  us  safely  in  their  hands.  That 
we  should  have  succeeded  in  eluding  them  was  quite 
beyond  their  calculations ;  and  in  order  to  free  them- 
selves from  any  blame  in  the  matter,  they  reported 
that  we  had  crossed  the  river  at  a  place  where  there 
was  no  ford,  but  this  was  not  true  ;  we  had  crossed 
by  the  waggon  and  post  ford — the  well-known  Schoe- 
mansdrift. 

But  whether  the  enemy  were  angry  or  not,  there 
was  no  doubt  that  they  were  pursuing  us  in  very  large 
numbers,  and  that  we  had  to  escape  from  them.  That 
evening,  the  7th  of  August,  we  went  to  the  north  of 
Frederiksstad  Station,  and  blew  up  a  bridge  with  two 
spans  and  wrecked  the  line  with  dynamite. 

The  following  day  we  arrived  at  the  Mooi  River. 
This  river  is  never  dry  winter  or  summer,  but  always 
flows  with  a  stream  as  clear  as  crystal.  It  affords  an 
inexhaustible  supply  of  water  to  the  rich  land  that 
lies  along  its  bank.  It  is  a  fitting  name  for  it — the 
name  of  Mooi.^ 

At  the  other  side  of  this  river  we  found  General 
Liebenberg's  commando,  which,  like  ourselves,  was  in 
the  trap. 

»  *'  Mooi  "  means  beautiful  in  the  Taal  language. 
140 


I  AM  DRIVEN  INTO  THE  TRANSVAAL 


The  General  joined  us  on  our  march,  and  the  fol- 
lowing day  we  were  nine  miles  from  Ventersdorp. 

Early  that  morning  a  report  came  that  the  English 
were  approaching  and  were  extended  right  across  the 
country. 

Inspan  !  " 

No  man  uttered  a  word  of  complaint ;  each  man 
did  his  work  so  quickly  that  one  could  hardly  believe 
that  a  laager  could  be  put  on  the  move  in  so  short  a 
time.  And  away  the  waggons  and  carts  skurried, 
steering  their  course  to  Ventersdorp. 

It  was  impossible  to  think  of  fighting — the  enemy's 
numbers  were  far  too  great.  Our  only  safety  lay  in 
flight. 

We  knew  very  well  that  an  Englishman  cannot 
keep  up  with  a  Boer  on  the  march,  and  that  if  he  tries 
to  do  so,  he  soon  finds  that  his  horses  and  oxen  can  go 
no  further.  Our  intention  was  then  to  march  at  the 
very  best  pace  we  could,  so  that  the  enemy  might  be 
forced  to  stop  from  sheer  exhaustion.  And  as  the 
reader  will  soon  see,  our  plan  was  successful. 

Nevertheless  we  had  to  do  some  fighting,  to  pro- 
tect our  laager  from  a  force  of  cavalry  that  was  rapidly 
coming  up  with  us. 

They  wanted  to  make  an  end  of  this  small  body  of 
Boers,  which  was  always  retreating,  but  yet,  now  and 
again,  offering  some  slight  resistance — this  tiny  force 
that  was  always  teaching  them  unpleasant  lessons ; 
first  at  Retiefsnek,  then  to  the  north  of  Lindley,  then 
on  the  railway  line,  then  near  Vredefort,  then  at 
Rhenosterpoort,  and  then  again  at  Tijgerfontein. 
Yes ;  this  sort  of  thing  must  come  to  an  end  once  for 
all! 

We  attacked  the  approaching  troops,  and  succeeded 
in  checking  their  advance.  But  our  resistance  could 
not  last  long,  and  soon  we  had  to  retreat  and  leave 
one  of  our  Krupps  behind  us. 

Had  I  not  continued  firing  with  my  Krupp  until  it 
was  impossible  to  save  it.  then,  in  all  probability,  the 

141 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


laager  would  have  been  taken.  But  with  the  loss  of 
this  Krupp  we  saved  the  laager. 

I  withdrew  my  burghers ;  I  released  the  prisoners 
whom  I  had  with  me. 

And  now  it  was  my  task  to  make  it  as  difificult  as 
possible  for  my  pursuers.  The  winter  grass  on  the 
veldt  was  dry  and  very  inflammable,  and  I  decided 
to  set  fire  to  it,  in  order  that  the  English  might  find 
it  impossible  to  obtain  pasture  for  their  oxen  and 
cattle.  I  accordingly  set  it  alight,  and  very  soon  the 
country  behind  was  black. 

We  hurried  on  until  we  reached  Mr.  Smit's  farm, 
which  is  one  hour  on  horseback  from  the  southern 
slopes  of  the  Witwatersrand — the  great  dividing  chain 
of  mountains  that  runs  in  the  direction  of  Marico. 
Crossing  this  range,  we  continued  on  the  march  the 
whole  night  until,  on  the  morning  of  the  nth  of 
August,  we  arrived  at  the  southern  side  of  the 
Magaliesberg. 

In  the  afternoon  we  went  over  the  saddle  of  the 
mountain  and  across  the  Krokodil  River. 

My  idea  was  to  remain  here  and  give  our  horses  and 
oxen  a  rest,  for  the  veldt  was  in  good  condition,  and 
we  could,  if  it  were  necessary,  occupy  the  shoulder  of 
the  mountain  behind  us. 

General  Liebenberg  took  possession  of  the  position 
to  the  west,  near  Rustenburg ;  but  hardly  had  he 
done  so,  before  the  English  made  their  appearance, 
coming  over  another  part  of  the  mountain.  He  sent 
me  a  report  to  this  effect,  adding  that  he  was  unable 
to  remain  where  he  was  stationed. 

Thus  again  we  had  to  retreat,  and  I  was  unable  to 
give  my  animals  the  rest  I  had  intended  to  give  them. 

We  now  took  the  road  from  Rustenburg  to  Pretoria, 
and  arrived  the  following  evening  close  to  Com- 
mandonek,  which  we  soon  found  was  held  by  an  Eng- 
lish force. 

I  left  the  laager  behind  and  rode  on  in  advance 
with  a  horse-commando.    When  I  was  a  short  distance 

142 


I  AM  DRIVEN  INTO  THE  TRANSVAAL 


from  the  enemy,  I  sent  a  letter  to  the  officer  in  com- 
mand, telling  him  that,  if  he  did  not  surrender,  I 
would  attack  him.  I  did  this  in  order  to  discover  the 
strength  of  the  English  force,  and  to  find  out  if  it  were 
possible  to  attack  the  enemy  at  once,  and  forcing  our 
way  through  the  Nek,  get  to  the  east  of  the  forces  that 
were  pursuing  me. 

My  despatch  rider  succeeded  in  getting  into  the 
English  camp  before  he  could  be  blindfolded.  He 
came  back  with  the  customary  refusal,  and  reported 
that  although  the  enemy's  force  was  not  very  large, 
still  the  positions  held  were  so  strong  that  I  could  not 
hope  to  be  able  to  capture  them  before  the  English 
behind  me  arrived. 

I  had  therefore  to  give  up  the  thought  of  breaking 
through  these  and  flanking  the  English.  Thus,  in- 
stead of  attacking  the  enemy,  we  went  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Zoutpan,  and  arrived  a  few  hours  later  at  the 
Krokodil  River. 

I  had  now  left  the  English  a  considerable  distance 
behind  me  ;  and  so  at  last — we  were  able  to  give  our- 
selves a  little  rest. 


M3 


CHAPTER  XIX 


I  Return  to  the  Free  State 

WHILST  we  were  encamped  on  the  Krokodil 
River,  President  Steyn  expressed  a  wish  to  pay 
a  visit,  with  the  Members  of  his  Government,  to  the 
Government  of  the  South  African  RepubHc,  which 
was  then  at  Machadodorp.  This  was  no  easy  task  to 
accomplish,  for  one  would  have  to  pass  through  a  part 
of  the  Transvaal  where  there  was  a  great  scarcity  of 
water — it  was  little  better  than  a  desert — and  where  in 
some  places  the  Kaffirs  were  unfriendly.  In  other 
words,  one  would  have  to  go  through  the  Boschveldt. 
There  would  also  be  some  danger  from  the  English, 
since  the  President  would  have  to  cross  the  Pieters- 
burg  Railway,  which  was  in  that  direction. 
However,  this  plan  was  approved. 
I  decided  not  to  accompany  the  President,  but  to 
return  at  once  with  two  hundred  riders  to  the  Orange 
Free  State.  I  intended  to  make  it  known  on  the 
farms  which  I  passed  on  the  way  that  I  was  going 
back,  hoping  thus  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Eng- 
lish from  our  laager. 

I  called  together  the  Commandants,  and  informed 
them  of  my  intention.  They  agreed  that  the  course  I 
proposed  was  the  right  one.  Commandant  Steene- 
kamp  was  then  nominated  to  act  as  Assistant  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, with  the  duty  of  conducting  the 
laager  through  the  Boschveldt. 

On  August  the  14th  President  Steyn  left  the  laager 
on  his  way  to  Machadodorp  ;  and  I  myself  took  my 
departure  three  days  later.  I  took  with  me  General 
Philip  Botha  and  Commandant  Prinsloo,  and  200  men, 

144 


I  RETURN  TO  THE  FREE  STATE 


and  also  Captain  Scheepers  with  his  corps,  which  con- 
sisted of  thirty  men.  With  the  addition  of  my  staff 
we  numbered  altogether  246  men. 

Thus  our  ways  parted — the  President  going  to  the 
Government  of  the  South  African  Republic,  the  laager 
to  the  north,  and  I  back  to  the  Free  State.  I  had 
now  to  cross  the  Magalies  Mountains.  The  nearest 
two  passes  were  Olifantsnek  and  Commandonek. 
But  the  first  named  was  too  much  to  the  west,  and 
the  second  was  probably  occupied  by  the  English.  I 
therefore  decided  to  take  a  footpath  that  crossed  the 
mountains  between  the  two  saddles.  I  was  forced  to 
choose  this  middle  road  because  I  had  no  means  of 
ascertaining  whether  Commandonek  was,  or  was  not, 
in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

On  August  1 8th  we  arrived  at  a  house  where  some 
Germans  were  living — the  parents  and  sisters  of  Mr. 
Penzhorn,  Secretary  to  General  Piet  Cronje.  They 
were  exceedingly  friendly  to  us,  and  did  all  in  their 
power  to  make  us  comfortable. 

We  did  not  stay  here  for  long,  but  were  on  the 
march  again  the  same  day.  Soon  after  we  had 
mounted  our  horses  we  came  in  sight  of  a  large  Eng- 
lish camp,  which  was  stationed  on  the  road  from  Rus- 
tenburg  to  Pretoria,  between  Commandonek  and 
Krokodil  River.  This  camp  lay  about  six  miles  to  the 
south-east  of  the  point  where  we  first  saw  it.  Another 
great  camp  stood  about  seven  miles  to  the  north-west. 

The  enemy  could  see  us  clearly,  as  it  was  open 
veldt,  with  only  a  few  bushes  cropping  up  here  and 
there.  We  now  rode  on  in  the  direction  of  Wolhu- 
terskop,  which  is  close  to  the  Magalies  Mountains.  I 
thought  I  should  thus  be  able  to  reach  the  great  road 
from  Rustenburg  to  Pretoria,  which  was  eight  or  nine 
miles  from  the  footpath  across  the  Magaliesberg. 
When  we  were  about  two  miles  east  of  Wolhuterskop 
we  suddenly  came  upon  two  English  scouts.  One  of 
them  we  captured  ;  and  he  told  us  that  there  was  a 
great  force  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  us  and  marching 

145 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


in  our  direction.    What  could  we  do  now  ?    It  was 

impossible  to  proceed  along  the  footpath  because  that 
road  was  closed  by  the  enemy.  North  and  west  of  us 
there  were  other  bodies  of  troops,  as  I  have  already 
said ;  and  there,  directly  in  front  of  us,  were  the  chains 
of  the  Magaliesbergen.  Thus  we  found  ourselves  be- 
tween four  fires. 

In  addition  to  this,  I  was  much  troubled  by  the 
thought  that  our  horses  were  now  exhausted  by  all 
this  endless  marching.  I  knew  this  was  also  the  case 
with  the  English  horses,  but  for  all  I  knew,  they 
might  have  obtained  fresh  ones  from  Pretoria.  They 
could  at  all  events  have  picked  the  best  horses  from 
each  camp,  and  thus  send  an  overpowering  force 
against  me.  This  was  one  of  those  moments  when  a 
man  has  to  keep  his  presence  of  mind,  or  else  all  is 
lost. 

Whilst  I  was  still  thinking  the  matter  over,  troops 
began  to  come  out  of  the  camps,  about  two  miles  to 
the  west  of  us  on  the  road  between  Wolhuterskop 
and  Magaliesberg.  The  scout  who  had  escaped 
might  now  be  with  that  force.  I  had  therefore  to  act 
at  once. 

I  decided  on  climbing  the  Magalies  Mountains, 
without  a  path  or  road ! 

Near  by  there  was  a  KafQr  hut,  and  I  rode  up  to  it. 
When  the  Kaffir  came  out  to  me,  I  pointed  to  the 
Magalies  Mountains,  and  asked  : — 

"  Right  before  us,  can  a  man  cross  there?" 

No,  baas,^  you  cannot ! "  the  Kaffir  answered. 
"  Has  a  man  never  ridden  across  here  ?" 
Yes,  baas,"  replied  the  Kaffir,  ''long  ago." 
Do  baboons  walk  across  ?  " 
**  Yes  !  baboons  do,  but  not  a  man." 
Come  on  !  "  I  said  to  my  burghers.    "  This  is  our 
only  way,  and  where  a  baboon  can  cross,  we  can 
cross." 

With  us  was  one  Adriaan  Matthijsen,  a  corporal 

'  Master. 
146 


I  RETURN  TO  THE  FREE  STATE 


who  came  from  the  district  of  Bethlehem,  and  was  a 
sort  of  jocular  character.  He  looked  up  at  the  moun- 
tains, 2,000  feet  above  him,  and  sighed  : — 
O  Red  Sea  !  " 
I  replied,  "The  children  of  Israel  had  faith  and  went 
through,  and  all  you  need  is  faith.  This  is  not  the 
first  Red  Sea  we  have  met  with  and  will  not  be  the 
last !  " 

What  Corporal  Matthijsen  thought  I  do  not  know, 
for  he  kept  silence.  But  he  pulled  a  long  face,  as  if 
saying  to  himself  : — 

Neither  you,  nor  anybody  else  with  us,  is  a 
Moses  ! " 

We  climbed  up  unobserved  to  a  bit  of  bush  which, 
to  continue  the  metaphor  of  the  Red  Sea,  was  a  Pil- 
lar of  Cloud  "  to  hide  us  from  the  English. 

We  then  reached  a  kloof  ^  running  in  a  south-west- 
erly direction,  and  ascended  by  it,  still  out  of  sight  of 
the  English,  till  we  reached  a  point  nearly  half-way  up 
the  mountain.  There  we  had  to  leave  the  kloof,  and, 
turning  to  the  south,  continue  our  ascent  in  full  view 
of  the  enemy. 

It  was  now  so  precipitous  that  there  was  no  possi- 
bility of  proceeding  any  further  on  horseback.  The 
burghers  had  therefore  to  lead  their  horses,  and  had 
great  difficulty  even  in  keeping  their  own  footing. 
It  frequently  happened  that  a  burgher  fell  and  slipped 
backwards  under  his  horse.  The  climb  became  now 
more  and  more  difficult ;  and  when  we  had  nearly 
reached  the  top  of  the  mountain,  there  was  a  huge 
slab  of  granite  as  slippery  as  ice,  and  here  man  and 
horse  stumbled  still  more,  and  were  continually  fall- 
ing. 

We  were,  as  I  have  said,  in  view  of  the  enemy,  and 
although  out  of  reach  of  the  Lee-Metfords,  were  in 
range  of  their  big  guns  ! 

I  heard  burghers  muttering  : — 

**  Suppose  the  enemy  should  aim  those  guns  at  us — 

Ravine. 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


what  will  become  of  us  then  ?  Nobody  can  get  out 
of  the  road  here  !  " 

I  told  them  that  this  could  only  be  done  if  the  Eng- 
lish had  a  Howitzer.  But  I  did  not  add  that  this  was 
a  sort  of  gun  which  the  columns  now  pursuing  me 
were  likely  enough  to  possess. 

But  nothing  happened.  The  English  neither  shot  at 
us,  nor  did  they  pursue  us.  Corporal  Matthijsen  would 
have  said  that  they  were  more  cautious  than  Pharaoh. 

We  now  reached  the  top  of  the  mountain — entirely 
exhausted.  I  have  ascended  many  a  mountain — the 
rough  cliffs  of  Majuba,  the  steep  sides  of  Nicholson's 
Nek — but  never  before  had  I  been  so  tired  as  I  was 
now  ;  yet  in  the  depths  of  my  heart  I  was  satisfied. 
All  our  toil  was  repaid  by  the  glorious  panorama  that 
now  stretched  out  before  us  to  the  south.  We  saw 
the  undulating  veldt  between  the  Magaliesbergen 
where  we  stood,  and  the  Witwatersrand.  Through  a 
ravine  we  had  a  view  extending  for  many  miles,  but 
wherever  we  cast  our  eyes  there  was  no  sign  of  any- 
thing that  resembled  the  enemy. 

As  it  was  now  too  late  to  off-saddle,  we  began,  after 
having  taken  a  little  rest,  to  descend  the  mountain  on 
the  other  side,  my  object  being  to  reach  a  farm  where 
I  hoped  to  get  some  sheep  or  oxen  for  my  men,  who 
not  only  were  tired  out,  but  nearly  famished. 

We  went  down  the  mountain — well,  somewhat 
quicker  than  we  had  climbed  it ;  however,  we  could 
not  go  very  fast,  as  the  incline  was  steep.  In  an  hour 
and  a  half  we  reached  a  Boer  farm. 

One  can  imagine  how  the  burghers  recovered  their 
spirits  as  they  ate  their  supper,  and  what  it  meant  for 
them  to  give  their  tired  limbs  a  rest. 

The  following  morning  we  found  good  horse-prov- 
ender, and  plenty  of  it.  It  was  not  as  yet  the  habit 
of  the  English  to  burn  everything  they  came  across — 
they  had  not  yet  begun  to  carry  out  that  policy  of  de- 
struction. 

I  now  felt  quite  easy  about  the  safety  of  our  camp. 

148 


I  RETURN  TO  THE  FREE  STATE 


The  attention  of  the  English  would  be  turned  in  quite 
another  direction. 

I  was  quite  right  in  this  view  of  the  matter.  For  I 
heard  a  few  days  later  that  the  enemy  had  not  been 
able  to  pursue  the  laager  as  their  draft-cattle  and  horses 
were  so  completely  exhausted,  that  they  had  fallen 
down  dead  in  heaps.  I  heard  also  that  they  had  soon 
been  made  acquainted  with  the  fact  that  I  was  on  my 
way  back  to  the  Free  State,  where  I  would  soon  begin 
again  to  wreck  railway  lines  and  telegraph  wires. 
They  had  also  discovered  that  President  Steyn  had 
left  the  laager  and  was  on  the  road  to  Machadodorp. 

It  was  on  the  i8th  of  August,  1900,  that  we  were 
able  to  eat  our  crust  of  bread  in  safety  on  the  farm 
just  mentioned,  and  to  let  our  horses  have  as  much 
food  as  they  wanted.  It  seemed  that  for  the  time 
being  a  heavy  burden  had  fallen  from  our  shoulders. 
That  afternoon  we  crossed  the  Krokodil  River,  and 
stopped  at  a  "winkel "  ^  under  the  Witwatersrand,  which 
had  been  spared  as  yet,  although  it  was  nearly  empty 
of  stores.  Fodder,  however,  was  plentiful,  and  thus, 
again,  we  could  give  our  horses  a  good  feed. 

I  now  received  a  report  that  a  strong  contingent 
of  the  enemy  was  on  the  march  from  Olifantsnek  to 
Krugersdorp,  and  accordingly  we  rode  off  in  the  night. 
We  found  that  this  force  was  the  very  one  that  had 
flanked  our  laager  the  previous  week,  when  we  were 
passing  Ventersdorp.  The  road  which  the  enemy 
were  taking  was  the  same  which  Jameson  had  marched 
when  he  made  his  inroad  into  the  South  African  Re- 
public. 

My  intention  was  to  cross  the  enemy's  path  before 
daylight  the  following  morning,  which  I  succeeded  in 
doing ;  and  we  heard  no  more  of  this  force.  I  pro- 
ceeded now  in  the  direction  of  Gatsrand. 

From  there  I  still  went  on,  and  crossed  the  Kru- 
gersdorp-Potchefstroom  Railway,  about  eight  or  ten 
miles  to  the  north  of  Bank  Station. 

»  General  Store. 
149 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


The  line  was  then  not  guarded  everywhere.  There 
were  small  garrisons  at  the  stations  only,  and  so  one 
could  cross  even  in  the  day  time.  To  my  vexation, 
I  had  not  a  single  cartridge  of  dynamite,  or  any  im- 
plements at  hand  with  which  I  could  wreck  the  line. 
It  was  painful  to  see  the  railway  line  and  not  be  able 
to  do  any  damage  to  it !  I  had  made  it  a  rule  never 
to  be  in  the  neighbourhood  of  a  railway  without  inter- 
rupting the  enemy's  means  of  communication. 

We  arrived  now  at  the  farm  of  Messrs.  Wolfaard, 
who  had  been  captured  with  General  Cronje  ;  and 
here  I  met  Commandant  Danie  Theron,  with  his 
eighty  men.  He  had  come  to  this  place  to  avoid  the 
troops  lying  between  Mooi  River  and  Ventersdorp. 
His  horses,  although  still  weak,  were  yet  somewhat 
rested,  and  I  gave  him  orders  to  join  me  in  a  few 
days,  in  order  to  reinforce  me  until  my  commandos 
should  come  back.  My  intention  was  not  to  under- 
take any  great  operations,  for  my  force  was  not  strong 
enough  for  that.  I  intended  my  principal  occupation 
to  be  to  interrupt  the  communications  of  the  enemy 
by  wrecking  the  line  and  telegraph. 

With  regard  to  the  main  line  in  the  Free  State  I 
must  remark  here  that  things  there  were  in  a  different 
condition  from  what  they  were  on  the  Krugersdorp 
line,  which  we  had  crossed.  The  Free  State  railway 
was  Lord  Roberts'  principal  line  of  communication, 
and  he  had  provided  guards  for  it  everywhere. 

During  the  night  of  August  21st,  we  arrived  at  Van- 
vurenskloof.  How  delightful  it  was  when  the  sun 
rose  to  see  once  more  the  well-known  mountains  to 
the  south  of  the  Vaal  River  in  our  own  Free  State  ! 

**  There  is  the  Free  State,"  we  called  out  to  each 
other  when  day  broke.  Every  one  was  jubilant  at 
seeing  again  that  country  which  of  all  the  countries  on 
the  earth  is  the  best.  From  here  I  despatched  Gen- 
eral Botha  with  the  purpose  of  collecting  the  burghers 
of  Vrede  and  Harrismith  who  had  remained  at  home, 
and  of  bringing  them  back  to  join  me. 

150 


I  RETURN  TO  THE  FREE  STATE 


We  remained  only  as  long  as  was  necessary  to  rest 
the  horses,  and  then  at  once  went  on.  The  same 
evening  we  arrived  at  the  farm  of  Rhenosterpoort, 
where  our  laager  had  waited  since  we  had  crossed  the 
Vaal  River  more  than  a  week  ago. 

The  proprietor  of  the  farm  of  Rhenosterpoort  was 
old  Mr.  Jan  Botha.  It  could  not  be  that  he  belonged 
to  the  family  of  Paul  Botha,  of  Kroonstad,  for  Jan 
Botha  and  his  household  (amongst  whom  was  his  son 
Jan,  an  excellent  veldtcornet)  were  true  Afrikanders. 
And  even  if  he  did  belong  to  the  family  of  Paul 
Botha,  then  the  difference  in  his  feelings  and  actions 
from  those  of  other  members  of  his  family  was  no 
greater  that  that,  alas  !  which  frequently  occurred  in 
many  families  during  this  war.  One  member  put 
everything  at  the  disposal  of  his  country,  whereas 
another  of  the  same  name  did  everything  possible 
against  his  country  and  his  people.  But  there  was  no 
such  discord  here.  The  two  old  brothers  of  Mr.  Botha, 
Philip  and  Hekky,  were  heart  and  soul  with  us. 

Potchefstroom  was  not  at  that  time  in  the  hands  of 
the  English.  I  rode  over  to  the  town,  and  then  it 
was  that  the  well-known  photo  was  taken  of  me  that 
has  been  spread  about  everywhere,  in  which  I  am  rep- 
resented with  a  Mauser  in  my  hand.  I  only  mention 
this  so  as  to  draw  attention  to  the  history  of  the 
weapon  which  I  held  in  my  hand.    It  is  as  follows  : — 

When  the  enemy  passed  through  Potchefstroom  on 
their  way  to  Pretoria,  they  left  a  garrison  behind  them, 
and  many  burghers  went  there  to  give  up  their  arms, 
which  forthwith  were  burnt  in  a  heap.  When  the 
garrison  left  the  dorp  the  burghers  returned.  Amongst 
them  were  some  who  set  to  work  to  make  butts  for 
the  rifles  that  had  been  burnt. 

"This  rifle,"  I  was  told  by  the  man  who  showed  it 
to  me,  is  the  two  hundredth  that  has  been  taken  out 
of  the  burnt  heap  and  repaired." 

This  made  such  an  impression  on  me  that  I  took  it 
in  my  hand,  and  had  my  photo  taken  with  it.    I  am 

151 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


only  sorry  that  I  cannot  mention  the  names  of  the 
burghers  who  did  that  work.  Their  names  are  worthy 
to  be  enrolled  on  the  annals  of  our  nation. 

After  having  provided  myself  with  dynamite,  I  left 
Potchefstroom  and  returned  to  my  commando,  then 
quietly  withdrew  in  the  night  to  Rhenosterkop.  From 
there  I  sent  Veldtcornet  Nicolaas  Serfontein,  of  the 
Bethlehem  commando,  in  the  direction  of  Reitz  and 
Lindley,  to  bring  the  Kaffirs  there  to  a  sense  of  their 
duty,  for  I  had  heard  that  they  were  behaving  very 
brutally  to  our  women.  The  remainder  of  the  Beth- 
lehem burghers  under  Commandant  Prinsloo  and 
Veldtcornet  Du  Preez,  remained  with  me  to  assist  me 
in  getting  under  my  supervision  the  commandos  which 
had  escaped  from  behind  the  Roodebergen.  These 
were  under  the  command  of  General  Fourie,  and  some 
were  in  the  south  of  the  State.  I  left  Captain  Schee- 
pers  behind  me  with  orders  to  wreck  the  line  every 
night. 

That  evening  I  went  to  Mr.  Welman's  farm,  which 
was  to  the  south-west  of  Kroonstad. 

There  I  received  a  report  that  the  commandos 
under  General  Fourie  were  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Ladybrand.  I  sent  a  despatch  to  him  and  Judge 
Hertzog  asking  them  to  come  and  see  me,  with  a 
view  to  bringing  the  burghers  under  arms  again,  in 
the  southern  and  south-western  districts  of  the  State. 

This  letter  was  taken  by  Commandant  Michal 
Prinsloo  and  some  despatch  riders  to  General  Fourie. 
The  night  that  he  crossed  the  line  a  train  was  passing, 
and  he  wrecked  the  railway  both  in  front  of  it  and 
behind  it.  The  train  could  thus  neither  advance  nor 
retreat,  and  it  fell  into  the  hands  of  Commandant 
Prinsloo,  who,  after  having  taken  what  he  wanted, 
burnt  it. 

With  regard  to  myself,  I  remained  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Commandant  Nel's  farm. 

Here  I  had  the  most  wonderful  of  all  the  escapes 
that  God  allowed  me  in  the  whole  course  of  the  war. 

152 


I  RETURN  TO  THE  FREE  STATE 


On  the  third  evening  at  sunset,  a  Hottentot  came  to 
me.  He  said  that  his  baas,"  whose  family  lived 
about  twelve  miles  from  the  farm  of  Commandant 
Nel,  had  laid  down  their  arms,  and  that  he  could  not 
remain  in  the  service  of  the  wife  of  such  a  bad  baas." 
He  asked  me  if  he  could  not  become  one  of  my 
'*  achterrijders." 

As  he  was  still  speaking  to  me,  Landdrost  Bosman 
from  Bothaville,  came  to  pay  me  a  visit. 

''Good,"  I  said  to  the  Hottentot,  **I  shall  see  you 
about  this  again."  For  I  wished  to  cross-question 
him.  I  then  went  into  the  house  with  the  Landdrost, 
and  spent  a  good  deal  of  time  in  writing  with  him. 
Late  in  the  evening  he  went  back  to  Bothaville  and  I 
to  bed  exactly  at  eleven  o'clock. 

I  had  scarcely  laid  down  when  the  Hottentot  came 
back  to  my  thoughts,  and  I  began  to  grow  uneasy.  I 
got  up  and  went  to  the  outhouse  where  my  Kaffir 
slept  I  woke  him  up  and  asked  him  where  the  Hot- 
tentot was.  "  Oh,  he  is  gone,"  he  replied,  *'to  go  and 
fetch  his  things  to  go  with  the  baas." 

I  at  once  felt  that  there  was  something  wrong,  and 
went  and  called  my  men.  I  told  them  to  saddle-up, 
and  went  off  with  my  staff  to  the  farm  of  Mr.  Schoe- 
man  on  the  Valsch  River,  to  the  east  of  Bothaville. 

On  the  following  morning  before  daybreak,  a  force 
of  two  hundred  English  stormed  the  farm  of  Com- 
mandant Nel.    They  had  come  to  take  me  prisoner. 

From  Schoeman's  farm  I  went  to  the  Rhenoster 
River  and  found  Captain  Scheepers  there.  He  re- 
ported that  he  had  wrecked  the  line  for  four  or  five 
consecutive  weeks,  as  I  had  told  him. 

I  also  received  there  the  sad  news  of  the  death  of 
the  never-to-be-forgotten  Danie  Theron,  in  a  fight 
at  Gatsrand.  A  more  brave  and  faithful  commander 
I  have  never  seen. 

So  Danie  Theron  was  no  more.  His  place  would 
not  be  easily  filled.  Men  as  lovable  or  as  valiant  there 
might  be,  but  where  should  I  find  a  man  who  com- 

153 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


bined  so  many  virtues  and  good  qualities  in  one  per- 
son ?  Not  only  had  he  the  heart  of  a  lion  but  he  also 
possessed  consummate  tact  and  the  greatest  energy. 
When  he  received  an  order,  or  if  he  wished  to  do  any- 
thing, then  it  was  bend  or  break  with  him.  Danie 
Theron  answered  the  highest  demands  that  could  be 
made  on  a  warrior. 

One  of  Commandant  Theron's  lieutenants,  Jan  The- 
ron, was  appointed  in  his  place. 

From  there  I  went  with  Captain  Scheepers  to  the 
railway  line,  where  I  burnt  a  railway  bridge  tempora- 
rily constructed  with  sleepers,  and  wrecked  a  great  part 
of  the  rails  with  dynamite.  I  then  proceeded  to  vari- 
ous farms  in  the  neighbourhood,  and  after  a  few  days, 
with  Commandant  Michal  Prinsloo,  who  had  joined 
me,  I  returned  to  the  same  part  of  the  railway  in  order 
to  carry  out  its  destruction  on  a  larger  scale. 

At  twenty-five  different  places  a  charge  of  dynamite 
was  placed  with  one  man  at  the  fuse,  who  had  to  set 
light  to  it  as  soon  as  he  heard  a  whistle,  that  all 
charges  could  be  ignited  at  the  same  time,  and  every 
one  be  out  of  the  way  when  the  pieces  of  iron  were 
hurled  in  the  air  by  the  explosion. 

When  the  signal  was  heard  the  lucifers  were  struck 
everywhere,  and  the  fuses  ignited. 

The  English,  keeping  watch  on  some  other  part  of 
the  line  not  far  from  us,  on  seeing  the  lights  fired  so 
fiercely  on  the  burghers  that  they  all  took  to  their 
horses  and  galloped  off. 

Only  five  charges  exploded. 

I  waited  for  a  moment,  but  no  sound  broke  the  si- 
lence. 

"  Come  on  !"  I  said,  "we  must  fire  all  the  charges." 

On  reaching  the  line  we  had  to  search  in  the  dark- 
ness for  the  spots  where  the  dynamite  had  been 
placed.  And  now  again  the  order  was  given  that  as 
soon  as  the  whistle  was  blown  every  one  had  to  ignite 
his  fuse. 

Again  there  was  a  blunder  ! 

154 


I  RETURN  TO  THE  FREE  STATE 


One  of  the  burghers  ignited  his  fuse  before  the 
signal  had  been  given,  and  this  caused  such  a  panic 
that  the  others  ran  away.  I  and  a  few  of  my  staff  lay 
flat  on  the  ground  where  we  were  until  this  charge 
had  exploded,  and  then  I  went  to  fetch  the  burghers 
back. 

This  time  everything  went  off  well,  and  all  the 
charges  exploded. 

The  bridge  I  had  destroyed  had  been  rebuilt,  and 
so  I  was  forced  to  burn  it  again.  When  this  was 
done  we  departed  and  rode  on  to  Rietspruit,  where 
we  up-saddled,  and  then  pushed  on  to  Rhenoster- 
poort. 


155 


CHAPTER  XX 


The  Oath  of  Neutrality 

ARRIVING  at  Rhenosterpoort,  I  found  there 
Commandant  F.  Van  Aard,  with  his  commando. 
He  told  me  that  after  I  had  left  the  laager,  the  burgh- 
ers had  not  been  troubled  again  by  the  English.  He 
had  gone  on  to  Waterberg,  and  after  having  stayed 
there  for  a  short  time,  he  had  returned  to  the  laager. 
He  still  had  some  of  his  waggons  with  him,  but  in 
many  cases  the  oxen  had  been  so  exhausted  that  the 
waggons  had  to  be  left  behind,  the  burghers  returning 
on  horseback,  or  even  on  foot.  He  also  told  me  that 
Vice-Commander-in-Chief  Steenekamp  had,  just  be- 
fore my  arrival,  crossed  the  line  in  the  direction  of 
Heilbron,  in  which  district  there  were  then  no  Eng- 
lish. 

Generals  Fourie  and  Froneman,  with  Hertzog, 
were  also  at  Rhenosterpoort,  having  left  their  com- 
mandos behind,  in  the  district  of  Winburg. 

They  had  much  to  tell  me  which  I  had  heard  al- 
ready, but- which  I  now  obtained  at  first  hand.  It 
appeared  that  the  burghers  who  had  been  taken  pris- 
oner with  General  Prinsloo  had  been  sent  to  Ceylon, 
notwithstanding  the  promise  that  had  been  given  them 
that  their  property  would  be  safe,  and  that  they  would 
be  allowed  to  return  to  their  farms. 

It  was  now  that  I  conceived  the  great  plan  of  bring- 
ing under  arms  all  the  burghers  who  had  laid  down 
their  weapons,  and  taken  the  oath  of  neutrality,  and 
of  sending  them  to  operate  in  every  part  of  the  State. 
To  this  end  I  went  with  these  officers  to  the  other 
side  of  the  railway  line,  in  order  to  meet  General 

156 


THE  OATH  OF  NEUTRALITY 


Philip  Botha  in  the  country  to  the  south-east  of  Heil- 
bron,  and  also,  if  possible,  General  Hattingh,  who  was 
in  command  of  the  Harrismith  and  Vrede  burghers. 

We  succeeded  in  crossing  the  railway  between 
Roodewal  and  Serfontein  siding,  but  not  without  fight- 
ing. Before  we  came  to  the  railway  line  the  English 
opened  a  cross  fire  on  us  from  the  north-east,  from  the 
direction  of  Roodewal ;  and  almost  directly  afterwards 
another  party  fired  on  us  from  the  south.  We  suc- 
ceeded, however,  in  getting  through  with  the  waggons 
which  Commandant  Van  Aard  had  with  him,  but  we 
lost  one  man  killed,  and  three  wounded. 

On  the  following  day  I  gave  Commandant  Van  Aard 
the  order  to  go  to  his  district  (Midden  Valsch  River) 
in  order  to  give  his  burghers  an  opportunity  of  getting 
their  clothes  washed,  and  of  obtaining  fresh  horses,  if 
any  were  to  be  had.  For  although  the  enemy  already 
had  begun  to  burn  down  our  houses,  and  to  carry  away 
our  horses,  things  had  not  as  yet  reached  such  a  pitch 
that  the  columns  spared  nothing  that  came  in  their 
way. 

Commandant  Van  Aard  started  off  on  his  errand, 
but  alas  !  a  few  days  afterwards  I  heard  that  he — one 
of  the  most  popular  of  all  our  officers — had  been  killed 
in  a  fight  near  his  own  farm  between  Kroonstad  and 
Lindley.  He  was  buried  there,  where  he  had  fallen, 
on  his  own  land. 

And  now  began  the  great  work  which  I  had  pro- 
posed to  accomplish. 

I  gave  instructions  to  Vice-Commander-in-Chief 
Piet  Fourie  to  take  under  his  charge  the  districts  of 
Bloemfontein,  Bethulie,  Smithfield,  Rouxville,  and 
Wepener,  and  to  permit  the  burghers  there,  who  had 
remained  behind,  to  join  us  again.  He  was  not,  how 
ever,  to  compel  anybody  to  do  so,  because  I  was  of 
opinion  that  a  coerced  burgher  would  be  of  no  real 
value  to  us,  and  would  besides  be  untrustworthy.  The 
following  officers  were  to  serve  under  Fourie  :  Andrias, 
Van  Tonder  and  Kritzinger.    The  last-named  had 

157 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


been  appointed  in  the  place  of  Commandant  Olivier, 
who  had  been  taken  prisoner  at  Winburg.^ 

I  had  appointed  Judge  Hertzog  as  a  second  Vice- 
Commander-in-Chief,  to  carry  out  the  same  work  in 
the  districts  of  Fauresmith,  Philippolis  and  Jacobsdal. 
He  had  under  him  Commandant  Hendrik  Pretorius 
(of  Jacobsdal)  and  Commandant  Visser.  The  latter 
was  the  man  who,  when  the  burghers  from  Faure- 
smith, even  before  the  taking  of  Bloemfontein,  had 
remained  behind,  broke  through  with  seventy  or  eighty 
troops.  He  had  always  behaved  faithfully  and  val- 
iantly until,  in  an  engagement  at  Jagersfontein,  he 
gave  up  his  life,  a  sacrifice  for  the  rights  of  his  nation. 
His  name  will  ever  be  held  in  honour  by  his  people. 

These  two  Vice-Commanders-in-Chief  had  no  easy 
task  to  perform.  In  fact,  as  every  one  will  admit, 
it  was  a  giant's  burden  that  I  had  laid  upon  their 
shoulders.  To  lighten  it  a  little  I  made  the  following 
arrangement :  I  sent  Captain  Pretorius,  with  a  small 
detachment,  in  advance  of  General  Fourie,  to  prepare 
the  road  for  him,  and  Captain  Scheepers  to  do  the 
same  for  Judge  Hertzog.  The  first  had  to  say: 
"  Hold  yourselves  in  readiness  !  Oom  Pieter  !  ^  is  com- 
ing." The  other  had  to  say  :  Be  prepared  !  The 
Rechter^  is  at  hand  ! " 

All  went  well.  General  Fourie  set  to  his  task  at 
once  and  did  excellent  work.  He  had  not  been 
long  in  his  division  before  he  had  collected  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  men,  and  had  had  several  skirmishes 
with  the  enemy.  It  was  on  account  of  his  acting  so 
vigorously  that  the  English  again  put  garrisons  into 
some  of  the  south-eastern  townships,  such  as  Dewets- 
dorp,  Wepener,  and  others. 

With  General  Hertzog  things  went  even  better. 
He  had  soon  twelve  hundred  men  under  arms.  Gen- 
eral Fourie  had  not  succeeded  in  getting  together  an 

»  Commandant  Van  Tender  had  been  made  prisoner  at  the  same  time,  but  he 
eluded  the  vigilance  of  his  captors,  and  running  for  his  life  under  a  shower  of 
their  bullets,  got  away  in  safety. 

«  Uncle  Peter.  »  Judge. 

»S8 


THE  OATH  OF  NEUTRALITY 


equally  large  force  in  his  division,  because  many 
burghers  from  these  districts  had  been  taken  prisoner 
at  the  time  of  the  surrender  of  Prinsloo.  General 
Hertzog  also  fought  more  than  one  battle  at  Jagers- 
fontein  and  Fauresmith. 

I  ought  to  add  that  after  I  had  crossed  the  Maga- 
liesberg  I  had  sent  Veldtcornet  C.  C.  Badenhorst,  with 
twenty-seven  men,  on  a  similar  errand  to  the  districts 
of  Boshof  and  Hoopstad.  1  promoted  him  to  the 
rank  of  commandant,  and  he  soon  had  a  thousand 
troops  under  him,  so  that  he  was  able  to  engage  the 
enemy  on  several  occasions.  He  had  not  been  long 
occupied  in  this  way,  before  I  appointed  him  Vice- 
Commander-in-Chief.  The  reader  who  has  followed 
me  throughout  this  narrative,  may  very  naturally  ask 
here  how  it  could  be  justifiable  for  nearly  three  thou- 
sand burghers  thus  to  take  up  arms  again,  and  break 
their  oath  of  neutrality  ?  I  will  answer  this  question 
by  another — who  first  broke  the  terms  of  this  oath  ? — 
the  burghers  or  the  English  military  authorities  ?  The 
military  authorities  without  any  doubt ;  what  other  an- 
swer can  one  give  ? 

Lord  Roberts  had  issued  a  proclamation  saying  that, 
if  the  burghers  took  an  oath  of  neutrality,  and  remained 
quietly  on  their  farms,  he  would  give  them  protection 
for  their  persons  and  property.  But  what  happened  ? 
He  himself  ordered  them  to  report  to  the  British  mil- 
itary authorities,  should  any  Boer  scout  or  commandos 
come  to  their  farms,  and  threatened  them  with  punish- 
ment if  they  did  not  do  so.  Old  people  also  who  had 
never  stirred  one  step  from  their  farms  were  fined  hun- 
dreds of  pounds  when  the  railway  or  telegraph  lines  in 
their  neighbourhood  were  wrecked.  Besides,  instead 
of  protection  being  given  to  the  burghers,  their  cattle 
were  taken  from  them  by  the  military,  at  prices  they 
would  never  have  thought  of  accepting,  and  often  by 
force.  Yes ;  and  from  widows,  who  had  not  even  sons 
on  commando,  everything  was  taken  away.  If  then 
the  English,  on  their  part-  had  broken  the  contract, 

159 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


were  not  the  burghers  perfectly  justified  in  considering 
themselves  no  longer  bound  by  the  conditions  which 
the  oath  laid  on  them  ? 

And  then  if  one  goes  further  into  the  matter,  and 
remembers  that  the  English  had  been  employing  such 
people  as  the  National  Scouts,  and  had  thus  been 
arming  men  who  had  taken  the  oath  of  neutrality, 
how  can  one  think  that  the  Boer  was  still  under  the 
obligation  of  keeping  his  oath  ? 

There  is  also  the  obligation  which  every  one  is  under 
to  his  own  Government ;  for  what  Government  could 
ever  acknowledge  an  oath  which  their  citizens  had  no 
right  to  take  ? 

No  !  taking  everything  into  consideration,  no  right- 
minded  burgher  could  have  acted  otherwise  than  to 
take  his  weapons  up  again,  not  only  in  order  to  be 
faithful  to  his  duty  as  a  citizen,  but  also  in  order  not  to 
be  branded  as  a  coward,  as  a  man  who  in  the  future 
could  never  again  look  any  one  in  the  face. 

I  arranged  various  matters  at  Doornspruit,  in  the 
district  of  Kroonstad,  on  the  23rd  of  September,  1900, 
and  then  went  from  there  in  the  direction  of  Rietfon- 
tein,  in  order  to  meet  the  commando  which  I  had  or- 
dered to  be  at  Heilbron  on  the  25th. 


160 


CHAPTER  XXI 


Frederiksstad  and  Bothaville 

WHEN  I  was  on  the  road  to  Heilbron,  I  heard 
that  the  commandos  under  General  Hattingh 
(those,  namely,  of  Harrismith  and  Vrede)  were  near 
the  Spitskopje,  seven  miles  to  the  south-east  of  Heil- 
bron. I  therefore  went  out  of  my  course  and  pro- 
ceeded in  the  direction  of  these  commandos.  They 
were  among  those  who  had  stood  the  crucial  test,  and 
had  not  surrendered  with  Prinsloo. 

It  was  a  real  pleasure  to  me  to  meet  the  Harrismith 
burghers,  and  to  talk  with  them  over  bygone  days. 
This  was  our  first  meeting  since  December,  1899.  The 
last  time  we  had  seen  each  other  was  when  we  were 
encamped  round  Ladysmith,  where  we  were,  so  to 
speak,  neighbours — our  positions  being  contiguous. 

But  what  a  shock  went  through  my  heart  when  I 
saw  the  cumbersome  waggon-camps  which  had  come 
both  from  Vrede  and  Harrismith  !  For  I  remembered 
what  trouble  and  anxiety  the  waggons  and  carts  had 
already  caused  me,  and  how  my  commandos,  in  order 
to  save  them,  had  been  forced  to  fly  280  miles — from 
Slabbertsnek  to  Waterberg.  As  Commander-in- 
Chief,  I  was  now  determined  to  carry  out  most  strictly 
the  Kroonstad  regulation  and  have  nothing  more  to 
do  with  the  waggons. 

I  did  not  think  that  I  should  have  any  difficulty  in 
convincing  the  commanders  of  Harrismith  and  Vrede 
that  the  best  thing  would  be  to  do  away  with  these 
unnecessary  impediments,  because,  shortly  before,  the 
English  themselves  had  given  me  a  text  to  preach 
from,  by  taking  away  a  great  number  of  waggons  from 

161 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Commandant  Hasebroek  at  Winburg  and  at  Vet- River. 
Nevertheless,  my  words  fell  on  unwilling  ears. 

It  was  not  long  after  I  had  arrived  in  the  camp 
when  I  got  the  burghers  together  and  spoke  to  them. 
After  thanking  the  officers  and  men  for  not  having 
surrendered  with  Prinsloo  at  Naauwpoort,  I  congratu- 
lated them  on  their  success  at  Ladybrand,  where  they 
had  driven  the  English  out  of  the  town  and  forced 
them  to  take  refuge  in  the  caverns  of  Leliehoek.  I 
then  went  on  to  tackle  the  tender  subject — as  a  Boer 
regards  it — of  sacrificing  the  waggons.  No  !  I  did 
not  say  so  much  as  that — I  only  insisted  on  the  wag- 
gons being  sent  home.  Now  this  was  very  much  the 
same  as  saying  :  Give  up  your  waggons  and  carts  to 
the  enemy  " — an  order  which,  expressed  in  that  bald 
manner,  would  have  given  offence. 

However,  I  was  resolved  to  have  my  way,  and  at 
the  end  of  my  speech,  I  said,  I  may  not  ask  you,  and 
I  will  not  ask  you  what  you  will  do  with  regard  to  the 
waggons.    I  only  tell  you  that  they  must  disappear." 

On  the  following  day  I  called  the  officers  together, 
and  gave  them  direct  orders  to  that  effect.  I  was  very 
polite,  but  also  very  determined  that  the  waggons 
should  be  sent  off  without  a  moment's  delay.  I  also 
gave  orders  that  the  Harrismith  and  Kroonstad  burgh- 
ers under  General  Philip  Botha  should  occupy  them- 
selves in  cutting  the  English  lines  of  communication 
between  Kroonstad  and  Zand  River.  The  Bothaville 
burghers  were  to  carry  out  similar  operations  in  their 
own  district. 

On  that  same  afternoon  I  rode  with  my  staff  to  the 
Heilbron  burghers,  who  now  had  returned  to  their 
farms.  (They  had  had  permission  to  go  home  after 
they  had  got  back  from  Waterberg.)  They  had  as- 
sembled in  very  strong  force. 

The  enemy  also  had  arrived  in  this  part  of  the  coun- 
try, and  we  were  therefore  obliged  at  once  to  get  our- 
selves ready  to  fight  in  case  it  should  be  necessary,  or 
to  retreat  if  the  enemy  should  be  too  strong  for  us. 

162 


FREDERIKSSTAD  AND  BOTHAVILLE 


With  the  Heilbron,  Harrismith  and  Vrede  com- 
mandos, I  had  now  a  very  considerable  force  at  my 
command. 

When  I  met  the  burghers  on  the  25th  of  September 
I  found  that  I  must  send  a  force  in  the  direction  of 
Kroonstad,  in  order  to  oppose  outposts  which  the 
enemy  had  stationed  some  six  miles  from  that  town. 

I  at  once  sent  orders  to  General  Hattingh  that  he 
was  to  come  over  to  me  with  his  burghers.  But  what 
did  I  hear  ?  The  burghers  had  not  been  able  to  make 
up  their  minds  to  part  with  their  waggons  ;  most  of 
the  men  from  Vrede  and  Harrismith  had  gone  home 
with  these  waggons,  although  there  was  a  Kaffir  driver 
and  a  leader  for  almost  every  one,  and  although  I  had 
given  express  orders  that  these  Kaffirs  were  to  be  the 
ones  to  take  back  the  waggons.  How  angry  I  was! 
At  such  moments  as  these  one  would  be  well  nigh 
driven  mad  were  there  not  a  Higher  Power  to  hold 
one  back. 

And,  to  make  the  situation  still  more  serious,  the 
English  now  came  on  from  all  sides,  and  I  had  no 
troops !  The  Kroonstad  burghers  were  in  their  own 
district.  I  allowed  those  from  Bethlehem  to  leave  me 
in  order  to  carry  on  operations  in  their  part  of  the 
country  ;  the  same  likewise  with  the  Winburgers  and 
the  valiant  Commandant  Hasebroek,  while  the  burgh- 
ers of  Vrede  and  Harrismith  had  gone  home. 

I  had  therefore  with  me  only  a  small  contingent' 
from  those  districts,  in  addition  to  the  burghers  from . 
Heilbron. 

The  reader  will  understand  that,  under  these  cir- 
cumstances, the  forces  which  now  began  to  concentrate 
on  us  were  too  great  for  us  to  withstand ;  and  that  no 
other  course  lay  open  to  me  than  to  go  through  Schoe- 
mansdrift ;  and,  in  case  I  should  be  pursued,  to  Botha- 
ville,  in  order  to  enter  the  zandveld  (desert)  through 
which  it  would  be  difficult  for  the  enemy  to  ad- 
vance. 

We  continued  in  the  direction  of  Wolvehoek  Sta- 

163 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


tion,  and  on  the  following  night  crossed  the  line  be- 
tween Vredefortweg  and  Wolvehoek,  where  I  wrecked 
the  railway  at  various  points,  and  also  took  prisoner  a 
small  force  of  thirteen  who  had  been  lying  asleep  in 
their  tents.  This  last  incident  happened  early  in  the 
morning  of  September  30th. 

We  had  crossed  the  line,  and  were  about  three  miles 
on  the  further  side  of  it,  when  a  train  came  up  and 
bombarded  us  with  an  Armstrong  and  a  Maxim-Nor- 
denfeldt,  without  however  doing  any  damage.  Our 
guns  were  too  far  behind  the  vanguard,  and  the  poor 
horses  too  tired  to  go  back  for  them,  or  we  should 
have  answered  their  fire.  However,  we  got  an  oppor- 
tunity of  using  our  big  guns  against  200  mounted  men, 
who  had  pursued  us,  but  who,  when  they  saw  we  were 
ready  to  receive  them,  turned  round  and — took  the 
shortest  road  to  safety ! 

That  evening  we  marched  to  a  place  a  little  to  the 
south  of  Parijs,  and  the  following  day  to  the  kopjes 
west  of  Vredefort.  There  we  stayed  a  few  days  until 
the  enemy  again  began  to  concentrate  at  Heilbron. 

I  then  divided  my  commando  into  two  parts.  One 
part  I  took  with  me,  while  I  sent  the  Harrismith 
burghers  (those  at  least  who  had  not  gone  home  with 
the  waggons)  under  General  Philip  Botha,  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Kroonstad,  where  he  would  meet  the  comman- 
do of  that  district,  which  had  received  orders  to  oper- 
ate to  the  west  of  the  railway  line.  General  Philip 
Botha  nominated  Veldtcornet  P.  De  Vos  as  Comman 
dant  of  the  Kroonstad  contingent  instead  of  Com 
mandant  Frans  Van  Aard.  He  made  a  good  choice, 
for  Commandant  De  Vos  was  not  only  a  valiant  offi- 
cer, but  also  a  strictly  honourable  man. 

For  some  days  the  enemy  remained  encamped  on 
the  farm  called  Klipstapel,  which  lies  to  the  south- 
east of  Vredefort.  Then  they  attacked  us.  We  held 
our  own  for  a  day  and  a  half,  but  at  last  had  to 
retreat  to  the  Vaal  River,  whither  the  English,  doubt- 
less thinking  that  we  were  again  going  to  Waterberg, 

164 


FREDERIKSSTAD  AND  BOTHAVILLE 


did  not  pursue  us.  This  was  on  the  7th  of  October, 
1900. 

I  now  received  a  report  from  General  Liebenberg 
that  General  Barton  and  his  column  were  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Frederiksstad  Station.  He  asked  me  (as 
he  was  too  weak  to  venture  anything  alone)  whether 
I  would  join  him  in  an  attack  upon  the  English  Gen- 
eral. I  decided  to  do  so,  and  sent  him  a  confidential 
letter  saying  that  I  would  join  him  in  a  week's  time. 

In  order  to  mislead  the  English,  I  retreated  osten- 
tatiously through  Schoemansdrift  to  the  farm  of  Bal- 
tespoort,  which  stands  on  the  banks  of  the  Rhenoster 
River,  fifteen  miles  from  the  drift.  The  following 
night  I  returned  by  the  way  I  had  come,  and  crossed 
the  river  a  little  to  the  west  of  Schoemansdrift. 

When  on  the  following  night  we  were  again  in  the 
saddle  I  heard  from  many  a  mouth,    Whither  now  ?  " 

Our  destination  was  Frederiksstad  Station,  where 
we  were  to  engage  General  Barton.  Previous  to  an 
attack,  thorough  scouting  should  always  take  place. 
Accordingly  I  sent  out  my  scouts,  and  discovered  that 
General  Liebenberg  had  entirely  cut  off  the  English 
from  their  communications,  so  that,  except  for  helio- 
graphic  messages,  they  were  entirely  out  of  touch  with 
the  rest  of  their  forces.  Now  I  do  not  know  if  they 
had  smelt  a  rat,"  but  they  were  certainly  well  en- 
trenched near  the  station  on  ridges  to  the  south-east 
and  to  the  north. 

We  had  therefore  to  besiege  General  Barton  in  his 
entrenchments.  For  the  first  five  days  we  held  posi- 
tions to  the  east,  to  the  south,  and  to  the  north-west. 
On  the  fifth  day  I  agreed  with  General  Liebenberg 
that  we  should  take  up  a  new  position  on  the  embank- 
ment north-=west  of  the  strongest  part  of  the  English 
encampment.  This  position  was  to  be  held  by  two 
hundred  men,  of  whom  I  gave  eighty  to  General 
Froneman  and  one  hundred  and  twenty  to  General 
Liebenberg.  It  was  a  position  that  we  could  not 
leave  during  the  day  without  great  danger,  and  it 

165 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


needed  a  large  force  to  hold  it,  for  its  garrison  had  to 
be  strong  enough  to  defend  itself  if  it  should  be  at- 
tacked. 

If  only  my  arrangements  had  been  carried  out  all 
would  have  gone  well. 
But  what  happened  ? 

I  thought  that  two  hundred  men  had  gone  in  ac- 
cordance with  my  orders  to  that  position.  Instead  of 
this  there  were  only  eighty  there  when,  on  the  follow- 
ing morning,  a  very  strong  reinforcement  of  English, 
ordered  up  by  General  Barton,  appeared  from  the  di- 
rection of  Krugersdorp.  I  did  not  hear  of  this  rein- 
forcement till  it  was  so  close  that  there  was  no  chance 
for  me  to  keep  it  back.  In  fact,  when  I  got  the  re- 
port the  enemy  were  already  storming  the  unfortu- 
nate handful  of  burghers  and  firing  fiercely  upon  them. 
If  these  burghers  had  only  had  enough  ammunition 
they  would  have  been  able  to  defend  themselves,  but 
as  they  were  obliged  to  keep  up  a  continuous  fire  on 
the  storming  party  their  cartridges  were  speedily  ex- 
hausted. When  this  happened  there  was  nothing  for 
them  to  do  but  to  fly.  This  they  did  under  a  fierce 
fire  from  three  guns,  which  had  been  bombarding  them 
continuously  since  the  morning  —  doing  but  little 
damage  however,  as  our  burghers  were  behind  the 
railway  embankment.  But  now  they  had  to  fiy  over 
open  ground,  and  on  foot,  as  they  had  gone  down 
without  their  horses  because  there  was  no  safe  place 
for  the  animals. 

If  two  hundred  burghers — the  number  I  had  ar- 
ranged for — had  been  in  the  position,  there  would 
have  been  no  chance  of  the  enemy's  reinforcement 
being  able  to  drive  them  out :  and  in  all  probability 
General  Barton  would  have  been  obliged  to  surrender. 
Instead  of  this  we  had  a  loss  of  thirty  killed  and 
wounded,  and  about  the  same  number  were  taken 
prisoners.  Among  the  dead  was  the  renowned  Sarel 
Cilliers,  grandson  of  the  worthy     voortrekker  "  ^  of 

*  Pioneer. 

i66 


FREDERIKSSTAD  AND  BOTHAVILLE 


the  same  name.  Veldtcornet  Jurie  Wessels  was  the 
most  distinguished  of  the  prisoners. 

It  was  a  miserable  affair  altogether  :  General  Frone- 
man  ought  to  have  called  his  men  back  when  he  saw 
that  General  Liebenberg  had  not  sent  his  contingent. 
I  have  heard  however  that  Captain  Cilliers  refused  to 
leave  the  position  until  it  became  no  longer  tenable. 
It  was  hard  indeed  for  him  to  lose  a  battle  thus,  when 
it  was  nearly  won,  and  to  be  compelled  to  retreat 
when  victory  was  all  but  within  his  grasp. 

We  retired  towards  Vanvurenskloof,  and  on  arriv- 
ing there  the  following  evening  heard  that  a  great 
English  force  had  come  from  Schoemansdrift  and 
captured  Potchefstroom,  that  another  force  was  at 
Tijgersfontein,  and  a  third  at  Schoemansdrift. 

Early  next  morning  we  crossed  the  Vaal  River  at 
Witbanksfontein.    There  we  off-saddled. 

Now  I  had  sent  out  scouts — not,  however.  Com- 
mandant Jan  Theron's  men,  but  ordinary  burghers 
whom  the  Commandants  had  sent  out — and  just  as 
we  had  partaken  about  noon  of  a  late  breakfast,  these 
burghers  came  hurriedly  into  the  camp,  shouting : 
The  enemy  is  close  at  hand  ! " 

It  was  not  long  before  every  one  had  up-saddled, 
and  we  were  off.  The  English  had  taken  up  positions 
on  the  kopjes  due  north  of  the  Vaal  River,  whilst  we 
had  for  our  defence  only  kraals  and  boundary  walls. 
As  these  offered  no  shelter  for  our  horses,  we  were 
forced  to  retreat.  And  a  most  unpleasant  time  of  it 
we  had  until  we  got  out  of  range  of  their  guns  and 
small  arms.  During  this  retreat  we  lost  one  of  our 
guns.  This  happened  while  I  was  with  the  left  wing. 
One  of  the  wheels  of  the  carriage  fell  off,  and  the 
gun  had  to  be  left  behind.  Another  incident  of  our 
flight  was  more  remarkable.  A  shell  from  one  of 
the  enemy's  guns  hit  an  ox  waggon  on  which  there 
were  four  cases  of  dynamite,  and  everything  was 
blown  up. 

The  oxen  had  just  been  unyoked  and  had  left  the 

167 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


waggon,  or  else  a  terrible  catastrophe  would  have 
occurred. 

We  lost  also  two  burghers,  who,  thinking  that  it 
would  be  safe  to  go  into  a  dwelling  house,  and  hide 
themselves  there,  gave  an  opportunity  to  some  Eng- 
lish troops  who  were  on  the  march  from  Schoemans- 
drift,  to  take  them  prisoner. 

We  retired  for  some  distance  in  an  easterly  direc- 
tion, and  when  it  became  dark,  swerved  suddenly  to 
the  west,  as  if  aiming  for  a  point  somewhat  to  the 
south-west  of  Bothaville.  The  following  evening  we 
stayed  at  Bronkhaistfontein,  near  the  Witkopjes. 
From  there  we  went  on  next  morning  to  the  west  of 
Rheboksfontein,  remaining  that  night  at  Winkeldrift, 
on  the  Rhenoster  River. 

There  I  received  a  report  that  President  Steyn  with 
his  staff  was  coming  from  Machadodorp,  where  he 
had  met  the  Transvaal  Government.  The  President 
requested  me  to  come  and  see  him,  and  also  to  meet 
General  De  la  Rey,  who  would  be  there. 

I  told  the  commandos  to  go  on  in  the  direction  of 
Bothaville  and  went  with  my  staff  to  the  President. 
We  met  on  the  31st  of  October  near  Ventersdorp. 
From  him  I  heard  that  when  he  came  to  Machadodorp 
President  Kruger  was  just  ready  to  sail  from  Louren^o 
Marques,  in  the  man-of-war  Gelderland,  which  had 
been  specially  sent  by  Queen  Wilhelmina  to  bring  him 
over  to  the  Netherlands.  This  was  shortly  before 
Portugal  ceased  to  be  neutral — the  old  President  got 
away  only  just  in  time. 

General  De  la  Rey  had  been  prevented  from  com- 
ing: and  on  the  2nd  of  November  I  went  with  the 
President  towards  Bothaville. 

I  had  received  reports  from  General  Fourie,  Judge 
Hertzog,  and  Captain  Scheepers,  that  the  burghers  in 
their  districts  had  rejoined ;  this  made  me  think  that 
the  time  had  now  come  to  make  another  dash  into 
Cape  Colony.  President  Steyn  had  expressed  a  wish 
to  go  with  us. 

168 


FREDERIKSSTAD  AND  BOTHAVILLE 


We  marched  on  with  the  intention  of  crossing  the 
railway  line  somewhere  near  Winburg.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  5th  we  arrived  at  Bothaville,  where  we 
found  General  Froneman,  who  had  been  marching 
with  the  commandos  from  Rhenoster  River.  Little 
did  we  know  that  a  terrible  misfortune  was  await- 
ing us. 

That  very  afternoon  a  strong  English  force,  which 
indeed  had  been  in  pursuit  of  us  all  the  time,  came 
up,  and  a  skirmish  took  place,  after  which  the  Eng- 
lish withdrew  out  of  reach  of  our  guns,  while  we  took 
up  a  position  under  cover  of  the  nearest  hill.  With- 
out suspecting  any  harm  we  went  into  camp  about 
seven  miles  from  the  English,  keeping  the  Valsch 
River  between  us  and  them. 

I  placed  an  outpost  that  night  close  to  the  river  and 
told  them  to  stay  there  till  the  following  day.  The 
burghers  of  this  watch  returned  in  the  morning  and 
reported  that  they  had  seen  nothing  but  wreaths  of 
smoke  ascending  from  the  north  bank  of  the  river. 
They  believed  that  these  came  from  the  English 
camp. 

We  were  still  safe  then — so  at  least  we  all  believed. 

But  the  corporal  who  had  brought  this  report  had 
but  just  left  me,  and  was  scarcely  one  hundred  paces 
off  when  I  heard  the  report  of  rifles.  I  thought  at 
first  that  it  was  only  some  cattle  being  shot  for  food, 
but  all  at  once  there  were  more  shots,  and  what  did  we 
see  ?  The  English  were  within  three  hundred  paces 
of  us,  on  a  little  hill  near  Bothaville,  and  close  to  the 
spot  from  whence  my  outpost  had  just  returned. 

It  was  early  morning.  The  sun  had  not  risen  more 
than  twenty  minutes  and  many  of  the  burghers  still 
lay  asleep  rolled  up  in  their  blankets. 

The  scene  which  ensued  was  unlike  anything  I  had 
ever  witnessed  before.  I  heard  a  good  deal  about  pan- 
ics— I  was  now  to  see  one  with  my  own  eyes.  Whilst 
I  was  looking  for  my  horse  to  get  him  up-saddled  a 
few  of  the  burghers  were  making  some  sort  of  a  stand 

169 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


against  the  enemy.  But  all  those  who  had  already  up- 
saddled  were  riding  away  at  break-neck  speed.  Many 
even  were  leaving  their  saddles  behind  and  galloping 
off  bare-back.  As  I  up-saddled  my  horse  I  called  out 
to  them  : — 

**  Don't  run  away !  Come  back  and  storm  the 
enemy's  position  !"  But  it  was  no  use.  A  panic  had 
seized  them,  and  the  victims  of  that  panic  were  those 
brave  men  who  had  never  thought  of  flight,  but  only 
of  resisting  the  enemy  ! 

The  only  thing  I  could  do  was  to  leap  into  the  sad- 
dle and  try  to  persuade  the  fugitives  to  return.  But  I 
did  not  succeed,  for  as  I  stopped  them  at  one  point 
others  galloped  past  me,  and  I  was  thus  kept  dodging 
from  point  to  point,  until  the  whole  commando  was 
out  of  range  of  the  firing. 

The  leader  of  the  enemy's  storming  party  was  Colo- 
nel Le  Gallais,  without  doubt  one  of  the  bravest  Eng- 
lish officers  I  have  ever  met.  On  this  occasion  he  did 
not  encounter  much  resistance,  for  only  a  very  few  of 
the  burghers  attacked  him,  and  that  only  at  one  point 
of  his  position.  Among  these  burghers  were  Staats- 
Procureur  Jacob  De  Villiers,  and  Veldtcornet  Jan 
Viljoen.  As  for  the  rest  of  our  men,  it  was  useless  to 
try  to  get  them  to  come  back  to  the  fight.  The  gun- 
ners however  did  everything  they  could  to  save  their 
guns,  but  had  not  enough  time  to  get  the  oxen  in- 
spanned. 

Our  loss  was,  as  far  as  I  could  make  out,  nine  killed, 
between  twenty  and  thirty  wounded,  and  about  one 
hundred  prisoners.  Among  the  dead  were  Veldtcor- 
nets  Jan  Viljoen,  of  Heilbron,  and  Van  Zijl,  of  Cape 
Colony  ;  and  among  the  wounded,  Staats-Procureur 
Jacob  De  Villiers  and  Jan  Rechter,  the  latter  of  whom 
subsequently  died.  The  wounded  who  managed  to 
escape  included  General  Froneman,  who  was  slightly 
wounded  in  the  chest ;  Mr.  Thomas  Brain,  who  had  been 
hit  in  the  thigh  ;  and  one  of  my  staff  who  was  severely 
wounded,  his  shoulder  being  pierced  by  a  bullet. 

170 


FREDERIKSSTAD  AND  BOTHAVILLE 


According  to  English  reports,  Dr.  De  Landsheer, 
a  Belgian,  was  killed  in  this  engagement.  The  Eng- 
lish newspapers  asserted  that  the  doctor  was  found 
dead  with  a  bandolier  round  his  body.  I  can  vouch 
for  the  fact  that  the  doctor  possessed  neither  rifle  nor 
bandolier,  and  I  am  unable  to  believe  that  he  armed 
himself  on  the  battlefield. 

Six  of  our  Krupp  guns  were  captured  in  this  battle, 
but  as  our  ammunition  for  these  pieces  was  nearly  ex- 
hausted, the  loss  of  them  made  little  difference  to  us. 

I  feel  compelled  to  add  that,  if  the  burghers  had 
stood  shoulder  to  shoulder  we  should  certainly  have 
driven  back  the  enemy,  and  the  mishap  would  never 
have  occurred.  We  were  eight  hundred  men  strong, 
and  the  enemy  numbered  not  more  than  one  thousand 
to  one  thousand  two  hundred.  But  a  surprise  attack 
such  as  theirs  had  been  usually  produces  disastrous 
consequences. 


171 


CHAPTER  XXII 


My  March  to  the  South 

THE  horses  of  the  burghers  were  in  a  very  weak 
condition  ;  and  as  the  Boer  is  only  half  a  man 
without  his  horse — for  he  relies  on  it  to  get  him  out 
of  any  and  every  difficulty — I  had  now  to  advance, 
and  see  if  I  could  not  find  some  means  of  providing 
my  men  with  horses  and  saddles.  I  went  on  this 
errand  in  the  direction  of  Zandriviersbrug  to  the  farm 
of  Mr.  Jacobus  Bornman. 

Here,  however,  I  divided  the  commandos.  General 
Froneman,  with  the  Vrede  and  Heilbron  burghers,  I 
sent  back  to  cross  the  railway  lines  between  the  Doorn 
and  Zand  Rivers,  with  orders  to  operate  in  the  north- 
ern districts  of  the  State.  I  took  with  me  Com- 
mandant Lategan  of  Colesberg,  with  about  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty  men,  and  Commandant  Jan  Theron, 
with  eighty  men,  and  proceeded  on  the  loth  or  nth 
of  November  across  the  railway  line  between  Doorn 
River  and  Theronskoppen,  with  the  intention  of 
executing  my  plan  of  making  an  inroad  into  the  Cape 
Colony. 

We  wrecked  the  railway  line  and  blew  up  a  few 
small  bridges,  and  then  proceeded  in  the  direction  of 
Doornberg,  where  I  met  Commandant  Hasebroek  and 
his  burghers.  I  sent  orders  to  General  Philip  Botha 
to  come  with  the  Harrismith  and  Kroonstad  burghers, 
which  he  had  with  him.  They  arrived  about  the  13th 
of  November. 

We  then  marched,  with  about  fifteen  hundred  men, 
in  the  direction  of  Springhaansnek,  to  the  east  of 
Thaba*  Nchu.    At  the  northern  point  of  Korannaberg, 

172 


MY  MARCH  TO  THE  SOUTH 


Commandant  Hasebroek  remained  behind,  waiting  for 
some  of  his  men  to  join  him. 

We  took  with  us  one  Krupp  with  sixteen  rounds — 
that  was  our  whole  stock  of  gun  ammunition  ! 

By  the  afternoon  of  the  i6th  we  had  advanced  as 
far  as  Springhaansnek.  The  English  had  built  a  line 
of  forts  from  Bloemfontein  to  Thaba  Nchu  and  Lady- 
brand.  And  just  at  the  point  where  we  wanted  to 
pass  them,  there  were  two  forts,  one  to  the  south  and 
the  other  to  the  north,  about  2,000  paces  from  each 
other,  on  the  shoulder  of  the  mountain. 

My  first  step  was  to  order  the  Krupp  to  fire  six 
shots  on  one  of  these  forts  ;  and,  very  much  to  the 
credit  of  my  gunners,  almost  everyone  of  these  shots 
found  its  mark.    Then  I  raced  through. 

All  went  well.  The  only  man  hit  was  Vice-As- 
sistant-Commandant Jan  Meijer,  of  Harrismith,  who 
received  a  wound  in  the  side.  He  was  shot  while  sit- 
ting in  a  cart,  where  he  had  been  placed  owing  to  a 
wound  which  he  had  received  a  few  days  before,  in 
the  course  of  a  hot  engagement,  which  General  Philip 
Botha  had  had  at  Ventersburg  Station. 

We  now  rode  on  through  Rietpoort  towards  Dewets- 
dorp,  staying,  during  the  night  of  the  1 7th  of  Novem- 
ber, at  a  place  on  the  M  odder  River.  The  following 
day  we  only  went  a  short  distance,  and  halted  at  the 
farm  of  Erinspride. 

On  the  19th  I  made  a  point  of  advancing  during 
the  day,  so  as  to  be  observed  by  the  garrison  at 
Dewetsdorp. 

My  object  was  to  lead  the  garrison  to  think  that  we 
did  not  want  to  attack  them,  but  wished  first  to  recon- 
noitre the  positions.  This  would  have  been  quite  an 
unnecessary  proceeding,  as  the  town  was  well  known 
to  me,  and  I  had  already  received  information  as  to 
where  the  enemy  was  posted. 

The  garrison  could  only  conclude  that  we  were  again 
flying,  just  as  we  were  supposed  to  have  done — by 
readers  of  English  newspapers — at  Springhaansnek. 

173 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


They  would  be  sure  to  think  that  after  reconnoitring 
their  positions  at  Dewetsdorp  we  had  gone  on  to 
Bloemfontein.  Indeed,  I  heard  afterwards  that  they 
had  sent  a  patrol,  to  pursue  us  to  the  hills  on  the  farm 
of  Glengarry,  and  that  this  patrol  had  seen  us  march 
away  in  the  direction  of  Bloemfontein.  In  fact  the 
enemy  seemed  to  have  a  fixed  impression  that  I  was 
going  there.  I  was  told  that  they  had  sa:d  :  "  De  Wet 
was  either  too  wise  or  too  frightened  to  attack  Dewets- 
dorp ;  and  if  he  did,  he  would  only  be  running  his 
head  against  a  wall."  And  again,  when  they  had  re- 
ceived the  telegram  which  informed  them  that  I  had 
gone  through  Springhaansnek,  they  said  :  "If  De  Wet 
comes  here  to  attack  us,  it  will  be  the  last  attack  he  will 
ever  make." 

We  came  to  the  farm  of  Roodewal,  and  remained 
there,  well  out  of  sight,  the  whole  of  the  20th  of  No- 
vember. Meanwhile  our  friends  (?)  at  Dewetsdorp 
were  saying  :  "The  Boers  are  ever  so  far  away." 

But  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  I  marched,  very 
quietly,  back  to  Dewetsdorp,  and  crept  up  as  close  as 
I  dared  to  the  positions  held  by  the  enemy's  garrison. 
My  early  days  had  been  spent  in  the  vicinity  of  this 
town,  w^hich  had  been  named  after  my  father  by  the 
Volksraad  ;  and  later  on  I  had  bought  from  him  the 
farm  ^  where  I  lived  as  a  boy. 

By  day  or  by  night,  I  had  been  accustomed  to  ride 
freely  in  and  out  of  the  old  town ;  never  before  had  I 
been  forced  to  approach  it,  as  I  was  now,  like  a  thief ! 
Was  nothing  on  this  earth  then  solid  or  lasting  ?  To 
think  that  I  must  not  enter  Dewetsdorp  unless  I 
were  prepared  to  surrender  to  the  English  ! 

I  was  not  prepared  to  surrender  to  the  English. 
Sooner  than  do  that  I  would  break  my  way  in  by 
force  of  arms. 

At  dawn,  on  the  21st  of  November,  we  took  posses- 
sion of  three  positions  round  the  town. 

General  Botha,  who  had  with  him  Jan  and  Arnoldus 

*  Nieuwjaarsfontein. 
^74 


MY  MARCH  TO  THE  SOUTH 


Du  Plessis  as  guides,  went  from  Boesmansbank  to  a 
tafelkop^  to  the  south-east  of  the  town.  On  this 
mountain  the  English  had  thrown  up  splendid  schaiizes, 
and  had  also  built  gun  forts  there,  which  would  have 
been  very  advantageous  to  us,  if  we  had  only  had 
more  ammunition.  The  English  had  undoubtedly 
built  these  forts  with  the  intention  of  placing  guns 
there,  and  thus  protecting  the  town  on  every  side 
should  danger  threaten.  But  they  did  not  know  how 
to  guard  their  own  forts,  for  when  General  Botha 
arrived  there  he  found  only  three  sentries — and  they 
were  fast  sleep  !  Two  of  them  escaped,  leaving  their 
clothes  behind,  but  the  third  was  killed. 

Commandant  De  Vos  and  I  occupied  a  position  on 
the  ridge  which  lies  to  the  north  of  the  town  ;  from 
this  point  we  could  shoot  into  the  town  at  a  range  of 
about  1, 600  paces. 

Commandant  Lategan  was  stationed  on  the  hill  to 
the  west  of  the  town,  close  to  the  farm  of  Glengarry, 
whose  owner,  Mr.  B.  W.  Richter — father  of  my  val- 
iant Adjutants,  B.  W.  and  Jan  Richter — must  have 
been  much  surprised  that  morning  when  he  discovered 
that  something  very  like  an  attack  was  being  made  on 
Dewetsdorp. 

The  enemy  held  strong  positions  on  points  of  the 
ridge  to  the  south-east  (above  the  Kaffir  location)  to 
the  south-west  and  to  the  north-west.  Their  schanzes 
were  built  of  stones,  and  provided  with  trenches.  On 
the  top  of  the  schanzes  sandbags  had  been  placed, 
with  spaces  left  between  them  for  the  rifles. 

Of  Major  Massey,  who  was  in  command,  and  his 
force,  consisting  of  parts  of  the  Gloucestershire  regi- 
ment, the  Highland  Light  Infantry,  and  the  Irish 
Rifles,  five  hundred  all  told,  I  have  only  to  say  that 
both  commanding  officer  and  men  displayed  the  great- 
est valour. 

Although  Commandants  Hasebroek  and  Prinsloo 
had  not  arrived,  nevertheless  I  had  as  many  as  nine 

A  table-shaped  hill. 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


hundred  men.  But  I  was  obliged  to  send  a  strong  patrol 
to  Roodekop,  eighteen  miles  from  us  in  the  direction 
of  Bloemfontein,  in  order  to  receive  reports  in  time, 
should  reinforcements  be  coming  up  to  the  help  of  the 
English.  I  had  also  to  send  men  to  keep  watch  out 
towards  Thaba'  Nchu,  Wepener  and  Reddersburg ; 
nor  could  I  leave  the  President's  little  camp  (which  I 
had  allowed  to  proceed  to  the  farm  called  Prospect ") 
without  some  protection.  Thus  it  was  that  of  my  nine 
hundred  men,  only  four  hundred  and  fifty  were  avail- 
able for  the  attack. 

It  delighted  me  to  see  how  courageous  our  burghers 
were  at  Dewetsdorp.  As  one  watched  them  creeping 
from  schanze  to  scJianze,  often  without  any  cover 
whatever,  and  in  danger  at  every  moment  of  falling 
under  the  enemy's  fire,  one  felt  that  there  was  still 
hope. 

On  the  first  day  we  advanced  until  we  were  close  to 
the  schanzes  on  the  south-east  and  on  the  north  ;  we 
remained  there  during  the  night  in  our  positions,  our 
food  being  brought  to  us. 

The  second  day,  November  22nd,  firing  began  very 
early  in  the  morning,  and  was  kept  up  until  the  after- 
noon. Our  most  advanced  burghers,  those  of  Harri- 
smith,  had  come  to  within  about  one  hundred  paces  of 
the  first  schanze. 

I  saw  one  of  our  men  creeping  on  till  he  was  close 
under  the  enemy's  fort.  Directly  afterwards  I  observed 
that  rifles  were  being  handed  over  the  scha7ize  to  this 
man.  Later  on  it  appeared  that  the  man  who  had  done 
this  valiant  deed  was  none  other  than  Veldtcornet 
Wessels,  of  Harrismith.  He  was  subsequently  pro- 
moted to  the  rank  of  Commandant,  to  take  the  place 
of  Commandant  Truter ;  later  on  again,  he  became 
Vice-Commander-in-Chief. 

Our  burghers  could  now  enter  this  fort  without  in- 
curring much  danger.  But  they  had  hardly  done  so, 
when  the  two  English  guns,  which  had  been  placed  to 
the  west  of  the  town,  opened  fire  on  them.  When 

176 


MY  MARCH  TO  THE  SOUTH 


this  happened,  I  gave  orders  to  my  men  that  a  great 
schanze  of  the  English,  about  eighty  paces  from  the 
one  which  we  had  just  taken,  should  be  stormed.  This 
was  successfully  carried  out  by  Veldtcornet  Wessels, 
who  had  with  him  about  twenty-five  men.  The  enemy 
meanwhile  kept  up  a  heavy  fire  on  our  storming  party, 
from  some  scJianzes  which  lay  still  further  away  ;  our 
men,  therefore,  had  nothing  left  them  but  to  take  these 
also.  Then  while  our  men  kept  in  cover  behind  the 
fort  which  they  had  just  taken,  the  English  left  the 
schanzes  upon  which  the  storming  party  had  been  firing 
so  fiercely  ;  this,  however,  Veldtcornet  Wessels  and  his 
burghers  did  not  know,  because,  after  having  rested  a 
little,  and  desiring  to  renew  the  attack,  they  only  saw 
that  everything  was  quiet  there,  and  that  they  were 
now  only  under  the  fire  of  guns  from  the  western  forts, 
which  lay  right  above  the  town.  I  also  had  not  ob- 
served that  the  forts  had  been  abandoned. 

Just  as  the  sun  was  setting,  and  when  it  was  too 
late  to  do  anything,  General  Philip  Botha,  with  his 
two  sons,  Louis  and  Charlie,  rushed  up  to  Veldtcor- 
net Wessels  and  told  him  what  the  real  state  of  affairs 
was. 

I  now  saw  columns  of  black  smoke  rising  from  the 
mill  of  Mn.Wessels  Badenhorst,  to  the  south  of  the 
town.  Everybody  was  saying:  *'The  EngHsh  are 
burning  their  commissariat ;  they  are  going  to  sur- 
render !  " 

The  English  had  a  strong  fort  on  the  north,  near 
the  place  where  Commandant  De  Vos  was  stationed. 
In  order  to  take  this  schanze  one  would  have  been 
obliged  to  cross  200  metres  of  open  ground.  More- 
over, it  was  so  placed  that  it  was  the  only  part  of  the 
English  possession  which  De  Vos's  guns  commanded. 
Accordingly,  when  the  sun  had  gone  down,  I  sent  or- 
ders to  him  that  he  was  to  storm  this  schanze  before 
daybreak  on  the  following  morning. 

My  orders  were  duly  carried  out. 

Commandant  De  Vos  crept  stealthily  up  to  the  fort, 

177 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


and  was  not  observed  by  the  enemy  until  he  was  close 
to  them.  They  then  fired  fiercely  on  him,  killing  two 
of  his  burghers,  but  our  men  would  not  be  denied  ; 
they  leapt  over  the  schanze  and  compelled  the  enemy 
to  surrender.  The  English  losses  on  this  occasion 
were  six  killed,  a  few  wounded,  and  about  thirty  taken 
prisoner. 

While  this  was  going  on,  Veldtcornet  Wessels,  in 
accordance  with  orders  which  I  had  given  him  the 
previous  evening,  had  taken  possession  of  the  river 
bank  exactly  opposite  to  the  town,  which  he  was  now 
preparing  to  storm. 

The  English  had  only  a  few  schanzes  to  the  west  of 
him,  and  these  were  not  more  than  two  hundred  paces 
off. 

I  had  been  to  the  laager  at  Prospect "  the  night 
before,  with  the  intention  of  returning  so  as  to  be  in 
time  for  the  storming  of  the  town.  I  had  arranged 
to  go  there  very  early  in  the  morning,  because  my 
journey  could  be  accomplished  with  much  less  risk  if 
carried  out  in  the  dark.  Unfortunately,  however,  day- 
light overtook  me  when  I  had  got  no  further  than  the 
Kaffir  location,  and  I  had  to  race  from  there,  over 
country  where  I  had  no  sort  of  cover,  to  the  ravine 
near  the  town.  From  this  ravine  to  where  Veldtcornet 
Wessels  was  waiting  for  me  on  the  river  bank,  I  rode 
in  comparative  safety. 

The  reader  can  easily  imagine  how  delighted  I  was 
to  meet  again  the  Dewetsdorp  folk,  to  whom  I  was 
so  well  known.  But  I  could  not  show  myself  too 
much.  That  would  not  have  been  safe.  After  I  had 
visited  three  houses — those  of  the  Schoolmaster,  Mr. 
Otto,  of  Mr.  Jacobus  Roos,  and  of  old  Mr.  H.  Van 
der  Schijf — and  had  partaken  in  each  of  a  cup  of 
coffee,  I  hurried  off  to  my  burghers. 

The  remaining  English  schanzes  had  been  so  well 
constructed  that  their  occupants  could  still  offer  a  very 
stubborn  resistance,  and  they  did  so.  It  was  not  until 
about  three  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  23rd  of 

178 


MY  MARCH  TO  THE  SOUTH 


November  that  we  saw  the  white  flag  go  up,  and 
knew  that  the  victory  was  ours. 

We  took  four  hundred  and  eight  prisoners,  amongst 
whom  were  Major  Massey  and  seven  other  officers. 
We  also  took  fifty  Kaffirs.  Two  Armstrong  guns 
with  more  than  three  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition, 
some  waggons,  horses  and  mules,  and  a  great  quan- 
tity of  Lee-Metford  cartridges  also  fell  into  our  hands. 

We  never  knew  the  exact  numbers  of  the  English 
dead  and  wounded,  but  they  must  have  lost  something 
between  seventy  and  one  hundred  men. 

Our  own  loss  was  heavy.  Seven  of  the  burghers 
were  killed  and  fourteen  wounded  ;  most  of  these, 
however,  slightly. 

The  sun  had  already  set  before  we  had  put  every- 
thing in  order,  and  it  was  late  in  the  evening  when  we 
returned  to  our  laager  at  Prospect."  There  I 
received  a  report  that  a  great  column  was  marching 
from  the  direction  of  Reddersburg,  in  order  to  relieve 
Major  Massey — but  they  were  too  late  ! 

Very  early  the  following  morning  we  made  prepara- 
tions to  intercept  the  advance  of  this  column.  We 
took  up  positions  to  the  west  of  Dewetsdorp,  and  the 
day  was  spent  in  exchanging  shots  with  the  enemy's 
guns.  During  the  night  we  remained  in  our  positions, 
but  when  the  sun  rose  I  discovered  that  the  column, 
which  was  already  too  strong  for  us,  was  expecting  a 
reinforcement,  and  as  no  attack  was  attempted  on 
their  side,  I  decided  to  leave  the  position  quietly,  and 
to  march  on.  My  inroad  into  Cape  Colony  must  no 
longer  be  delayed. 

Our  positions  at  Dewetsdorp  were  so  situated  that  I 
could  leave  them  unnoticed.  I  thought  it  well,  how- 
ever, to  leave  behind  a  small  number  of  burghers  as  a 
decoy,  so  that  the  English  should  not  pursue  us  at 
once. 


179 


CHAPTER  XXIII 
I  Fail  to  Enter  Cape  Colony 

THE  enemy  gave  us  plenty  of  time  in  which  to 
effect  our  escape,  and  by  nightfall  we  had  aban- 
doned our  positions  at  Platkop.  Taking  with  us  the 
prisoners  of  war  (whom  I  intended  to  set  free  on 
the  far  side  of  the  Orange  River),  we  marched  towards 
Vaalbank,  arriving  there  on  the  following  morning. 
That  day  the  English  attacked  us  unawares.  While 
I  was  at  Dewetsdorp,  Captain  Pretorius  had  come  up 
to  give  me  a  report  of  his  recent  doings.  I  had 
sent  him,  two  months  previously,  from  the  district  of 
Heilbron  to  Fauresmith  and  Philippolis,  in  order  to 
fetch  two  or  three  hundred  horses  from  those  dis- 
tricts ;  he  had  told  me  that  he  had  brought  the  horses, 
and  that  they  were  with  his  200  men  at  Droogfontein. 

It  was  about  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning  after  our 
night  march  that  our  outpost  at  Vaalbank  saw  a 
mounted  commando  riding  from  Beijersberg  in  the 
direction  of  Reddersburg.  I  was  at  once  informed  of 
this,  but  as  I  was  expecting  Pretorius  from  that  direc- 
tion, I  merely  said  :  "  It  rs  sure  to  be  Captain  Pre- 
torius." 

No  ;  this  is  an  English  commando." 

English  or  Australian — it  made  very  little  matter— 
they  were  enemies. 

I  had  no  need  to  give  the  order  to  off-saddle,  the 
burghers  did  it  at  once  of  their  own  accord.  But 
before  we  were  ready  for  him,  the  enemy  opened  fire 
on  us  from  the  very  ridge  on  which  our  outpost  had 
been  stationed. 

Off  went  the  burghers,  and  I  made  no  effort  to  stop 

180 


I  FAIL  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


them,  for  the  spot  where  we  were  did  not  command  a 
good  view  of  the  surrounding  country,  and  I  already 
had  my  eye  on  some  ridges,  about  half  an  hour's  ride 
away.  There  we  should  be  able  to  reconnoitre,  espe- 
cially towards  Dewetsdorp,  whence  I  expected  the 
enemy  at  any  moment.  During  the  retreat  Veldtcor- 
net  de  Wet  was  severely  wounded.  Moreover,  some 
of  our  horses  had  to  be  left  behind,  being  too  exhaust- 
ed to  go  any  further. 

We  marched  on  towards  Bethulie.  When  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  this  town,  and  of  the  farm  of  "  Klein 
Bloemfontein,"  I  fell  in  with  General  Piet  Fourie  and 
Captain  Scheepers,  and  took  them  with  me.  While 
on  this  farm  I  set  free  the  Kaffirs  whom  I  had  taken 
prisoner  at  Dewetsdorp  ;  they  pretended  they  had  not 
been  fighting,  but  were  only  waggon-drivers.  I  gave 
them  a  pass  to  go  into  Basutoland. 

We  then  proceeded  towards  Karmel,  and  just  as  we 
were  approaching  the  farm  of  ''Good  Hope,"  we 
caught  sight  of  an  English  column  which  had  come 
from  Bethulie,  and  was  making  for  Smithfield.  I  at 
once  opened  fire  upon  them  from  two  sides,  but  they 
were  in  such  good  positions  that  we  failed  that  day  to 
drive  them  out.  On  the  morrow,  early  in  the  morn° 
ing,  the  fight  began  afresh. 

About  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  General  Charles 
Knox,  with  a  large  reinforcement,  arrived  from  Smith- 
field,  and  we  had  once  more  to  retire.  It  was  here 
that  I  sustained  a  loss  upon  my  staff — my  nephew, 
Johannes  Jacobus  de  Wet.  It  was  sad  to  think  that 
I  should  never  again  see  Johannes — so  brave  and 
cheerful  as  he  had  always  been.  His  death  was  r 
great  shock  to  me. 

Our  only  other  casualties  were  four  burghers  wound- 
ed, whereas  the  enemy,  unless  I  am  much  mistaken, 
must  have  lost  heavily. 

Whilst  this  fight  was  in  progress  General  Hertzog 
joined  me.  We  arranged  that  he  should  with  all  speed 
make  an  inroad  into  Cape  Colony,  between  the  Nor- 

i8i 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


valspont  and  Hopetown  railway  bridges,  and  that  I 
should  do  the  same  between  the  railway  bridges  at 
Bethulie  and  Aliwal  North.  He  was  to  operate  in 
the  north-western  part  of  the  country,  I  in  the  eastern 
and  midland  parts. 

That  night  we  continued  our  march  towards  Kar- 
mel,  under  a  heavy  downpour  of  rain.  Next  morn- 
ing it  was  still  raining  when  we  started  to  continue 
our  march  ;  later  on  in  the  day  we  off -saddled  for  a 
short  time  and  then  went  on  again,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
cross  the  Caledon  River  before  it  became  impossible 
to  do  so.  I  can  assure  you  that  it  rained  so  hard 
while  we  were  fording  the  Caledon,  that,  as  the  Boers 
say,  It  was  enough  to  kill  the  big  devils  and  cut  off 
the  legs  of  the  little  ones."  We  then  marched  on — still 
through  heavy  rain. 

Commandant  Truter,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
rear-guard,  had  left  a  Krupp  and  an  ammunition  wag- 
gon behind.  I  was  not  at  all  pleased  about  this,  but, 
as  we  had  not  a  single  round  of  Krupp  ammunition 
left,  the  gun  would  only  have  hampered  us. 

That  evening  we  reached  the  Orange  River,  at  a 
point  some  three  miles  to  the  north  of  Odendaals- 
stroom,  but,  alas  !  what  a  sight  met  our  eyes  !  The 
river  was  quite  impassable  owing  to  the  floods,  and,  in 
addition,  the  ford  was  held  by  English  troops  stationed 
on  the  south  bank. 

Our  position  was  beginning  to  be  critical,  for  there 
was  an  English  garrison  at  Aliwal  North,  so  that  I 
could  not  cross  the  Orange  River  by  the  bridge  there. 
It  was  also  highly  probable  that  the  Caledon  would  be 
in  flood,  and  I  knew  that  General  Charles  Knox  had 
left  a  division  of  his  troops  at  Smithfield — they  would 
be  sure  to  be  holding  the  bridge  over  the  Caledon  at 
Commissiedrift.  Moreover,  Jammerbergsdrift,  near 
Wepener,  was  doubtless  well  guarded,  so  that  there, 
too,  I  would  have  no  chance  of  crossing  the  river. 
There  was  still  Basutoland,  but  we  did  not  wish  to 
cross  its  borders — we  were  on  good  terms  with  the 

182 


I  FAIL  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


Basutos  and  we  could  not  afford  to  make  enemies  ot 
them.    Surely  we  had  enough  enemies  already  ! 

To  make  the  best  of  a  bad  job  I  sent  Commandant 
Kritzinger^  and  Captain  Scheepers,  with  their  three 
hundred  men,  to  march  in  the  direction  of  Rouxville 
with  orders  that  as  soon  as  the  Orange  River  became 
fordable,  they  were  to  cross  it  into  Cape  Colony  with- 
out delay.  I  entertained  no  doubt  that  they  would 
succeed. 

Everything  is  as  it  must  be,  and  unless  one  is  a 
sluggard — who  brings  trouble  upon  himself  by  doing 
nothing  to  avoid  it — one  has  no  reason  to  complain. 

Such  were  my  thoughts  as  I  contemplated  our  situ- 
ation. 

The  Orange  River  was  in  flood — the  Government 
and  I,  therefore,  could  not  possibly  remain  where  we 
were  for  long.  The  English  were  so  fond  of  us  that 
they  would  be  sure  to  be  paying  us  a  visit !  No,  to 
wait  there  until  the  river  was  fordable  was  not  to  be 
thought  of. 

The  reader  will  now  perceive  how  it  was  that  my 
projected  inroad  into  Cape  Colony  did  not  become  a 
fact.  My  dear  old  friend.  General  Charles  Knox,  was 
against  it,  and  he  had  the  best  of  the  argument,  for 
the  river  was  unfordable.  What  then  was  I  to  do  ? 
Retreat  I  could  not,  for  the  Caledon  also  was  now 
full.  Again,  as  I  have  already  explained,  it  would 
not  do  for  me  to  take  refuge  in  Basutoland.  But 
even  that  would  be  better  than  to  attempt  to  hold  out 
where  I  was — in  a  narrow  belt  of  country  between 
two  rivers  in  flood — against  the  overpowering  force 
which  was  at  General  Knox's  disposal,  and  which  in 
ten  or  twelve  days  would  increase  tenfold,  by  rein- 
forcements from  all  parts  of  the  country. 

I  knew  that  the  Orange  and  the  Caledon  Rivers 
sometimes  remained  unfordable  for  weeks  together. 
How  could  I  then  escape  ? — Oh,  the  English  had 
caught  me  at  last !    They  hemmed  me  in  on  every 

>  He  was  subsequently  appointed  Vice-Coinmander-in-Chief  in  Cape  Colony. 

183 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


side  ;  I  could  not  get  away  from  them.  In  fact  they 
had  cornered"  me,  to  use  one  of  their  own  favourite 
expressions.  That  they  also  thought  so  appears  from 
what  I  read  afterwards  in  the  South  African  News, 
where  I  saw  that  Lord  Kitchener  had  given  orders  to 
General  Charles  Knox  ''not  to  take  any  prisoners 
there  ! "  For  the  truth  of  this  I  cannot  positively 
vouch  ;  but  it  was  a  very  suspicious  circumstance 
that  Mr.  Cartwright,  the  editor  of  the  newspaper  to 
which  I  have  referred,  was  afterwards  thrown  into 
prison  for  having  published  this  very  anecdote  about 
Lord  Kitchener. 

Our  prospects  were  then  by  no  means  bright ;  I 
knew  very  well  that  those  trusty  counsellors  of  the 
English — the  National  Scouts — would  have  advised 
their  masters  to  seize  the  bridges  and  thus  make  escape 
impossible  for  Steyn  and  De  Wet. 

Without  delay  I  proceeded  to  the  Commissiedrift 
bridge  over  the  Caledon.  As  I  feared,  it  was  occu- 
pied by  the  enemy.  Entrenchments  had  been  dug, 
and  schanzes  thrown  up  at  both  ends. 

Foiled  here,  I  at  once  sent  a  man  down  to  the  river 
to  see  if  it  was  still  rising.  It  might  be  the  case  that 
there  had  not  been  so  much  rain  higher  up.  The  man 
whom  I  had  sent  soon  returned,  reporting  that  the 
river  was  falling,  and  would  be  fordable  by  the  even- 
ing.   This  was  good  news  indeed. 

On  the  other  hand,  our  horses  were  exhausted. 
They  had  now  for  three  days  been  obliged  to  plough 
their  way  through  the  wet,  muddy  paths.  We  had 
no  forage  to  give  them,  and  the  grass  was  so  young  as 
yet  that  it  did  not  seem  to  strengthen  them  at  all. 

Nevertheless,  we  had  to  be  off.  And  there  was  but 
one  road  open  to  us — we  must  somehow  get  across  the 
Orange  River  and  thus  obtain  elbow-room.  Accord- 
ingly we  returned  to  make  for  Zevenfontein,  a  ford 
ten  or  twelve  miles  further  up  the  river.  If  it  were 
not  already  in  the  enemy's  hands,  we  would  surely  be 
able  to  get  across  there.    Shortly  before  sunset,  on  the 

184 


I  FAIL  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


8th  of  December,  we  arrived  at  Zevenfontein.  To  our 
immense  joy,  it  was  unoccupied  and  fordable. 

I  at  once  marched  towards  Dewetsdorp,  intending, 
if  only  General  Knox  and  his  huge  force  would  give 
me  the  chance,  to  rest  my  horses,  and  then  make 
another  attempt  to  enter  Cape  Colony. 

But  it  was  not  to  be. 

The  English  were  afraid  that  if  President  Steyn 
and  I  were  in  Cape  Colony  their  troubles  would  be 
doubled.  General  Knox  therefore  concentrated  all 
his  available  forces  in  order  to  drive  us  northwards.  It 
was  disappointing,  but  there  was  a  bright  side  to  it. 
If  the  English  were  pursuing  me,  they  would  have  to 
leave  Commandant  Kritzinger  and  Captain  Scheepers, 
who  would  thus  be  able  to  cross  the  Orange  River. 

These  two  officers,  however,  were  not  left  entirely 
in  peace.  While  they  rested  for  a  time  near  Zastron, 
in  order  to  give  their  horses  a  chance  of  recovering 
their  strength,  there  came  a  division  of  Brabant's 
Horse  to  pay  them  a  visit.  The  result  was  that  about 
sixty  of  the  visitors  were  wounded  or  taken  prisoner, 
while  the  rest  found  it  as  much  as  they  could  do  to 
get  back  to  Aliwal  North,  whence  they  had  started. 
Commandant  Kritzinger  and  Captain  Scheepers  had 
then  another  opportunity  for  rest  until  the  day  should 
come  when  they  could  make  an  inroad  into  Cape 
Colony  according  to  my  instructions. 

Although,  as  I  have  already  said,  the  English  were 
passionately  devoted  to  President  Steyn  and  myself,  I 
was  deprived  of  their  endearments  for  the  space  of 
two  whole  days,  during  which  I  was  at  Wilgeboom- 
spruit.  Here  I  was  joined  by  Commandant  Hase- 
broek  with  his  commando,  and  all  of  us — horses  as 
well  as  men — enjoyed  a  little  rest.  But  very  soon 
General  Knox  was  again  at  our  heels,  and,  to  escape 
him,  I  marched  west  in  the  direction  of  Edenburg, 
hoping  at  last  to  be  able  to  get  into  Cape  Colony. 
Not  only  were  the  forces  of  General  Knox  behind 
us,  but,  when  we  arrived  at  the  farm  of  "  Hexrivier," 

1S5 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


and  thus  were  within  two  hours'  march  of  Edenburg, 
I  heard  from  my  scouts,  whom  I  had  sent  on  in  ad- 
vance, that  there  was  a  great  English  column  in  front 
of  us  at  that  town. 

In  the  evening,  therefore,  I  turned  ofif  towards  the 
cast,  and  marched  in  the  direction  of  Wepener. 

The  following  morning  the  enemy  was  again  on  our 
track  ;  but,  as  we  had  covered  twenty  miles  during 
the  night,  we  were  so  far  ahead  that  it  was  unneces- 
sary for  us  to  move  very  fast  during  that  and  the  fol- 
lowing day. 

At  mid-day,  the  13th  of  December,  we  took  up  ex- 
cellent positions — placed  in  a  line  of  about  eight  miles 
from  end  to  end — on  the  farm  called  Rietfontein," 
which  is  in  the  district  of  Wepener,  north-east  of  Das- 
poort.  We  were  so  strongly  posted  that  the  enemy 
had  to  halt  and  wait  for  the  arrival  of  the  rearguard. 
I  had  calculated  on  this,  and  knew  that  darkness 
would  come  to  our  aid  before  the  English  were  ready 
to  attack  us.  But  in  front  of  us  there  was  a  strong 
line  of  forts,  extending  from  Bloemfontein  through 
Thaba'  Nchu  and  Springhaansnek  to  Ladybrand. 
Through  this  line  we  should  have  to  fight  our  way  ; 
this  would  be  difficult  enough,  and  it  would  never  do 
to  have  General  Knox  at  our  heels,  to  increase  the  dif- 
ficulty. Our  only  plan,  then,  was  to  make  a  long 
night  march,  and  thus  to  get  well  out  of  the  way. 

Accordingly,  I  gave  orders  to  the  men  to  hold  their 
positions  until  dark,  and  to  let  the  enemy  see  that  they 
were  doing  so.  I  had  even  had  schanzes  built,  so  as 
to  impress  them  with  the  idea  that  I  intended  to  at- 
tack them  the  following  day  if  they  advanced  towards 
my  positions.  And  just  before  the  night  came  on,  I 
ordered  the  burghers  to  show  themselves  from  behind 
all  our  schanzes. 

Then  night  fell,  and  I  at  once  gave  orders  to  march 
off. 

The  burghers  could  not  understand  this,  and  began 
to  grumble  about  it — what  could  their  General  mean? 

186 


I  FAIL  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


Why  this  sudden  change  in  his  plans  ?  I  said  noth- 
ing, but  thought  to  myself,  ''You  shall  know  why  to- 
morrow." 

We  marched  directly  towards  Springhaansnek.  It 
was  very  slow  work,  for  many  of  the  burghers'  horses 
were  so  weak  that  their  owners  had  to  go  on  foot. 
General  Philip  Botha  and  I  were  with  the  rearguard, 
and  did  not  expect  to  reach  the  line  of  forts  until  ten 
o'clock  on  the  following  morning. 

We  had  not  advanced  very  far  before  we  were 
joined  by  Commandant  Michal  Prinsloo,  who  had 
with  him  three  hundred  of  the  Bethlehem  burghers. 
He  had  come  down  from  Springhaansnek,  and  as  his 
horses  were  in  good  condition  I  ordered  him  to  go  in 
advance  of  us,  to  pass  through  Springhaansnek,  and 
then  to  occupy  positions  to  the  north  of  the  lines  of 
forts  and  east  of  Thaba'  Nchu. 

My  object  in  making  this  arrangement  was  that 
when  on  the  following  morning  we  were  crossing  the 
mountains,  he  might  be  able  to  hinder  the  enemy  at 
Thaba'  Nchu  from  either  checking  our  advance,  or 
sending  reinforcements  to  the  Springhaansnek  forts. 

And  in  point  of  fact,  Prinsloo's  commando  proved 
to  be  our  salvation  ;  for  the  English,  from  their  high 
position  at  Thaba'  Nchu,  spied  us  as  soon  as  day  broke, 
and  indeed  sent  troops  to  reinforce  the  point  for  which 
we  were  making.  But  Prinsloo  succeeded  in  holding 
them  in  check,  so  that  when  we  arrived  at  Springhaans- 
nek we  had  to  fight  against  strong  positions,  but  against 
nothing  else — but  I  must  not  anticipate. 

Before  it  began  to  be  light  on  the  morning  of  the 
14th  of  December,  Commandant  Prinsloo  passed 
through  the  enemy's  lines  between  the  forts.  The 
English  fired  upon  him,  but  he  did  not  turn  back. 
Then  a  small  outpost  of  the  enemy,  which  lay  half- 
way between  the  forts,  made  an  attempt  to  turn  the 
oncoming  burghers  by  shooting  at  them  from  the 
front.  The  Commandant  only  gave  strict  orders  that 
the  men  must  force  their  way  through.    The  conse- 

187 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


quence  was  that  two  of  the  enemy,  who  did  not  get 
out  of  the  way  in  time,  were  literally  ridden  over.  The 
burghers  thought  that  these  two  unfortunate  men  had 
been  trodden  to  death  by  the  horses,  but  it  was  not 
likely  that  any  of  them  would  dismount  to  see  if  this 
were  actually  the  case. 

As  I  have  already  said.  General  Botha  and  I  were 
in  the  rearguard.  We  knew,  however,  that  Vice- 
Commandant-in-Chief  Piet  Fourie  —  a  man  whom 
nothing  on  earth  would  stop,  if  he  had  once  made  up 
his  mind — was  leading  the  van,  and  that  he  was  sup- 
ported by  Veldtcornet  Johannes  Hattingh,  who  was 
as  resolute  and  undaunted  as  his  chief. 

Fourie  did  not  wait  for  us  to  catch  him  up,  but  at 
once  went  down  the  mountain  side.  When  we  saw 
this.  General  Botha  and  I  rode  with  all  speed  ahead, 
telling  the  burghers  to  come  on  more  gently  with  their 
weary  horses.  I  did  not  fear  thus  to  leave  them  be- 
hind, because  I  knew  that  General  Knox  was  still  a 
long  way  in  the  rear. 

Just  as  General  Fourie,  leading  the  first  storming- 
party,  had  passed  between  the  forts,  we  came  up  with 
him,  our  burghers  still  straggling  on  behind  us.  As 
soon  as  we  had  crossed  over  the  first  piece  of  rising 
ground,  I  halted  my  men,  and  ordered  them  to  leave 
their  horses  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  and  to  return 
to  the  brow  of  the  hill,  so  as  to  be  able  to  fire  into  the 
forts  on  the  right  and  left  hand,  which  were  from  eight 
hundred  to  nine  hundred  paces  from  us.  From  this 
hill  we  kept  up  as  fierce  a  fire  as  we  could,  and  this  to 
a  great  extent  prevented  the  enemy  in  those  forts 
from  firing  on  our  burghers  who  were  still  coming  on 
in  a  long  train. 

It  is  necessary,  in  order  that  the  reader  may  under- 
stand the  task  which  we  had  set  ourselves  to  accom- 
plish, to  say  a  few  words  about  Springhaansnek.  At 
either  side  of  the  way  by  which  we  must  pass,  there 
were  two  strong  forts,  at  a  distance  of  from  a  thou- 
sand to  twelve  hundred  ])accs  from  each  other.  In 

i88 


I  FAIL  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


the  space  between  them  there  was  absolutely  no  cover  ; 
and  the  distance  from  the  point  where  the  burghers 
were  first  visible  to  the  men  in  these  forts,  to  the 
point  where  they  again  disappeared  from  view,  was  at 
least  three  thousand  paces. 

Over  these  terrible  three  thousand  paces  our  burgh- 
ers raced,  while  a  storm  of  bullets  was  poured  in  upon 
them  from  both  sides.  And  of  all  that  force — eight 
thousand  strong — no  single  man  was  killed,  and  only 
one  was  wounded  ! 

Our  marvellous  escape  can  only  be  described  to  the 
providence  and  irresistible  protection  of  Almighty 
God,  who  kept  His  hand  graciously  over  us. 

What  the  enemy's  loss  was  I  never  heard. 

In  addition  to  the  burghers,  a  few  carts  and  wag- 
gons, as  well  as  one  of  the  two  guns  which  had  been 
taken  at  Dewetsdorp,  got  safely  through  the  English 
lines.  The  other  gun  was  left  behind  by  the  sergeant 
of  the  artillery,  before  he  reached  the  fighting  line. 
He  sent  the  horses  of  the  gun-carriage  with  the  gun- 
ners, back  to  Commandant  Hasel,  who  subsequently 
followed  us  to  Ijzernek,  to  the  west  of  Thaba'  Nchu. 

My  ambulance  with  Dr.  Fourie  and  Dr.  Poutsma, 
were  stopped  by  the  English.  Dr.  Fourie  had,  as  was 
quite  proper,  remained  outside  the  fighting  line,  with 
the  intention  of  coming  through  afterwards.  This 
he  was  permitted  to  do  on  the  following  day.  He 
brought  me  a  message  from  General  Knox  to  the 
effect  that  Commandant  Hasebroek  had  lost  heavily 
in  an  engagement  with  Colonel  White,  who  had 
marched  out  from  Thaba  Nchu.  But  I  had  already 
received  information  that  the  Commandant  had  got 
through  the  enemy's  lines  unhurt,  and  that  on  the  con- 
trary it  was  he  who  had  killed  some  of  Colonel  White's 
men,  while  they  were  attacking  him. 

We  decided  to  retreat  still  further,  in  order  to  reach 
a  place  of  safety  where  we  might  rest  our  horses,  in 
preparation  for  that  long  dash  into  Cape  Colony,  which 
I  still  intended  to  carry  out  on  the  first  opportu- 

189 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 

mty.  I  felt  sure,  however,  that  my  commandos  would 
be  allowed  no  rest  by  the  enemy  as  long  as  the  Presi- 
dent and  I  were  with  them.  Accordingly  I  planned 
that  as  soon  as  we  got  to  the  north  of  Winburg  he 
and  I  should  absent  ourselves  from  the  commandos 
for  some  time,  while  I  proceeded  to  arrange  certain 
matters  (to  be  set  down  in  a  later  chapter)  by  which 
I  hoped  to  effectually  "settle"^  the  EngHsh. 

On  our  arrival  at  a  certain  farm  to  the  south  of  Se- 
nekal  we  discovered  that  General  Knox  was  once 
more  at  our  heels.  We  had  several  small  engage- 
ments with  him,  in  one  of  which  a  son  of  Comman- 
dant Truter,  of  Harrismith,  was  killed. 

On  the  afternoon  of  Christmas  Day,  1900,  we  left 
the  farm,  and  rode  on  to  the  Tafelkop,  nine  miles  to 
the  west  of  Senekal. 

*  In  the  original  a  Kaffir  word  is  used  here.  The  literal  meaning  of  the 
phrase  is  "to  throw  the  knuckle  bones  " — the  Kaffir  equivalent  for  dice. 


190 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


Wherein  Something  is  Found  About  War 
against  Women 

IT  was  decided  here,  on  the  26th  December,  to 
divide  the  large  commando  into  two.  The  one 
part  was  to  be  under  the  command  of  Assistant-Chief- 
Commander  P.  H.  Botha,  and  the  other  Assistant- 
Chief-Commander  Pete  Fourie. 

I  entrusted  to  President  Steyn  a  bodyguard  under 
Commander  Davel,  who  went  with  the  Government 
in  the  direction  of  Reitz. 

As  regards  myself,  I  went  to  Assistant-Chief-Com- 
mander C.  C.  Froneman,  who  was  with  the  Heilbron 
Commander,  L.  Steenekamp,  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Heilbron.  It  was  my  intention  to  take  with  me  from 
there  a  strong  escort,  and  to  dig  up  the  ammunition  at 
Roodewal  taken  on  the  7th  of  June,  as  both  our  Mau- 
ser and  our  Lee-Metford  ammunition  were  nearly  ex- 
hausted, although  we  still  had  a  fairly  large  supply  of 
Martini-Henry  Giddy  cartridges. 

I  then  started  from  Tafelkop,  on  the  27th  of  De- 
cember, and  arrived  two  days  later  at  General  Frone- 
man's  commando,  close  to  Heilbron.  I  had  to  wait 
there  till  the  evening  of  the  31st  December,  until  the 
necessary  carriages  and  oxen  had  been  got  together  for 
carrying  the  ammunition  with  us.  Carriages  were  now 
no  longer  to  be  got  easily,  because  the  British  had  not 
only  taken  them  away  from  the  farms,  but  had  also 
burnt  many  of  them.  Where  formerly  in  each  farm 
there  were  at  least  one  carriage  and  a  team  of  oxen, 
and  in  some  two,  three  or  even  more,  there  were  now 
frequently  not  a  single  one.    Even  where  there  were 

191 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 

carriages  the  women  had  always  to  keep  them  in  readi- 
ness to  fly  on  them  before  the  columns  of  the  enemy, 
who  had  now  already  commenced  to  carry  the  women 
away  from  their  dwellings  to  the  concentration  camps 
within  their  own  lines,  in  nearly  all  villages  where  the 
English  had  established  strong  garrisons.  Proclama- 
tions had  been  issued  by  Lord  Roberts,  prescribing 
that  any  building  within  ten  miles  from  the  railway, 
where  the  Boers  had  blown  up  or  broken  up  the  rail- 
way line,  should  be  burnt  down.  This  was  also  car- 
ried out,  but  not  only  within  the  specified  radius,  but 
also  everywhere  throughout  the  State.  Everywhere 
houses  were  burnt  down  or  destroyed  with  dynamite. 
And,  worse  still,  the  furniture  itself  and  the  grain  were 
burnt,  and  the  sheep,  cattle  and  horses  were  carried 
off.  Nor  was  it  long  before  horses  were  shot 
down  in  heaps,  and  the  sheep  killed  by  thousands  by 
the  Kaffirs  and  the  National  Scouts,  or  run  through 
by  the  troops  with  their  bayonets.  The  devastation 
became  worse  and  worse  from  day  to  day.  And  the 
Boer  women — did  they  lose  courage  with  this  before 
their  eyes  ?  By  no  means,  as  when  the  capturing  of 
women,  or  rather  the  war  against  them  and  against  the 
possessions  of  the  Boer  commenced,  they  took  to  bit- 
ter flight  to  remain  at  least  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  In  order  to  keep  something  for  themselves 
and  their  children,  they  loaded  the  carriages  with  grain 
and  the  most  indispensable  furniture.  When  then  a 
column  approached  a  farm,  even  at  night,  in  all  sorts 
of  weather,  many  a  young  daughter  had  to  take  hold 
of  the  leading  rope  of  the  team  of  oxen,  and  the  mother 
the  whip,  or  vice  versa.  Many  a  smart,  well-bred 
daughter  rode  on  horseback  and  urged  the  cattle  on, 
in  order  to  keep  out  of  the  hands  of  the  pursuers  as 
long  as  at  all  possible,  and  not  to  be  carried  awav_to 
thejconcentratio^^  which  the  British  called  Ref- 
ugee ^amps  (Camps  oTRefuge)"  HowThcorrect,  in- 
deed!  Coula  anj^one  ever_have  thought  before  the 
war  that  the  twentieth  century  could  show  such  bar- 

192 


ABOUT  WAR  AGAINST  WOMEN 


barities  ?    No.    Any  one  knows  that  in  war,  cruelties 
~mo1reniorrible  than  murder  can  take  place,  but  that 
■Such_girect  and  indirect  murder  should  have'Been  com- 
mitted  against  defenceless  women  and  children  is  a 
tEmg^whi^cjiXsl^^^        staked  my  head  could  never 
'have  ha^ened  in  a  war~wa^ed  by  the  civilized  EnglTsR 
Tiation.    And_yet  it  happened.    Taagers  contaim 
no  one  but  women  and  children  and  decrepit  old  men, 
"were  fired  upon  with  cannon^ and  rifles  in  order  to  com- 
peljthem  to  stop.    I  could  append  here  hundreds  of 
aeclarations  in  proof  of  what  I  say.    I  do  not  do  so, 
as  my  object  is  not  to  write  on  this  matter.    I  only 
touch  upon  it  in  passing.    There  are  sufficiently  many 
righteous  pens  in  South  Africa  and  England  to  pillory 
these  deeds  and  bring  them  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
world,  to  remain  on  record  for  the  future.    For  what 
nation  exists,  or  has  existed,  which  has  not  a  historical 
record  whether  to  its  advantage  or  to  its  disadvantage  ? 
I  cannot  do  it  here  as  it  should  be  done.    And  too 
much  cannot  be  said  about  this  shameful  history. 
I  had  to  unburden  my  heart.    Now  let  me  proceed. 
On  the  evening  of  the  ist  of  January,  1901,  I  pushed 
on  towards  Roodewal  Station,  for  I  had  obtained  all 
the  waggons  I  needed  for  my  purpose.    Perhaps  that 
night  the  outposts  were  asleep  ;  but  however  that  may 
be,  we  reached  the  railway  without  the  enemy  being 
aware  of  our  movements.    The  hour  was  growing  late, 
and  so  we  had  no  choice  but  to  remain  where  we  were, 
nine  miles  from  the  spot  at  which  we  aimed.    But  the 
following  evening  we  were  again  on  the  march,  and 
reached  the  place  where  the  ammunition  had  been 
buried.    We  found  it  untouched,  and  just  where  we 
had  left  it,  a  few  miles  from  the  railway,  and  quite 
close  to  the  English  camp,  at  Rhenosterriviersbrug. 

We  were  very  careful  to  recover  every  cartridge, 
since  it  was  clear  that  the  war  must  still  continue  for 
a  long  space  of  time.  We  could  have  no  thought  of 
giving  up  the  struggle,  whilst  the  pride  of  England 
would  not  allow  her  to  turn  back. 

193 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


We  loaded  our  waggons  with  the  ammunition,  and 
I  gave  to  General  Froneman  the  task  of  conducting 
it  across  the  railway  line.  I  myself  proceeded  to  the 
Vredefort  commandos,  which  were  stationed  some 
fifteen  miles  away,  for  the  state  of  affairs  amongst 
these  commandos  called  for  my  presence.  On  the 
4th  of  January,  when  night  had  fallen,  I  crossed 
the  railway  near  Vredefortweg,  unnoticed  by  the 
enemy. 

Two  days  later  I  was  back  again  with  General 
Froneman's  commando,  where  I  found  that  the  am- 
munition had  arrived  in  safety.  I  was  informed  that 
General  Knox  had  divided  his  forces  into  three  parts, 
one  of  which  had  engaged  General  Fourie  and  Com- 
mandant Prinsloo,  near  Bethlehem.  We  had  given 
the  enemy  a  good  beating,  but  had  lost  two  men  in 
the  affair.  I  regret  to  say  that  one  of  them  was  that 
clever  officer,  Vice-Commandant  Ignatius  du  Preeij. 
He  was  a  man  whom  every  burgher  loved,  for  he  was 
goodness  personified.  The  second  of  General  Knox's 
division  had  set  out  in  the  direction  of  Heilbron, 
whilst  the  third  had  pursued  General  Philip  Botha 
along  the  Libenbergsvlei.^ 

This  division  had  attempted  to  mislead  General 
Botha  by  all  sorts  of  tricks,  but  on  January  the  3rd 
he  had  put  up  notices  outside  different  farmhouses, 
stating  that  he  did  not  like  such  familiarity. 

On  one  occasion  the  General,  with  only  fifty  burgh- 
ers, had  charged  one  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  body- 
guard, and  had  taken  one  hundred  and  seventeen 
prisoners,  leaving  the  whole  of  the  remainder  either 
killed  or  wounded. 

A  panic  now  occurred  among  General  Knox's 
forces.  The  division  that  was  marching  to  Heilbron 
suddenly  turned  aside  towards  Kroonstad,  only  to 
meet  with  General  Botha,  who  left  them  in  anything 
but  an  undamaged  condition. 

The  division  which  had  been  despatched  to  deal 

*  Vlei — a  valley  with  stagnant  water  in  it. 
194 


ABOUT  WAR  AGAINST  WOMEN 


with  General  Fourie  and  Commandant  Prinsloo 
entered  Senekal. 

When  I  arrived  at  General  Botha's  camp,  which 
was  situated  six  miles  to  the  east  of  Lindley,  I  found 
that  General  Knox  had  already  taken  Kroonstad. 

After  this  we  allowed  ourselves  a  rest. 

On  the  8th  of  January  I  received  reports  from 
Commandant  Kritzinger  and  Captain  Scheepers  deal- 
ing with  the  state  of  affairs  in  Cape  Colony.  They 
informed  me  that  they  had  safely  crossed  the  Orange 
River  by  a  foot-path.  There  was  another  footpath, 
more  to  the  south,  which  an  English  outpost  of  eight 
men  was  guarding.  These  soldiers  occupied  a  house 
near  by,  and  the  first  warning  they  had  that  we  had 
crossed  the  river  was  when  the  door  of  their  abode 
opened,  and  they  heard  the  order  to  "hands  up." 

Commandant  Kritzinger  and  Captain  Scheepers 
also  assured  me  that  the  sympathies  of  the  Colonial 
burghers  were  strongly  with  us.  Like  every  other 
right-minded  man,  I  had  expected  this  to  be  the  case, 
for    blood  is  thicker  than  water."  ^ 

Although  the  Colonials  were  well  aware  what  a 
dangerous  course  they  would  be  pursuing  if  they 
joined  us,  and  how,  later,  they  would  be  sure  to  be 
treated  as  rebels,  they  nevertheless  threw  in  their  lot 
with  ours. 

From  Judge  Hertzog  I  received  a  very  encouraging 
report  as  to  the  burghers  in  the  north-western  parts  of 
Cape  Colony.  This  news  decided  me  on  leaving 
behind,  in  their  own  districts,  parts  of  the  commandos 
from  all  the  various  divisions,  and  on  taking  others  to 
join  with  me  in  a  second  expedition  into  Cape  Colony. 
The  following  were  the  officers  I  took  with  me,  order- 
ing them  to  assemble  at  Doornberg,  in  the  district  of 
Winburg,  on  the  25th  of  January,  1901  :  Generals 
Piet  Fourie,  Philip  Botha  and  Froneman ;  Com- 
mandants Prinsloo  (Bethlehem),  Steyn  (Ficksburg), 
Hasebroek  (Winburg),  De  Vos  (Kroonstad),  Merve 

»  The  Boer  proverb  is: — *'  Blood  creeps  where  it  cannot  walk." 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


(Parijs),  Ross  (Frankfort),  Wessel  Wessels^  (Harri- 
smith),  Kolbe  (Bloemfontein),  and  Jan  Theron,  with 
the  renowned  Theron  Scouts. 

From  the  8th  to  the  25th  of  January  we  were  in  the 
north-western  districts  of  the  Free  State.  We  were 
waiting  for  a  suitable  opportunity  to  make  a  dash  into 
Cape  Colony. 

*  I  had  appointed  him  in  place  of  Commandant  Truter,  who  had  resigned. 


196 


CHAPTER  XXV 


I  Again  Attempt  to  Enter  Cape  Colony 

I WAS  now  about  to  make  a  second  attempt  to 
march  into  Cape  Colony.  I  had  great  fears  that 
my  plans  would  leak  out,  since  I  was  obliged  to  men- 
tion them  to  the  commandants.  But  I  was  not  able 
to  confine  all  knowledge  of  my  future  movements  en- 
tirely to  the  commandants.  For  I  had  sent  many  a 
burgher  home  to  fetch  a  second  horse  ;  and  the  burgh- 
ers began  to  make  all  sorts  of  guesses  as  to  why  they 
had  to  fetch  the  horses ;  and  one  could  hear  them 
mutter  :     We  are  going  to  the  Colony." 

But  nevertheless  they  were  all  in  good  spirits,  with 
the  exception  of  some,  who  had  for  commander  a 
most  contradictory  and  obstinate  officer. 

By  January  the  25th  nearly  the  whole  of  my  com- 
mandos had  assembled  ;  only  General  Philip  Botha, 
with  the  burghers  from  Vrede  under  Commandant 
Hermanns  Botha,  had  yet  to  arrive  in  order  to  com- 
plete our  numbers  ;  and  he  had  been  prevented  coming. 

President  Steyn  and  the  Government  decided  to  go 
with  me  and  my  two  thousand  burghers. 

At  Doornberg  the  council  of  war  was  called  to- 
gether by  the  Government.  President  Steyn  then 
communicated  to  the  meeting  that  his  term  of  office 
would  soon  expire.  He  pointed  out  that  the  provis- 
ions of  the  law  designed  to  meet  this  contingency 
could  not  be  carried  out,  because  a  legally  constituted 
Volksraad  could  not  be  summoned  at  the  present 
moment. 

The  council  of  war  decided  to  propose  a  candidate 
to  the  burghers  without  any  delay,  at  the  same  time 

197 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


giving  them  the  option  of  nominating  candidates  of 
their  own.  Further,  it  was  decided  that  the  candidate 
who  should  be  elected  should  be  sworn  in  as  Vice- 
States  President,  and  retain  that  title  until  the  time 
arrived  when  the  condition  of  the  country  should  make 
it  possible  to  hold  an  election  in  conformity  with  the 
law. 

After  the  voting  had  taken  place,  it  was  found  that 
the  former  President,  Marthinus  Theunis  Steyn,  had 
been  unanimously  re-elected. 

At  the  burghers'  meeting  the  voting  resulted  in  the 
same  way,  except  at  a  meeting  at  which  Mr.  Cecil 
Rhodes  was  proposed  as  a  candidate.  This  proposal 
was  not  seconded  ! 

President  Steyn  was  declared  elected.  And  he  was 
then  sworn  in. 

The  executive  Raad  now  consisted  of  the  President, 
as  chairman,  with  T.  Brain,  Secretary  of  State,  W.  J. 
C.  Brebner,  Secretary  of  State,  A.  P.  Cronje,  Jan 
Meijer  and  myself  as  members.  Mr.  Rocco  De  Vil- 
liers  was  Secretary  of  the  War  Council,  and  Mr.  Gor- 
don Eraser,  Private  Secretary  to  the  States  President. 

No  States- Procureur  had  been  appointed  since  Mr. 
Jacob  De  Villiers  had  been  taken  prisoner  at  Botha- 
ville  ;  but  the  Council  appointed  Mr.  Hendrik  Pot- 
gieter,  Landdrost  of  Kroonstad,  as  Public  Prose- 
cutor. 

V arious  causes  had  made  it  impossible  for  a  legally 
constituted  Volksraad  to  sit.  Some  members  had,  as 
we  called  it,  hands-upped  "  ;  others  had  thought  that 
they  had  done  quite  enough  when  they  had  voted  for 
the  war.  I  would  be  the  last  to  assert  that  they  had 
done  wrong  in  voting  thus.  The  whole  world  is  con- 
vinced that,  whatever  the  Boers  might  have  done, 
England  was  determined  to  colour  the  map  of  South 
Africa  red  !  And  England  succeeded  beyond  her 
expectations  !  Eor  South  Africa  was  stained  with  the 
blood  of  burghers  and  defenceless  women  and  chil- 
dren, and  with  the  blood  of  English  soldiers  who  had 

198 


ATTEMPT  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


died  in  a  quarrel  for  which  they  were  not  responsible, 
and  which  could  have  been  avoided  ! 

There  were  other  members — and  I  had  no  patience 
with  them — who  had  said  :  We  will  give  our  last 
drop  of  blood  for  our  country,"  and  then  had  taken 
good  care  that  no  one  should  have  a  chance  of  getting 
even  the  first  drop  !  They  preferred  to  remain  quietly 
at  home,  and  wait  for  the  English  to  come  and  make 
them  prisoners  of  war ! 

Only  a  minority  of  the  members  had  remained 
faithful  to  our  cause,  and  these  did  not  constitute  a 
quorum  ;  and  so  no  sitting  could  take  place.  This 
small  party,  as  far  as  I  can  recollect,  consisted  of  the 
following  ten  members :  C.  H.  Wessels  Bishop, 
Chairman ;  Wessel  Wessels  (Vrede)  ;  J.  B.  Wessels 
(Winburg) ;  A.  P.  Cronje  (Winburg)  ;  Jan  Steijl 
(Bloemfontein)  ;  Jan  Meijer(Harrismith)  ;  J.  J.  Van 
Niekerk  (Fauresmith) ;  Daniel  Steyn  (Heilbron)  ; 
Hendrik  Ecksteen  (Vrede);  and  Hendrik  Serfontein 
(Kroonstad). 

We  marched  from  Doornberg  on  the  26th  of  January 
to  Commandant  Sarel  Hasebroek's  farm,  which  is  eight 
miles  to  the  north  of  Winburg. 

There  was  a  strong  English  force  seven  or  eight 
miles  to  the  east  of  Winburg,  and  another  body  of  the 
enemy  eleven  or  twelve  miles  still  further  to  the  east. 
In  addition,  a  column  was  marching  northwards  from 
Ventersburg,  west  of  our  position. 

It  was  perfectly  plain  that  the  enemy  were  aware 
of  our  intentions ;  but  this,  as  I  have  already  said, 
could  not  be  helped.  Our  army  was  so  constituted 
that  no  secret  could  be  kept ;  and  I  decided  for  the 
future  to  tell  no  one  of  any  further  plans  I  might  form. 

On  the  27th  of  June  I  reconnoitred  to  the  east  of 
Winburg,  and  took  care  to  let  myself  be  seen,  for  I 
wished  to  make  it  appear  that  it  was  my  intention  to 
proceed  in  that  direction  in  the  evening.  Meanwhile 
I  secretly  sent  my  scouts  to  the  west. 

That  night  I  marched  to  the  west  of  Winburg, 

199 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


crossing  the  branch  railway  without  meeting  with  any 
opposition,  and  arrived  on  the  following  morning  at 
the  Vet  River — to  the  south  of  the  town.  We  did 
not  advance  very  fast/  as  we  expected  that  we  should 
soon  once  more  have  to  face  the  difficulty  of  marching 
with  exhausted  horses. 

In  the  afternoon  we  continued  our  way  till  we  had 
passed  Tabaksberg.  The  following  morning,  January 
28th,  I  received  a  report  that  the  English  were  advanc- 
ing in  two  divisions.  I  ordered  my  burghers  to  up- 
saddle  and  to  occupy  positions  to  the  east  of  Takasberg. 

The  enemy's  right  wing  was  to  the  east,  and  we 
stationed  ourselves  on  some  ridges  that  lay  in  front  of 
them,  but  were  unable  to  deliver  an  attack.  We 
charged  their  left  wing,  however,  and  captured  a 
Maxim-Nordenfeldt,  which  was  in  perfect  order,  at 
the  cost  of  one  killed  and  three  wounded.  Our  other 
losses  amounted  to  a  very  small  number. 

As  to  the  enemy's  losses,  they  took  some  of  their 
dead  and  wounded  away,  but  they  left  behind  them 
several  of  their  dead  at  the  spot  where  we  had  capt- 
ured the  gun. 

To  remain  there  and  continue  the  fighting  the  next 
day  could  not  even  be  thought  of;  for  if  we  had 
waited  the  English  would  have  had  time  to  bring  up 
reinforcements,  and  my  plan  of  entering  Cape  Colony 
would  have  been  rendered  impossible. 

Our  position  was  difficult  enough.  The  enemy  were 
at  our  heels,  and  we  had  to  get  away  as  best  we  could. 
In  front  of  us  there  was  the  line  of  fortifications  from 
Bloemfontein  to  Ladybrand,  which  had  been  greatly 
strengthened  since  we  had  forced  our  way  through  it 
at  Springhaansnek.  It  was  impossible  to  get  through 
at  Springhaansnek  now. 

»  Our  forethought  proved  later  on  to  have  been  of  little  avail.  For  notwith- 
standing the  bountiful  rains  which  had  fallen  at  the  end  of  November  and  the 
beginning  of  January  in  the  southern  and  western  parts  of  the  State  we  found, 
when  we  arrived  there,  that  the  grass  had  been  entirely  destroyed  by  the  locusts. 
Neither  could  we  obtain  any  fodder  ;  and  so  the  difficulty  of  providing  for  our 
horses  was  as  great  as  ever. 

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ATTEMPT  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


I  decided  to  march  towards  Thaba'  Nchu.  But  in 
order  to  deceive  the  English  I  sent  a  strong  patrol  on 
the  following  day  in  the  direction  of  Springhaansnek, 
ordering  them  to  make  no  attempt  to  conceal  their 
movements. 

I  could  advance  for  eight  miles  without  attracting 
the  enemy's  notice  ;  but  if  I  had  gone  further  I  should 
have  been  seen  from  the  forts.  I  need  scarcely  say 
that  it  was  greatly  to  my  advantage  not  to  give  the 
English  a  chance  of  seeing  me.  And  so  when  we  had 
covered  eight  miles  we  off-saddled.  If  I  had  allowed 
the  English  to  discover  what  I  was  doing  they  would 
have  brought  up  troops  from  Thaba  Nchu,  Sauna's 
Post  and  Bloemfontein  ;  and  these  troops  m  combina- 
tion with  the  force  behind  me  might  have  put  me  into 
a  very  awkward  position. 

My  old  friend,  General  Knox,  whose  duty  it  had 
been  to  prevent  me  entering  Cape  Colony  on  a  pre- 
vious occasion,  was  again  entrusted  with  the  same  task. 
Any  person  who  has  had  dealings  with  this  General 
will  acknowledge  that  he  is  apt  to  be  rather  a  trouble- 
some friend ;  for  not  only  does  he  understand  the  art  of 
marching  by  night,  but  he  is  also  rather  inclined  to  be 
overbearing  when  he  measures  his  strength  with  that 
of  his  opponents. 

And  now,  as  we  were  in  camp,  congratulating  our- 
selves that  we  were  safe  for  the  time  being,  my  scouts 
reported  that  this  same  General  Knox  was  approach- 
ing. I  at  once  ordered  the  burghers  to  up-saddle, 
and  to  inspan  the  ten  waggons  we  had  with  us  laden 
with  ammunition  and  flour. 

I  left  behind  me  a  portion  of  my  commando  under 
General  Fourie,  whose  duty  it  was  to  check  General 
Knox,  whilst  I  myself  was  going  forward  to  clear  a 
road  through  the  enemy's  forts. 

It  was  lucky  for  us  that  General  Knox  had  been 
deceived  by  the  strong  patrol  I  had  sent  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Springhaansnek,  and  that  he  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  my  commando  was  marching  to  the 

20I 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


same  place.  He  therefore  started  off  in  that  direction 
and  continued  until  he  discovered  his  mistake.  Then 
he  turned  aside  and  came  in  contact  with  General 
Fourie.  Our  men  held  him  back  for  a  few  hours,  and 
lost  two  men,  very  badly  wounded  in  the  engagement. 

Whilst  this  was  occurring  I  had  reached  the  forts 
between  Thaba'  Nchu  and  Sauna's  Post.  When  I 
was  there  a  reinforcement  of  cavalry  approached  from 
the  direction  of  Bloemfontein. 

I  immediately  opened  fire  (with  a  gun  and  a  Maxim- 
Nordenfeldt  at  a  range  of  4,000  paces)  on  the  fort, 
which  obstructed  my  road.  After  we  had  fired  a  few 
shots  the  English  abandoned  that  fort  and  fled  to  the 
nearest  fort  to  the  east.  Shortly  afterwards  this  fort 
was  also  abandoned. 

The  fort  to  the  west  was  captured  by  Commandant 
Steenekamp  and  the  Heilbron  burghers.  They  suc- 
ceeded in  taking  a  few  prisoners ;  but  most  of  the 
enemy  fled  to  Sauna's  Post.  Only  one  of  the  Heil- 
bron burghers  was  wounded — Piet  Steenekamp,  the 
son  of  the  Commandant. 

And  now  our  road  was  clear ;  and  we  passed 
through  !  General  Fourie  joined  us  two  hours  after 
sunset.  Then  we  marched  on  to  Dewetsdorp  ^  where 
we  arrived  on  January  31st. 

General  Knox,  I  heard,  proceeded  to  Bloemfon- 
tein ;  thence  he  sent  his  troops  to  the  railway  bridge 
across  the  Orange  River,  near  Bethulie.  He  was  now 
aware  that  we  were  determined  to  enter  the  Colony  at 
all  costs,  and  so  he  stationed  troops  everywhere  to  turn 
us  back.  He  placed  forces  not  only  at  Bethulie  rail- 
way bridge,  but  also  at  Springfontein,  and  Norvals- 
pont.  Thus  he  could  easily  prevent  us  crossing  at  the 
fords. 

I  had  now  to  find  some  trump  card  which  would 
spoil  the  game  he  was  playing ! 

I  ordered  General  Froneman  to  proceed  from  the 
source  of  the  Kaflir  River  in  the  direction  of  Jager^ 

»  At  this  date  the  English  had  not  re-garrisoned  the  town. 
202 


ATTEMPT  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


fontein  Road  Station,  to  the  west  of  Dewetsdorp  : 
General  Fourie  I  despatched  in  the  direction  of  Oden- 
daalsstroom,  on  the  Orange  River,  to  the  farm  of  Klein 
Kinderfontein,  to  the  west  of  Smithfield. 

I  then  sent  scouts  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Oden- 
daalsdrift.  They  told  me  that  there  was  an  English 
patrol  at  the  drift,  and  that  they  had  heard  that  the 
enemy  expected  that  we  should  try  and  cross  into  Cape 
Colony  at  that  spot. 

The  following  day  I  ordered  a  patrol  to  ride  up  and 
down  the  river ;  and  I  caused  a  report  to  be  spread  to 
the  effect  that  I  considered  it  too  dangerous  to  cross 
the  Orange  River  below  its  junction  with  the  Caledon, 
owing  to  the  river  being  already  very  full  and  quite 
unfordable  if  there  was  any  rain  at  all ;  and  that  I 
had  for  this  reason  decided  to  recall  General  Frone- 
man,  and  to  take  Odendaalsstroom  by  force,  or  else  to 
attack  the  enemy  at  the  Aliwal-north  Bridge. 

I  felt  quite  sure  that  this  rumour  would  reach  General 
Knox  that  very  day,  for  he  had  plenty  of  friends  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Caledon  and  the  Orange  River. 

General  Froneman  had  orders  to  march  in  the  di- 
rection of  Zanddrift,  which  is  about  half-way  between 
Norvals  Pont  railway  bridge  and  that  of  Hopetown. 
He  succeeded  in  capturing  a  train  close  to  Jagers- 
fontein  Road  Station,  by  the  simple  device  of  blowing 
up  the  line  both  in  front  of  it  and  behind  it.  In 
this  train  the  burghers  found  a  great  quantity  of  things 
they  greatly  needed. 

It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  there  were  scarcely 
any  factories  in  South  Africa,  and  this  was  more  es- 
pecially the  case  in  the  two  Republics.  And,  as  all 
imports  had  been  stopped  for  some  considerable 
time,  it  was  natural  that  any  booty  which  consisted  of 
such  things  as  saddles,  blankets  and  ammunition  was 
very  acceptable. 

When  the  burghers  had  helped  themselves  to  what 
they  wanted,  the  train  was  burnt. 

l^or  the  space  of  a  day  I  remained  quiet,  so  that  I 

203 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


might  be  quite  sure  that  the  EngHsh  had  received  the 
report  I  had  spread. 

I  soon  discovered  that  my  plan  had  been  quite  suc- 
cessful. The  English  marched  off  in  the  direction  I 
wished,  believing,  no  doubt,  that  the  rumours  they  had 
heard  were  true  ;  whilst  I,  on  the  evening  of  the  5th  of 
February,  1901,  took  some  of  the  burghers,  with  the 
guns  and  waggons,  to  a  spot  between  the  stations  of 
Springfontein  and  Jagersfontein,  and  the  following 
day  remained  in  hiding. 

I  left  General  Fourie  behind  me  with  a  horse-com- 
mando, with  orders  to  remain  there  for  two  days, 
and  to  carry  on  manoeuvres  in  the  direction  of  Oden- 
daalsstroom. 

I  crossed  the  railway  line  that  evening  without  any 
mishap  to  my  force,  but  to  my  great  sorrow  the  val- 
iant Lieutenant  Banie  ^  Enslin,  one  of  the  best  of  my 
scouts,  was  severely  wounded  the  same  night,  and  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  English.  He  had  ridden  in  ad- 
vance with  one  of  Theron's  Scouting  Corps,  with  the 
object  of  finding  a  favourable  spot  where  he  could 
lead  us  across  the  railway.  The  night  was  very  dark, 
and  he  had  lost  his  way.  We  crossed,  as  I  have 
already  said,  without  hindrance  ;  but  he  and  his  com- 
panions rode  into  an  outpost  of  the  enemy  a  few  miles 
to  the  north.  The  English  opened  fire  on  them,  with 
the  unhappy  result  that  the  estimable  Banie  was  so 
seriously  wounded  that  he  had  to  be  left  behind.  His 
comrades  joined  us  the  following  morning,  bringing 
the  sad  news  with  them. 

We  now  continued  our  march  at  as  rapid  a  pace  as 
was  possible  ;  but  the  road  was  so  soaked  by  rain  that 
it  was  difficult  for  the  oxen  and  the  mules  to  draw  the 
waggons  and  the  guns. 

On  the  8th  of  February  we  overtook  General  Frone- 
man  at  Lubbesdrift,  six  miles  to  the  north  of  Philip- 
polis.  We  pushed  on  that  evening  towards  Zanddrift, 
which  we  reached  on  the  loth  of  February. 

*  Barend. 
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ATTEMPT  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


Then  we  crossed  ever  into  Cape  Colony. 

When  we  had  crossed  the  river,  I  received  a  report 
from  my  scouts  that  there  were  about  twenty  of  the 
enemy  in  a  strong  schanze  on  a  kopje,  which  was  about 
half  an  hour's  march  further  up  stream.  I  gave  orders 
that  a  veldtcornet  and  twenty-five  men,  among  whom 
was  one  of  my  staff,  Willem  Pretorius,  should  go  and 
capture  the  schanze. 

The  veldtcornet  preferred  not  to  approach  beyond 
a  certain  distance,  and  consequently  Willem  Pretorius 
and  four  other  men  were  left  to  do  the  work. 

Willem  climbed  the  hill  from  one  side,  and  the 
others,  dividing  into  two,  climbed  it  from  the  other 
side  at  two  different  points.  They  were  met  by  a 
severe  fire  from  the  fort,  but  when  they  got  to  close 
quarters  up  went  the  white  flag,  and  the  English 
shouted    We  surrender  !  " 

Thus  Willem  Pretorius  and  four  burghers  captured 
twenty  prisoners  and  a  like  number  of  horses,  saddles, 
bridles,  rifles  and  bandoliers,  not  to  mention  some 
three  thousand  cartridges. 

When  the  veldtcornet  at  last  arrived  w^ith  his  twenty 
men,  he  certainly  proved  himself  very  useful  in  carry- 
ing away  the  booty  ! 

This  veldtcornet  was  shortly  afterwards  Stellen- 
bosched."*  I  then  nominated  in  his  place  Willem 
Pretorius  *  as  veldtcornet. 

We  left  the  river  that  afternoon  behind  us,  and 
marched  south  to  Mr.  Bezuidenhout's  farm.  The  fol- 
lowing day  we  waited  there  for  General  Fourie  to 

*  Stellenbosched :  this  was  the  word  the  English  applied  to  officers,  who,  on 
account  of  inefficiency,  or  for  other  reasons,  had  to  be  dismissed.  Stellenbosch 
was  a  place  where  only  very  unimportant  work  was  performed. 

'  I  must  give  a  short  account  of  Willem  Pretorius,  for  he  was  a  dear  friend 
of  mine.  He  had  only  reached  the  age  of  twenty  when  I  made  him  a  Veldt- 
cornet. His  courage  certainly  could  not  be  surpassed,  yet  he  never  let  it  go 
beyond  his  reason.  About  twenty  days  before  the  conclusion  of  Peace,  he  was 
killed  by  a  bullet  at  a  range  of  1,100  paces.  Throughout  the  whole  previous 
course  of  the  war  fortune  had  favoured  him  almost  miraculously :  six  horses 
had  been  killed  and  many  more  wounded  under  him ;  yet  he  had  never  received 
more  than  a  scratch.  But  in  the  end  he,  like  so  many  other  brave  men,  was 
destined  to  die  for  the  country  that  he  loved  so  dearly.  Poor  Willem  !  You 
and  the  other  heroes  in  our  struggle  will  live  for  ever  in  our  memories. 

205 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


join  us.  He  arrived  the  next  day — and  now  we  were 
ready  to  begin  the  game  once  more  ! 

Our  position  was  embarrassing,  for  not  only  was 
there  a  large  English  force  at  General  Fourie's  heels, 
but  also  there  were  two  strong  columns  on  the  north 
from  Colesberg,  which  were  making  for  Hamelfon- 
tein.  And  these  two  columns  were  some  twelve  miles 
from  us. 

I  at  once  set  out  in  the  direction  of  Hamelfontein, 
and  the  following  day  I  discovered  that  the  enemy's 
columns  had  divided  into  two  parties  ;  one  of  them 
had  gone  in  a  westerly  direction,  whilst  the  other  was 
marching  straight  towards  us.  Meanwhile  the  force 
which  had  pursued  General  Fourie  had  crossed  the 
river  at  Zanddrift. 

My  intention  had  been  to  divide  my  force  into 
three  divisions  directly  I  arrived  in  the  Colony.  But 
I  had  been  obliged  to  wait  till  General  Fourie  could 
join  me  ;  and  when  he  had  come,  there  was  such 
large  numbers  of  the  enemy  on  every  side  that  they 
gave  me  no  opportunity  of  carrying  out  my  original 
intention. 

I  may  mention  here  that  Lieutenant  Malan,  who 
became  afterwards  Commandant,  and  ultimately 
Vechtgeneraal,  had  penetrated  into  the  Colony  with 
fifty  or  sixty  men,  and  had  advanced  considerably 
farther  than  I  had  done. 

That  afternoon  I  ordered  the  small  waggon  to  pro- 
ceed to  a  point  between  Philipstown  and  Petrusville. 

We  had  several  slight  skirmishes  with  the  English  ; 
and  at  sunset  we  nearly  fell  into  their  hands,  but  fort- 
unately we  were  successful  in  holding  the  enemy  in 
check  until  our  small  laager  had  passed. 

During  that  night  we  marched  to  Hondeblaf  River. 
The  following  morning  we  found  that  there  was  no 
grass  for  the  horses,  for  the  locusts  had  eaten  it  all. 
The  horses,  poor  creatures,  were  very  hungry,  and  also 
much  exhausted  by  all  those  forced  marches.  When 
we  had  been  at  Winburg.  the  pasture  had  been  very 

206 


ATTEMPT  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


poor  although  it  had  rained  every  day.  This,  of 
course,  was  very  good  for  the  veldt;  but  unfortu- 
nately it  did  not  rain  grass — the  veldt  required  time 
to  produce  it. 

All  this  was  most  unlucky.  Already  some  of  my 
men  had  to  go  on  foot,  and  there  were  no  horses  to 
be  obtained  in  that  district. 

The  number  of  my  burghers  had  now  been  di- 
minished by  nearly  six  hundred  men.  Commandant 
Prinsloo  had  remained  behind  with  three  hundred 
men,  Vice-Commandant  Van  Tonder  with  one  hun- 
dred, and  lastly,  Commandant  De  Vos  at  the  Orange 
River  with  two  hundred. 

There  was  now  only  one  course  open  to  us — and 
that  was  to  cross  as  quickly  as  possible  the  railway 
line  near  Hopetown,  for  if  an  English  force  was 
brought  down  by  rail,  it  would  mean  our  utter  de- 
struction. 

We  accordingly  moved  away  at  once  from  Honde- 
blaf  River.  The  following  day  the  English  were 
again  hot  on  our  track.  I  ordered  General  Fourie 
and  General  Froneman  to  oppose  the  enemy,  for  it 
was  necessary  that  something  should  be  done  to  save 
our  rearguard  from  being  cut  off.  These  Generals  had 
several  sharp  engagements  with  the  English,  resulting 
in  the  capture  of  a  number  of  prisoners,  and  a  con- 
siderable loss  in  dead  and  wounded  to  the  English. 
After  we  had  been  on  the  march  for  a  short  time,  a 
Broodspioen  came  rushing  up  to  me.  (Had  not 
my  scouts  been  riding  in  a  different  direction  they 
would  have  given  me  notice  of  his  proximity.)  He 
told  me  that  he  and  a  friend  of  his  of  the  same  calling 
had  gone  to  a  farm  near  by  to  buy  bread,  but  when 
they  had  approached  the  house,  a  number  of  English 
soldiers  appeared  at  the  door  and  called  out  hands 

*  Broodspioen  :  literally  a  bread  spy.  This  was  the  name  applied  to  a  burgh- 
er, who,  with  or  without  an  order  from  his  officer,  rode  in  advance  of  his 
commando  to  obtain  bread  for  himself  and  his  comrades.  He  was  frequently 
a  man  who  placed  the  interests  of  his  stomach  before  the  safety  of  his  com- 
mando. 

207 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


up  !  "  His  friend  had  been  captured,  but  he  having 
been  some  fifteen  paces  from  the  house,  had  managed 
to  escape  under  a  hail  of  bullets.  He  had  had  to  gal- 
lop one  thousand  paces  before  he  could  get  out  of 
range  behind  a  ridge  that  stretched  between  us  and  the 
farm.  I  ordered  the  burghers  to  halt  behind  the  ridge, 
and  sent  a  small  body  of  men  ahead  to  determine  the 
strength  of  the  enemy.  We  could  now  see  that  the 
English  had  hidden  their  horses  behind  some  fruit- 
trees.  When  they  caught  sight  of  our  men  on  the  top 
of  the  ridge,  they  took  up  positions  behind  kraals  and 
a  dam-wall  not  far  from  the  house,  knowing  well  that 
escape  was  impossible. 

I  thought  it  best  to  send  a  note  to  this  handful  of 
men,  advising  them  to  surrender,  for  I  did  not  wish 
that  any  of  my  burghers'  lives  should  be  sacrificed  in 
an  unnecessary  attack.  Whilst  I  was  writing  the  letter 
they  punctuated  it  by  an  incessant  fire,  to  which  the 
burghers  replied  by  a  few  shots,  although  none  of  the 
enemy  were  visible.  As  soon,  however,  as  my  des- 
patch rider  appeared  with  a  white  flag,  their  firing 
ceased.  The  answer  they  returned  left  something  to 
be  desired — We  shall  not  surrender !  " 

I  immediately  ordered  fifty  of  my  men  to  attack 
them.  Hardly  had  I  given  the  order,  when  a  number 
of  young  burghers  sprung  on  their  horses  and  galloped 
at  break-neck  pace  towards  the  kraals. 

And  now  there  was  an  end  to  all  boasting,  for  with- 
out firing  a  single  shot  the  enemy  surrendered. 

We  took  twenty  prisoners  there,  and  an  equal  num- 
ber of  rifles  and  bandoliers.  The  horses  we  captured 
— again  twenty  in  number — were  in  excellent  con- 
dition, and  all  up-saddled.  We  now  had  made  ninety 
men  our  prisoners  since  we  crossed  the  Orange  River. 

The  joy  of  the  Broodspioen,  who  had  been  for  fifty 
minutes  in  the  hands  of  the  English,  was  very  great ; 
and  I  believe  he  never  returned  again  to  his  very 
doubtful  profession. 

The  following  day  we  came  to  a  farm  about  six 

208 


ATTEMPT  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


miles  to  the  east  of  Houtkraal  Station,  which  we 
christened  Moddervlei/  on  account  of  the  experience 
we  had  on  the  night  following  our  arrival. 

The  great  English  force  was  close  behind  us,  and 
when  night  fell  the  enemy  were  not  more  than  five 
miles  from  us. 

It  was  at  the  hour  of  sunset,  shortly  before  we  came 
to  the  swamp,  which  I  shall  presently  describe,  that  my 
scouts  came  across  fifteen  of  the  enemy.  When  the 
English  saw  our  men  they  turned  round  at  once.  But 
they  did  not  get  away  before  one  was  shot  from  his 
horse,  and  another  seriously  wounded,  and  several  of 
them  taken  prisoner. 

I  now  sent  two  patrols  to  blow  up  the  railway,  seven 
miles  at  each  side  of  the  point  where  I  intended  to 
cross.  I  had  no  wish  that  an  armoured  train  should 
appear  and  prevent  my  crossing. 

But,  before  we  could  reach  the  railway  line  a  swamp 
lay  in  our  way.  This  swamp  was  about  one  thousand 
paces  broad,  and  was  covered  knee  deep  with  water, 
and  in  some  places  even  deeper ;  for  heavy  rain  had 
fallen  during  the  afternoon.  The  water,  however, 
would  have  been  a  matter  of  very  little  consequence, 
had  it  not  been  that  the  bottom  of  the  swamp  was  of 
such  a  nature  that  the  horses  sank  in  it  up  to  their 
knees,  and  even  sometimes  up  to  their  girths.  But 
w^e  fourteen  hundred  riders  had  to  get  over  it  some- 
how or  other ! 

Let  the  reader  try  to  picture  to  himself  the  condi- 
tion of  the  swamp  when  the  last  burgher  had  crossed  ! 

Many  of  the  men  lost  their  balance  as  their  horses 
struggled  in  the  mud,  and  several  of  the  burghers  had 
to  dismount  and  lead  their  poor  tired-out  animals. 

The  guns  and  the  waggons  caused  us  a  great  deal  of 
trouble.  We  inspanned  thirty  oxen  to  each  gun  ;  but 
if  it  got  stuck  fast  in  the  mud,  fifty  oxen  were  some- 
times not  sufficient  to  move  it. 

At  last  we  got  the  guns  through,  and  succeeded  in 

»  A  swamp. 
209 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


getting  a  trolley,  and  the  little  waggon  which  carried 
my  documents  and  papers,  safely  to  the  other  side. 
But  the  ammunition  and  flour-waggons  were  impos- 
sible to  move  when  they  had  once  entered  the 
swamp. 

It  was  a  night  which  I  shall  never  forget ! 

We  had  now  to  determine  what  we  should  do  with 
the  waggons.  The  day  would  soon  break  and  we  could 
only  cross  the  railway  line  when  darkness  covered  our 
movements.  It  would  be  disastrous  to  us  if,  while 
we  were  still  between  the  swamp  and  the  railway, 
troops  should  be  brought  up  by  rail  from  De  Aar  and 
Hopetown. 

It  was  perfectly  clear  that  those  who  had  crossed 
the  swamp  must  go  on.  And  so  I  advanced,  at  the 
same  time  giving  General  Fourie  orders  to  remain  be- 
hind with  a  hundred  of  the  men  whose  horses  were 
less  exhausted  than  those  of  the  other  burghers,  and 
to  try  to  get  the  waggons  through.  In  the  event  of 
the  enemy  arriving  before  his  task  was  completed,  I 
told  him  to  leave  the  waggons  and  make  his  escape  to 
the  south. 

Having  given  these  orders,  I  proceeded  with  my 
commando  to  the  railway  line.  Only  the  weakest  of 
the  horses  were  with  us,  so  that  many  of  my  burghers 
had  to  go  on  foot. 

The  ninety  prisoners  we  had  taken  were  with  me. 
I  could  not  release  them,  because  I  did  not  want  them 
to  tell  the  enemy  how  exhausted  our  horses  were. 
Should  the  English  know  this  they  would  know  ex- 
actly where  our  weak  point  lay. 

I  pitied  the  poor  Tommies,"  but  what  else  could  I 
do  but  order  them  to  march  with  me  ?  I  treated  them 
as  well  as  I  could,  and  made  no  difference  between 
them  and  the  burghers.  And  after  all,  many  of  our 
own  men  had  to  go  on  foot. 

Any  delay  was  dangerous,  and  so  we  hurried  on  as 
fast  as  possible.  When  we  reached  the  railway  line, 
day  had  already  begun  to  break.     Fortunately,  we 

2  lO 


ATTEMPT  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


met  with  no  opposition  ;  the  patrols  had  followed  my 
orders  and  broken  the  line. 

When  the  sun  rose  one  could  see  what  a  terrible 
condition  the  burghers  were  in.  On  every  man  s  face 
utter  exhaustion  could  be  read.  But  how  could  it 
have  been  otherwise  }  The  men  had  had  fighting  to 
do  the  previous  day,  and  had  only  once  been  able  to 
off-saddle,  and  that  not  long  enough  to  cook  a  piece  of 
meat.  Rain  had  also  been  falling  in  torrents,  and 
most  of  the  men  were  wet  to  the  skin,  for  very  few  of 
them  had  waterproofs.  And  to  make  matters  still 
worse,  the  burghers  were  covered  with  the  mud  from 
the  swamp  that  still  clung  to  them. 

Twenty-four  hours  had  passed  without  the  men 
being  able  to  lie  down  and  rest  ;  and  sleep,  of  course, 
had  been  entirely  impossible. 

Three  miles  beyond  the  railway  line  I  gave  orders 
to  off-saddle,  although  there  was  no  grass  for  the 
horses.  Hardly  had  we  dismounted  when  I  was  told 
that  we  should  find  grass  about  one  hour's  ride  further 
on.  And  so  we  mounted  again,  fatigued  though  we 
were,  and  found  pasture  at  last  for  the  poor  animals. 
I  thought  it  better  that  the  masters  should  endure 
more  hardships  than  that  the  horses  should  go  without 
grass.  We  were  rewarded  for  our  short  ride  by  the 
knowledge  that  our  horses  had  something  to  eat,  and 
we  could  sleep  in  peace  without  having  to  think  that 
our  animals  were  starving. 

But  before  we  could  sleep  hunger  compelled  us  to 
kill  a  sheep  which  we  had  bought  from  a  farmer  living 
near.  In  that  part  of  Cape  Colony  sheep-farming  is 
almost  the  only  occupation,  and  so  well  adapted  is  this 
district  for  rearing  sheep  that  it  is  quite  an  exception 
to  see  a  lean  one.  It  may  interest  some  of  my  readers 
to  know  that  the  African  sheep  has  a  very  remarkable 
peculiarity  ;  it  possesses  a  huge  tail,  which  sometimes 
weighs  as  much  as  ten  pounds. 

We  were  unable  to  obtain  bread,  and  our  flour  had 
remained  behind  in  the  waggons.    The  sound  of  an 

211 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


explosion  had  told  us  that  General  Fourie  had  not 
been  able  to  save  them,  and  that  by  now  they  must 
have  been  burnt. 

I  heard  later  on  that  General  Fourie  had  been  at- 
tacked by  the  English  and  had  not  been  able  to  set 
fire  to  the  waggons  himself.  But  the  English,  so  my 
scouts  informed  me,  had  done  the  work  for  him,  and 
so  thoroughly  that  they  had  also  burnt  some  of  their 
own  waggons  which  had  got  into  the  swamp. 

After  we  had  helped  ourselves  to  a  good  ''African 
boutspan,"  and  had  slept  with  our  saddles  as  pillows, 
we  were  all  in  good  spirits  again,  although  we  could 
not  forget  our  experiences  in  the  swamp. 

The  burghers  whom  I  had  with  me  were  of  the 
right  stamp,  and  were  prepared  to  sacrifice  everything 
for  the  freedom  of  the  people.  If  any  one  had  asked 
them  whether  they  were  ready  to  undergo  any  further 
hardships,  they  would  have  replied  that  a  hundred 
swamps  would  not  discourage  them.  They  knew  that 
freedom  was  a  pearl  of  such  value  that  no  man 
since  the  world  began  had  been  able  to  set  a  price 
upon  it. 

When  General  Fourie  had  abandoned  the  waggons, 
he  retreated  to  the  south,  crossing  the  railway  at  De 
Aar.  He  joined  me  again  near  Petrusville  when  I 
was  returning  to  the  Free  State. 

As  the  English  had  to  march  round  the  swamp, 
leaving  their  waggons  behind,  we  were  not  pressed 
for  time,  or  obliged  to  march  very  far.  We  took 
advantage  of  this  respite  to  give  our  horses  a  little 
rest. 

I  now  proceeded  to  the  west  of  Hopetown,  in  the 
direction  of  Strijdenburg.  The  following  day  the 
English  were  again  on  our  heels  in  greater  numbers 
than  ever,  and  advancing  more  speedily  than  before. 
I  was  obliged  to  engage  their  vanguard  for  nearly  the 
whole  of  that  day. 

That  evening  we  arrived  at  a  spot  about  ten  or  twelve 
miles  to  the  north-west  of  Strijdenburg.    Here  I  left 

212 


ATTEMPT  TO  ENTER  CAPE  COLONY 


Commandant  Hasebroek  behind  with  three  hundred 
men,  till  the  following  morning,  with  orders  to  watch 
the  enemy  and  hold  them  back  if  necessary.  This 
would  give  my  burghers  who  were  on  foot,  or  whose 
horses  were  exhausted,  a  chance  of  getting  away. 

I  might  here  explain  to  the  uninitiated  our  methods 
of  checking  the  advance  of  the  enemy. 

The  burghers  who  had  the  best  horses  would  remain 
behind  any  rise  or  kopje  they  could  find  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood. When  the  enemy  approached  and  saw 
ahead  of  them  two  or  three  hundred  burghers  they 
would  halt  and  bring  their  guns  (which  were  usually 
placed  in  the  middle  of  the  column)  to  the  front. 
When  they  had  got  the  guns  in  position,  they  would 
bombard  the  ridge  behind  which  the  burghers  were 
stationed.  But  as  our  men  had  no  wish  to  remain 
under  fire,  they  would  then  quietly  withdraw  out  of 
sight.  But  the  English  would  continue  bombarding 
the  hill,  and  would  send  flanking  parties  to  the  right 
and  left.  Sometimes  it  would  take  the  English  sev- 
eral hours  before  they  could  make  sure  that  there  were 
no  Boers  behind  the  rise. 

It  was  tactics  such  as  the  above  that  gave  my 
burghers  who  were  handicapped  by  the  condition  of 
their  horses,  time  to  retreat. 

It  sometimes  happened,  in  these  rearguard  actions, 
when  the  position  was  favourable,  that  the  enemy 
were  led  into  an  ambush,  and  then  they  were  either 
captured  or  sent  racing  back  under  our  fire  to  bring 
up  their  guns  and  main  force.  Had  we  not  acted 
in  some  such  way  as  this,  all  my  men  would  have 
been  taken  prisoner  in  this  and  in  many  other 
marches. 

The  large  forces  which  the  English  on  all  occasions 
concentrated  round  me  deprived  me  of  any  chance  of 
fighting  a  great  battle  ;  and  I  could  only  act  in  the 
way  I  did. 

If  the  reader  is  eager  to  know  how  it  was  that  I 
kept  out  of  the  enemy's  hands  until  the  end  of  the 

213 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 

war,  I  can  only  answer,  although  I  may  not  be  under- 
stood, that  I  ascribed  it  to  nothing  else  than  this  : — It 
was  not  God's  will  that  I  should  fall  into  their  hands. 

Let  those  who  rejoice  at  my  miraculous  escapes 
give  all  the  praise  to  God. 


2T4 


CHAPTER  XXVI 


Darkness  Proves  my  Salvation 


OMMANDANT  HASEBROEK  held  the  en- 
emy  in  check  whilst  we  continued  our  march  to 


a  place  called  Vrouwpan.  On  the  following  day  we 
struck  the  Brak  River  at  a  point  ten  miles  south- 
east of  its  confluence  with  the  Orange  River,  to  the 
east  of  Prieska.  It  was  not  fordable,  and  we  had  to 
off-saddle. 

There  was  absolutely  no  chance  of  getting  across — 
the  best  of  swimmers  would  have  been  helpless  in 
that  swollen  torrent,  which  rushed  down  to  the  Orange 
River,  its  great  waves  roaring  like  a  tempestuous  sea. 

About  two  hours  before  sunset  Commandant  Hase- 
broek  reported  that  the  English  were  rapidly  ap- 
proaching. The  question  was,  Which  way  shall  we 
go  ?  "  It  was  impossible  to  escape  either  to  the  south 
of  the  river  or  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  for 
the  veldt  was  too  flat  to  afford  us  any  cover.  If  we 
were  not  to  be  cornered  against  an  impassable  tor- 
rent, we  must  make  our  way  down  stream  to  the  north- 
west ;  and  even  then  we  should  be  in  danger  of  being 
driven  on  to  the  Orange  River,  which  was  only  ten 
miles  distant.  By  taking  this  road  the  English  would 
not  see  us,  on  account  of  a  ridge  which  lay  between 
us  and  them. 

My  plan  was  to  get  behind  this  ridge  and  to  march 
under  its  shelter  until  darkness  came  on;  then,  pro- 
ceeding up  the  Orange  River,  to  attack  the  enemy  in 
the  rear.  They  were,  however,  only  nine  miles  from 
us,  and  should  their  advance  be  rapid,  they  would  reach 
the  friendly  ridge  before  night  came  on  ;  and  the 

215 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


danger  would  then  be  that  before  I  had  fulfilled  my 
purpose,  we  should  be  hemmed  in  between  two  swol- 
len rivers  with  the  most  fatal  consequences.  The 
risk  was  great,  but  no  other  course  was  open  to  us. 
There  was  no  time  to  seek  advice  from  any  one  ;  I 
had  but  a  moment  to  spare  in  which  to  acquaint 
President  Steyn  with  my  scheme.  He  said  at  once  : 
General,  do  as  you  think  best." 
My  mind  had  been  already  made  up ;  but  my  re- 
spect for  the  President  was  so  great,  and  we  had  al- 
ways worked  in  such  harmony,  that  I  did  not  like  to 
do  anything  without  his  knowledge  ;  besides  which, 
his  advice  was  often  of  great  value.  Joshua  of  old 
prayed  that  the  day  might  be  lengthened  :  but  here 
the  case  was  different ;  we  had  reason  to  be  thankful 
that  the  day  was  passed  and  night  had  begun  to  fall 
before  the  vanguard  of  the  enemy  had  reached  the 
ridge,  from  the  summit  of  which  they  might  have  ob- 
served us. 

That  night  was  the  darkest  I  had  ever  known.  And 
this  was  in  our  favour.  Very  quietly  we  retreated  in 
a  line  parallel  with  the  English  column  until,  on  the 
following  morning,  we  were  not  only  out  of  sight  but 
a  good  nine  or  ten  miles  behind  the  enemy,  who  were 
marching  on,  fully  expecting  to  corner  us  between  the 
two  rivers. 

The  English  army  had  been  enormously  reinforced, 
and  it  was  clear  that  now  more  than  ever  they  were 
putting  forth  all  their  powers  to  silence  President  Steyn 
and  myself  effectually. 

From  their  point  of  view  they  were  right ;  for  had 
things  turned  out  in  such  a  way  that  we  could  have 
remained  in  Cape  Colony,  then  I  am  convinced  we 
should  have  made  matters  very  awkward  for  them. 

But  what  were  we  to  do  now  ?  With  so  many 
burghers  on  foot  or  provided  only  with  worn-out 
horses,  it  was  useless  to  think  of  circumventing  the 
enemy,  and  thus  getting  once  more  to  the  south  of 
them  ;  whereas  to  go  up  stream  along  the  banks  of  the 

216 


DARKNESS  PROVES  MY  SALVATION 


Orange  River  until  we  could  discover  a  ford,  and  then 
to  return  across  it  into  the  Free  State,  would  mean  the 
upsetting  of  my  plan  of  campaign. 

I  was  obliged  to  make  the  best  of  a  bad  bargain  ; 
and  I  decided  to  find  a  way  across  the  Orange 
River  before  the  enemy  had  discovered  my  where- 
abouts. 

That  day,  the  20th  of  February,  we  set  out  along 
the  river,  looking  for  a  ford.  The  river  was  falling, 
but  as  there  was  no  feasible  crossing  we  had  no  choice 
but  to  go  on,  trusting  that  we  should  find  one  near  the 
confluence  of  the  two  rivers.  Here  agam  we  were 
disappointed  ;  the  punts  which  should  have  been  there 
had  been  destroyed  some  time  before  by  the  English, 
but  we  heard  of  a  boat  six  miles  higher  up,  so  on  we 
marched.  When  found,  it  was  only  a  small  boat, 
capable  of  holding,  at  most,  twelve  men,  but  we  got  to 
work  at  once,  and  by  the  evening  of  the  22nd  there 
were  two  hundred  dismounted  burghers  on  the  other 
bank  of  the  river.  Some  crossed  by  swimming,  in 
attempting  which  a  man  of  the  name  of  Van  de  Nerwe 
was  drowned. 

A  few  of  those  who  crossed  in  the  boat  succeeded 
in  pulling  their  horses  after  them. 

On  the  morning  of  the  23rd  I  received  a  report  that 
the  English  forces  were  close  on  our  heels.  We  did 
not  expect  them  so  soon,  but  they  had  made  a  long 
night's  march.  Without  delay  we  ofif-saddled,  and  pro- 
ceeded along  the  river,  while  the  rearguard  covered 
our  retreat.  The  force  of  the  enemy  was,  however, 
too  great,  and  the  rearguard  had,  after  a  short  engage- 
ment, to  give  way. 

Fortunately  the  veldt  was  broken,  and  we  could  (as 
we  had  done  a  few  days  previously)  march  ahead  out 
of  sight  of  the  enemy.  Towards  two  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  we  were  obliged  to  off-saddle,  but  could  only 
do  so  for  one  hour,  for  the  English  were  upon  us 
again.  Our  gun  and  Maxim-Nordenfeldt  we  had  to 
leave  behind  for  the  enemy;  the. draught  cattle  had 

217 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


become  exhausted,  and  we  had  no  dynamite  with  which 
to  blow  up  the  guns. 

But  what  did  it  matter?  England  had  already  so 
many  big  guns  that  two  more  could  not  make  much 
difference,  if  added  to  the  four  hundred  which  that 
country — one  of  the  oldest  and  strongest  of  Empires — 
had  brought  against  a  small  nation,  fighting  only  to 
defend  its  sacred  rights. 

Nevertheless,  it  cut  me  to  the  heart  to  give  up  my 
guns^  on  that  day — the  23rd  of  February — the  com- 
memoration day  of  the  independence  of  the  Orange 
Free  State.  In  happier  times  we  had  celebrated  this 
day  amongst  our  friends,  to  the  accompaniment  of 
salvoes  of  rifles.  Now  we  were  obliged  to  celebrate 
it  by  giving  up  the  only  two  guns  with  which  we 
could  still  shoot,  and  which  we  were  now  to  see 
turned  upon  ourselves. 

My  feelings  on  that  day  I  can  never  forget !  Those 
Englishmen  who  go  by  the  name  of  Pro-Boers  "  are 
the  best  fitted  to  describe  the  anguish  which  then 
overpowered  me,  for  they  stood  up  for  justice  even 
against  their  own  people.  And  this  not  because  they 
were  hostile  to  their  Government,  or  to  the  greatness 
of  England's  power,  but  only  because  they  were  not 
without  moral  sense,  because  they  could  not  stifle 
conscience  at  the  expense  of  justice,  nor  identify 
themselves  with  iniquitous  actions. 

But  the  day  will  come — of  this  I  am  convinced — 
when  not  Pro-Boers  only,  but  all  England  will  acknowl- 
edge our  rights — the  rights  which  we  shall  then  have 
earned  by  our  quiet  faithfulness  and  obedience.  I 
cannot  believe  that  any  father  will  look  without  pity 
on  a  child  who  comes  to  him  as  a  child  should — obedi- 
ent and  submissive. 

The  23rd  of  February,  1901,  the  forty-seventh  anni- 
versary of  the  Orange  Free  States,  had  been  a  disas- 
trous day  for  us  indeed,  but  it  was  to  end  in  another 
miraculous  escape,  for  in  the  darkness  of  that  evening 

*  There  were  still  two  Krupps  left,  but  we  had  no  ammunition  for  them. 

218 


DARKNESS  PROVES  MY  SALVATION 


it  again  happened  that  we  were  deHvered  from  an 
apparently  unavoidable  misfortune.  As  I  have  said 
already,  the  English  were  firing  on  my  rear-guard ;  at 
the  same  time  my  scouts  came  in  to  tell  me  that,  just 
in  front  of  us,  at  a  distance  of  not  quite  four  miles, 
there  was  another  great  army  of  the  enemy.  I  had 
intended  to  march  that  night  to  the  west  of  Hope- 
town.  But  now  if  I  went  in  that  direction  I  should 
only  run  straight  on  to  this  army.  If  we  went  to  the 
left  we  could  only  advance  2,000  paces  before  being 
visible  to  the  English  on  the  kop  close  to  Hopetown, 
from  where  they  could  make  known  our  movements 
by  heliograph.  At  our  front,  at  our  back,  on  our  left, 
the  outlook  was  hopeless;  and  to  the  right  lay  the 
cruel  river.  Stand  still  we  could  not — the  enemy 
were  upon  us — it  was  impossible  that  anything  could 
save  us  —  no,  not  impossible  —  a  rescue  was  at 
hand. 

The  sun  was  just  going  down,  and  by  the  time  we 
could  be  seen  from  Hopetown,  night  would  have  cov- 
ered us  with  its  sheltering  wings. 

We  should  then  be  able  to  execute  a  flank  move- 
ment, and  make  a  detour  round  the  enemy  who  were 
before  us.  But  now  I  knew  that  we  must  be  prepared 
to  march  nearly  the  whole  night  through,  in  order  that 
we  might  be  able,  early  on  the  following  morning,  to 
cross  the  railway  lines.  If  we  did  not  do  this,  then  we 
should  have  the  enemy  close  in  our  rear,  and  perhaps 
an  armour  train  threatening  us  in  front.  But  .  .  . 
there  were  the  burghers  on  foot  and  those  who  had 
weak  horses ;  and  I  had  not  the  heart  to  make  them 
march  on  foot  for  so  long  a  time,  yet  the  thought  of 
allowing  such  trustworthy  patriotic  burghers  to  fall  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy  was  unbearable.  I  therefore 
decided  on  letting  them  take  a  cross  road  to  the  north, 
to  the  banks  of  the  Orange  River  about  five  miles 
from  our  position.  There,  on  the  banks  of  the  river, 
were  many  bushes  amongst  which  they  could  hide 
themselves  until  the  enemy  had  passed  by.  They 

219 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


could  then  proceed  along  the  banks  of  the  river  and 
cross  it  by  means  of  the  boat.  I  cautioned  them  not 
to  march  in  one  troop,  or  in  one  trail,  but  to  spread 
out,  so  that  the  English  could  not  easily  follow  their 
tracks.  In  this  the  poor  burghers  succeeded  ;  they 
already,  on  that  memorable  and  sad  day,  had  marched 
eighteen  miles  ;  but  they  had  yet  to  cover  another 
five  miles  to  the  river  before  they  could  take  their 
night's  rest.  They  accomplished  this  feat  (on  the  sec- 
ond day)  under  the  valiant  and  true  Commandant 
Hasebroek,  whose  horse,  although  tired,  was  still  able 
to  proceed.  As  for  me,  I  marched  away  in  the  even- 
ing, and  after  we  had  rested  that  night  for  a  few  hours, 
we  arrived  at  a  place  a  short  distance  to  the  south  of 
Hopetown.  About  eight  o'clock  we  crossed  the  line, 
which  was  fortunately  at  that  point  not  as  yet  guarded 
by  forts,  and  off -saddled  about  six  miles  beyond.  We 
had  eaten  nothing  since  the  previous  day,  and  it  will 
easily  be  understood  that  we  were  so  hungry  that  we, 
as  the  Boer  proverb  says, — could  have  eaten  off  a 
nail's  head."  There  we  got  some  sheep,  and  it  was  not 
long  before  they  were  killed,  broiled,  and  eaten  ;  what 
a  meal  we  made  ! 

Towards  mid-day  we  headed  once  more  for  the 
Orange  River.  We  thought  that  by  the  time  we  ar- 
rived it  would  be  fordable,  for  we  had  seen  on  the 
previous  morning  that  it  was  falling  rapidly,  but  what 
was  our  disappointment !  there  must  have  been  rain 
higher  up  the  stream,  as  the  river  had  become  fuller, 
and  there  was  still  no  chance  of  crossing. 

The  English  were  approaching.  We  had,  however, 
to  use  our  field  glasses  to  enable  us  to  see  them,  as 
we  were  fifteen  or  sixteen  miles  in  front  of  them. 
Once  more  there  were  burghers  whose  horses  were 
tired  and  who  had  to  march  on  foot.  We  thought 
now  that  there  would  be  a  better  chance  at  Limoens- 
drift  ;  and  every  one  who  knew  this  ford  said  that  it 
was  a  shallow  one.  The  following  day  saw  us  there, 
and — the  river  was  quite  full !    We  then  tried  higher 

220 


DARKNESS  PROVES  MY  SALVATION 


up,  still  with  the  same  result — every  drift  was  unford- 
able. 

At  last  we  reached  the  Zanddrift,  where  we  had 
crossed  seventeen  days  before.  We  knew  that  this 
was  a  shallow  drift,  and  on  arriving  there  I  got  two 
young  burghers, — of  whom  the  one,  David  Heenop, 
was  an  excellent  swimmer, — to  make  a  trial.  The 
water  had  not  appeared  to  be  so  deep  as  we  found  it 
to  be,  when  the  two  burghers  plunged  into  it.  They 
could  not  remain  on  their  horses'  backs,  but  had  to 
swim  alongside  of  them  to  the  other  side  of  the  river. 
All  thought  of  their  return  was  out  of  the  question  ; 
they  had  risked  their  lives  in  crossing,  and  I  gave 
them  orders  from  my  side  of  the  river  not  to  attempt 
the  passage  back.  But  they  had  not  a  stitch  of  cloth- 
ing on  them,  for  they  had  stripped  themselves  before 
entering  the  water  !  In  this  state,  then,  they  were 
obliged  to  mount  their  horses  and  proceed,  and  this 
under  a  burning  sun,  which  scorched  them  with  its 
rays.  About  three-quarters  of  an  hour's  ride  from 
there  was  a  Boer  farm ;  their  only  course,  they 
thought,  was  to  ask  for  gowns  from  the  ladies  there, 
in  which  to  dress  themselves.  When  they  arrived 
at  a  short  distance  from  the  house  (such  was  the 
account  they  gave  on  joining  me  later  on)  they  halted 
and  shouted  to  the  house  for  clothing.  A  Boer 
vrouw  ^  named  Boshof,  sent  to  each  one  through  her 
son — not  a  gown,  but  a  pair  of  trousers  and  a  shirt 
of  her  husband's,  which  she  had  been  able  to  hide 
from  the  English,  who  had  passed  there,  and  who 
generally  took  away,  or  burnt,  all  male  attire. 

The  enemy  had,  in  the  meantime,  approached  quite 
close  to  us,  and  we  were  again  obliged  to  look  for  a 
drift  up  stream.  We  had  hopes  that  if  the  river  did 
not  all  of  a  sudden  rise,  we  should  find  one.  We 
came  so  close  to  the  English  that  we  had  to  open  fire 
on  their  advance  guard  before  we  could  proceed. 

Here  General  Judge  Hartzog  met  us  with  his  com- 

»  Farmer's  wife. 
221 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


mandos  from  the  south-west  of  Cape  Colony,  and 
with  him,  General  Fourie. 

That  night  we  marched  about  fourteen  miles. 

In  the  night,  after  crossing  the  Zeekoe  River,  we 
arrived  at  a  Boer  farm,  to  which  (we  are  told)  twenty 
English  scouts  had  paid  a  visit  shortly  after  sunset, 
and,  having  asked  for  information  concerning  us,  had 
gone  away  by  the  same  road  we  were  following. 
About  four  or  five  miles  from  there  we  had  to  cross  a 
ridge.  It  was  dark,  and  I  had  forgotten  those  twenty 
English.  I  had  sent  out  no  scouts  before  me,  but 
rode,  as  was  my  habit,  with  my  staff,  in  front  of  the 
commandos.  As  we  approached  the  summit  of  the 
mountain  I  saw  a  group  of  horses  fastened  together, 
and  some  men  lying  in  front  of  them.  The  horses  and 
men  were  not  twenty  paces  to  the  left  of  the  path, 
among  the  bushes.  I  thought  at  first  that  they  were 
some  of  my  burghers  who  had  ridden  on  in  advance, 
and  were  now  lying  there  asleep  ;  I  myself  had  rested 
for  a  while  at  the  foot  of  the  mountains,  to  give  the 
burghers,  who  were  on  foot,  a  chance  of  coming  up 
with  me.  The  thought  angered  me,  for  it  would  have 
been  against  all  orders  that  any  burghers,  without 
special  permission,  should  go  in  advance.  I  proceeded 
to  wake  them  up. 

What  do  you  mean  by  riding  ahead  like  this  ?  "  I 
called  out  to  them.  Nearly  all  with  one  accord  sprang 
up  and  asked,  "Who  are  you?"  ''Hands  up!"  I 
called  out ;  as  one  man  their  hands  went  up.  They 
explained  that  they  were  seven  of  the  twenty  scouts 
before  mentioned, — but  here  the  remainder  opened 
fire  upon  us  from  about  two  hundred  paces  to  the 
front.    I  called  out  to  the  burghers,  "  Charge  ! " 

The  burghers  did  so,  but  as  they  came  to  the  little 
hill  where  we  had  seen  the  sparks  from  the  guns  they 
found  nobody.  The  English  had  fled,  and,  as  the 
moon  had  just  gone  down,  it  was  too  dark  to  pursue 
them.  Taking  with  us  the  seven  prisoners,  we  con- 
tinued on  our  way  until  the  following  morning.  We 

222 


DARKNESS  PROVES  MY  SALVATION 


allowed  them  to  retain  their  clothes.  It  was  still  be- 
fore the    uitschuddings  "  ^  period. 

The  day  broke,  and  after  having  been  turned  back 
on  the  banks  of  the  Brak  River,  we  marched  to  the 
fifteenth  ford.  If  we  could  only  get  across  here," 
we  said.  We  knew  that  once  across  we  should  have  a 
respite  from  the  enemy,  and  could  with  thankful  hearts 
take  breath  even  if  it  were  only  for  three  or  four  days. 

When  we  came  to  the  river  I  at  once  ordered  a 
few  burghers  to  undress  and  go  in.  Alas  !  when  the 
horses  entered  the  ford,  the  water  came  over  their 
backs,  and  they  had  almost  to  swim.  Now  they 
will  have  to  swim ! "  we  cried,  but  presently  we  saw 
that  the  farther  they  went  the  shallower  it  became, 
and  that  they  walked  where  we  expected  them  to  swim, 
until  at  last  the  water  reached  only  to  the  horses'  knees. 

What  a  scramble  there  was  now  among  the  burghers 
in  order  to  cross !  Soon  the  river  was  one  mass  of 
men  from  bank  to  bank. 

I  can  hardly  describe  the  different  exclamations  of 
joy,  the  Psalms  and  the  songs  that  now  rose  up  from 
the  burghers  splashing  through  the  water.  Never 
will  we  return,"  No  more  of  the  Colony  for  me," 
"The  Free  State,"  ''On  to  the  Free  State!"  ''The 
Free  State  for  ever  !  "  Then  again,  "  Praise  the  Lord 
with  cheerful  song,"  "  Hurrah  !"  These  were  among 
the  expressions  which  met  my  ears. 

Although  this  was  only  an  old  waggon-ford,  which 
had  not  been  used  for  the  last  few  years,  my  little 
waggon  and  a  few  carts  got  across.  One  of  the  carts 
was  drawn  by  two  small  donkeys.  Somebody  told  me 
that  the  little  donkeys  had  to  swim  a  short  distance 
where  it  was  deep,  and  at  one  time  disappeared  be- 
neath the  water  ;  but  that  the  driver  was  so  full  of  joy 
— or  of  fear — that  he  went  on  whipping  the  water  ! 

A  fearful  experience  we  had  had  !  We  asked  each 
other  in  wonder,  "Is  it  possible  ?  How  could  we 
have  endured  it  ?  "    But  as  I  have  only  been  hinting 

*  Stripping. 
223 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


at  things,  the  reader  will  perhaps  say,  O  come !  it 
hasn't  been  as  bad  as  all  that ! " 

Give  me  leave  then,  dear  reader,  to  place  before  you 
the  whole  of  the  circumstances.  England's  great 
power  pitted  against  two  Republics,  which,  in  com- 
parison with  European  countries,  were  nearly  unin- 
habited !  This  mighty  Empire  employed  against  us, 
besides  their  own  English,  Scotch  and  Irish  soldiers, 
volunteers  from  the  Australian,  New  Zealand,  Canadian 
and  South  African  Colonies  ;  hired  against  us  both 
black  and  white  nations,  and,  what  is  the  w^orst  of  all, 
the  national  scouts  from  our  own  nation  sent  out 
against  us.  Think,  further,  that  all  harbours  were 
closed  to  us,  and  that  there  were  therefore  no  imports. 
Can  you  not  see  that  the  whole  course  of  events  was 
a  miracle  from  beginning  to  end  ?  A  miracle  of  God 
in  the  eyes  of  every  one  who  looks  at  it  with  an  un- 
biassed mind,  but  even  more  apparent  to  those  who 
had  personal  experience  of  it.  Yet,  however  that  may 
be,  I  had  to  declare  again  that  if  there  had  been  no  na- 
tional scouts  and  no  Kaffirs,  in  all  human  probability 
matters  would  have  taken  another  turn.  But  as 
things  have  turned  out,  all  that  can  now  be  said  is, 
that  we  have  done  our  best,  and  that  to  ask  any  one 
to  do  more  is  unreasonable.  May  it  be  the  cry  of 
every  one,  **God  willed  it  so — His  name  be  praised  !" 


S24 


CHAPTER  XXVII 


Was  Ours  a  Guerilla  War? 

SOMETHING  almost  miraculous  now  happened  ! 
Hardly  had  we  been  three  hours  across  the 
river  when  it  became  completely  unfordable  ! 

We  knew  that  we  should  have  now  a  few  days  at 
least  in  which  to  rest  ourselves,  and  we  marched 
slowly  to  the  farm  of  Lubbeshoop.  From  there  I 
sent  General  Fourie  to  operate  in  the  south-eastern 
districts,  where  he  had  been  before,  and  despatched 
Judge  Hertzog  to  the  south-western  districts. 

We  were  of  the  opinion  that  we  should  be  able  to 
do  better  work  if  we  divided  the  commandos  up  into 
small  parties.  We  could  not  risk  any  great  battles, 
and,  if  we  divided  our  forces,  the  English  would  have 
to  divide  their  forces  too. 

The  commandos  were  now  divided  as  follows  : 

1.  The  district  of  Kroonstad  :  the  men  under 
Commandants  PhiHp  De  Vos,  Jan  Cilliers  and  Maree. 

Sub-district  of  Heilbron  :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandants F.  E.  Mentz,  Lucas  Steenekamp  and  J.  Van 
de  Merwe. 

All  of  these  were  under  Vice-Commander-in-Chief 
Johannes  Hattingh. 

2.  The  district  of  Vrede  :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandants Ross  and  Manie  Botha. 

Sub-district  of  Harrismith  :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandants Jan  Meijer,  Jan  Jacobsz,^  and  (at  a  later 
period)  Brukes. 

All  of  these  were  under  Vice-Commander-in-Chief 
Wessel  Wessels. 

*  Veldtcornet  Franz  Jocobsz  was  afterwards  appointed  in  the  place  of  this 

Commandant,  who  resigned. 

225 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


3.  The  district  of  Winburg  :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandant Hasebroek. 

The  sub-district  of  Ladybrand :  the  men  under 
Commandant  Koen. 

The  sub-district  of  Ficksburg  :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandant Steyn.^ 

The  sub-district  of  Bethlehem  :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandant Michal  Prinsloo. 

All  of  these  men  were  under  Vice-Commander-in- 
Chief  C.  C.  Froneman. 

4.  The  district  of  Boshof :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandant J.  N.  Jacobsz,  P.  Erasmus  and  H.  Theu- 
nissen.^ 

Sub-district  of  Hoopstad :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandants Jacobus  Theron  (of  Winburg)  and  A.  J. 
Bester  (of  Brandfort). 

All  of  these  were  under  Vice-Commander-in-Chief 
C.  C.  J.  Badenhorst. 

5.  The  district  of  Philippolis :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandants Munnik  and  Hertzog. 

Sub-district  of  Fauresmith  :  the  men  under  Com 
mandant  Charles  Nieuwoudt. 

Sub-district  of  Jacobsdal :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandant Hendrik  Pretorius. 

Sub-district  of  Petrusburg :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandant Van  du  Berg. 

All  of  these  were  under  Vice-Commander-in-Chief 
Judge  J.  B.  M.  Hertzog,  who  also  was  in  command 
of  the  western  part  of  Bloemfontein. 

6.  The  district  of  the  southern  part  of  Bloemfon- 
tein :  the  men  under  Commandants  Ackerman  and 
Willem  Kolbe. 

Sub-district  of  Thaba  Nchu :  the  men  under 
Commandant  J.  P.  Strijl  (a  member  of  the  Volks- 
raad). 

»  When  this  Commandant  resigned,  Veldtcornet  J.  J.  Van  Niekerk  was  ap- 
pointed in  his  place. 

'  When,  at  a  later  period.  Commandant  Theunissen  was  put  in  command  of 
the  burghers  of  Fauresmith,  Commandant  Mijburg  was  appointed  in  his  place 
This  latter  Commandant  was  afterwards  killed. 

226 


WAS  OURS  A  GUERILLA  WAR? 


Sub-districts  of  Bethulie  and  Smithfield  :  the  men 
under  Commandant  Gideon  Joubert. 

Sub-district  of  Rouxville :  the  men  under  Com- 
mandant Frederik  Rheeders. 

Sub-district  of  Wepener :  the  men  under  Comman- 
dant R.  Coetzee. 

All  of  these  were  under  Vice-Commander-in-Chief 
Piet  Fourie,  and  later  on  under  George  Brand. 

Not  long  after  this  arrangement  had  been  made  the 
district  under  General  Froneman  was  divided  into  two 
divisions,  and  Commandant  Michal  Prinsloo  was  pro- 
moted to  be  Vice-Commander-in-Chief  of  Bethlehem 
and  Ficksburg  as  separate  sub-districts.  Bethlehem 
was  then  given  three  Commandants,  namely,  Com- 
mandants Olivier,  Rautenbach  and  Bruwer. 

All  this  new  arrangement  of  our  forces  made  it  im- 
possible for  great  battles  to  be  fought ;  it  offered  us 
the  opportunity  of  frequently  engaging  the  enemy  in 
skirmishes,  and  inflicting  heavier  losses  upon  them  than 
would  otherwise  have  been  the  case.  For  the  same 
reason  our  losses  grew  larger  from  month  to  month, 
but  they  did  not  increase  in  the  same  proportion  as 
those  of  the  enemy.  Again,  we  captured  more  pris- 
oners than  formerly.  It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that 
we  were  unable  to  keep  them,  for  had  we  been  in  a 
position  to  do  so,  the  world  would  have  been  aston- 
ished at  their  number.  But  unfortunately  we  were 
now  unable  to  retain  any  of  our  prisoners.  We  had 
no  St.  Helena,  Ceylon  or  Bermuda,  whither  we  could 
send  them.  Thus,  whilst  every  prisoner  which  the 
English  captured  meant  one  less  man  for  us,  the  thou- 
sands of  prisoners  we  took  from  the  English  were  no 
loss  to  them  at  all,  for  in  most  cases  it  was  only  a  few 
hours  before  they  could  fight  again.  All  that  was  re- 
quired was  that  a  rifle  should  be  ready  in  the  camp 
on  a  prisoner  s  return,  and  he  was  prepared  for  service 
once  more. 

The  fact  that  we  fought  throughout  the  Free  State 
in  small  detachments,  put  the  English  to  some  trouble, 

227 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


for  they  felt  themselves  obliged  to  discover  a  vocabu- 
lary of  names  to  apply  to  us  ! 

Thus  when  Lord  Roberts  on  the  24th  of  May,  1900, 
proclaimed  the  Orange  Free  State  (and  afterwards  the 
Transvaal)  as  annexed  by  the  British  Crown,  he  de- 
scribed those  who  continued  to  fight  as  rebels.  Then 
again  we  were  called  ''Sniping  Bands"  and  ''Brig- 
ands." But  the  list  of  epithets  was  not  exhausted  yet, 
for  it  appeared  that  we  were  "Guerillas,"  and  our 
leaders  "  Guerilla  Chiefs  !  " 

I  was  always  at  a  loss  to  understand  by  what  right 
the  English  designated  us  "  Guerillas."  They  had, 
however,  to  withdraw  the  soubrzqtcet  at  the  Peace  Ne- 
gotiations, when  they  acknowledged  that  our  leaders 
formed  a  legal  government. 

Let  me  say  a  few  words  more  about  this  term 
**  Guerillas."  We  will  suppose  that  England  has  capt- 
ured New  York,  St.  Petersburg,  Berlin,  Paris,  Am- 
sterdam, or  any  other  capital  of  a  free  and  independent 
State,  Kingdom  or  Empire,  and  that  the  Government 
of  such  State,  Kingdom  or  Empire  still  continues  to 
defend  itself.  Would  England  then  be  entitled  to 
call  their  antagonists  "Guerillas"?  Or,  we  will  sup- 
pose that  England's  capital  has  been  taken  by  another 
nation,  but  the  English  Government  still  remains  in 
existence.  Could  England  then  be  considered  to  be 
annexed  by  the  other  nation,  and  could  the  enemy 
term  the  Enghsh  "Guerillas"?  Surely  it  would  be 
impossible ! 

The  only  case  in  which  one  can  use  this  word,  is 
when  one  civilized  nation  has  so  completely  van- 
quished another,  that  not  only  is  the  capital  taken, 
but  also  the  country  from  border  to  border  is  so  com- 
pletely conquered  that  any  resistance  is  out  of  the 
question. 

But  that  nothing  like  this  had  happened  in  South 
Africa  is  clear  to  every  one  who  recalls  the  names  of 
Lindley.^  Roodewal,  Dewetsdorp,  Vlakfontein,  Tafel- 

*  Where  the  yeomanry  were  captured. 
22S 


WAS  OURS  A  GUERILLA  WAR? 

kop  ^  and  Tweefontein,  not  to  speak  of  many  other 
glorious  battle-fields  on  which  we  fought  after  the  so- 
called  annexation. 

Nor  must  we  forget  to  mention  the  defeat  that 
Lord  Methuen  received  at  the  hands  of  General  De  la 
Rey  immediately  before  the  conclusion  of  peace  ;  a 
defeat  which  put  the  crown  on  all  our  victories. 

But,  as  I  have  already  said,  it  very  soon  appeared 
that  when  England  stamped  us  as  "  Guerillas,"  they 
really  did  not  mean  to  use  the  word  at  all. 

*  (District  Vrede) — encounter  with  Brabant's  Horse. 


229 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 


Negotiations  with  the  Enemy 

IT  was  the  intention  of  President  Steyn  to  remain 
for  some  time  in  the  division  of  Vice-Commander- 
in-Chief  Judge  Hertzog.  Meanwhile,  I  went  to  the 
northern  commandos,  in  order  to  keep  in  touch  with 
Generals  Louis  Botha  and  De  la  Rey  and  our  Gov- 
ernment. When  I  was  about  twelve  miles  to  the 
south  of  Petrusburg,  I  received  a  letter  from  General 
Botha,  informing  me  that  Lord  Kitchener  desired  to 
have  a  conference  held,  at  Middelburg,  in  the  middle 
of  February,  as  the  English  Government  wanted  to 
make  a  Peace  Proposal.  General  Botha  asked  the 
President  and  myself  to  come  yet  nearer,  so  that,  in 
case  we  might  be  wanted,  we  should  be  within  reach. 

I  sent  on  his  letter  to  President  Steyn,  giving  him 
my  opinion  of  it,  and  asking  if  he  would  come.  The 
President,  who  was  always  ready  to  do  anything  for 
his  country  or  people,  did  not  lose  one  moment,  but 
came  at  once.  Meanwhile,  I  went  on  ahead  with  my 
staff,  taking  with  me  also  Captain  Louis  Wessels,  and 
five  of  his  men. 

About  the  15th  of  March  I  crossed  the  railway  line, 
ten  miles  to  the  north  of  Brandfort,  during  the  night. 
There  we  placed  some  charges  of  dynamite  under  the 
rails,  but  before  we  had  completed  our  work,  a  train 
came  up  so  quietly  that  one  might  call  it  a  "scouting 
train."  It  was  a  dark  night,  and  there  was  no  lantern 
at  the  head  of  the  engine,  so  that  we  did  not  see  it 
until  it  was  close  upon  us.  We  had,  therefore,  no 
chance  to  ignite  the  fuse.  We  retired  to  a  distance  of 
about  one  hundred  paces  from  the  line,  when  a  fierce 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  ENEMY 


fire  was  opened  upon  us  from  the  train.  We  replied 
to  this  as  the  train  went  past,  to  be  succeeded  imme- 
diately afterwards  by  a  second  one.  As  soon  as  this 
also  had  passed  us,  we  fired  the  fuses  and  blew  up  the 
railway  line  at  different  places  close  to  each  other. 

Immediately  after  this  two  trains  came  up,  stopping 
close  to  the  place  where  the  explosions  had  occurred, 
and  fired  on  us  for  about  ten  minutes  without  in- 
termission. We  paid  them  back  in  their  own  coin, 
and  then  each  train  went  its  way,  leaving  the  repairing 
of  the  line  to  the  following  day. 

From  there  we  marched  on,  without  accident,  ex- 
cept that  a  German  received  a  slight  wound,  and  one 
horse  was  killed.  We  soon  reached  Senekal  (which 
had  been  abandoned  by  the  English),  where  for  the 
first  time  I  met  Dr.  Reich  and  his  wife.  The  doctor 
received  us  very  heartily  ;  although  he  did  not  belong 
to  our  Field  Ambulance,  he  did  everything  that  he 
could  for  our  wounded,  as  he  had  done  for  those  of 
the  enemy. 

From  Senekal  I  went  on  to  pay  a  visit  to  the  Heil- 
bron  commando,  after  which  T  proceeded  to  Vrede, 
arriving  there  on  the  24th  of  February. 

It  was  at  Vrede  that  I  had  asked  Louis  Botha  to 
meet  me,  if  he  could  manage  it,  and  the  day  after 
my  arrival  this  meeting  took  place.  The  General  told 
me  that  the  negotiations  between  him  and  Lord 
Kitchener  had  resulted  in  nothing. 

Although  this  was  not  very  satisfactory,  still  it  was 
just  as  well  that  I  should  meet  the  Commandant- 
General  of  the  Transvaal.  We  had  much  to  discuss 
and,  after  a  long  talk,  we  parted  with  the  firm  deter- 
mination that,  whatever  happened,  we  would  continue 
the  war. 

On  the  27th  General  Botha  returned  to  the  Trans- 
vaal, and  I  to  the  Heilbron  commando.  After  a  few 
days  President  Steyn  came  from  the  south  of  the 
Free  State,  in  order  to  meet  the  Transvaal  Govern- 
ment at  Vrede.    After  this  meeting  had  taken  place 

231 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


he  went  off  to  a  camp  of  his  own,  for  it  was  thought 
better  that  he  should  not  remain  with  the  commandos 
any  longer.  I  gave  him  fifty  burghers,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Commandant  Davel,  to  serve  as  a  bodyguard. 

I  had  but  just  returned  from  my  meeting  with  Gen- 
eral Botha  when  a  serious  matter  arose  at  Petrusburof, 
demanding  my  immediate  presence  there.  It  was  three 
hundred  and  sixty  miles  there  and  back,  and  the  jour- 
ney promised  to  be  anything  but  a  pleasure  trip — far 
less  a  safe  excursion — for  me  ;  but  the  country's  in- 
terest requiring  it,  I  started  on  the  8th  of  April,  al- 
though much  fatigued  by  my  inroad  into  Cape 
Colony. 

My  staff  succeeded  in  capturing  an  outpost  of  six- 
teen men  on  the  railway  line  near  Vredefort,  the 
English  losing  one  killed  and  two  wounded. 

I  visited  the  commando  at  Vredefort,  arranged 
everything  at  Petrusburg,  and  started  on  my  return 
journey  on  the  17th.  I  crossed  the  railway  line  be- 
tween Smaldeel  and  Ventersburg  Road  Station,  and 
after  paying  Commandant  Hasebroek  a  short  visit, 
I  came  back  to  the  Heilbron  commando. 

^_Our^  tactics  of  dividing  our  commandos,  and  thus 
keeping  the^En^ljshJbusy  in  eyeryjiafr  of ^  the  Free 
State,  or,  where  they  were  too  numerous  for  us,  of 
refusing  to  allow  them  to'^Tve  us  battle, 'so  enj:aged 
them_that_they  no  longer  spared  the^armhouses  in  the 
north  and  nortliAvesfern  districtsT  Even  in  the  south 
and  south-west  rhany  ofTheTiouses  were  wrecked,  but 
the  work  of  destruction  was  not  carried  out  with  the 
same  completeness  as  in  the  afore-mentioned  districts. 
The  enemy,  moreover,  didjLQl_spar£^  our^^attle^  but 
either  drove  them  off  or  killed_them  for  food.  As  for 
ourwom  en-folk — any  of  them  \vho  fell  into  the  hands 
of  thejengivoverejent  off  toTHe^nceiitration  camps. 

I  have  no  space  here,  however,  to  write  about  the 
treatment  of  the  women  ;  it  is  such  a  serious  matter 
that  it  would  require  whole  chapters  to  deal  with  it 
adequately.    Abler  pens  than  mine  will  deal  with  it  in 

232 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  ENEMY 


full  detail.  I  will  only  remark  here  that  ^e_i3pex 
women  were  shamefully  treated,  and  that  if  England 
wishes  to  efface  the  impressio^rTwHcTTlTiese  cruelties 
havejeft  upon  the  hearts  of  our  people,  she  will  have  to 
act^as  every:  great  conquering  race  must  act,  if  it  is  ever 
to  be  reconciled  with  the  nations  it  has  vanquished. 

Our  winter  season  had  now  begun.  We  had  no  pro- 
visions except  meat,  bread  and  maize.  Even  these 
were  rather  scarce,  but  we  could  not  yet  say  that  we 
were  altogether  destitute.  Coffee  and  sugar — except 
when  we  had  an  opportunity  of  helping  ourselves  from 
the  enemy's  stores — were  unknown  to  us.  With  regard 
to  the  first-named  commodity,  however,  the  reader 
must  know  that  in  the  district  of  Boshof  there  grows 
a  wild  tree,  whose  roots  make  an  excellent  substitute 
for  coffee.  Broken  up  into  small  pieces  and  roasted, 
they  supplied  us  with  a  delicious  beverage.  The  only 
pity  was  that  the  tree  was  so  scarce  that  the  demand 
for  this  concoction  very  greatly  exceeded  the  supply. 
We  therefore  invented  another  drink — which  we  also 
called  coffee — and  which  was  composed  of  corn,  barley, 
maize,  dried  peaches,  sweet  potatoes,  and  miscellane- 
ous ingredients.  My  own  favourite  beverage  was 
abundant — especially  after  heavy  rain  ! 

The  question  of  clothing  was  now  beginning  to  be 
a  very  serious  one.  We  were  reduced  to  mending 
our  trousers,  and  even  our  jackets  with  leather.  For 
the  tanning  of  this  leather  the  old  and  feeble  were  em- 
ployed, who,  as  soon  as  the  enemy  approached,  fled, 
and  as  soon  as  they  had  passed,  returned  to  their  tan- 
ning. At  a  later  period  the  English  had  a  trick  of 
taking  the  hides  out  of  the  tanning  tubs  and  cutting 
them  to  pieces,  in  the  hope,  I  suppose,  that  we  should 
then  be  compelled  to  go  barefoot  and  unclothed. 

It  was  to  obviate  such  a  catastrophe  as  this  that  the 
custom  of  Uitschudden  ^  now  came  into  force.  The 
burghers,  although  against  orders,  stripped  every  pris- 
oner.   The  English  had  begun  by  taking  away,  or 

'  Stripping. 
233 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


burning,  the  clothes  which  the  burghers  had  left  in 
their  houses — that  was  bad  enough.  But  that  they 
should  cut  up  the  hides,  which  they  found  in  the  tan- 
ning tubs,  was  still  worse  ;  and — the  burghers  paid 
them  back  in  the  same  coin  by  stripping  the  troops. 

Towards  the  end  of  May  I  crossed  the  railway  line 
to  Parijs  and  Vredefort,  intending  to  go  on  from 
there  to  see  General  De  la  Rey,  and  discuss  our  af- 
fairs with  him.  I  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it 
would  be  good  policy  to  send  small  commandos  into 
Cape  Colony ;  for  small  bodies  of  men  can  move 
rapidly,  and  are  thus  able  to  get  out  of  the  way  if  they 
are  threatened  by  overpowering  numbers.  Moreover, 
such  small  detachments  would  compel  the  English  to 
divide  their  forces. 

When  I  reached  Vredefort  I  received  a  despatch 
from  President  Steyn,  summoning  me  to  him.  I  had 
thus  to  abandon  my  idea  of  visiting  General  De  la  Rey  ; 
instead  of  this,  I  wrote  him  a  letter  requesting  him  to 
come  to  the  President.    I  also  sent  for  Judge  Hertzog. 

De  la  Rey  was  the  first  to  arrive,  and,  without  wait- 
ing for  Judge  Hertzog,  we  at  once  proceeded  to  take 
into  consideration  the  following  letter  from  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  South  African  Republic. 

Government  Offices, 

In  the  Field, 
District  Ermelo, 
South  African  Republic, 
May  \oth,  1901. 
To  the  Government  Secretary,  O.F.S. 
Sir, — 

I  have  the  honour  to  report  to  you  that  to-day  the 
following  officers  met  the  Government,  namely,  the 
Commandant-General,  General  B.  Viljoen,  General  J. 
C.  Smuts  (Staats-Procureur),  the  last-named  represent- 
ing the  western  districts.  Our  situation  was  seriously 
discussed,  and,  among  others,  the  following  facts  were 
pointed  out : — 

234 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  ENEMY 


1.  That  small  parties  of  burghers  are  still  continu- 
ally  laying  down  their  arms,  and  that  the  danger  aris- 
ing from  this  is  becoming  every  day  more  threatening, 
namely,  that  we  are  exposed  to  the  risk  of  our  cam- 
paign ending  in  disgrace,  as  the  consequence  of  these 
surrenders  may  be  that  the  Government  and  the  offi- 
cers will  be  left  in  the  field  without  any  burghers,  and 
that,  therefore,  heavy  responsibility  rests  upon  the  Gov- 
ernment and  War  Officers,  as  they  represent  the  na- 
tion and  not  themselves  only. 

2.  That  our  ammunition  is  so  exhausted  that  no 
battle  of  any  importance  can  be  fought,  and  that  this 
lack  of  ammunition  will  soon  bring  us  to  the  neces- 
sity of  flying  helplessly  before  the  enemy.  And  that 
through  this  same  lack  it  has  become  impossible  for 
us  to  afford  adequate  protection  to  our  people  and 
their  cattle,  with  the  result  that  the  general  popula- 
tion is  being  reduced  to  poverty  and  despair,  and  that 
even  the  troops  will  soon  be  unable  to  be  supplied 
with  provisions. 

3.  That  through  the  above-mentioned  conditions  the 
authority  of  the  Government  is  becoming  more  and 
more  weakened,  and  that  thus  the  danger  arises  of  the 
people  losing  all  respect  and  reverence  for  lawful  au- 
thority, and  falling  into  a  condition  of  lawlessness.  And 
that  to  prolong  the  war  can  only  lead  to  hastening  the 
ruin  of  the  people,  and  making  it  clear  to  them  that  the 
only  authority  in  the  country  is  that  of  the  enemy. 

4.  That  not  only  is  our  nation  becoming  disorgan- 
ized in  the  manner  above  referred  to,  but  that  it  will 
also  most  certainly  happen  that  the  leaders  of  the 
nation,  whose  personal  influence  has  hitherto  kept  it 
together,  will  fall  into  utter  contempt,  and  lose  that 
influence  which  is  our  only  hope  for  reviving  the 
national  spirit  in  the  future. 

5.  That  the  people  are  constantly  demanding  to  be 
told  what  hope  still  exists  of  successfully  prosecuting 
the  w^ar,  and  that  they  have  the  right  to  expect  to  be 
informed  in  an  honest  and  straightforward  manner 

235 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


that  their  cause  is  hopeless,  whenever  this  has  become 
evident  to  the  Government  and  the  Leaders. 

Up  to  the  present  time  the  Government  and  the 
nation  have  been  expecting  that,  with  the  co-operation 
of  their  Deputation  and  by  the  aid  of  European  com- 
pHcations,  there  would  be  some  hope  for  the  success 
of  their  cause,  and  the  Government  feels  strongly 
that  before  taking  any  decisive  step,  an  attempt 
should  again  be  made  to  arrive  with  certainty  at  the 
results  of  the  Deputation  and  the  political  situation  in 
Europe. 

Having  taken  all  the  facts  into  consideration,  the 
Government,  acting  in  conjunction  with  the  above- 
mentioned  officers,  have  arrived  at  the  following  de- 
cision : 

Firstly,  that  a  request  should  be  addressed  this  very 
day  to  Lord  Kitchener,  asking  that  through  the  inter- 
vention of  ambassadors  sent  by  us  to  Europe,  the  con- 
dition of  our  country  may  be  allowed  to  be  placed 
before  President  Kruger,  which  ambassadors  are  to 
return  with  all  possible  speed. 

Secondly,  that  should  this  request  be  refused,  or 
lead  to  no  results,  an  armistice  should  be  asked  for, 
by  which  the  opportunity  should  be  given  us  of  finally 
deciding  in  consultation  with  your  Government,  and 
the  people  of  the  two  States,  what  we  must  do. 

This  second  proposal  is,  however,  subject  to  any 
solution  which  your  Government,  taking  into  consid- 
eration the  above-mentioned  grievances,  may  be  able 
to  suggest. 

The  Government  feels  very  keenly  that  it  would  no 
longer  be  right  to  allow  things  to  go  on  as  they  have 
been  going  on,  and  that  the  time  has  arrived  for  tak- 
ing some  definite  steps ;  it  will,  therefore,  be  glad  to 
receive  an  answer  from  your  Government  as  soon  as 
possible.  I  have  the  honour  to  be, 

Yours,  etc., 

F.  W.  Reitz, 
Secretary  of  State, 

236 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  ENEMY 


The  answer  which  the  President  sent  to  this  letter 
was  formerly  in  my  possession,  but  has  been  lost  with 
many  of  my  documents.  I  am  able,  however,  to  give 
an  extract,  which  I  received  from  the  Rev.  J.  D.  Kes- 
trell.    It  was  to  the  following  effect : — 

The  President  was  much  disappointed  with  the  let- 
ter of  the  Transvaal  Government ;  he  said  that  al- 
though there  had  been  in  the  past  some  surrenders  in 
the  Free  State,  this  difficulty  had  now  been  overcome. 
Moreover,  although  the  ammunition  had  for  a  long 
time  been  scarce,  nevertheless,  after  every  fight,  there 
had  been  enough  to  begin  the  next  with.  To  the 
question.  What  probability  was  there  of  their  being 
able  to  continue  the  struggle  ?  he  would  reply  by  ask- 
ing another  question — What  hope  had  the  two  little 
Republics,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  of  winning 
the  fight  against  the  might  of  England  ?  If  they  had 
trusted  in  God  at  the  beginning,  why  did  they  not 
continue  to  trust  in  Him  ? 

He  also  pointed  out  that  if  the  Boer  cause  was 
really  quite  hopeless,  the  Deputation  would  have  been 
sure  to  send  word  to  that  effect.  Further,  he  as- 
sured the  Transvaal  Government  that  if  an  armistice 
were  to  be  obtained,  and  if  during  it  the  people  of  the 
Free  State  were  to  be  asked  for  their  opinion,  the 
decision  of  the  burghers  who  were  still  in  the  field 
would  be  to  continue  the  war. 

He  could  not  approve  of  the  decision  of  the  Trans- 
vaal Government  to  ask  Lord  Kitchener  to  allow  am- 
bassadors to  be  sent  to  Europe,  for,  by  so  doing,  the 
Government  would  be  showing  its  hand  to  the  enemy  ; 
he  added  that  he  was  very  sorry  that  such  a  decision 
had  been  taken  without  first  consulting  the  Free  State. 

As  to  the  fear  expressed  by  the  Transvaal  Govern- 
ment, that  the  Authorities  and  the  Officers  in  the 
field  would  be  left  without  burghers,  the  President 
said,  that  even  if  the  Government  and  the  Officers  of 
the  Free  State  were  to  surrender,  the  nation  would 
not  do  so.    It  would  be  a  great  misfortune,  he  added, 

237 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


if  the  Orange  Free  State,  which  had  not  only  lost  its 
property  and  the  lives  of  many  of  its  burghers  but  also 
even  its  very  independence,  in  the  defence  of  the 
sister  Republic,  should  now  be  abandoned  by  that 
Republic;  that  then  all  confidence  in  one  another  and 
all  co-operation  between  Afrikanders  would  come  to 
an  end  for  ever  :  and  that,  under  such  circumstances, 
it  would  be  too  much  to  expect  that  the  African 
nation  should  ever  be  able  to  rise  again.  If  then  the 
Boers  wished  to  remain  a  nation,  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  continue  the  war. 

After  having  quoted  various  appropriate  passages 
from  the  newspapers,  the  President  went  on  as  fol- 
lows : — 

"All  these  considerations  combine  to  make  me  be- 
lieve that  we  should  be  committing  a  National  murder 
if  we  were  to  give  in  now.  Brethren  !  Hold  out  a 
little  longer.  Let  not  our  sufferings  and  our  struggles 
be  in  vain  ;  let  not  our  faith  in  the  God  of  our  fathers 
become  a  byword.  Do  all  that  you  can  to  encourage 
one  another." 

The  President  concluded  this  very  remarkable  and 
powerful  letter  with  the  question  : — 

"  Are  we  again  to  leave  the  Colonial  burghers  in 
the  lurch  ?    God  forbid." 

We  decided  to  set  out  for  the  Transvaal  in  order  to 
discuss  the  matter  with  the  Government ;  and  on  the 
evening  of  the  5th  of  June  we  marched  four  or  five 
miles  from  Liebenbergsvlei,  to  a  place  opposite  Ver- 
kijkersdorp.  We  were,  all  told,  between  sixty  and 
seventy  men,  including  the  staff  and  part  of  the  body- 
guard of  President  Steyn,  the  staff  of  General  De  la 
Rey,  and  eight  of  my  staff  officers. 

The  following  morning,  an  hour  and  a  half  after 
sunrise,  a  burgher  came  galloping  up  to  tell  us  that 
the  enemy  had  just  captured  a  laager  of  women.^ 

'  The  previous  evening  we  had  received  a  report  of  two  English  camps  on 
the  Wilge  River :  One  at  Duminy  Drift,  the  other  at  Steildrift — unde  General 
Elliott.    Th&y  were  led  by  Piet  de  Wet  and  other  National  Scouts. 

238 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  ENEMY 


It  seemed  impossible  to  ride  over  to  the  rescue  of 
these  women,  for  our  horses  had  still  to  make  the  long 
journey  into  the  Transvaal.  I  asked  our  guest,  Gene- 
ral De  la  Rey,  what  he  thought  about  the  matter.  He 
at  once  replied  that  we  must  go  and  liberate  the 
women.  As  we  were  already  up-saddled  in  readiness 
for  our  march,  I  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  give  the 
order  to  start.  The  President,  with  his  staff  and  some 
of  the  bodyguard,  remained  behind;  while  General  De 
la  Rey,  Commandant  Davel  and  I,  with  fifty-five  men, 
hurried  off.  The  retired  General,  Piet  Fourie,  was 
also  with  us. 

The  enemy  had  marched  with  the  laager  on  to  a  hill 
near  the  Kaffir  kraal,  consisting  of  four  or  five  huts  and 
a  building  made  of  sods. 

We  first  caught  sight  of  the  English  when  we  were 
at  a  distance  of  four  miles  from  them  ;  they  were  then 
busy  drawing  up  the  waggons  of  the  women  in  rows  of 
ten  or  twelve.  The  oxen  belonging  to  the  first  row 
stood  close  against  the  kraal,  as  we  saw  later  on  ;  those 
of  the  second  row  being  behind  them,  and  so  on. 

The  women  told  us  afterwards  that  they  had  asked 
to  be  allowed  to  retire  to  a  place  where  they  would  not 
run  the  risk  of  being  shot  by  us  (for  the  English  had 
taken  cover  barely  one  hundred  paces  behind  the  wag- 
gons and  were  preparing  to  fight  us  from  there),  but 
that  they  were  ordered  to  remain  behind  the  soldiers. 
They  were  thus  exposed  to  the  danger  of  being  hit  by 
us,  if  we  shot  a  little  too  high.  It  was,  they  said,  the 
most  terrible  day  they  had  ever  spent. 

When  we  came  within  range  of  the  English,  they 
opened  a  hot  fire  upon  us.  We  had  to  gallop  over 
ground  as  smooth  as  a  table  with  no  cover  until  we 
were  close  up  to  them,  and  protected  by  a  small  hill. 
We  left  our  horses  here,  and  ran  as  fast  as  we  could 
up  the  incline.  At  the  top  we  were  within  forty  paces 
of  the  place  where  the  English  were  lying  in  wait 
for  us.  As  soon  as  our  heads  appeared  over  the  brow 
of  the  hill  they  fired  on  us ;  but  there  was  only  one  round 

239 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


fired,  for  our  reply  was  so  sharp  and  severe  that  many  of 
them  were  at  once  mowed  down.  The  rest  jumped  up 
and  retreated  behind  the  last  row  of  waggons,  several 
of  them,  however,  being  killed  during  their  flight. 

Our  men  dashed  through  between  the  waggons,  but 
the  English  were  the  first  to  reach  the  kraal.  They 
had  made  loopholes  in  its  walls,  through  which  they 
now  fired  on  us.  The  only  shelter  we  had  was  a  Kaffir 
hut,  which  as  is  well  known,  always  has  a  round  wall. 
There  was  no  chance  for  us  to  make  loopholes — the 
wall  was  too  solid — so  that  if  a  burgher  wanted  to  shoot 
he  had  to  expose  his  whole  body,  while  the  English 
lay  ready  behind  their  loopholes  to  fire  on  us.  So  it 
happened  that  eleven  burghers  were  killed  and  seven 
wounded.  Among  the  dead  was  Captain  Thijnsma, 
and  among  the  wounded.  Lieutenant  H.  Howell. 

In  the  meantime  we  had  got  the  waggons  away,  ex- 
cept the  row  which  was  nearest  to  the  kraal,  and  which 
were  too  close  to  the  enemy  for  us  to  be  able  to  ap- 
proach them  safely. 

No  sooner  had  the  English  taken  refuge  in  the  kraal 
than  the  women  fled  with  the  waggons  ;  and  it  is  aston- 
ishing to  relate  that  only  one  little  boy  of  thirteen  years 
was  killed,  and  a  woman  and  a  girl  slightly  wounded. 
One  of  the  burghers  whom  the  English  had  taken 
prisoner  was  also  killed. 

I  have  no  exact  figure  as  to  the  losses  of  the  Eng- 
lish, but  judging  from  the  number  of  dead  and  wounded 
lying  on  the  battlefield,  I  should  say  that  their  casual- 
ties must  have  been  about  eighty. 

The  fight  lasted  from  eleven  till  three  o'clock,  and 
then  a  reinforcement  of  cavalry,  from  eight  hundred 
to  one  thousand  men  strong,  appeared  with  some  guns. 
The  force  with  which  we  had  been  engaged,  number- 
ing about  two  hundred  men,  belonged  to  the  column 
which  was  now  coming  up.  As  we  could  not  drive 
the  English  from  the  kraal  before  the  arrival  of  the 
reinforcements,  we  had  to  give  way. 

Although  I  had  given  orders  that  all  the  waggons 

240 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  ENEMY 


which  had  managed  to  escape  should  be  sent  on  to 
Reitz,  in  the  actual  event  only  a  few  carts  went  there. 
The  women  had  left  the  waggons  behind,  close  to  the 
hill  at  the  foot  of  the  English  position,  where  I  could 
not  see  them,  in  order  to  await  the  result.  They  had 
forgotten  what  I  had  told  them,  namely,  that  they  were 
to  get  away  as  quickly  as  possible.  This  order  I  had 
given  in  the  expectation  that  a  reinforcement  might 
arrive  at  any  moment. 

After  I  had  ordered  a  few  men  to  bring  the  wounded 
:*nto  a  safe  place,  I  retired  with  the  remainder,  some 
forty-five  in  number.  Among  these  was  Veldtcornet 
Serfontein  and  his  burghers. 

The  English  now  directed  their  fire  upon  the  wom- 
en's laager,  to  compel  it  to  come  to  a  standstill. 
Whether  any  of  the  women  and  children  were  killed 
or  wounded  I  was  unable  to  ascertain,  but  it  was  hor- 
rible to  see  the  bombs  bursting  over  their  heads.  Thus 
the  women  again  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

With  four  of  my  adjutants  and  Piet  Fourie,  I  suc- 
ceeded in  driving  away  quite  one  thousand  five  hun- 
dred head  of  cattle.  The  bombs  fell  heavily  on  them 
also,  but  I  got  them  safely  away.  Late  that  evening 
we  arrived  at  the  spot  where  we  had  left  President 
Steyn,  only  to  find  that  he  had  gone  away.  He  had 
been  obliged  to  retreat  before  the  force  which  the  pre- 
vious evening  had  been  at  Duminy  Drift,  and  which 
had  passed  near  him  during  the  day.  The  President 
had  accordingly  gone  some  twelve  miles  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Lindley. 

It  was  one  of  the  coldest  nights  we  had  that  winter, 
and  our  pack-horses  which  were  carrying  the  blankets 
were  with  the  President.  It  was  impossible  for  us  to 
sleep  without  any  covering  on  such  a  night  as  that,  and 
so  we  were  obliged  to  march  on.  We  had  moreover 
to  look  for  something  to  eat,  for  we  had  had  nothing 
since  breakfast.  Our  horses  had  never  had  their  sad- 
dles off  from  the  time  we  went  out  to  fight  until  we 
arrived  about  midnight  at  the  President's  camp. 

241 


CHAPTER  XXIX 


President  Steyn's  Narrow  Escape 


HE  following  morning  we  had  to  continue  our 


JL  journey  to  the  Transvaal.  It  being  necessary 
to  keep  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy,  we  marched  first  a 
short  distance  to  the  south,  and  then  went  south-east. 
After  a  few  days  we  reached  Vrede.  There  Com- 
mandant Manie  Botha  spared  us  a  few  burghers  who 
knew^  this  part  of  the  country  well  to  serve  as  guides 
across  the  railway  line.  We  headed  to  the  north  of 
Volksrust,  and  on  the  second  evening  after  we  had 
left  V rede,  we  struck  the  railway  line  at  a  spot  which 
was  guarded  by  an  outpost.  They  opened  fire  on  us 
at  once.  General  De  la  Rey  and  I  then  came  to  the 
decision  that  after  the  burghers  had  exchanged  a  few 
shots,  we  would  quietly  retreat  a  short  distance,  and 
then,  with  a  sweep,  try  and  cross  the  line  at  another 
spot.  This  ruse  was  successful  and  we  crossed  unob- 
served. But  the  first  of  our  men  had  hardly  got  sev- 
enty paces  from  the  railway  line,  when  a  fearful  ex- 
plosion of  dynamite  took  place,  not  thirty  paces  from 
the  spot  where  we  had  crossed.  Whether  this  was 
managed  by  electricity  or  whether  the  hindmost  horses 
had  struck  on  the  connecting  wire  of  some  trap  set 
by  the  enemy,  I  cannot  say  ;  at  all  events,  we  escaped 
with  only  a  fright. 

On  the  fourth  day  after  this  we  met  the  Transvaal 
Government  and  held  a  conference  at  once,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  letter  mentioned  in  my  last  chap- 
ter. It  grieved  us  much  that  things  should  have 
taken  this  turn,  for  it  nearly  always  happened  that 
somehow  matters  of  this  sort  came  to  the  ears  of  the 
English. 


PRESIDENT  STEYN'S  NARROW  ESCAPE 

But  the  Transvaal  Government  had  again  taken 
courage,  as  they  had  received  an  answer  to  the  cable 
which  they  had  sent  to  the  Deputation,  which  answer 
instructed  them  to  hold  out ;  and  also  because  two 
successful  battles  had  taken  place  shortly  before — one 
fought  by  General  Kemp,  and  the  other  by  Comman- 
dant Mullen  We  remained  there  for  two  days,  and 
after  it  had  been  settled  by  the  two  Governments 
that  the  war  should  be  continued  with  all  our  might, 
and  also  that  days  of  thanksgiving  and  humiliation 
should  be  appointed,  we  went  away  accompanied  by 
the  genial  and  friendly  Commandant  Alberts,  of 
Standerton,  who  brought  us  across  the  Natal-Trans- 
vaal railway.  Captain  Alberts  was  renowned  as  a 
valiant  soldier ;  we  now  also  found  him  to  be  a  most 
sociable  man.  He  beguiled  the  time  with  agreeable 
narratives  of  events  in  which  he  had  taken  part,  and 
almost  before  we  realized  it  we  had  reached  the  rail- 
way line.  We  crossed  in  safety  and  took  a  hearty 
farewell  of  our  friendly  Commandant  and  his  burghers. 

On  our  march  to  Zilverbank — a  farm  on  the  Water- 
val  River — I  did  not  require  any  guide,  for  I  knew 
the  surroundings,  having  lived  there  for  two  years. 
After  breakfast  on  the  following  morning  we  went  on 
to  within  four  or  five  miles  south  of  Hexrivier  farm, 
about  three  miles  to  the  north  of  the  Vaal  River. 
There  we  off-saddled  ;  and  shortly  after  General  De 
la  Rey  took  leave  of  us.  He  wanted  to  cross  the 
railway  at  a  place  between  Vereeniging  and  Meyerton 
Station.  This  would  lead  him  by  a  shorter  road  to 
his  commandos  than  if  he  went  through  the  Free 
State.  Our  farewell  was  affectionate — all  the  more 
so  because  we  did  not  know  whether  we  should  see 
each  other  again  on  this  earth.  Then  we  continued 
on  our  way  with  light  hearts ;  having  been  inspirited, 
not  only  by  the  pleasant  company  of  the  last  few  days, 
but  also  by  the  decision  taken  by  the  two  Govern 
ments,  that,  come  what  might,  our  independence 
should  not  be  sacrificed  by  us. 

243 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


I  crossed  the  Vaal  River  at  Villiersdorp  and  re- 
mained there  that  evening  and  through  the  following 
day.  Then  President  Steyn  and  I  parted.  He  went 
to  Bezuidenhoutsdrift,  and  I,  by  way  of  Frankfort,  to 
the  Heilbron  commando.  I  remained  at  Frankfort 
for  one  night,  with  Commandant  Ross  and  his  men, 
and  had  a  very  enjoyable  time. 

With  the  Heilbron  people  I  stayed  a  few  days  only, 
because  I  had  important  work  to  accomplish  in  the 
Winburg  district ;  to  this  district  therefore  I  went. 

As  the  commandos  were  now  so  scattered  there  was 
enough  work  for  each  of  us  in  his  own  district,  and 
I  had  much  more  riding  to  do  than  formerly.  I  found 
Commandant  Hasebroek  and  his  men  at  Doornberg  a 
few  days  later.  Whilst  there  I  received  from  Presi- 
dent Steyn  a  report  of  his  narrow  escape  at  Reitz,  on 
the  I  ith  of  July,  1901,  when  he  and  some  of  his  body- 
guard escaped,  whilst,  unfortunately.  Commandant 
Davel  and  all  the  members  of  the  Government,  ex- 
cept Mr.  W.  C.  J.  Brebner,  who  was  absent,  were 
taken  prisoners. 

From  Winburg  I  paid  a  visit  to  Vice-Commandant- 
in-Chief  J.  Hattingh,  of  the  Kroonstad  commando, 
and  then  went  to  President  Steyn.  My  joy  in  finding 
that  the  President  was  safe,  was  only  equalled  by 
my  grief  at  the  loss  of  such  old  friends  as  General 
Cronje,  Member  of  the  Executive  Council ;  General 
J.  B.  Wessels ;  T.  Brain,  Secretary  to  the  Govern- 
ment ;  Commandant  Davel ;  Rocco  De  Villiers,  Sec- 
retary to  the  Executive  Council ;  Gordon  Eraser, 
Private  Secretary  to  the  President ;  Mac  Hardy,  As- 
sistant Secretary ;  Pieter  Steyn,  brother  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  Veldtcornet  of  the  staff;  and  my  other 
friends  in  the  bodyguard.  It  was  sad  to  think  that 
such  men  were  prisoners,  and  were  lost  to  us  so  long 
as  the  war  continued.  We  had  become  rather  accus- 
tomed to  such  experiences,  but  what  made  this  so  hard 
to  bear  was  that  treachery  had  a  hand  in  it — when  the 
English  took  the  Government  and  President  Steyn's 

244 


PRESIDENT  STEYN'S  NARROW  ESCAPE 


bodyguard  prisoners,  they  had  had  a  Free  State  burghei 
as  their  guide. 

The  vacant  posts  in  the  Government  had  now  to  be 
filled  up,  and  the  President  appointed  the  following 
persons  : — In  the  place  of  A.  P.  Cronje,  General  C. 
H.  Olivier,  as  Member  of  the  Executive  Council  ; 
and  in  place  of  Mr.  T.  Brain,  Mr.  W.  C.  J.  Brebner, 
as  Government  Secretary.  Mr.  Johannes  Theron  he 
appointed  Secretary  to  the  Executive  Council,  instead 
of  Mr.  Rocco  De  Villiers  ;  and  Mr.  B.  J.  Du  Plessis 
Private  Secretary  to  himself  in  place  of  Mr.  Gordon 
Eraser. 

The  President  also  decided  to  have,  in  future,  only 
thirty  burghers  as  his  bodyguard,  and  appointed  Cap- 
tain Niekerk  as  their  Commandant. 


245 


CHAPTER  XXX 


The  Last  Proclamation 

1NOW  impressed  upon  my  officers  as  forcibiy  as  I 
could  the  importance  of  intercepting  the  commu- 
nications of  the  enemy  by  blowing  up  their  trains.  A 
mechanical  device  had  been  thought  of,  by  which  this 
could  be  done.  The  barrel  and  lock  of  a  gun,  in  con- 
nexion with  a  dynamite  cartridge,  were  placed  under 
a  sleeper,  so  that  when  a  passing  engine  pressed  the 
rail  on  to  this  machine,  it  exploded,  and  the  train  was 
blown  up.  It  was  terrible  to  take  human  lives  in 
such  a  manner ;  still,  however  fearful,  it  was  not  con- 
trary to  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare,  and  we  were  en- 
tirely within  our  rights  in  obstructing  the  enemy's  lines 
of  communication  in  this  manner. 

Owing  to  this,  the  English  were  obliged  to  place 
many  more  thousands  of  soldiers  along  the  railway 
line,  in  order  to  keep  the  track  clear.  Even  then, 
the  trains,  for  a  considerable  time,  could  not  run  by 
night.  The  English  soon  discovered  how  we  arranged 
these  explosions,  and  the  guards  carefully  inspected 
the  lines  each  day  to  find  out  if  one  of  these  ma- 
chines had  been  placed  beneath  the  rails.  We  knew 
that  one  had  been  found  and  removed,  whenever  we 
saw  a  train  pass  over  the  spot  without  being  blown 
up.  This,  however,  only  made  us  more  careful.  We 
went  to  the  spot  which  we  had  fixed  upon  for  the 
explosion,  hollowed  out  the  gravel,  placed  the  ma- 
chine under  the  sleeper,  and  covered  it  up  again,  throw- 
ing the  gravel  that  was  left  to  a  good  distance  from 
the  line.  After  this,  the  guards  could  not  discover 
where  the  machine  was  placed.  They  trebled  the 
troops  on  the  line  in  consequence. 

246 


THE  LAST  PROCLAMATION 


The  month  of  July  had  passed,  and  we  wondered 
what  August  held  in  store  for  us.  The  customary 
fights  of  the  different  commandos  still  went  on  ;  here 
five,  here  ten,  here  thirty  of  the  English  were  killed, 
wounded  or  made  prisoners.  If  these  numbers  had 
been  put  down  they  would  have  mounted  up  to  a 
considerable  total ;  but  the  war  was  not  of  such  a 
nature  that  an  office  could  be  opened  to  record  them. 
Reports  of  battles  were  sent  to  me,  and  after  I  had 
allowed  them  to  accumulate  for  three  or  four  weeks, 
they  were  sent  to  the  different  Vice-Commandants-in« 
Chief  for  their  general  information,  and  then  torn  up. 

Many  reports  and  much  correspondence  concerning 
the  beginning  of  the  war  have  been  preserved.  I  gave 
them  to  a  trustworthy  friend  with  instructions  to  bury 
them,  but  do  not  know  where  he  placed  them,  as  he 
was  taken  prisoner  later  on,  and  I  have  never  been  able 
to  find  out  where  he  was  sent  to.  These  documents 
are  of  great  value,  and  ought  to  be  published. 

I  was  on  the  farm  of  Blijdschap,  between  Harri- 
smith  and  Bethlehem — my  English  friends,  Generals 
Knox,  Elliott  and  Paget,  with  their  Colonels  Riming- 
ton,  Byng,  Baker,  etc.,  etc.,  will  not  have  forgotten 
where  Blijdschap  is — when  I  received  a  letter  from 
Lord  Kitchener,  enclosing  his  Proclamation  of  the  7th 
of  August,  1 90 1. 

This  proclamation  was  as  follows : 

By  his  Excellency  Baron  Kitchener  of  Khartoum, 
G.C.B.,  K.C.M.G.,  General  Commander-in-Chief  of 
His  Majesty's  forces  in  South  Africa  ;  High  Com- 
missioner of  South  Africa,  and  Administrator  of  the 
Transvaal,  etc. 

Whereas  the  former  Orange  Free  State  and  South 
African  Republic  are  annexed  to  His  Majesty's  posses- 
sions ; 

**  And  whereas  His  Majesty's  forces  have  now  been 
for  some  considerable  time  in  full  possession  of  the 
Government  seats  of  both  the  above-mentioned  terri- 

247 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


tories,  with  all  their  public  offices  and  means  of  ad- 
ministration, as  well  as  of  the  principal  towns  and  the 
whole  railway  ; 

"  And  whereas  the  great  majority  of  burghers  of 
the  two  late  Republics  (which  number  thirty-five 
thousand  over  and  above  those  who  have  been  killed 
in  the  war)  are  now  prisoners  of  war,  or  have  sub- 
jected themselves  to  His  Majesty's  Government,  and 
are  now  living  in  safety,  in  villages  or  camps  under 
the  protection  of  His  Majesty's  forces  ; 

And  whereas  the  burghers  of  the  late  Republics, 
now  under  arms  against  His  Majesty's  forces,  are  not 
only  few  in  number,  but  have  also  lost  nearly  all  their 
guns,  and  war  requisites,  and  are  without  proper  mili- 
tary organization,  and  are  therefore  not  in  a  position 
to  carry  on  a  regular  war,  or  to  make  any  organized 
resistance  against  His  Majesty's  forces  in  any  part  of 
the  country  ; 

And  whereas  the  burghers  who  are  now  still  under 
arms,  although  not  in  a  position  to  carry  on  a  regular 
war,  continue  to  make  attacks  on  small  posts  and 
divisions  of  His  Majesty's  forces,  to  plunder  and  to 
destroy  farms,  and  to  cut  the  railway  and  telegraph 
lines,  both  in  the  Orange  River  Colony  and  in  the 
Transvaal  and  other  parts  of  His  Majesty's  South 
African  possessions  ; 

And  whereas  the  country  is  thus  kept  in  a  state 
of  unrest,  and  the  carrying  on  of  agriculture  and  in- 
dustries is  hindered  ; 

*'And  whereas  His  Majesty's  Government  has  de- 
cided to  make  an  end  of  a  situation  which  involves 
unnecessary  bloodshed  and  devastation,  and  which  is 
ruining  the  great  majority  of  the  inhabitants,  who  are 
willing  to  live  in  peace,  and  are  desirous  of  earning  a 
livelihood  for  themselves  and  their  families  ; 

"  And  whereas  it  is  only  just  that  steps  should  be 
taken  against  those  who  still  resist,  and  principally 
against  those  persons  who  are  in  authority,  and  who  are 
responsible  for  the  continuance  ol  the  present  state  of 

248 


THE  LAST  PROCLAMATION 


disorganization  in  the  country,  and  who  instigate  their 
fellow  citizens  to  persist  in  their  hopeless  resistance 
against  His  Majesty's  Government  ; 

I,  Horatio  Herbert  Baron  Kitchener,  of  Khartoum, 
G.C.B.,  K.C.M.G.,  General  Commander-in-Chief  of 
His  Majesty's  forces  in  South  Africa  ;  High  Commis- 
sioner in  South  Africa,  on  behalf  of  His  Majesty's 
Government,  proclaim  and  make  known  as  follows  : 

All  Commandants,  Veldtcornets  and  leaders  of 
armed  bands — being  burghers  of  the  late  Republics — - 
still  resisting  His  Majesty's  forces  in  the  Orange 
River  Colony  and  the  Transvaal,  or  in  any  part  of 
His  Majesty's  South  African  possessions,  and  all  mem- 
bers of  the  Government  of  the  late  Orange  Free  State 
and  of  the  late  South  African  Republic,  shall,  unless 
they  surrender  before  the  1 5th  September  of  this  year, 
be  banished  for  ever  from  South  Africa  ;  and  the 
cost  of  maintaining  the  families  of  such  burghers  shall 
be  recoverable  from,  and  become  a  charge  on,  their 
properties,  whether  landed  or  movable,  in  both  Col- 
onies. 

GOD  SAVE  THE  KING. 

Given  under  my  hand  at  Pretoria,  the  seventh  day 
of  August,  1 90 1. 

Kitchener,  General, 
High  Commissioner  of  South  Africa. 

I  answered  Lord  Kitchener  very  carefully  in  the 
following  words : — 

*'  Excellency, — 

I  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  Excellency's 
missive  in  which  was  enclosed  your  Proclamation, 
dated  the  7th  August,  1901.  I  and  my  officers  assure 
your  Excellency  that  we  fight  with  one  aim  only — 
our  independence,  which  we  never  can  or  will  sacri- 
fice!" 

249 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


It  would  have  been  childish  to  fear  that  letter  and 
that  Proclamation.  From  the  short  answer  which  I 
sent  to  Lord  Kitchener,  the  reader  will  clearly  see  the 
opinion  that  I  and  my  officers  held  concerning  it : 
Bangmaak  is  nog  niet  doodmaak,"  ^  as  our  proverb 
says. 

It  was  curious  to  see  how  this  Proclamation  was 
taken  by  the  burghers.  It  had  no  effect  whatsoever. 
I  heard  many  burghers  say  that  it  would  now  be  seen 
whether  the  officers  had  the  cause  of  their  country 
really  at  heart  or  not,  and  whether  they  were  them- 
selves to  surrender  and  lay  down  their  arms  before  the 
15th  of  September.  I  must  here  declare  that  I  know 
of  no  single  case  where  an  officer  in  consequence  of 
this  proclamation  surrendered  ;  on  the  contrary,  when 
the  day  fixed  by  Lord  Kitchener  for  the  surrender 
had  passed,  the  burghers  had  more  reason  to  trust  in 
their  officers  than  before  ;  and  I  can  assure  my  readers 
that  if  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  we  had  had  officers 
of  the  same  kind  as  we  had  towards  the  end  of  the 
strife,  it  would  have  been  easier  to  have  maintained 
discipline. 

September  the  15th  was  thus  fixed  upon  by  Lord 
Kitchener  as  the  last  day  on  which  we  should  have 
an  opportunity  of  surrendering.  The  President  and 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange 
Free  State  returned  answer  that  they  would  still  con- 
tinue the  war,  and  subsequent  events  put  a  seal  to 
their  answer. 

Three  battles  were  fought — one  by  General  Brand 
at  Blakfontein,  another  by  General  De  la  Key  in 
the  west  of  the  Transvaal,  and  yet  another  by  Gen- 
eral Botha  at  Itala,  all  in  the  month  of  Septem- 
ber. 

President  Steyn  sent  Lord  Kitchener  a  long  letter, 
in  which  he  showed  most  clearly  what  the  causes  of 
the  war  had  been,  and  what  was  the  condition  of  mat- 
ters at  that  time.    The  letter  was  as  follows  : — 

*  Nobody  dies  of  fright. 
250 


THE  LAST  PROCLAMATION 


In  the  Veldt,  August  \^th,  1901. 
To  His  Excellency^_Lord  Kitchener,  etc. 

EXCELL^NCY^ — 

I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of 
your  Excellency's  letter,  dated  Aug.  7th,  1901,  en- 
closing your  Excellency's  Proclamation  of  the  same 
date. 

The  conciliatory  tone  of  your  Excellency's  letter  en- 
courages me  to  speak  freely,  and  to  answer  it  at  some 
length.  I  have  noticed  that  not  only  your  Excellency 
in  your  letter  asserts,  but  that  also  responsible  states- 
men in  your  country  assert,  that  the  declaration  of 
war  from  the  South  African  Republic,  and  the  inroad 
on  the  British  territory,  had  been  the  cause  of  the  war. 
I  hardly  believe  it  necessary  to  remind  your  Excel- 
lency that,  in  1895,  when  the  South  African  Republic 
was  unarmed  and  peaceful,  and  had  no  thought  but 
that  their  neighbours  were  civilized  nations,  an  unex- 
pected attack  was  made  on  them  from  the  British  ter- 
ritory. I  do  not  consider  it  necessary  to  point  out  to 
your  Excellency  that  the  mad  enterprise — for  surely 
^the  instigators  of  it  could  not  have  been  sane — mis- 
carried, and  the  whole  body  of  invaders  fell  into  the  ^ 
hands  of  the  South  Atrican  Republic.  The  South 
^African  Government,  trusting  in  the  integrity  of  the 
English  nation,  handed  over  to  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment all  the  persons  whom  they  had  taken  prisoner, 
notwithstanding  that,  in  conformity  with  international 
law,  these  persons  had  merited  death. 

I  also  do  not  consider  it  necessary  to  remind  your 
Excellency  that  after  an  honest  judge  had  condemned 
the  leaders  of  this  expedition  to  imprisonment,  the 
most  prominent  of  them  were  not  compelled  to  serve 
the  whole  of  their  time,  but,  previous  to  its  termina- 
tion, were  liberated  for  various  most  insufficient  rea- 
sons. Neither  need  I  remind  your  Excellency  that 
when  a  Parliamentary  Commission  was  nominated,  to 
investigate  the  causes  and  reasons  of  the  said  expedi- 

251 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


tion,  this  Commission,  instead  of  investigating  the 
matter,  would  not  allow  the  proofs  to  come  to  light, 
and  that,  when  the  Commission,  notwithstanding  the 
high  influence  at  work  during  its  sitting,  had  found 
the  chief  conspirator,  Mr.  Rhodes,  guilty,  and  had  re- 
ported him  as  such  to  Parliament,  Mr.  Chamberlain, 
who  was  one  of  the  members  of  the  Commission,  con- 
tradicted his  own  report  ^  by  defending  Mr.  Rhodes. 

Your  Excellency  will  have  to  acknowledge  that  the 
South  African  Republic  as  well  as  the  civilized  world 
was  perfectly  justified  in  coming  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  Jameson  expedition,  which  we  first  believed  to 
have  been  undertaken  by  irresponsible  persons,  and  with- 
out the  cognizance  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  was 
well  known,  if  not  to  all,  yet  still  to  some  members  of 
His  Majesty's  Government.  I  need  not  remind  your 
Excellency  that  since  that  time,  not  only  has  no  rea- 
sonable indemnity  been  paid  to  the  South  African 
Republic,  as  was  at  that  time  promised,  but  also  that 
the  Republic  has  been  harassed  with  despatches  and 
threats  concerning  its  internal  Government.  I  also 
need  not  tell  your  Excellency  that  outside  influence 
was  used  in  order  that  memorials  to  His  Majesty's 
Government  might  be  drawn  up  concerning  alleged 
grievances,  so  that  His  Majesty's  Government  might 
have  the  desired  opportunity  of  interfering  with  the 
inner  policy  of  the  South  African  Republic. 

As  I  have  said,  I  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  re- 
mind your  Excellency  of  the  above-mentioned  facts, 
because  I  am  of  opinion  that  they  are  well  known  to 
you.  I,  however,  should  like  your  Excellency  to  be 
good  enough  to  pay  attention  to  the  following 
facts  : — 

When,  at  the  time  of  the  circulation  of  the  last- 
mentioned  Memorial,  I  could  see  that  a  certain  party 
was  working  hard  to  involve  the  British  Government 
in  a  war  with  the  South  African  Republic,  I  stepped 
into  the  breach,  and  endeavoured,  by  bringing  the  par- 

>  The  report  of  the  Commission  of  which  he  was  a  member. 
252 


THE  LAST  PROCLAMATION 


ties  together,  and  by  using  my  influence  with  the 
South  African  Republic,  to  induce  the  latter  to  give 
in  to  the  demands  of  His  Majesty's  Government  in 
order  to  maintain  the  peace. 

I  succeeded  in  getting  the  Transvaal  to  yield,  not 
because  I  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  English  Govern- 
ment had  any  right  to  make  such  demands,  but  only 
in  order  to  prevent  bloodshed.  When  the  British 
Government  was  still  not  satisfied,  then  the  South  Af- 
rican Government  made  concession  after  concession 
to  the  ever-increasing  demands  made  upon  them,  until 
at  last  there  came  a  request  that  the  law  on  franchise 
should  be  laid  before  a  Commission.  On  the  behest 
of  the  British  Agent  in  Pretoria,  the  South  African 
Republic  made  a  proposal  granting  far  more  than  was 
demanded  by  the  High  Commissioner.  As  this  pro- 
posal was  not  accepted  by  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, who  made  yet  further  demands,  the  South  Af- 
rican Republic  withdrew  their  proposal,  and  declared 
themselves  willing  to  accept  England's  proposal  to  lay 
the  law  before  the  Commission.  The  British  Gov- 
ernment then  closed  all  correspondence,  and  wrote  to 
the  South  African  Republic  saying  that  they  would 
make  their  demands  later  on.  In  other  words,  the 
British  Government  then  gave  to  the  South  African 
Republic  an  ultimatum,  and  it  was  clear  that  they 
were  only  prevented  from  commencing  the  war  at 
once  by  the  fact  that  they  had  not  then  landed  suffi- 
cient troops  in  the  country. 

The  Orange  Free  State  Government  then  again 
came  to  the  rescue,  in  order  to  attempt  at  the  last  mo- 
ment to  avoid  the  war,  and  cabled  through  the  High 
Commissioner  direct  to  the  British  Government,  ask- 
ing for  information  as  to  the  nature  of  the  demands 
which  were  to  be  made  upon  the  South  African  Re- 
public ;  which  cable,  to  my  sorrow,  was  never  sent  in 
its  entirety.  The  only  answer  to  my  cable  was  the 
continual  arrival  of  transports  of  troops  from  all  quar- 
ters of  the  globe,  which  were  massed,  not  only  on  the 

253 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


frontier  of  the  South  African  Republic,  but  also  on 
the  frontiers  of  the  still  friendly  Orange  Free  State. 
Then,  when  the  South  African  Republic  saw  that  Eng- 
land had  no  intention  of  repairing  the  alleged  griev- 
ances, but  had  only  brought  them  up  as  an  excuse  for 
depriving  the  Republic  of  its  independence,  they  re- 
quested that  the  troops  might  be  taken  from  their 
frontiers,  and  that  all  disputes  might  be  settled  by 
arbitration.  This  happened  about  three  weeks  after 
the  British  Government  had  issued  their  ultimatum, 
and  about  one  month  after  the  Orange  Free  State 
Government  had  received  a  wire  asking  them  to  re- 
main neutral,  thus  clearly  giving  them  to  understand 
that  the  British  Government  intended  to  make  war  on 
the  South  African  Government.  This  telegram  was 
sent  to  the  Orange  Free  State  because  they  knew  that 
the  latter  had  made  a  defensive  alliance  with  the  South 
African  Republic  since  the  year  1899. 

Then  the  South  African  Republic  decided  that  they 
must  defend  their  frontiers  against  the  enemy  who 
threatened  their  borders,  and  I  was  obliged  to  take  a 
most  painful  step,  namely,  that  of  severing  the  bonds 
of  friendship  that  existed  between  us  and  the  Brit- 
ish Government,  and,  true  to  our  alliance  with  the 
Transvaal,  to  help  the  sister  Republic.  That  we  were 
perfectly  correct  in  our  surmise  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment had  firmly  decided  to  wipe  out  the  two  Repub- 
lics has  been  clearly  proved  since  the  breaking  out  of 
the  war.  It  was  not  only  made  evident  from  the 
documents  that  fell  into  our  hands,  although  there  it 
was  easy  to  gather  that  since  1896,  that  is  from  Jame- 
son's raid,  the  British  Government  was  firmly  deter- 
mined to  make  an  inroad  into  the  two  Republics : 
only  lately  it  has  been  acknowledged  by  Lord  Lans- 
downe  that  he  in  June,  1899,  had  already  discussed 
with  Lord  Wolseley  (then  Commander-in-Chief  of 
His  Majesty's  troops),  the  best  time  at  which  to  make 
an  attack  on  the  two  Republics.  Your  Excellency 
will  thus  see  that  it  was  not  we  who  drew  the  sword, 


254 


THE  LAST  PROCLAMATION 


but  that  we  only  put  it  away  from  our  throats.  We 
have  only  acted  in  self-defence — one  of  the  holiest 
rights  of  man — in  order  to  assert  our  right  to  exist. 
And  therefore  I  think,  with  all  respect,  that  we  have 
a  right  to  trust  in  a  just  God. 

I  again  observe  that  your  Excellency  reverts  to  the 
impossibility  of  intervention  by  any  foreign  power, 
and  that  your  Excellency  interprets  our  resistance  as 
only  based  on  the  hope  of  such  intervention. 

With  your  Excellency's  permission,  I  should  like 
to  clear  up  our  position  with  regard  to  intervention. 
It  is  this :  We  hope,  and  still  are  hoping,  that  the 
moral  feeling  of  the  civilized  world  would  protest 
against  the  crime  which  England  is  now  permitting  in 
South  Africa,  namely,  that  of  endeavouring  to  exter- 
minate a  young  nation,  but  we  were  still  firmly  deter- 
mined that,  should  our  hopes  not  be  realized,  we 
would  exert  our  utmost  strength  to  defend  ourselves, 
and  this  decision,  based  on  a  firm  trust  in  a  merciful 
God,  is  still  unshaken  in  us. 

I  further  notice  that  your  Excellency  thinks  that 
our  fight  is  hopeless.  I  do  not  know  on  what  grounds 
this  assumption  is  based.  Let  us  for  a  moment  com- 
pare our  mutual  situations  of  to-day  with  those  of  a 
year  ago,  after  the  surrender  of  General  Prinsloo. 
Then,  the  Cape  Colony  was  altogether  quiet,  and  free 
from  our  commandos.  The  Orange  Free  State  was 
almost  entirely  in  your  hands,  not  only  as  regards  the 
principal  townships,  railway  lines  and  villages,  but 
also  the  whole  country,  except  where  Commandant 
Hasebroek  was,  with  his  commando.  And  in  the 
South  African  Republic  the  situation  was  very  similar. 
That  country  was  also  mainly  held  by  you,  except  in 
the  parts  which  General  De  la  Rey  and  General  Botha 
occupied  with  their  commandos,  far  up  in  the  Bosch- 
veldt. 

How  do  matters  stand  now  ? 

The  Cape  Colony  is,  so  to  speak,  overrun  by  our 
commandos,  and  they  are  really  in  temporary  posses- 

255 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


sion  of  the  greater  part  of  Cape  Colony.  They  go 
about  there  as  they  choose,  and  many  of  our  national- 
ity and  others  also  are  continuing  to  join  us  there,  and 
uniting  forces  with  us  against  the  cruel  injustice  that 
is  being  done  to  the  Republics. 

In  the  Orange  Free  State  I  willingly  acknowledge 
that  your  Excellency  is  in  possession  of  the  Capi- 
tal, the  railways,  and  some  other  towns  not  on  the 
railways,  but  that  is  all  that  your  Excellency  has 
got.  The  whole  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  except 
the  paits  which  I  have  just  mentioned,  is  in  our  pos- 
session. In  most  of  the  principal  towns  there  are 
landdrosts  ^  appointed  by  us  ;  thus  in  this  State  the 
keeping  of  order  and  the  administration  of  justice  are 
managed  by  us,  and  not  by  your  Excellency.  In  the 
Transvaal  it  is  just  the  same.  There  also  justice  and 
order  are  managed  by  magistrates  appointed  by  our 
Government. 

May  I  be  permitted  to  say  that  your  Excellency's 
jurisdiction  is  limited  by  the  range  of  your  Excel- 
lency's guns.  If  your  Excellency  will  look  on  the 
matter  from  a  military  point  of  view  then  it  must  be 
acknowledged  that  notwithstanding  the  enormous 
forces  that  are  brought  against  us  in  the  field,  our 
cause,  in  the  past  year,  has  made  wonderful  progress. 
Therefore  we  need  be  in  no  way  discouraged,  and,  if 
your  Proclamation  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  we 
are  so,  then  it  has  now  even  less  justification  than  it 
had  a  year  ago.  I  am  sorry  that  anything  I  say  should 
appear  boastful,  but  the  assertions  in  your  Excellency's 
Proclamation  compel  me  to  speak  in  this  manner. 

With  regard  to  the  35,000  men  w^hich  your  Excel- 
lency says  are  in  your  hands,  I  cannot  speak  as  to 
the  numbers,  but  this  much  I  will  say,  I  am  not  re- 
ferring to  those  men  who  were  led  astray  by  the 
Proclamation  of  your  Excellency's  predecessor,  and  so 
failed  in  their  duty  to  their  Government ;  nor  to  those 
— thank  God  they  are  but  few — who  from  treachery 

» Resident  Magistrates. 
256 


THE  LAST  PROCLAMATION 


or  other  cause  have  gone  over  to  the  enemy  ;  but  of 
the  remainder  who  have  been  taken,  not  too  honestly, 
as  prisoners  of  war,  and  are  still  kept  as  such.  Of 
these  I  will  say  that  they  are  either  old  men  and 
feeble,  or  young  boys  not  yet  of  age,  who  were  carried 
off  by  force  from  their  farms  by  your  Excellency's 
troops,  and  shut  up  against  their  will  in  your  Excel- 
lency's camps.  To  say  of  these  therefore,  that  they  are 

dwelling  peacefully  with  you,"  is  an  assertion  which 
can  hardly  be  taken  seriously.  I  am  able  to  say  with 
perfect  truth,  that  except  the  prisoners,  and  the  few 
who  have  gone  over  to  the  enemy,  the  overpowering 
majority  of  the  fighting  burghers  are  still  under  arms. 
As  regards  those  who  have  gone  over  from  us  to  the 
enemy — a  rare  occurrence  now — I  can  only  say  that  our 
experience  is  not  unique,  for  history  shows  that  in  all 
wars  for  freedom,  as  in  America  and  elsewhere,  there 
were  such  :  and  we  shall  try  to  get  on  without  them. 

As  regards  the  74,000  women  and  children  who,^  as 
your  Excellency  alleges,  are  maintained  in  the  camps, 
it  appears  to  me  that  your  Excellency  must  be  unaware 
ot  the  criieTmanner  in  which  these  defenceless  ones 
were  dragged  awaj^  from^eir_d\vellings  by  your  Ex- 
cellency's  troopj^  \v]}ojBTSt_d^troyed^^a^^  and 
property  of  their  wretched  captives.  Yes,  to  such  a 
passliad  it  come,  that  whenever  your  men  were  seen 
approaching,  the  poor  sacrifices  of  the  war,  in  all 
weathers,  by  day  and  by  night,  would  flee  from  their 
dwellings  in  order  that  they  might  not  be  taken. 

Does  your  Excellency  realize  that  your  troops  have 
not  been  ashamed  to  fire  (in  the  full  knowledge  of 
what  they  were  doing)  with  guns  and  small  arms  on 
our  helpless  ones  when  they,  to  avoid  capture,  had 
taken  flight,  either  alone  or  with  their  waggons,  and 
^thus  many  women^nd  children  have  been  killed  and 
Vounded.  I  will  give"  you  an  instance.  Not  long 
ago7mr  the  6th  of  June,  at  Graspan,  near  Reitz,  a 
camp  of  women,  falsely  reported  as  a  convoy  to  your 
Excellency,  was  taken  by  your  troops.    This  was  res- 

257 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


cued  again  by  us,  whilst  your  troops  took  shelter  be- 
hind our  women,  and  when  your  reinforcement  came 
up,  they  opened  fire  with  guns  and  small  arms  on  that 
camp,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  they  knew  it  con- 
tained women  only. 

I  can  quote  hundreds  of  cases  of  this  kind,  but  I  do 
not  think  it  necessary,  because  if  your  Excellency  will 
take  the  trouble  to  ask  any  soldier  who  respects  the 
truth,  he  will  be  compelled  to  confirm  my  assertion. 
To  say  that  the  women  are  in  your  camps  of  their  own 
free  will  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  facts,  and  for 
any  one  to  assert  that  they  are  brought  to  the  camps 
because  the  Boers  are  unwilling  to  provide  for  the 
maintenance  of  their  families  as  it  is  said  that  His  Ex- 
cellency the  Minister  for  War  has  asserted  in  Parlia- 
ment, is  to  make  himself  guilty  of  calumny,  that  will 
do  more  harm  to  the  calumniator  than  to  us,  and  is  a 
statement  which  I  am  sure  can  never  meet  with  your 
Excellency's  approval. 

Now,  as  regards  the  Proclamation  itself,  I  can  give 
your  Excellency  the  assurance  as  far  as  I  am  myself 
concerned,  that  it  will  make  no  difference  to  my  ful- 
filling my  duty  faithfully  to  the  end,  for  I  shall  be 
guided  by  my  conscience  and  not  by  the  enemy.  ^  Our 
country  is  ruined  ;  our  heardis  and  homes  are  wrecked  ; 
our  cattle  are  J oo ted^  or  .killed  by  the  thousand;  our 
wornen_aiid^childre  are  made  prisoners,  insulted,  and 
carried  away  bj^  the  troops  and  armed  Kaffirs  ;  ajid 
many  hundreds  have  already  given  their  lives  for  the 


merelji^,  quest igi^^  of  banishment — shrink  from  our 
d^ty^_Caji^jve  become  faithless  to  the  hundreds  of 
tolled  and  prisoners,  who,  trusting  in  our  firmness, 
offered  their  lives  aiid^  freedom  for  the  fatherland  ? 
OFcan  we  lose  faitji  Jn  a  just  God,  who  has  so  won- 
derfully upheld  us  till  now?  I  am  convinced  that 
should  we  do  so,  we  should  be  despised  not  only  by 
your  Excellency  and  all  honest  men,  but  also  by 
ourselves. 


Can  we  now — when  it  is 


THE  LAST  PROCLAMATION 


I  will  close  by  giving  your  Excellency  the  assurance 
that  no  one  is  more  anxious  than  I  to  see  peace  re- 
stored, and  I  am  therefore  ready  to  meet  your  Ex- 
cellency at  any  time  in  order  to  discus;<^  the  term^;  qjj 

^which  this  peace  can  be  arrang^ed^;  but  in  order  that  I 
may  not  mislead  your  Excellency,  I  have  to_^ay  ihp»t, 
no  peace  will  be  accepted  by  us  which  fmp^n^JJa^Jn^- 

Mependence  oi  the  two  Republics^  or~\vhich  does  not 
take  into  consideration  the  interests  of  our  Colonial 
brethren  who  have  joined  us.  If  it  is  a  crime  to  fight 
in  one's  self-defence,  and  if  such  a  crime  is  to  be 
punished,  then  I  am  of  opinion  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  should  be  satisfied  with  the  annihilation 
of  the  country,  the  misery  of  women  and  children  and 
the  general  desolation  which  this  war  has  already 
caused.  It  is  in  your  Excellency's  power  more  than 
in  that  of  any  one  else,  to  put  a  stop  to  this,  and  by 
doing  so,  to  restore  this  unfortunate  part  of  the  world 
to  its  former  happiness.  We  ask  no  magnanimity,  we 
only  demand  justice.  I  enclose  a  translation  of  my 
letter  in  order  to  avoid  any  misinterpretation  of  it  by 
your  Excellency,  as  this  happened  not  long  ago  when 
a  letter  which  I  had  written  to  the  Government  of 
the  South  African  Republic,  and  which  at  Reitz  fell 
into  your  hands,  was  published  in  such  a  way  that  it 
was  nearly  unrecognizable,  as  not  only  was  it  wrongly 
interpreted  in  some  places,  but  sentences  were  inserted 
which  had  never  been  written,  and  other  parts  were  left 
out  altogether,  so  that  an  entirely  wrong  meaning  was 
given  to  the  letter. 

I  have  the  honour,  etc., 

M.  T.  Steyn, 
State-President  of  the  Orange  Free  State, 


259 


CHAPTER  XXXI 


Blockhouses  and  Night  Attacks 

WHILE  the  great  events  recorded  at  the  end  of 
my  last  chapter  were  in  progress,  I  paid  a 
visit  to  the  Harrismith  burghers,  who  were  under  the 
command  of  Commandant  Jan  Jacobsz,  and  also  to 
some  of  the  Bethlehem  men.  On  my  return  I  learnt 
that  the  enemy  were  occupied  in  building  a  line  of 
blockhouses  from  Heilbron  to  Frankfort. 

It  has  always  seemed  to  me  a  most  unaccountable 
circumstance  that  England — the  all-powerful — could 
not  catch  the  Boers  without  the  aid  of  these  block- 
houses. There  w^ere  so  many  other  ways  in  which  the 
thing  might  have  been  done,  and  better  done  ;  and 
the  following  incident,  which  occurred  during  the  war. 
serves  to  show  that  this  policy  of  the  blockhouse  might 
equally  well  have  been  called  the  policy  of  the  block- 
head. 

On  the  27th  of  February,  1902,  the  English  made 
one  of  their  biggest  "  catches "  in  the  Free  State. 
They  had  made  a  great  kraal  " — what  they  themselves 
call  a  "  drive  " — and  stood,  hand  in  hand,"  one  might 
almost  say,  in  a  ring  around  us,  coming  from  Heil- 
bron, Frankfort,  Bethlehem,  and  Harrismith,  and 
stretching,  on  the  Transvaal  side,  from  Vrede  to  the 
Drakensberg. 

Narrower  and  narrower  did  the  circle  become,  hem- 
ming us  in  more  closely  at  every  moment.  The  result 
was  that  they  "  bagged  "  an  enormous  number  of  men 
and  cattle,  without  a  solitary  burgher  (or,  for  the  mat- 
ter of  that,  a  solitary  ox)  having  been  captured  by 
means  of  their  famous  blockhouse  system. 

260 


BLOCKHOUSES  AND  NIGHT  ATTACKS 


The  English  have  been  constantly  boasting  in  the 
newspapers  about  the  advantages  of  their  blockhouses, 
but  they  have  never  been  able  to  give  an  instance  of 
a  capture  effected  by  them.  On  the  contrary,  when 
during  the  last  stages  of  the  war  it  happened,  as  it 
often  did,  that  they  drove  some  of  our  men  against 
one  or  other  of  the  great  blockhouse  lines  which  then 
intersected  the  country,  and  it  became  necessary  for 
us  to  fight  our  way  through,  we  generally  succeeded 
in  doing  so.  And  that,  with  fewer  casualties  than 
when,  as  in  the  instance  I  have  just  given,  they  con- 
centrated their  forces,  and  formed  a  circle  around  us. 

The  English  then  were  busy  when  I  returned  from 
the  south  in  building  a  blockhouse  line  from  Heilbron 
to  Frankfort.  They  accomplished  this  speedily,  and 
then  proceeded  to  the  construction  of  other  similar 
lines,  not  being  contented  until  they  had  ''pegged 
out  "  the  country  as  follows  : — 

On  the  Natal  frontier  there  was  a  line  from  Vreda 
to  Bothaspas,  continued  westward  by  a  series  of  forts 
to  Harrismith,  whence  the  line  went  on,  still  west- 
ward, to  Bethlehem,  and  thence  down  to  the  Basuto- 
land  border  at  Fouriesburg. 

Kroonstad  was  made,  so  to  speak,  the  axle," 
whence  a  series  of  "  spokes "  proceeded  ;  one  to  the 
north-east,  to  Vrede ;  a  second  to  the  north-west, 
through  Driekopjes  Diamond  Mine,  to  Winkledrift, 
and  thence  down  the  Rhenoster  River  to  its  conflu- 
ence with  the  Vaal ;  a  third,  to  the  south-east,  to 
Lindley ;  and  a  fourth,  to  the  south-west,  along  the 
railway  line,  to  the  frontier  of  Cape  Colony. 

In  the  western  districts  there  was  a  line  along  the 
left  bank  of  the  Valsch  River  to  the  point  where  it 
joins  the  Vaal,  and  another  (also  terminating  at  the 
Vaal  River)  starting  from  Zand  River  railway  bridge, 
and  running  parallel  to  the  Zand  River.  There  was 
also  a  line  from  Boshof,  across  the  Cape  Colony  fron- 
tier, to  Kimberley. 

Last,  but  not  least,  came  the  *'  White  Elephant  '* 

261 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


with  which  the  reader  is  already  acquainted — the  line 
from  Bloemfontein  to  Ladybrand,  through  Thaba* 
Nchu. 

All  these  lines  were  in  the  Free  State.  I  make  no 
mention  here  of  the  thousands  of  miles  of  similar 
blockhouse  lines,  which  made  a  sort  of  spider's  web 
of  the  South  African  Republic. 

The  blockhouses  themselves  were  sometimes  round, 
sometimes  angular,  erections.  The  roofs  were  always 
of  iron.  The  walls  were  pierced  with  loop-holes  four 
feet  from  the  ground,  and  from  four  to  six  feet  from 
one  another.  Sometimes  stone  was  used  in  the  con- 
struction of  these  walls,  at  other  times  iron.  In  the 
latter  case  the  wall  is  double,  the  space  of  from  six  to 
nine  inches  between  the  inner  and  the  outer  wall  being 
filled  with  earth. 

These  buildings  stood  at  a  distance  of  from  a  hun- 
dred to  a  thousand  paces  from  one  another;  every- 
thing depended  upon  the  lie  of  the  ground,  and  the 
means  at  the  enemy's  disposal ;  a  greater  distance  than 
a  thousand  paces  was  exceptional.  They  were  always 
so  placed  that  each  of  them  could  be  seen  by  its  neigh- 
bours on  both  sides,  the  line  which  they  followed  being 
a  zigzag. 

Between  the  blockhouses  were  fences,  made  with 
five  strands  of  barbed  wire.  Parallel  with  these  was  a 
trench,  three  feet  deep  and  four  to  five  feet  across  at 
the  top,  but  narrower  at  the  bottom.  Where  the  ma- 
terial could  be  procured,  there  was  also  a  stone  wall, 
to  serve  as  an  additional  obstacle.  Sometimes  there 
were  two  lines  of  fences,  the  upper  one — erected  on 
the  top  of  the  earth  thrown  up  from  the  trench — con- 
sisting of  three  or  four  strands  only. 

There  was  thus  a  regular  network  of  wires  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  blockhouses — the  English  seemed  to 
think  that  a  Boer  might  be  netted  like  a  fish.  If  a 
wild  horse  had  been  trapped  there,  I  should  like  to 
have  been  there  to  see,  but  I  should  not  have  liked  to 
have  been  the  wild  horse. 

262 


BLOCKHOUSES  AND  NIGHT  ATTACKS 

The  building  of  these  blockhouses  cost  many  thou- 
sands of  pounds,  and  still  greater  were  the  expenses  in- 
curred in  providing  the  soldiers  in  them  with  food, 
which  had  to  be  fetched  up  by  special  convoys.  And 
it  was  all  money  thrown  away  !  and  worse  than  thrown 
away !  for  when  I  come  to  describe  how  I  broke 
through  these  blockhouse  lines  (see  next  page),  the 
reader  wnll  see  that  this  wonderful  scheme  of  the  Eng- 
lish prolonged  the  war  for  at  least  three  months. 

Let  us  turn  now  to  another,  and  a  more  successful 
device  of  the  enemy. 

From  the  first  weeks  of  the  winter,  1901 — the  reader 
must  remember  that  our  winter  commences  in  May — 
the  English  began  to  make  night  attacks  upon  us  ;  at 
last  they  had  found  out  a  way  of  inflicting  severe  losses 
upon  us,  and  these  night  attacks  grew  more  and  more 
frequent  during  the  last  period  of  the  war.  But  they 
would  never  have  thought  of  them  at  all,  if  they  had 
not  been  instructed  in  them  by  the  National  Scouts — 
our  own  flesh  and  blood ! 

These  tactics  were  not  always  successful.  It  some- 
times happened  that  the  English  got  cornered "  ; 
sometimes  they  had  to  right  about  turn  "  and  run  for 
their  lives.  The  latter  was  the  case  at  Witkopjes,  five 
miles  to  the  south  of  Heilbron,  and  again,  near  Ma- 
kenwaansstad.  But  on  only  too  many  occasions  they 
managed  to  surprise  troops  of  burghers  on  their  camp- 
ing places,  and,  having  captured  those  who  could  not 
run  away,  they  left  the  dead  and  wounded  on  the 
ground. 

We  soon  discovered  that  these  night  attacks  were 
the  most  difficult  of  the  enemy's  tactics  with  which  we 
had  to  deal. 

Sometimes  the  burghers,  surprised  by  a  sudden 
visit  from  the  English  at  such  an  unconventional 
hour,  found  it  necessary  to  run  away  at  once  as  fast 
as  their  legs  would  carry  them,  so  that  they  often  arrived 
at  the  nearest  camp  without  their  hats.  Indeed  a  se- 
ries of  these  attacks  produced  such  a  ^anic  among  our 

263 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


men  that  I  have  known  a  Boer  lose  not  only  his  hat, 
but  also  his  head. 

I  come  now,  in  the  regular  course  of  my  narrative, 
to  an  engagement  between  my  burghers  and  an  Eng- 
lish force  which  had  marched  from  Bethlehem  to 
Reitz,  a  distance  of  thirty  miles.  This  force  was  guided 
by  a  son  of  one  of  the  Free  State  Members  of  Par- 
liament, and,  marching  all  night,  reached  Reitz  just  as 
the  day  began  to  dawn.  This  was  a  smart  piece  of 
business ;  and  though  the  guide  to  whom  its  success 
was  due  was  my  enemy,  I  fully  appreciated  the  skill 
which  he  then  displayed. 

The  English  captured  ten  or  twelve  burghers  at 
Reitz,  whither  they  had  perhaps  gone  in  search  of  the 
President. 

I  was  ten  miles  to  the  west,  on  the  farm  of  Blijds- 
chap,  and  did  not  receive  reports  of  what  had  hap- 
pened until  towards  noon. 

What  was  I  to  do  ?  I  could  not  call  up  men  from 
Heilbron,  Bethlehem,  Vrede,  or  Harrismith  :  it  would 
have  been  at  least  twenty-four  hours  before  they  could 
have  arrived.  All  I  could  do  was  to  summon  Veldt- 
cornet  Vlok  with  some  of  the  Parijs  commandos  and 
Veldtcornet  Louwrens,  and  Matthijs  De  Beer,  and  the 
men.  With  these  and  my  staff  we  would  not  number 
more  than  sixty  or  seventy  all  told. 

I  at  once  gave  orders  to  these  veldtcornets  to  meet 
me  at  a  certain  place,  and  they  were  there  by  the  ap- 
pointed hour. 

My  intention  was  to  deliver  a  flank  attack  upon  the 
English  while  they  retreated  during  the  night ;  for,  as 
they  only  numbered  five  hundred  men,  I  felt  sure  that 
they  would  not  care  to  remain  thirty  miles  away  from 
their  column,  but  would  fall  back  upon  Bethlehem. 

In  the  afternoon  I  marched  to  within  a  short  dis- 
tance of  Reitz,  in  order  to  discover  the  enemy's  plans ; 
then,  immediately  after  sunset,  I  sent  a  few  burghers 
quite  close  to  the  town,  with  orders  to  meet  me  again  at 
a  certain  point  about  two  thousand  paces  to  the  south, 

264 


BLOCKHOUSES  AND  NIGHT  ATTACKS 


and  to  inform  me  vvbither  the  enemy  were  going  to 
march.  The  scouts  returned  at  ten  o'clock  that  night, 
and  reported  that  the  enemy  was  on  the  march  towards 
Harrismith.  In  order  to  reach  this  town  they  would 
have  to  start  by  the  Bethlehem  road,  from  which  the  , 
Harrismith  road  forks,  at  about  eight  thousand  paces 
from  the  town. 

Our  horses  stood  ready  up-saddled  ;  I  had  only  to 
give  the  order  to  mount. 

I  meant  to  cross  the  Bethlehem  road  and  go  to  a 
deep  hollow  which  I  knew  of  near  the  Harrismith 
road  ;  then,  when  the  English  appeared  against  the 
horizon,  we  would  fire  at  them. 

But  my  scouts  had  blundered.  The  English  were 
not  going  to  Harrismith  after  all.  For  as  we  came  to 
the  Bethlehem  road,  we  nearly  stumbled  over  them. 
They  were  riding  quietly  along  only  a  short  distance 
from  us.  As  we  were  galloping  they  knew  of  our 
proximity  before  we  were  aware  of  theirs,  and  when 
we  were  less  than  two  hundred  paces  from  them  they 
opened  fire. 

Charge,  burghers  ! " 

They  all  heard  me,  but  they  did  not  all  obey.  About 
fifty  of  the  most  valiant  of  them  galloped  straight  at 
the  enemy.    The  rest  fled. 

After  a  short  but  fierce  engagement  we  were  forced 
to  retire,  as  six  of  our  men  had  been  hit.  Fortunately, 
their  wounds  were  but  slight,  the  most  severe  being 
that  of  my  son  Isaac,  v^ho  had  been  shot  through  the 
leg  below  the  knee. 

We  rode  away  a  short  distance,  and  saw  looming 
through  the  darkness  a  company  of  horsemen  ap- 
proaching us  from  Reitz.  I  thought  at  first  that  they 
were  some  of  my  own  burghers — the  ones  who  had 
taken  to  their  heels — but  it  turned  out  to  be  General 
Wessel  Wessels,  who  was  nearer  than  I  knew  with  his 
staff,  in  all  some  twenty  men.  I,  however,  could  muster 
seventy,  and  we  decided  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy.    But  they  had,  in  the  meantime,  been  riding 

265 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


on  so  fast  that  we  did  not  reach  them  until  it  had 
grown  quite  light.  An  engagement,  short  and  fierce 
as  the  last,  ensued,  but  as  the  enemy  was  from  six  to 
seven  times  as  strong  as  we  were,  and  had  a  gun  and 
a  Maxim-Nordenfeldt  with  them,  we  could  not  stand 
against  them,  and  had  to  let  them  go  on  their  road. 

We  were  fortunate  in  suffering  no  loss  there,  and 
while  the  English  marched  on  to  Bethlehem  we  rode 
off  in  the  opposite  direction. 

We  had  now  a  short  period  of  repose.  The  English 
were  so  busy  building  blockhouses  that  they  had  no 
time  to  fight  us.  Our  poor  horses  were  in  a  miserable 
condition,  for  so  little  rain  had  fallen  that  the  grass 
was  very  dry  and  sapless.  But  at  least  we  could  now 
give  them  the  rest  which  they  sorely  needed. 


266 


CHAPTER  XXXII 


My  Commando  of  Seven  Hundred  Men 

TOWARDS  the  end  of  September  Commandant 
F.  E.  Mentz  had  an  engagement  with  Colo- 
nel Byng's  column  near  Heilbron.  A  portion  of 
this  officer's  force  had  held  a  ridge  where  there  were 
some  Kaffir  kraals  for  cover  ;  and  Commandant  Mentz 
had  with  fifty  burghers  stormed  this  ridge,  shooting 
down  from  thirty  to  forty  of  the  enemy,  and  taking 
twenty-five  prisoners.  We  lost  two  killed  and  three 
wounded.  The  Frankfort  burghers  under  Comman- 
dant Ross  had  also  not  been  idle,  for  they  had  attacked 
a  division  of  Colonel  Rimington's  troops  with  the  re- 
sult that  sixteen  killed  and  wounded  fell  into  their 
hands — among  these  were  seven  of  the  National 
Scouts. 

Thus  fighting  was  taking  place  all  over  the  country. 
I  do  not  give  any  report  of  the  various  engagements, 
as  I  was  not  present  at  them,  and,  as  I  have  already 
said,  I  only  wish  to  record  my  own  experiences.  But 
it  will  be  easily  seen,  even  from  the  scanty  information 
I  can  give  of  these  skirmishes,  that  our  small  comman- 
dos had  a  splendid  record  of  success. 

It  is  my  intention  to  ask  all  my  Vice-Commanders- 
in-Chief  to  narrate  their  experiences.  And  when  the 
whole  story  is  told  I  am  convinced  that  the  world  will 
be  astonished  at  what  we  were  able  to  accomplish. 

But  however  well  these  small  commandos  had 
fought,  I  myself  believed  that  the  time  had  now  come 
to  make  a  great  stroke.  With  this  object  in  view  I 
gave  orders  that  a  number  of  the  burghers  should 
come  to  Blijdschap,  in  the  district  of  Bethlehem,  under 

267 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


the  command  of  the  following  officers  : — General 
Michal  Prinsloo  with  Commandants  Olivier,  and  Rau- 
tenbach  of  the  Bethlehem  Commando  ;  Commandant 
David  Van  Coller,  who  was  in  command  of  the  Heil- 
bron  burghers  in  the  place  of  Commandant  Steene- 
kamp,  who  had  resigned  ;  Commandant  Hermanns 
Botha  of  Vrede  ;  Commandant  Roen  of  Ladybrand  ; 
and  Commandant  Jan  Cilliers  of  Kroonstad. 

By  the  beginning  of  November  I  had  a  force  of 
seven  hundred  burghers  under  me  at  Blijdschap.^ 

Although  the  spring  was  now  far  advanced,  the  veldt 
was  in  a  very  backward  condition.  I  therefore  or- 
dered the  various  subdivisions  of  my  commando  to  go 
and  camp  on  the  different  farms  in  the  neighbourhood. 
I  spread  the  horses  over  a  large  area,  as  they  would 
thus  find  better  pasture  and  so  the  sooner  recover  their 
strength. 

When  November  was  drawing  to  a  close  I  had  an 
engagement  with  the  English  to  the  south  of  Lindley. 
I  had  with  me  at  that  time  General  Hattingh,  General 
Wessel  Wessels,  and  General  Michal  Prinsloo. 

An  English  force  had  encamped  two  days  previously 
on  the  farm  of  Jagersrust,  which  lies  some  ten  miles  to 
the  south-east  of  Heilbron,  and  about  the  same  dis- 
tance from  Blijdschap.  I  had  wished  to  make  an  at- 
tack on  them  the  night  they  arrived,  but  they  were  too 
near  to  Heilbron  for  me  to  venture  on  it. 

The  previous  week  three  columns  which  came  from 
Winburg  and  Kroonstad  had  been  operating  near  the 
Liebenbergsvlei,  and  driving  a  large  laager  of  women 
before  them  towards  the  north-east  of  the  Liebenbergs- 
vlei. But  they  had  now  left  the  laager  alone  and  re- 
turned to  Kroonstad.  The  women  had  arrived  at 
Blijdschap  at  noon  on  November  28th  on  their  way 
back  to  Lindley. 

The  morning  following,  two  hours  after  sunrise,  I 
received  a  report  from  General  Hattingh,  who  with 

^  A  court-martial  was  held  at  this  place,  and  several  persons  appeared  before 
it.    A  certain  De  Lange  was  condemned  to  death  for  high  treason. 

268 


COMMANDO   OF  SEVEN  HUNDRED  MEN 


Commandant  Cilliers  and  a  hundred  men  was  stationed 
close  to  Blijdschap.  The  General  reported  that  the 
English  from  Jagersrust  were  hotly  pursuing  the  wom- 
en's laager.  And  it  soon  appeared  that  the  women 
were  being  driven  to  the  west  of  Blijdschap. 

When  General  Hattingh  heard  that  the  English 
were  hard  by,  he  was  some  twenty  minutes'  ride  from 
Blijdschap,  but  he  mounted  his  horse  at  once  and  rode 
there  as  quickly  as  he  could.  On  his  arrival  he  im- 
mediately gave  orders  to  up-saddle,  and,  having  sent 
me  a  second  report,  he  started  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy. 

As  soon  as  I  had  received  General  Hattingh's  re- 
ports, I  followed  him  with  General  Wessels  and  a 
force  of  only  a  hundred  men.  I  was  at  least  five 
miles  from  General  Hattingh,  and  the  English  were 
twelve  miles  ahead.  General  Michal  Prinsloo  was 
unfortunately  a  considerable  distance  away  ;  and  thus 
it  was  that  I  could  not  at  once  get  together  my  whole 
force  of  six  hundred  burghers. 

But  General  Michal  Prinsloo  had  spent  the  time  in 
attacking  the  English  force  on  their  left  front.  Shortly 
after  he  had  engaged  the  enemy  I  came  up  behind 
them  and  delivered  an  attack  on  their  right.  But  the 
veldt  was  very  uneven  and  high  hills  and  intervening 
hollows  made  any  co-operation  between  us  impossible, 
for  one  force  could  not  tell  where  the  other  force  was. 

Meanwhile  General  Hattingh  had  attacked  the 
enemy  in  the  rear  and  thus  compelled  them  to  with- 
draw their  vanguard,  which  was  then  not  far  from  the 
women's  laager  and  had  nearly  succeeded  in  capturing 
it.  But  now  that  the  whole  force  of  the  enemy  was 
opposed  to  General  Hattingh,  he  was  forced  to  give 
way  and  leave  his  positions.  We  lost  two  killed  and 
three  wounded.  Among  the  dead  was  the  valiant  P. 
C.  Klopper  of  Kroonstad. 

When  I,  with  General  Wessels  and  Commandant 
Hermanus  Botha  hurried  up.  Commandant  Hattingh 
was  just  on  the  point  of  retreating. 

The  English  I  saw  numbered  about  a  thousand 

269 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


mounted  men  and  they  had  three  guns  with  them.  I 
determined  to  make  a  flank  attack,  and  accordingly 
marched  round  to  their  right,  at  the  same  time  send- 
ing orders  to  General  Prinsloo  to  get  in  the  rear,  or  if 
he  preferred  in  front  of  the  enemy,  so  that  we  might 
make  a  united  attack  upon  them  as  they  marched  in 
the  direction  of  Lindley. 

It  now  began  to  rain  and  a  little  later  a  very  heavy 
thunderstorm  burst  on  our  heads.  This  forced  the 
English  to  halt  on  the  farm  of  Victoriespruit. 

The  rain  continued  to  fall  in  torrents  and  hindered 
General  Prinsloo  carrying  out  my  orders. 

And  now  the  sun  went  down. 

As  our  horses  were  quite  exhausted  by  the  hot  pur- 
suit after  the  English,  and  the  burghers  wet  through 
to  the  skin,  I  decided  to  postpone  the  attack  to  the 
following  day.  I  was  also  influenced  in  my  decision  by 
the  consideration  that  as  the  English  were  so  far  from 
any  point  from  which  reinforcements  could  come,  it 
was  quite  safe  to  let  them  alone  until  the  morning. 
Nobody  could  have  foreseen  that  they  would  escape 
that  night. 

We  slept  about  five  miles  from  them  to  the  north- 
east, whilst  General  Prinsloo  and  his  men  were  not 
very  far  away  to  the  south-east. 

That  night  we  placed  the  ordinary  outposts,  but  no 

brand wachten." 

When  on  the  next  morning  I  sent  my  scouts  out  to 
discover  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  what  was  my 
surprise  when  they  reported  that  they  had  fled.  They 
had  gone,  my  scouts  informed  me,  towards  Heilbron, 
which  was  about  eighteen  miles  off,  and  they  had  left 
behind  them  five  laden  waggons  and  one  cart;  and 
where  they  had  crossed  Karoospruit  they  had,  very 
naturally,  lightened  their  waggons,  and  flour,  seed, 
oats,  tarpaulins,  and  tents  marked  the  point  where  they 
had  crossed  the  spruit.  The  enemy  were  already  so 
far  ahead  when  I  received  this  report  that  it  was  quite 
out  of  the  question  to  catch  them  before  they  reached 

270 


COMMANDO  OF  SEVEN  HUNDRED  MEN 


Heilbron  ;  so  all  idea  of  pursuing  them  had  to  be 
abandoned. 

So  far  as  I  was  able  to  find  out,  this  column  was 
under  the  command  of  Colonel  Rimington. 

As  I  was  unable  now  to  get  in  touch  with  the  ene- 
my, I  set  off  with  my  commando  to  what  was  once 
the  town  of  Lindley.  Alas  !  it  could  not  any  more 
be  called  a  town.  Every  house  was  burnt  down  ;  not 
even  the  church  and  parsonage  were  spared. 

We  found  the  veldt  in  very  good  condition  ;  the 
early  spring  rains  and  the  downpours  of  the  previous 
day  had  quite  revived  the  grass.  And  so  I  decided  to 
remain  at  Lindley  as  long  as  possible,  to  give  our 
horses  a  chance  of  recovering  their  condition.  It  was 
impossible  to  provide  them  with  forage,  for  the 
amount  the  English  had  left  behind  was  entirely  in- 
sufficient as  a  supply  for  the  large  number  of  horses 
w^e  had  with  us. 

For  ten  or  twelve  days  we  remained  at  Lindley,  and 
so  the  horses  had  a  short  breathing  time,  but  not  long 
enough  to  give  the  poor  animals  time  fully  to  regaia 
their  strength.  In  addition  to  being  overworked, 
some  of  our  horses  were  suffering  from  a  skin  disease 
which  we  were  quite  unable  to  cure.  This  disease  had 
never  before  been  known  in  the  Republics. 

When  I  was  at  Lindley  I  sent  Commandant  Johan- 
nes Meijer,  one  of  my  staff,  with  forty  men,  to  Cape 
Colony.  With  him  went  that  brave  soldier.  Captain 
Willem  Pretorius,  of  w^hom  I  have  made  mention 
previously.  If  Commandant  Meijer  had  had  sufficient 
time  to  collect  a  commando  in  the  Colony,  I  am  sure 
that  he  would  have  proved  that  the  younger  genera- 
tion of  Free-Staters,  to  whom  he  and  Willem  Preto- 
rius belonged,  possess  qualities  which  were  entirely 
unsuspected  before  the  war  began. 

On  the  8th  of  December  three  columns  of  the  en- 
emy appeared  from  Kroonstad. 

It  had  been  my  plan  to  remain  at  Lindley  and  wait 
my  chance  of  dealing  with  Colonel  Baker,  for  he  had 

271 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


under  him  a  certain  National  Scout,  who  constantly 
made  raids  from  Winburg  with  a  band  of  four  or  five 
hundred  Kaffirs.  A  few  months  previously  a  division 
of  Commandant  Hasebroek's  commando  had  been 
attacked  at  Doornberg  by  this  man's  Kaffirs,  and  four 
burghers  had  been  murdered  in  a  horrible  manner. 
More  cases  of  this  nature  had  taken  place,  and  I  only 
mention  this  one  in  passing.  I  am  not  in  a  position 
to  give  all  the  instances,  but  many  of  them  were  sworn 
to  in  affidavits,  of  which  copies  were  sent  to  Lord 
Kitchener.  The  original  affidavits  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  English  ;  but  fresh  ones  shall  be  drawn  up  on 
my  return  to  South  Africa,  so  that  I  may  be  able  to 
prove  the  statements  I  have  made.  The  narration  of 
these  brutalities  I  prefer  to  leave  to  persons  more  con- 
versant with  the  facts  than  myself.  I  have  only  al- 
luded to  the  subject  so  as  to  make  it  clear  why  I  like 
to  keep  my  eye  on  Colonel  Baker's  column. 

I  must  now  continue  my  story  where  I  left  it. 

I  took  up  my  position  to  the  north-west  of  Lindley, 
in  front  of  the  columns  which  approached  from 
Kroonstad.  But  after  a  few  skirmishes  with  them,  I 
returned  to  the  east  till  darkness  came  on.  When 
night  had  fallen  I  went  round  to  the  south,  behind 
Kaffirskop,  expecting  to  receive  the  news  that  Colonel 
Baker  was  coming  up  from  Winburg,  for  he  general- 
ly carried  on  his  operations  in  conjunction  with  the 
forces  at  Kroonstad. 

On  the  following  day  the  enemy  marched  to  Lie- 
benbergsvlei,  between  Bethlehem  and  Reitz.  Thence 
they  took  the  road  between  Lindley  and  Reitz  to 
Kroonstad. 

Piet  de  Wet,  of  the  National  Scouts,  was  with 
these  columns. 

After  we  had  remained  two  days  at  Kaffirskop,  we 
crossed  the  Valsch  River.  The  news  then  came  that 
a  column  with  a  convoy  was  on  the  march  from  Hai- 
rismith  to  Bethlehem. 

I  felt  that  it  was  my  duty  to  attack  this  column, 

272 


COMMANDO  OF  SEVEN  HUNDRED  MEN 


but,  although  I  advanced  with  all  haste,  I  was  not  in 
time  to  catch  the  enemy  before  they  reached  Bethle- 
hem. When  I  saw  this,  I  decided  to  wait,  at  a  dis- 
tance of  some  fifteen  miles  to  the  north-east  of  Beth- 
lehem, for  I  expected  that  the  column  would  return 
to  Harrismith. 

The  troops  remained  in  Bethlehem  till  the  morning 
of  the  1 8th  of  December;  they  then  marched  out 
towards  Harrismith. 

I  at  once  divided  my  commando  into  two  parts, 
each  consisting  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  men.  One 
of  these  divisions  I  posted  behind  the  eastern  end  of 
the  Langberg,  about  forty  miles  from  Bethlehem  ;  the 
other  on  the  banks  of  the  Tijgerkloofspruit,  at  the 
point  where  the  road  to  Harrismith  crosses  the 
stream. 

I  gave  strict  orders  to  both  divisions  that  as  soon  as 
I  opened  fire  on  the  English  with  the  Maxim-Norden- 
feldt,  they  were  to  charge  down  on  them  from  both 
sides  at  the  same  time. 

The  enemy,  I  may  mention,  were  about  six  or  seven 
hundred  men  strong,  and  had  two  guns. 

I  myself,  with  the  Maxim-Nordenfeldt,  was  now  on 
a  high  round  hill,  on  the  eastern  side  of  Tijgerkloof. 
I  was  very  careful  to  be  out  of  sight  of  the  English, 
so  that  they  might  get  quite  close  to  the  burghers  be- 
fore the  gun  disclosed  my  presence. 

I  succeeded  in  hiding  my  burghers  so  successfully 
that  the  English  did  not  observe  them  until  they  were 
within  about  twelve  hundred  paces  of  my  men  in 
Tijgerkloof. 

Some  of  the  enemy's  scouts  rode  on  ahead,  and 
when  I  judged  that  they  must  almost  immediately  see 
the  burghers,  I  ordered  Captain  Muller,  who  was 
standing  behind  a  rise,  to  come  out  of  cover  and  open 
fire  ;  then  I  jumped  on  my  horse,  and  down  the  hill  I 
went,  at  full  gallop,  to  my  burghers. 

I  had  scarcely  covered  half  the  distance,  when  Cap- 
tain Muller  opened  fire  on  the  enemy. 

273 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


As  the  sound  fell  on  my  ears,  it  seemed  to  me  that 
nothing  now  could  save  them  ! 

What  was  now  my  bitter  disappointment  when  I 
saw  that  only  one-third  of  my  burghers  were  charging. 
The  others  were  keeping  under  cover,  and  do  what  I 
would  I  could  not  drive  them  out. 

Everything  went  wrong. 

When  the  burghers  who  were  charging  the  English 
discovered  that  the  greater  part  of  their  comrades  had 
remained,  they  turned  round  and  retreated.  But  before 
this  had  happened  they  had  attacked  the  English  at 
four  different  points. 

It  had  been  a  short  but  a  very  hot  engagement. 

There  was  no  possibility  of  inducing  my  men  to 
charge,  and  so  I  thought  it  wisest  to  retreat,  swallow- 
ing my  disappointment  as  best  I  could. 

The  burghers  re-assembled  to  the  south  of  the  Lang- 
berg  ;  and  we  found  that  our  loss  was  two  killed  and 
nine  wounded,  of  whom  two  subsequently  died. 

We  could  not  ascertain  the  English  losses,  but  we 
saw  their  ambulances  very  busy.  We  heard  after- 
wards that  they  had  suffered  much  more  severely  than 
we  had  done. 


274 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 


A  Success  at  Tweefontein 

THE  column  had  marched  to  Harrismith. 
It  was  time  that  I  accomphshed  something 
further,  and  I  determined  that  the  next  blow  I  struck 
should  be  a  heavy  one.  I  therefore  retired  to  the 
north-east  of  Bethlehem,  and  concealed  my  men  in 
the  veldt  round  Tijgerkloof  (which  was  suited  to  the 
purpose)  whilst  I  made  my  plans. 

Colonel  Firman's  brigade  was  camped  between 
Bethlehem  and  Harrismith,  at  Elands  River  bridge, 
where  he  was  building  the  line  of  blockhouses  be- 
tween the  two  towns.  This  camp  was  so  well  en- 
trenched that  there  w^as  no  possibility  of  storming  it, 
and  I  knew  that  so  long  as  Colonel  Firman  thought  I 
was  still  in  the  neighbourhood  he  would  not  dare  to 
come  out  and  give  me  an  opportunity  of  attacking 
him. 

I  saw  that  a  ruse  was  necessary  to  entice  him  out  of 
his  fortress.  With  this  object  in  view  I  sent  for 
Commandant  Jan  Jacobsz,  with  his  fifty  men  from 
Witzeshoek.  When  he  joined  me  I  confided  my 
secret  to  him,  and  ordered  him  to  go  back  with  his 
fifty  men,  and  to  let  Colonel  Firman  see  him  doing 
so.  He  also  had  instructions  to  let  some  of  his  veldt- 
cornets  ride  to  the  Kaffir  kraals,  which  were  close  to 
the  Enghsh  camp,  in  order  to  tell  these  Kaffirs  that 
he  had  had  orders  to  come  to  me  with  fifty  men,  but 
that  when  he  arrived  I  had  commanded  him  to  return 
to  his  district,  because  I  was  going  to  march  with  my 
commando  to  Winburg. 

The  following  day  Colonel  Firman's  scouts  were,  as 

275 


TWEEFONTEIN. 


A  SUCCESS  AT  TWEEFONTEIN 


might  have  been  expected,  informed  by  the  Kaffirs  of 
what  they  had  heard  from  the  burghers  under  Com- 
mandant Jacobsz  ;  and  the  day  after — that  is,  the  22nd 
of  December — Colonel  Firman's  column,  about  six  to 
seven  hundred  men  strong,  marched  from  Elands 
River  to  Tweefontein,  half-way  between  Elands  River 
and  Tijgerkloof.  On  the  farm  of  Tweefontein  there 
was  a  mountain  called  Groenkop — which  has  since,  for 
a  reason  which  will  soon  be  apparent  to  the  reader, 
received  the  name  of    Christmas  Kop." 

I  gave  Commandant  Jacobsz  orders  to  come  to  me 
with  his  fifty  men  on  Christmas  Eve,  but  this  time 
with  the  strict  injunction  that  he  must  conceal  his 
march  from  the  enemy.  I  also  called  up  Veldtcornet 
Beukes,  with  his  fifty  men,  from  Wilge  River,  in  the 
district  of  Harrismith.  Veldtcornet  Beukes  was  a 
brave  man  and  trustworthy  ;  he  was  shortly  afterwards 
promoted  to  the  command  of  a  division  of  the  Harri- 
smith burghers. 

My  intention  was  to  attack  Colonel  Firman  early 
on  Christmas  morning. 

Two  days  previously  I  had,  with  General  Prinsloo 
and  the  Commandant,  reconnoitred  the  neighbourhood 
of  Groenkop,  on  which  Colonel  Firman  was  encamped. 
I  approached  as  near  as  possible  to  the  mountain,  but 
could  only  inspect  it  from  the  west,  north,  and  east, 
but  on  the  following  day  I  reconnoitred  it  also  from 
the  south. 

My  plan  of  making  the  attack  early  the  next  morn- 
ing was  somewhat  spoilt  by  the  fact  that  the  English 
had  already,  on  the  21st  of  December,  quitted  their 
camp  on  the  mountain.  Thus  they  had  had  four  days 
in  which  to  entrench  themselves. 

Whilst  we  were  reconnoitring  the  mountain  from 
the  south,  we  saw  three  horsemen  coming  cautiously 
out  of  the  camp,  riding  in  a  north-easterly  direction, 
and  thus  giving  us  no  chance  to  intercept  them. 
Commandant  Olivier  and  Captain  Potgieter  now  made 
a  detour,  so  that  they  could  cut  off  the  unsuspecting 

277 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


scouts  from  their  camp,  and  could  also  get  nearer  to 
the  mountain  themselves.  I  knew  that  by  doing  so 
they  would  draw  the  fire  of  the  two  guns,  which 
would  tell  me  precisely  where  Colonel  Firman's  bat- 
tery stood. 

Before  these  officers  could  accomplish  their  purpose 
they  were  observed,  and  seeing  that  they  could  not 
cut  off  the  three  men,  they  turned  their  horses  and 
galloped  back.  But  when  they  saw  that  the  three 
scouts  had  the  temerity  to  pursue  them,  they  faced 
round  at  the  first  rise  and  suddenly  confronted  them. 
The  three  (who  were  Kaffirs),  seeing  that  the  tables 
were  turned,  hastily  wheeled  round  towards  their  own 
camp,  but  before  they  could  reach  it  one  of  their 
number  was  caught  and  shot  down.  One  gun  and  the 
Maxim-Nordenfeldt  now  fired  upon  our  two  officers 
as  long  as  they  were  in  sight,  and  thus  we  learnt  that 
the  guns  were  placed  on  the  high  western  point  of  the 
mountain,  from  which  they  could  shoot  in  all  direc- 
tions. 

Let  me  describe  Groenkop.  On  its  western  side 
was  a  precipice,  on  the  north  and  south  a  steep  de- 
scent, and  on  the  east  a  gentle  slope  which  ran  down 
to  the  plain. 

From  which  side  should  the  attack  take  place  ? 

Some  of  the  officers  were  of  the  opinion  that  this 
should  take  place  on  the  east,  where  it  was  the  least 
steep,  but  I  differed  from  them,  for  through  our  field- 
glasses  we  could  see  that  the  walls  of  the  fort  were  so 
built  that  it  was  quite  clear  the  enemy  had  thought 
that,  should  they  be  attacked,  it  would  be  from  the 
east.  The  forts  were  built  in  a  semicircle  towards  that 
side,  and  although  this  would  be  of  little  importance 
once  the  fight  had  begun  (because  the  defenders  had 
only  to  jump  over  the  wall  to  find  themselves  still  en- 
trenched), still  it  was  to  the  advantage  of  the  attack- 
ing party  to  come  from  a  side  where  they  would  not 
be  expected. 

These  reasons  brought  me  to  the  conclusion  that 

278 


A  SUCCESS  AT  TWEEFONTEIN 


the  English  would  not  be  on  the  look-out  for  us  from 
the  west,  and  I  therefore  decided  to  make  the  attack 
from  this  side,  the  steep  side  of  the  mountain.  But  I 
did  not  then  know  how  steep  it  really  was. 

On  the  western  point  there  were  four  forts  close  to 
each  other.  Each  was  sufficient  to  give  shelter  to 
about  twenty-five  men.  To  the  south  there  were  four 
forts,  and  to  the  east  three. 

The  top  of  the  mountain  was  not  more  than  three 
to  four  hundred  paces  in  diameter.  To  the  east  in  a 
hollow  the  convoy  was  placed,  and  from  every  schanze 
we  could  rake  it  with  our  fire. 

I  remained  on  the  spot  from  which  I  was  reconnoi- 
tring, and  sent  word  to  the  commando,  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  24th  of  December,  to  come  to  a  certain 
place  at  Tijgerkloof,  which  they  could  do  without 
being  observed.  I  ordered  them  to  remain  there  until 
nightfall,  and  then  to  advance  within  four  miles  of 
Groenkop,  to  the  north,  where  I  would  meet  them. 

This  was  done.  I  found  the  commando  at  the 
appointed  place,  and  also  General  Brand  and  Com- 
mandant Karel  Coetzee,  who  had  come  on  a  visit  that 
day  to  my  commando.  They  also  took  part  in  the 
attack.  My  men  consisted  of  burghers  from  General 
Michal  Prinsloo,  Commandants  Hermanus  Botha,  Van 
CoUer,  Olivier,  Rautenbach,  Koen,  Jan  Jacobsz  and 
Mears,  in  all  six  hundred  men.  Of  these  I  left  one 
hundred  in  charge  of  the  Maxim-Nordenfeldt  and  the 
pack-horses. 

We  had  not  a  single  waggon  with  us  ;  every  man 
put  what  he  had  with  him  on  his  pack-horse,  for  long 
we  had  made  it  a  rule  not  to  be  hampered  with  wag- 
gons. Yet  whenever  we  picked  up  reports  of  engage- 
ments in  the  camping  places  of  the  English  we  repeat- 
edly saw  that  they  had  taken  a  Boer  camp — and  their 
greatest  delight  was  to  say  that  it  was  one  of  De  Wet's 
convoys. 

They  could  not  have  been  convoys  of  mine,  because 
for  the  last  fifteen  months  I  had  had  no  waggon-camp 

279 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


with  me.  If  a  waggon-camp  was  taken,  it  could  only 
have  been  one  consisting  of  women,  who  were  flying 
in  order  to  escape  capture  by  the  English,  and  to 
avoid  being  sent  to  the  concentration  camps.  Every- 
where in  the  State  the  women  were  taking  to  flight, 
and  their  terror  was  increased  tenfold  when  the  news 
came  that  niany_a.  woman  and  child  had  found  an 
untimely  gravejnjthes^carnps. 

The  troops  which  had  not  remained  with  the  pack- 
horses  now  advanced  towards  the  mountain.  Each 
commando  was  ordered  to  ride  by  itself,  and  to  leave 
in  single  file.  My  orders  were  that  they  were  to  march 
quietly  to  the  western  foot  of  the  mountain  ;  here  the 
horses  were  to  be  left  behind,  and  the  climb  made  on 
foot,  the  burghers  keeping  the  same  order  as  that  in 
which  they  had  been  riding.  Should  the  English,  how- 
ever, discover  us  before  we  reached  the  mountain,  we 
must  then  storm  it  altogether,  and  leave  the  horses 
wherever  we  had  dismounted. 

We  succeeded  in  coming  to  the  mountain  unob- 
served, and  at  once  began  the  climb.  It  was  exact- 
ly two  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  December  25th, 
1901. 

When  we  had  gone  up  about  half-way  we  heard  the 
challenge  of  a  sentry  : — 
"  Halt ;  who  goes  there  ?  " 
Then  followed  a  few  shots. 
My  command  rang  out  through  the  night — 
"  Burghers,  Storm  ! " 

The  word  was  taken  up  by  the  burghers  themselves, 
and  on  all  sides  one  heard    Storm  !  Storm  ! " 

It  was  a  never-to-be-forgotten  moment.  Amidst 
the  bullets,  which  we  could  hear  whistling  above  and 
around  us,  the  burghers  advanced  to  the  top,  calling 
out,    Storm  !  Storm  !" 

The  mountain,  however,  was  so  steep  that  it  can 
scarcely  be  said  that  we  stormed  it  ;  it  was  much 
more  of  a  climb.  Often  our  feet  slipped  from  under 
us,  and  we  fell  to  the  ground  ;  but  in  an  instant  we 

280 


A  SUCCESS  AT  TWEEFONTEIN 


were  up  again  and  climbed  on,  and  on,  to  gain  the 
summit. 

I  think  that  after  the  sentry  heard  us,  three  or  four 
minutes  must  have  elapsed  before  the  troops,  who 
were  lying  asleep  in  their  tents  or  on  the  veldt,  were 
awakened  and  could  come  out,  because  their  camp 
was  about  a  hundred  paces  distant  from  our  point  of 
attack. 

Directly  we  reached  the  top  the  deafening  roar  of  a 
heavy  fight  began,  and  lasted  from  fifteen  to  twenty 
minutes.  Shortly  before  this  the  Armstrong  gun  and 
the  Maxim-Nordenfeldt  had  each  fired  two  shots,  but 
they  fired  no  more  ;  as  we  reached  the  top  the  gun- 
ners were  shot  down  at  their  guns. 

After  a  short  but  desperate  struggle  the  English 
gave  way,  or  surrendered,  and  we  took  possession  of 
the  Armstrong  and  Maxim-Nordenfeldt. 

We  continued  to  fire  on  the  troops,  who  had  re- 
treated to  a  short  distance.  Again  they  gave  way, 
and  took  up  another  position  a  little  further  on,  and 
so  it  went  on  for  about  two  thousand  paces,  and 
then  the  English  took  to  flight. 

As  we  had  no  horses  with  us  and  it  was  dark,  we 
did  not  pursue  the  fleeing  enemy,  but  returned  to  the 
camp.  The  whole  engagement  lasted,  so  far  as  I 
could  judge,  for  about  an  hour.  I  cannot  say  for  cer- 
tain, because  I  made  no  note  of  the  time. 

It  was  a  party  of  Yeomanry  with  whom  we  had 
been  dealing,  and  I  must  say  they  behaved  very  gal- 
lantly under  exceptionally  trying  circumstances  ;  for 
it  is  always  to  be  expected  that  when  men  are  at- 
tacked during  the  night  a  certain  amount  of  confu- 
sion must  ensue. 

It  was  heartrending  to  hear  the  moaning  of  the 
wounded  in  the  dark.  The  burghers  helped  the  doc- 
tors to  bring  the  wounded  into  the  tents,  where  they 
could  be  attended  to  ;  I  gave  the  doctors  as  much 
water  as  they  liked  to  take  for  the  wounded. 

It  was  greatly  to  be  deplored  that  the  ambulance 

281 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


had  been  placed  in  the  centre  of  the  camp,  for  this 
was  the  cause  of  Dr.  Reid  being  fatally  wounded. 

When  the  day  began  to  dawn  we  brought  the  wag- 
gons and  guns  down  the  mountain.  I  sent  them  in 
the  direction  of  Langberg,  to  the  west  of  Groenkop. 

The  enemy  lost  about  one  hundred  and  sixteen  dead 
and  wounded,  and  two  hundred  and  forty  prisoners  of 
war. 

Our  loss  was  also  heavy — fourteen  dead  and  thirty 
wounded ;  among  the  dead  were  Commandant  Oli- 
vier from  Bethlehem  and  Vice-Veldtcornet  Jan  Dale- 
bout  from  Harrismith  ;  among  the  wounded  was  one 
of  my  own  staff,  Gert  de  Wet.  Later  on  two  more 
died,  one  of  them  being  Veldtcornet  Louwrens.  I 
appointed  Mr.  A.  J.  Bester  as  Commandant  in  the 
place  of  Commandant  Olivier. 

Besides  one  Armstrong  and  one  Maxim-Norden- 
feldt,  our  booty  consisted  of  twenty  waggons,  mostly 
ox-waggons,  a  great  quantity  of  rifle  and  gun  ammu- 
nition, guns,  tents,  five  hundred  horses  and  mules,  and 
one  waggon  laden  with  spirits,  so  that  the  burghers, 
who  were  not  averse  to  this,  could  now  satisfy  their 
thirst. 

The  sun  had  hardly  risen  when  the  enemy  opened 
fire  from  a  mountain  two  miles  to  the  north-east  of 
Groenkop,  where  there  was  a  little  camp  with  one  gun. 
If  I  still  had  had  the  same  numbers  as  were  with  me 
at  the  storming  of  Groenkop,  then  I  could  also  have 
taken  this  little  camp.  But  it  was  not  to  be  thought 
of,  for  some  of  my  men  had  been  sent  away  with  the 
waggons,  and  the  others — well,  every  one  had  a  horse 
that  he  had  taken  from  the  English,  and  as  these 
horses  were  in  the  pink  of  condition  for  rapid  retreat, 
I  thought  it  wiser  not  to  call  upon  the  burghers  to 
attack.  I  ordered  them,  therefore,  to  go  back  after 
the  waggons,  and  in  the  evening  we  camped  to  the 
north  of  Bethlehem.  From  here,  on  the  following 
day,  I  sent  the  prisoners  of  war  through  Naauwpoort 
into  Basutoland. 

282 


A  SUCCESS  AT  TWEEFONTEIN 


On  the  same  day  I  gave  orders  to  General  Michal 
Prinsloo  to  take  the  commando  and  to  strike  a  course 
between  Reitz  and  Heilbron.  I  myself  paid  a  visit  to 
President  Steyn  and  General  Wessel  Wessels,  after 
which  I  put  matters  straight  in  our  hospital  at  Bezui- 
denhoutsdrift,  which  was  under  the  charge  of  Dr.  H. 
J.  Poutsma. 


283 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 


I  Cut  my  Way  Through  Sixty  Thousand 

Troops 

THE  English  could  not  endure  the  thought  that 
we  had  their  guns  in  our  possession.  And, 
accordingly,  when  General  Michal  Prinsloo  came  near 
the  Liebenbergsvlei,  on  the  road  between  Reitz  and 
Heilbron,  he  met  a  strong  force  of  the  enemy  which 
had  come  from  Kroonstad.  The  English  then  had  a 
taste  of  what  it  was  like  to  be  under  the  fire  of  our 
artillery  ;  and  so  well  did  the  gunners  do  their  work 
that  the  enemy  were  forced  to  retreat.  This  occurred 
shortly  before  sunset  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28th  of 
December. 

But  the  forces  in  front  of  General  Prinsloo  were  too 
strong  for  him,  and  so  when  night  came  he  marched 
past,  and  the  following  morning  was  twelve  miles  to 
the  south-west  of  them. 

The  enemy  advanced  against  the  position  which 
General  Prinsloo  had  occupied  the  previous  day,  quite 
unaware  that  he  was  now  in  their  rear.  In  the  mean- 
time the  General  was  watching  their  movements  from 
behind,  and  quietly  enjoying  their  mistake. 

I  left  the  hospital  that  afternoon,  and  crossing  the 
Liebenbergsvlei  to  the  rear  of  the  English,  I  joined 
the  Heilbron  commando. 

The  following  day  the  enemy  retreated  to  the  farm 
of  Groenvlei,  which  lies  just  to  the  north  of  Lindley. 
They  remained  there  for  a  few  days  awaiting  large  re- 
inforcements. 

I  quite  understand  your  plan,"  I  said  to  myself,  as 
I  set  to  work  to  split  up  the  great  force  which  the 

28^ 


THROUGH  SIXTY  THOUSAND  TROOPS 


enemy  were  concentrating.  And  with  this  object  in 
view  I  sent  each  Commandant  to  his  own  district,  be- 
lieving that  by  dispersing  my  own  men  I  should  again 
induce  the  English  to  divide  their  troops  into  smaller 
parties.  Commandant  Mears,  with  his  fifty  men,  I 
ordered  to  remain  with  the  guns  and  the  artillery,  and 
to  guard  them  by  very  careful  scouting. 

In  less  than  a  fortnight  seven  large  columns  of  the 
enemy  were  operating  in  the  district  between  Heilbron 
and  Bethlehem  and  Harrismith.  These  columns  burnt 
all  the  houses  within  their  reach,  and  those  which  had 
been  spared  before  were  now  given  over  to  the  flames. 
And  not  only  were  the  houses  destroyed,  but  every 
head  of  cattle  was  taken. 

Towards  the  end  of  January,  1902,  still  more  col- 
umns arrived  and  a    drive  "  began. 

I  remained  in  the  neighbourhood  until  the  2nd  of 
February  and  stationed  Commandant  Mears  with  the 
guns  to  the  east  of  the  Wilge  River.  The  English 
formed  a  circle  round  him,  but  he  succeeded  in  getting 
the  guns  away  in  safety.  When  he  was  out  of  their 
clutches,  I  sent  him  orders  to  bring  the  guns  through 
the  blockhouse  line  between  Lindley  and  Bethlehem, 
and  then  to  push  on  towards  Winburg. 

It  was  my  intention,  on  arriving  there,  to  collect  as 
rapidly  as  possible  a  commando  from  the  men  of  Beth- 
lehem, Kroonstad,  and  Winburg,  and  to  attack  the  first 
column  that  gave  me  a  chance  of  doing  so. 

Commandant  Mears  carried  out  my  orders  at  once. 
A  force  of  the  enemy  had  been  waiting  for  him  for  three 
or  four  days  at  the  farm  of  Fanny's  Home,  on  the  Lie- 
benbergsvlei.  But  before  the  sun  had  risen,  a  strong 
force  under  Colonel  Byng  had  surrounded  him  and 
forced  him  to  abandon  the  guns.  And  not  only  were 
the  guns  lost,  but  Captain  Muller  and  thirteen  gunners 
were  taken  prisoner. 

Thus  the  guns  had  not  been  of  much  benefit  to  us, 
for  the  English  had  kept  us  so  constantly  on  the  move 
that  it  had  been  impossible  to  use  them. 

285 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


The  forces  of  the  enemy  between  Harrismith  and 
Vrede  had  formed  a  line  extending  from  the  Harri- 
smith-Bethlehem  blockhouses  to  the  blockhouses  be- 
tween Vrede,  Frankfort  and  Heilbron.  And  now  the 
troops  were  advancing  in  close  contact  with  each  oth- 
er, hoping  thus  to  force  us  against  one  or  other  line  of 
blockhouses. 

Nearer  and  nearer  they  came,  until  at  noon  on  Feb- 
ruary the  5th  we  saw  them  to  the  east  of  Lieben- 
bergsvlei.  As  I  was  watching  their  movements  from 
the  top  of  Elandskop,  I  was  informed  by  hehogram  ^ 
from  Blaauwkop  and  Verkijkerskop  that  there  was  a 
cordon  of  the  English  from  Frankfort  to  a  spot  be- 
tween Bethlehem  and  Lindley. 

The  intention  of  the  enemy  appeared  to  be  to  drive 
us  against  the  Heilbron-Kroonstad  blockhouses  and 
the  railway  line.  We  had  therefore  to  be  prepared  to 
fight  our  way  through  the  blockhouses.  And  these, 
as  I  found  out  lately,  had  been  greatly  strengthened. 

On  the  6th  of  February  I  was  on  the  march,  intend- 
ing to  advance  to  Slangfontein,  to  the  west  of  Heil- 
bron. I  sent  orders  to  Commandants  Mentz,  Van  der 
Merwe,  and  Van  Coller,  to  take  a  portion  of  Com- 
mandant Bester's  burghers,  telling  them  to  go  to 
Slangfontein.  For  I  hoped  to  break  through  at  some 
point  or  other  that  night. 

Still  nearer  the  enemy  came,  marching  almost 
shoulder  to  shoulder. 

The  Commandants  Van  Coller  and  Van  der  Merwe 
did  not  go  to  Slangfontein.  They  broke  through  the 
English  columns  near  Jagersrust,  and  crossed  the 
Heilbron- Frankfort  blockhouse  line,  where  they  put  a 
few  soldiers  to  flight,  not,  however,  without  a  loss  of 
two  burghers,  who  were  killed. 

Neither  did  the  burghers  under  Veldtcornets  Tal- 

^  We  had  heliographic  communication  between  Elandskop  and  Blaauwkop, 
which  formed  a  connecting  link  between  Bethlehem  and  Lindley ;  and  from 
Blaauwkop  we  had  communication  with  Verkijkerskop.  There  was  also  helio- 
graphic communication  between  Bethlehem  and  Lindley,  and  Biddulphsberg, 
across  the  line  of  blockhouses. 

286 


THROUGH  SIXTY  THOUSAND  TROOPS 


jaart  and  Prinsloo  arrive.  They  preferred  to  go  their 
own  way — and  all  were  captured  with  the  exception 
of  twenty-eight  men.  But  this  misfortune  was  not 
due  to  the  blockhouses.  On  the  contrary,  they  were 
taken  prisoners  when  they  were  attempting  to  hide 
themselves  in  small  bodies.  In  this  way  more  than  a 
hundred  burghers  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  English. 

There  were  now  with  me  Commandant  Mentz,  and 
portions  of  the  commandos  of  Commandants  Bester, 
Cilliers,  and  Mears. 

That  afternoon  we  marched  to  a  farm  which  w^as 
twelve  miles  from  the  Lindley-Kroonstad  line  of 
blockhouses.  When  it  was  quite  dark,  we  left  the 
farm  with  the  intention  of  breaking  through  this  line 
before  daybreak.  There  had  been  five  or  six  hundred 
head  of  cattle  with  us,  but,  without  my  being  aware 
of  it,  they  had  gone  astray  in  the  darkness. 

We  intentionally  left  the  path,  because  we  thought 
that  the  English  would  be  most  vigilant  at  points 
where  paths  crossed  the  line. 

Suddenly  we  found  ourselves  at  a  wire  fence.  The 
darkness  was  so  thick,  that  it  was  only  after  we  had 
cut  the  wire  that  we  discovered  that  we  were  close  to 
a  blockhouse.  Although  the  house  was  not  more 
than  a  hundred  paces  from  us,  we  could  hear  and  see 
nothing.  When  we  were  some  four  hundred  paces 
on  the  other  side  of  the  line  of  the  blockhouses,  I  sent 
a  burgher  back  to  see  if  all  the  men  and  cattle  had 
crossed  safely — for  we  were  riding  in  a  long  trail,  and 
amongst  us  were  old  men  and  youngsters  of  only  ten 
years,  or  even  less.  These  boys  would  have  been 
taken  away  from  their  mothers  had  they  stayed  at 
home  ;  and  thus  the  only  way  to  keep  them  from  cap- 
tivity  was  to  let  them  join  the  commandos. 

The  burgher  soon  returned,  and  told  me  that  the 
whole  commando  and  all  the  cattle  had  crossed  the 
line.    Then  I  marched  forward  again. 

At  break  of  day  we  were  close  to  the  Valsch  River. 
Here  I  made  a  short  halt,  in  order  to  allow  the  strag- 

287 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


glers  to  come  up.  It  was  then  that  a  man  came  to 
me  who  had  been  riding  far  behind,  and  had  thus  not 
seen  that  we  had  cut  the  wire.  He  was  probably  one 
of  those  who  quite  needlessly  feared  a  blockhouse 
line. 

General,  when  shall  we  come  to  the  blockhouses? " 
he  asked  me. 

Oh  !  we  are  through  long  ago  !  "  I  answered. 

It  did  not  require  any  deep  insight,  I  can  assure 
you,  to  see  how  delighted  this  burgher  was  that  we 
were  safely  out  of  it ! 

We  discovered  now  that  the  cattle  had  not  crossed 
the  line.  When  I  investigated  the  matter  more 
closely,  I  found  that  they  had  gone  astray  before  we 
reached  the  blockhouses.  But  it  was  impossible  to 
wait  for  them,  and  there  was  nothing  left  but  to  pro- 
ceed without  them. 

When  we  arrived  at  the  Valsch  River,  there  was  a 
sound  of  shouting  behind  us,  and  presently  the  cattle 
appeared  coming  over  a  rise.  I  heard  from  the  driv- 
ers that  they  had  lost  their  way,  and  had  only  reached 
the  blockhouses  at  daylight.  But  they  had  succeeded 
in  breaking  through  under  a  fierce  rifle  fire.  Twenty 
head  of  cattle  had  been  killed  or  wounded,  and  one  of 
the  men's  horses  had  been  shot  under  him. 

The  burghers  who  had  accomplished  this  valiant 
deed  were  :  Jan  Potgieter,  Gert  Potgieter,  Jzoon,  and 
Wessel  Potgieter — all  from  the  district  of  Heilbron. 

I  have,  myself,  seen  a  report  in  an  English  paper  of 
my  breaking  through  the  blockhouse  line.  This  paper 
declared  that  I  had  driven  a  great  herd  of  cattle  in 
front  of  me  to  break  down  the  fencing !  .  .  .  This  is 
the  way  the  English  write  the  reports. 

This  breaking  through  of  my  cattle  inspired  the 
English,  at  least  so  I  thought,  to  dig  trenches  every- 
where. But  they  were  again  wrong ;  for  although  a 
vehicle  might  have  some  difficulty  before  the  trench 
was  filled  in,  no  riders,  pedestrians,  or  cattle  would 
have  been  stopped  for  a  moment. 

288 


THROUGH  SIXTY  THOUSAND  TROOPS 


And  now  we  marched  on,  till  we  reached  a  spot 
about  fourteen  miles  to  the  south  of  the  blockhouse 
line  ;  and  there  we  remained  for  three  days. 

Whilst  we  were  waiting  here,  I  sent  two  burghers 
back  to  the  blockhouse  line,  to  discover  in  what 
direction  the  English  columns  had  marched,  so  that  I 
might  know  where  I  should  go  myself.  Now,  less 
than  ever,  was  it  advisable  to  make  night  marches, 
for  our  horses  were  in  a  very  poor  condition. 

The  day  following  I  received  a  heliographic  mes- 
age  from  these  burghers,  who  were  now  on  the  other 
side  of  the  line.  They  signalled  that  I  could  come  on 
with  my  commando,  since  the  English  columns  had 
returned  to  Kroonstad  and  Heilbron. 

When  night  came  I  started  on  my  way  back.  I 
did  not  go  (as  before)  to  the  east  of  Lindley,  but  to 
the  farm  of  Palmietfontein,  which  lies  to  the  west. 
When  we  were  close  to  the  line,  I  sent  some  burghers 
in  advance  to  cut  the  wire.  But  this  time  there  was  a 
reception  ready  for  us,  which  we  certainly  would  rather 
have  been  without  !  This  was  to  be  ascribed  to  the 
fact  that  instead  of  only  two  scouts,  as  I  had  ordered, 
about  ten  had  gone  to  reconnoitre.  So  large  a  num- 
ber had  attracted  the  attention  of  the  enemy,  and  the 
guards  had  concentrated  at  the  spot  where  we  wished 
to  break  through. 

Thus  before  my  commando  reached  the  line  a  fierce 
fire  was  opened  on  it  from  two  sides.  Yet  not- 
withstanding this  the  wires  were  cut  and  we  reached 
the  other  side,  but  not  without  loss.  One  of  my 
burghers  was  killed,  and  one  wounded.  A  boy  of 
ten  was  also  killed,  and  another  of  seven  severely 
wounded.  We  could  not  ascertain  the  losses  of  the 
enemy. 

It  was  terrible  that  children  should  be  exposed  to 
such  dangers  ;  but,  as  I  have  already  said,  if  we  had  not 
taken  them  with  us  they  would  have  been  captured. 
During  the  very  drive "  I  have  just  described,  two 
children  who  had  remained  at  home  with  their  mothers 

289 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


were  taken  prisoner  by  the  English.  One  of  these  was 
a  boy  of  nine,  the  Httle  son  of  Jacobus  Theron.  Not- 
withstanding the  prayers  and  entreaties  of  the  poor 
mother,  he  was  torn  from  her  and  carried  away.  In 
the  same  way  another  boy,  twelve  years  old,  whose 
name  I  do  not  know,  was  dragged  from  his  mother's 
arms. 

The  chronicling  of  such  inexplicable  cruelties  I 
leave  to  other  pens.  I  have  drawn  attention  to  them 
to  make  it  clear  that  it  was  not  without  good  cause 
that  children  joined  the  commandos.  Some  of  these 
little  ones  became  a  prey  to  the  bullets  of  the  enemy, 
and  the  South  African  soil  is  stained  by  the  blood  of 
children  slain  by  England. 

With  the  exception  of  the  sad  incidents  I  have  de- 
scribed, we  came  through  in  safety. 

1  afterwards  heard  that  Lord  Kitchener  had  on  this 
occasion  gone  to  Wolvehoek  Station  in  order  to  see 
President  Steyn  and  myself  carried  away  in  the  train 
to  banishment !  But  his  calculations  were  not  alto- 
gether correct. 

A  Higher  Power  had  willed  it  otherwise. 

The  burghers  had  now  returned  to  their  own  dis- 
tricts. I  myself  went  to  a  farm  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Elandskop  belonging  to  Mr.  Hendrick  Prinsloo — 
the  rooije}  After  I  had  been  there  a  few  days  I  heard 
that  a  strong  column  was  approaching  Lindley  from 
Kroonstad.  During  the  night  of  the  1 7th  of  February 
this  column  attacked  some  burghers  who  were  posted 
less  than  four  miles  from  Elandskop,  with  the  object — 
as  I  heard  later — of  catching  me.  And  they  would 
have  been  quite  successful  in  their  attempt  had  I  been 
sleeping  in  the  house  where  their  information  led  them 
to  believe  they  would  find  me.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
I  seldom,  if  ever,  slept  in  a  house,  for  to  tell  the  truth, 
there  were  scarcely  any  houses  left  to  sleep  in  !  The 
women  who  had  escaped  capture  lived  in  narrow  shel- 
ters, which  had  been  made  by  placing  corrugated  iron 

»  "Rooije"  is  the  Taal  for  "red." 
290 


THROUGH  SIXTY  THOUSAND  TROOPS 


sheets  on  what  was  left  standing  of  the  walls  that  re- 
mained. 

I  crossed  the  Liebenbergsvlei  on  the  i8th  of  Febru- 
ary, and  proceeded  to  the  farm  of  Rondebosch,  which 
stands  to  the  north-east  of  Reitz.  There  I  met  the 
Government. 

And  now  another  big  "drive*'  took  place.  The 
English  columns  marched  to  the  south  of  the  Kroon- 
stad-Lindley  blockhouse  line  in  the  direction  of  Beth- 
lehem. Other  troops  came  from  Heilbron,  and  ad- 
vanced to  the  north  of  the  Heilbron-Frankfort  line, 
driving  Commandant  Ross  across  this  line  to  the 
south. 

Nearer  and  nearer  these  two  great  divisions  ap- 
proached each  other,  until  at  last  they  stretched  with- 
out any  break  from  the  Bethlehem-Lindley  to  the 
Frankfort-Vrede  line  of  blockhouses.  On  the  21st  of 
February  the  whole  column  moved  towards  Vrede  and 
Harrismith. 

It  seemed  to  me  that  my  best  plan  would  be  to  go 
with  President  Steyn  and  the  Government  to  the 
Witkopjes,  which  lay  between  Harrismith  and  Vrede, 
and  then  to  break  through  the  English  columns  near 
Vrede  or  Harrismith,  or,  if  it  proved  impossible  to  do 
so  at  these  points,  at  least  to  force  a  way  through 
somewhere. 

On  this  occasion  we  had  a  great  deal  more  difficulty 
in  escaping  from  the  English  than  we  had  had  during 
the  previous  "  drive."  Not  only  had  we  to  deal  with 
these  large  forces  behind,  but  also  with  thousands  of 
troops  which  were  now  approaching  from  Villiersdorp, 
Standerton,  Volksrust,  and  Laingsnek,  and  which  were 
extended  across  the  country  in  one  continuous  line. 
The  whole  cordon  thus  formed  consisted,  as  the  Eng- 
lish themselves  acknowledge,  of  sixty  thousand  men. 

And  again  on  this  occasion  they  did  not  attempt  to 
drive  us  against  one  or  other  of  the  blockhouse  lines, 
but  they  came,  column  on  column,  from  all  sides,  and 
formed  a  big  circle  round  us.    They  thus  made  it 

291 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


quite  apparent  that  they  had  lost  all  faith  in  their 
blockhouses. 

I  only  received  news  of  the  approach  of  these  rein- 
forcements on  the  evening  of  the  22  nd  of  February, 
after  they  had  passed  the  blockhouses.  The  report 
was  brought  to  me  by  Commandant  Hermanus  Botha, 
a  party  of  whose  burghers  had  been  driven  across  the 
Vrede-Frankfort  line  during  the  previous  night.  I 
have  already  stated  that  some  of  the  burghers  under 
Commandant  Ross  had  shared  the  same  experience, 
and  now  they  were  retreating  before  the  English.  I 
also  heard  that  Commandant  Mentz  had  gone  east- 
wards, in  the  belief  that  the  forces  behind  him  would 
move  to  the  west,  but  that  unfortunately  the  columns 
also  moved  to  the  east,  so  that  he  jumped  into  the 
lion's  mouth,  which  was  only  too  ready  to  close  ! 

We  marched  that  night  to  Cornelius  River,  and  the 
day  following  to  Mr.  James  Howell's  farm  at  Brak- 
fontein.  It  was  my  intention  to  break  through  some- 
where between  Vrede  and  Bothaspas. 

But  my  scouts  brought  me  word  in  the  evening  that 
there  was  a  very  poor  chance  of  success  in  that  neigh- 
bourhood, for  the  columns  had  concentrated  there. 
Other  scouts,  however,  reported  that  there  was  a  small 
opening  at  Kalkkrans,  on  the  Holspruit ;  and  so  I  de- 
cided to  march  to  Kalkkrans. 

When  the  sun  had  set  I  left  Brakfontein  and  started 
on  my  road  to  Kalkkrans,  with  the  firm  determination 
to  force  my  way  through  there,  cost  what  it  might. 
If  I  failed  in  the  attempt  I  knew  that  it  would  mean 
an  irretrievable  loss,  for  not  only  should  I  myself  be 
captured,  but  also  President  Steyn  and  the  whole 
Government. 

I  had  with  me  a  portion  of  the  Harrismith  burghers, 
the  commandos  from  Vrede  and  Frankfort,  and  sec- 
tions of  the  commandos  from  Standerton  and  Wak- 
kerstroom,  these  latter  under  Commandant  Alberts. 
This  Commandant  had  come  to  these  districts  to 
obtain  horses  for  his  burghers ;  he  was  obliged  to  be 

292 


THROUGH  SIXTY  THOUSAND  TROOPS 


content  with  the  wild  horses  of  the  veldt,  for  there 
were  no  others  to  be  had. 

Beside  the  above  burghers,  I  had  with  me  old  men 
and  children,  and  others  who  were  non-combatants. 
These  had  joined  the  commando  to  escape  falling  into 
the  enemy's  hands. 

Altogether  I  had  well-nigh  two  thousand  persons 
with  me.  Commandant  Mentz  was,  like  myself,  en- 
closed in  the  drive,"  but  some  distance  away.  Gen- 
eral Wessels,  Commandant  Beukes,  and  some  of  the 
Bethlehem  burghers  were  in  the  same  predicament  to 
the  west  of  us.  I  did  not  know  for  certain  where 
these  officers  were  placed,  and  therefore  I  could  not 
inform  them  of  my  plan  to  break  through  that  night, 
for  I  had  only  come  to  this  determination  after  the 
sun  had  set.  But  I  felt  sure  that  they  would  at  all 
costs  make  their  way  through  the  cordon.^ 

Commandant  Jan  Meijer  had  met  me  at  Brakfon- 
tein,  but  one  party  of  his  burghers  was  still  six  miles 
to  the  south.  When  I  decided  to  break  through,  I 
sent  him  orders  to  follow  me  ;  and  this  he  was  quite 
capable  of  doing,  as  he  was  well  acquainted  with  this 
part  of  the  country.  My  orders  were  that  the  mounted 
men  were  to  proceed  in  advance,  taking  with  them 
my  little  waggon  drawn  by  eight  mules. 

This  waggon  had  accompanied  me  into  Cape  Colo- 
ny, and  since  that  time — for  fourteen  weary  months 
— had  never  left  me.  I  had  even  taken  it  with  me 
when,  a  fortnight  previously,  I  had  broken  through  the 
blockhouse  lines. 

Behind  the  horsemen  came  the  aged  and  the  sick, 
who  occupied  the  remaining  vehicles,  and  lastly  the 
cattle,  divided  into  several  herds. 

In  this  order  we  rode  on. 

When  we  were  approaching  the  spot  at  which  I  ex- 
pected to  find  the  enemy,  I  ordered  Commandant 
Ross  and  one  hundred  men,  with  Hermanns  Botha 

»  In  this  I  was  correct.  They  contrived  to  break  through  where  the  enemy 
were  more  scattered. 


293 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


and  Alberts,  and  portions  of  their  commandos,  to  go 
on  ahead  of  us. 

After  passing  through  Holspruit  we  inclined  to  the 
west,  as  the  road  to  the  east  would,  according  to  my 
scouts,  have  led  us  right  into  the  English  camp.  But  it 
was  not  with  one  camp  only  that  we  had  to  deal :  the 
English  were  everywhere  :  a  whole  army  lay  before 
us — an  army  so  immense  that  many  Englishmen 
thought  that  it  would  be  a  task  beyond  the  stupid  and 
illiterate  Boer  to  count  it,  much  less  to  understand  its 
significance.  I  will  pander  to  the  English  conception 
of  us  and  say,  We  have  seen  them :  they  are  a 
great  big  lot ! " 

We  had  hardly  moved  three  hundred  paces  from 
where  we  had  crossed  Holspruit,  when  the  English, 
lined  up  about  three  hundred  yards  in  front  of  us, 
and  opened  fire.  We  saw  that  they  did  not  intend  our 
flight  to  be  an  easy  one. 

Before  we  had  reached  the  spruit,"  ^  and  while 
crossing  it,  the  burghers  had  kept  pushing  ahead 
and  crowds  had  even  passed  us,  but  the  enemy's  fire 
checked  them  and  they  wheeled  round. 

Only  the  men  under  Commandants  Ross,  Botha, 
and  Alberts  did  not  waver.  These  officers  and  their 
veldtcornets  with  less  than  one  hundred  men  stormed 
the  nearest  position  of  the  enemy,  who  were  occupy- 
ing a  fort  on  the  brow  of  a  steep  bank. 

I  shouted  to  my  command:  "Charge." 

I  exerted  all  my  powers  of  persuasion  to  arrest  the 
flight  of  my  burghers ;  even  bringing  the  sjambok 
into  the  argument. 

Two  hundred  and  fifty  were  all  that  I  could  bring 
back  to  the  fight,  whilst,  as  I  have  said,  the  Comman- 
dants had  a  hundred  with  them  when  they  charged  ; 
the  rest,  regardless  of  my  attempts  to  stop  them, 
fled. 

1  was  also  without  my  staff,  some  of  whom  had 
remained  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy  awaiting  my 

*  Spruit — rivulet. 
«Q4 


THROUGH  SIXTY  THOUSAND  TROOPS 


orders  as  to  what  was  to  be  done  with  my  little  wag- 
gon. Others,  amongst  whom  was  my  son  Kootie, 
who  was  then  acting  as  my  secretary,  had  followed 
me,  but  had  got  lost  in  the  confusion  of  the  moment. 

This  confusion  arose  from  the  fact  that  the  burghers 
imagined  that  they  had  got  through  at  the  first  at- 
tempt, but  had  found  themselves  again  fired  at  from 
the  front.  Meanwhile,  I  hurried  to  and  fro,  encour- 
aging the  burghers  in  their  attempts  to  break  through. 
When  thus  engaged  I  came  across  two  of  my  staff, 
Albertus  Theunissen  and  Burt  Nissey.  To  them  I 
gave  the  order :  Get  the  waggon  through  at  all 
costs."  I  also  found  my  son,  Isaac,  and  kept  him 
with  me.  The  English  now  were  firing  not  only 
from  in  front  but  also  on  our  right,  and  there  was 
nothing  for  it  but  to  clear  a  road  for  ourselves,  and 
this  we  eventually  succeeded  in  doing,  and  in  about 
forty  minutes  had  at  last  broken  through. 

The  enemy  had  dug  trenches,  thirty  to  forty  paces 
from  each  other,  which  served  as  schanzes.  In  each 
of  these  trenches  were  placed  ten  to  thirty  men. 
They  had  also  a  Maxim-Nordenfeldt,  which,  at  first, 
kept  up  a  hot  fire  ;  but  soon  was  silenced  as  the  gun- 
ners were  shot  down.  The  rest  of  the  troops  retired 
with  the  gun,  but  had  to  leave  the  caisson  behind 
them.  It  was  evident  to  me  from  the  way  in  which 
they  fired  that  the  English  were  retreating,  and  so  I 
despatched  two  men  to  tell  the  burghers,  who  had 
gone  back,  to  come  on ;  but  this  they  did  not  do, 
thinking  perhaps  that  they  could  discover  a  safer 
route  on  the  following  evening.  This  was  short- 
sighted policy  on  their  part,  for  the  circle  within 
which  they  were  caught  was  daily  becoming  narrower, 
and  it  was  plain  that  on  the  third  day  the  enemy 
would  be  so  close  that  all  hope  of  escape  would  be 
gone. 

The  two  burghers  did  not  return,  and  we  went  on 
without  them,  taking  with  us  our  wounded — twelve 
in  number    Two  of  these,  whose  injuries  were  seri- 

295 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


ous,  had  been  placed  by  some  of  my  staff  on  my  wag- 
gon ;  one  was  Van  der  Merwe,  a  member  of  President 
Steyn's  bodyguard  ;  the  other  was  a  boy  of  thirteen 
years  old,  named  Olivier. 

We  hurried  on,  and  came,  shortly  after  sundown,  to 
the  farm  called  "  Bavaria,"  on  the  Bothasberg.  There 
Van  der  Merwe  died. 

The  boy  had  already  been  relieved  from  his  suffer- 
ings. Thus,  once  again,  the  soil  drank  the  blood  of  a 
child. 

Eleven  of  my  men  were  left  dead  on  the  battlefield. 
We  had  to  leave  them  there,  for  to  recover  their 
bodies  might  have  meant  the  sacrifice  of  more  lives. 

When  the  burghers  and  I  forced  our  way  through 
the  storm  of  bullets,  we  had  with  us  President  Steyn, 
the  Members  of  the  Government,  and  the  Rev.  D. 
Kestell,  minister  of  the  Dutch  Reformed  Church  at 
Harrismith. 

The  greater  part  of  the  English,  indeed  all  of  them, 
so  far  as  we  could  observe,  remained,  during  the  24th, 
on  the  spot  where  we  had  left  them.  We  found  out, 
later  on,  that  we  had  broken  through  their  lines  at  the 
point  where  Colonel  Rimington's  force  was  stationed. 

The  following  day  the  columns  departed.  We  then 
went  to  bury  our  dead,  but  found  that  the  enemy  had 
already  done  so.  But  as  the  graves  which  they  had 
made  were  very  shallow,  we  dug  them  deeper. 

During  that  night  (the  25th)  another  force  of  burgh- 
ers, to  the  number  of  about  three  hundred  and  fifty, 
broke  through  the  English  cordon.  Our  men  only 
lost  two  killed,  and  eleven  wounded. 

Besides  those  already  mentioned,  the  burghers  un- 
der General  Wessel  Wessels  and  Commandant  Mentz 
were  also  among  those  who  escaped  of  the  two  thou- 
sand troops  surrounded  by  the  enemy. 

With  the  others  it  fared  but  ill. 

The  English  closed  in,  and  the  circle  became  nar- 
rower and  narrower. 

On  the  27th  of  February,  1902 — **  Majuba  Day" — 

296 


THROUGH  SIXTY  THOUSAND  TROOPS 


Commandant  Van  Merwe  and  four  hundred  men  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.^ 

On  that  very  day,  in  the  year  1881,  the  famous  bat- 
tle of  Majuba  had  been  fought.  Nineteen  years  after- 
wards, on  the  same  day  of  the  same  month,  we  suffered 
a  terrible  defeat  at  Paardeberg,  where  we  lost  General 
Piet  Cronje  and  a  great  force  of  burghers. 

And  now  the  27th  of  February  had  come  round 
again,  and  this  time  it  was  the  twenty-first  anniversary 
of  Majuba  that  we  were  celebrating.  The  day  of  our 
coming  of  age  had  thus  arrived,  if  I  may  be  allowed 
to  say  so.  But  instead  of  the  Republics  now  attaining 
their  majority — as  they  should  have  done,  according 
to  all  precedent — minority  would  have  been  a  more 
fitting  word  to  describe  the  condition  in  which  we  now 
found  ourselves — for,  through  the  losses  which  we  had 
just  sustained,  we  were  minus  not  only  a  large  num- 
ber of  burghers,  but  also  an  enormous  quantity  of 
cattle,  which  ought  to  have  served  as  food  to  our 
commandos  and  families,  but  which  the  enemy  had 
captured. 

The  cattle  which  had  just  been  taken  from  us  had 
formed  the  greater  part  of  our  cattle  in  this  district. 
We  had  always  been  able,  until  now,  to  get  them 
safely  away  ;  the  unevenness  of  the  veldt  here  was 
greatly  in  our  favour.  This  time  we  could  not.  How 
am  I  to  explain  the  inexplicable  ?  We  had  sinned — 
but  not  against  Engla7id  I 

*  Also  my  son,  Jacobus  (Kootie).  He  has  now  returned  from  St.  Helena, 
whither  he  had  been  sent  as  a  prisoner,  and  we  have  met.  He  tells  me  that  on 
the  night  when  I  broke  through,  he  wanted  to  come  with  me,  but  was  unable 
to  do  so,  because  his  horse  had  been  shot  under  him- 


297 


CHAPTER  XXXV 


I  go  to  the  Transvaal  with  President 

Steyn 

ON  the  26th  of  February  I  went  with  the  Govern- 
ment to  Duminys  Drift,  on  the  Wilge  River, 
and  we  thus  found  ourselves  again  at  the  farm  of  Ron- 
debosch. 

The  Government  remained  there  for  a  few  days,  and 
then  President  Steyn  decided  to  go  into  the  western 
parts  of  the  State,  where  Generals  Badenhorst  and 
Nieuwouwdt  were  then  operating.  He  thought  that 
if  he  absented  himself  from  the  north-eastern  districts 
the  English  would  cease  their  devastations  in  that  part 
of  the  country,  for  it  was  well  known  that  the  enemy's 
concentration  of  forces  was  principally  aimed  at  the 
President  and  myself. 

I,  however,  did  not  intend  to  follow  his  example, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  got  myself  ready  to  join  the  Heil- 
bron  commando.  By  March  22nd  all  my  preparations 
were  made,  and  I  had,  alas!  to  say  farewell  to  my  trusty 
friend — my  little  waggon  !  I  saw  that  it  must  be  re- 
linquished— that  I  could  not  carry  it  about  with  me 
any  longer.  I  left  it  at  a  farm,  first  taking  out  my 
documents  and  papers ;  I  ordered  these  to  be  concealed 
for  greater  safety,  in  a  cave  on  the  farm  of  General 
Wessels. 

The  clothes  and  ammunition  of  myself  and  staff  had 
been  hidden  in  this  cave  for  some  time. 

The  following  day  I  joined  President  Steyn,  who 
told  me  that  he  wished  me  to  accompany  him  in  his 
march  to  the  west.  And  although  it  did  not  agree 
with  my  own  ideas — principally,  because  I  did  not 
want  the  enemy  to  think  that  I  was  running  away  from 

298 


WITH  PRESIDENT  STEYN 


them — I  consented  to  this  plan,  and  the  more  willingly 
because  it  was  some  time  since  I  had  visited  the  west- 
ern commandos. 

It  was  a  long  journey  that  lay  before  us,  and  I  had 
only  the  clothes  that  I  was  then  wearing.  I  would 
have  sent  for  another  suit  had  I  not  heard  that  the 
enemy  were  encamped  close  to  the  cave  where  our 
treasures  lay  hidden.^ 

I  had  therefore  to  do  the  best  I  could  with  what  I 
had.  There  was  no  clothing  to  be  got  in  the  western 
districts,  so  that  when  my  present  outfit  was  worn  out, 
I  should  be  compelled  to  put  on  khaki " — although 
there  was  nothing  I  relished  less  than  to  rob  a  prisoner 
of  war. 

We  started  out  that  same  evening  in  the  direction 
of  the  railway  line.  Our  party  consisted  of  about 
two  hundred  men,  composed  as  follows:  the  President, 
with  his  bodyguard  of  thirty  men,  under  Commandant 
H.  Van  Niekerk,  the  Government,  Commandant  Van 
,de  Merwe,  of  Vredefort,  my  staff  and  myself. 

Before  daybreak  we  got  through  the  Heilbron- 
Frankfort  line  of  blockhouses  without  accident ;  and 
on  the  following  night  (March  5th)  we  crossed  the 
railway  line,  between  Wolvehoek  and  Viljoensdrift. 
Whilst  we  were  occupied  there  in  cutting  the  tele- 
graph wires,  the  enemy  fired  a  few  rounds  on  us,  at  a 
distance  of  five  hundred  or  six  hundred  paces.  We 
approached  nearer,  and  they  then  opened  fire  with  a 
Maxim — but  without  doing  any  damage. 

We  continued  on  our  road,  past  Parijs  and  Vrede- 
fort, towards  Bothaville,  and  we  came  upon  a  block- 
house line  which  extended  from  Kroonstad  to  the 
Vaal  River.  We  rested  for  two  days,  to  the  north  of 
Bothaville ;  during  this  time  my  scouts  captured  from 
the  enemy  eighteen  horses,  most  of  which  were  in 
good  condition. 

*  Shortly  afterwards  I  heard  that  it  was  Colonel  Rimington's  column  who 
were  encamped  there.  They  discovered  the  cave,  and  removed  the  documents 
and  wearing  apparel,  leaving  me  with  only  a  suit  of  clothes — which  I  should 
have  liked  to  preserve  as  a  curiosity  ! 

299 


On  the  night  of  March  12th  we  broke  through  the 
blockhouse  line,  some  five  miles  to  the  west  of  Botha- 
ville.    When  we  were  about  fifty  paces  from  the  line, 
somebody  to  our  left  challenged  us : 
Halt !    Who  goes  there  ?  " 

He  challenged  us  a  second  time,  and  then  fired. 

At  once  seven  or  eight  sentries  fired  upon  us.  Shots 
also  were  directed  at  us  from  the  right.  Nevertheless 
we  cut  through  the  barbed  wire  and  crossed  in  safety, 
the  firing  still  continuing,  until  we  were  about  fifteen 
hundred  paces  on  the  far  side  of  the  Hne.  Fortunately 
no  one  was  hit. 

Having  thus  escaped  from  the  last  ''White  Ele- 
phant "  that  we  should  have  to  reckon  with,  the  next 
obstacle  to  be  encountered  was  the  Vaal  River.  For 
the  President,  since  we  had  crossed  the  Valsch  River, 
had  decided  to  visit  De  la  Rey,  in  order  to  place  him- 
self under  medical  advice.  His  eyes  had  become  very 
weak  during  the  last  fortnight  or  so,  and  he  thought 
that  Dr.  Van  Rennenkampf  might  be  able  to  do  some- 
thing for  them. 

Thus  we  had  to  cross  the  Vaal  River. 

But  we  heard  that  there  was  a  military  post  at  Com- 
mandodrift,  where  we  wanted  to  cross,  and  further, 
that  all  the  other  fords  were  occupied  by  the  English. 
We  should  have  been  in  a  great  difficulty  had  not  one 
of  our  burghers,  Pietersen,  who  knew  this  district 
thoroughly,  brought  us  across  the  river  by  a  footpath 
ford. 

We  crossed  on  March  15th.  The  current  was  so 
strong  that  in  places  the  horses  were  almost  swimming  ; 
in  other  places  the  river-bed  was  strewn  with  huge 
boulders,  over  which  our  steeds  had  to  cHmb.  How- 
ever, we  all  managed  to  get  safely  over,  and  arrived  at 
Witpoort  on  the  evening  of  the  i6th.  On  the  follow- 
ing day  we  joined  General  De  la  Rey. 

It  was  a  most  interesting  occasion.  We  had  a 
hearty  reception,  several  impromptu  *'  addresses  "  be- 
ing presented  to  the  President,  who  in  turn  spoke  to 

300 


WITH  PRESIDENT  STEYN 


the  burghers  with  much  fire  and  enthusiasm.  They 
were  already  in  the  best  of  spirits,  as  they  might  well 
be,  for  their  General  had  but  recently  won  victories 
over  Von  Donop  and  Lord  Methuen. 

Dr.  Van  Rennenkampf,  having  examined  the  Pres- 
ident's eyes,  said  that  he  must  remain  for  some  time 
under  his  care.  Accordingly  I  left  President  Steyn 
with  De  la  Rey,  and,  on  the  third  day  after  our  arrival, 
set  out  with  my  staff  to  join  General  Badenhorst,  who 
was  then  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Boshof.  It  was  be- 
coming more  and  more  important  that  I  should  see 
Badenhorst  and  Nieuwouwdt,  and  discuss  with  them 
how  best  they  might  collect  their  forces,  for  I  wished 
to  be  able  to  attack  the  first  English  column  that 
should  enter  the  western  district  of  the  State. 

I  had  received  reports  that,  with  the  exception  of 
the  garrison  at  Boshof,  the  west,  for  the  moment,  was 
free  from  the  enemy  ;  and  this  information  caused  me 
no  surprise,  for  I  could  well  believe  that  they  had  just 
"  packed  up  their  trunks  "  in  the  north. 

On  the  25th  of  March  I  joined  General  Badenhorst 
on  the  Gannapan,^  thirty  miles  to  the  north-east  of 
Boshof.  I  at  once  sent  an  express  to  General  Nieu- 
wouwdt, ordering  him  to  come  to  me  with  all  speed, 
and  to  bring  about  four  hundred  and  fifty  of  his  men 
with  him.  Meanwhile,  General  Badenhorst  received 
instructions  from  me  to  get  all  his  scattered  com- 
mandos together.^ 

Before  there  had  been  time  for  these  orders  to  be 
carried  out  I  received,  on  March  28th,  a  letter  from 
President  Steyn,  giving  me  the  following  informa- 
tion : 

Mr.  S.  W.  Burger,  Vice-States  President  of  the 
South  African  Republic,  had  written  to  President 
Steyn,  saying  that  he  was  at  Kroonstad,  and  that  he 

»  A  salt  lake. 

*  Commandant  Jacobsz  was  somewhere  not  very  far  from  Kimberley ;  Com- 
mandant Bester,  close  to  Brandfort ;  Commandant  Jacobus  Theron,  near  Smal- 
deel ;  Commandant  Flamming,  near  Hoopstad ;  and  Commandant  Pieter 
Erasmus,  near  the  Gannapan. 

301 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


wished  to  meet  the  Government  of  the  Orange  Free 
State.  He  also  said  that  a  copy  of  the  correspondence 
between  the  Governments  of  the  Queen  of  the  Nether- 
lands and  of  the  King  of  England  had  been  sent  to 
him  by  Lord  Kitchener. 

From  this  correspondence  it  appeared  that  the 
Netherlands  Government  (considering  the  condition 
of  affairs  to  be  exceptional,  in  that  the  Boers  who 
were  still  fighting  were  unable  to  negotiate  either  with 
the  British  Government  or  with  the  Deputation  in 
Europe)  felt  justified  in  offering  to  act  as  an  inter- 
mediary. In  this  capacity  they  were  prepared  to  ask 
the  Deputation  if  they  were  willing — supposing  that  a 
safe  conduct  could  be  obtained  from  England — to  go 
to  South  Africa,  and  discuss  matters  with  the  Boers, 
in  order  to  be  able  subsequently  to  return  to  Europe, 
empowered  to  conclude  a  Treaty  of  Peace,  which 
would  be  binding  both  in  South  Africa  and  in  Europe. 

Lord  Lansdowne,  in  the  name  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, replied  that  his  Government  highly  appreci- 
ated the  humane  intentions  of  the  Government  of  the 
Netherlands,  but  that  they  had  made  up  their  mmds 
to  abide  by  their  former  decision,  and  not  to  accept 
any  foreign  intervention.  Further,  that  the  Deputa- 
tion could,  if  they  wished,  address  a  request  for  a  safe 
conduct  to  the  British  Government,  but  that  the  mat- 
ter could  not  be  decided  in  England,  until  the  precise 
nature  of  the  request,  and  the  grounds  on  which  it  was 
preferred,  were  fully  understood. 

Lord  Lansdowne  also  said  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment was  not  quite  clear  as  to  whether  the  Deputation 
still  retained  any  influence  over  the  Boer  leaders  in 
South  Africa ;  that  they  thought  that  the  power  to 
negotiate  for  the  Orange  Free  State  lay  w^ith  Presi- 
dent Steyn,  and,  for  the  Transvaal,  with  President 
Burger ;  and  that  they  considered  that  the  most  satis- 
factory arrangement  would  be  for  the  leaders  of  the 
Boers  to  negotiate  directly  with  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  British  forces  in  South  Africa,  who  had 

302 


WITH  PRESIDENT  STEYN 


been  ordered  to  transmit  at  once  to  the  British  Gov- 
ernment any  offers  or  proposals  which  might  be  made 
to  him. 

Lord  Lansdowne  concluded  by  saying  that,  if  the 
Boers  wished  to  negotiate,  it  must  be  in  South  Africa, 
and  not  in  Europe.  For,  if  the  Deputation  were  to 
go  to  South  Africa,  at  least  three  months  must  elapse 
before  anything  could  be  effected,  and,  as  hostilities 
must  continue  during  this  delay,  much  suffering  would 
be  caused. 

Vice-President  Burger  went  on  to  say  that  when  he 
received  a  copy  of  this  correspondence  he  could  only 
conclude  that  Lord  Kitchener,  indirectly  at  least,  if 
not  directly,  was  asking  the  Boer  leaders  to  negotiate 
with  him.  Accordingly,  he  wrote  to  Lord  Kitchener 
for  a  free  pass,  and,  having  obtained  it,  came  with  his 
Government  by  rail  to  Kroonstad.  He  now,  acccord- 
ingly,  requested  President  Steyn  to  let  him  know 
when  and  where  the  two  Governments  could  meet. 
He  also  intimated  that  he  had  written  to  Lord  Kitch- 
ener, informing  him  that  he  wished — after  consulting 
tne  Government  of  the  Orange  Free  State — to  make 
a  Peace  Proposal. 

President  Steyn  told  me  that  when  the  Free  State 
Government  received  this  letter  from  President  Bur- 
ger, they  had  not  been  able  to  see  their  way  to  refuse 
what  the  latter  asked,  as  the  promise  of  a  Peace  Pro- 
posal had  already  been  sent.  They  had  regretted, 
however,  that  the  Transvaal  Government  had  made 
use  of  a  safe  conduct,  and  gone  through  the  English 
lines — not  that  they  had  for  one  moment  distrusted 
the  Government — but  simply  because  the  proceeding 
had  seemed  to  have  been  ill-advised.  Nevertheless 
the  Free  State,  finding  itself  not  only  obliged  to  dis- 
cuss the  matters  in  question  with  the  Transvaal,  but 
also,  conjointly  with  the  Transvaal,  to  make  a  Propo- 
sal to  Lord  Kitchener,  had  appointed  a  place  of  meet- 
ing in  accordance  with  the  request  which  had  been 
addressed  to  it. 

303 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


This  was  what  I  learnt  from  President  Steyn's 
letter. 

On  the  5th  of  April  the  President  received  another 
letter  from  President  Burger,  arranging  that  the 
meeting  should  take  place  at  Klerksdorp.  A  safe 
conduct  for  the  President  and  Government  of  the 
Orange  Free  State  was  sent  at  the  same  time. 


304 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 


Peace  Negotiations 

GENERAL  DE  LA  REY,  who,  as  a  Member  of 
the  Transvaal  Government,  had  to  be  present 
at  the  coming  deliberations,  accompanied  the  Presi- 
dent to  Klerksdorp,  where  they  arrived  on  the  9th  of 
April,  and  found  the  Transvaal  Government  already 
there  awaiting  them. 

The  two  Governments  held  their  first  meeting  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  same  day.  The  South  African 
Republic  was  represented  by  : — Vice-States-President 
S.  W.  Burger  ;  Commandant-General  Louis  Botha ; 
Secretary  of  State  F.  W.  Reitz  ;  General  De  la  Rey ; 
Ex-General  L.  J.  Meijer ;  and  Mr.  J.  B.  Krogh. 
Although  not  a  member  of  the  Government,  the 
States-Procureur,  L.  Jacobsz,  was  also  present. 

On  behalf  of  the  Orange  Free  State  appeared : — 
States-President  M.  T.  Steyn  ;  Commander-in-Chief 
C.  R.  de  Wet ;  Vice-Commander-in-Chief  Judge  J. 
B.  M.  Hertzog;  States-Secretary  W.  J.  C.  Brebner ; 
and  General  C.  H.  Olivier. 

It  was  decided  that  no  minutes  should  be  taken. 
Accordingly,  I  am  only  able  to  give  a  summary  of  the 
proceedings. 

The  meeting  having  been  opened  with  prayer,  the 
Vice-President  of  the  South  African  Republic  said 
that  the  fact  that  Lord  Kitchener  had  sent  in  a  copy 
of  the  correspondence  between  the  Governments  of 
the  Netherlands  and  England,  was  looked  upon  by 
himself  and  his  Government  as  an  invitation  on  the 
part  of  England  to  the  two  States  to  discuss  the  mat- 
ter dealt  with  in  that  correspondence,  and  to  see  if 

305 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


peace  could  not  be  concluded.  Before,  however,  the 
meeting  could  make  a  proposal,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  hear  what  the  state  of  affairs  really  was. 

Thereupon,  firstly.  Commandant  -  General  Louis 
Botha,  then  I,  and  lastly.  General  De  La  Rey,  gave  a 
report  of  how  matters  stood. 

President  Burger  now  asked  whether  an  interview 
with  Lord  Kitchener  should  be  asked  for,  and  (in  case 
Lord  Kitchener  acceded  to  this)  what  we  were  to  de- 
mand, and  what  we  should  be  prepared  to  sacrifice. 
He  went  on  to  ask  President  Steyn  what  he  thought 
of  the  proposal  which  the  Transvaal  had  made  to  the 
Free  State  Government  in  the  October  of  the  previ- 
ous year. 

President  Steyn  answered  that  he  was  still  of  the 
same  opinion  as  in  June,  1901,  when  the  two  Govern- 
ments had  agreed  to  stand  by  Independence.  If  the 
English  now  refused  to  grant  Independence,  then  the 
war  must  continue.  He  said  that  he  would  rather  sur- 
render to  the  English  unconditionally  than  make  terms 
with  them. 

The  remainder  of  the  day  was  occupied  in  listening 
to  speeches  from  State-Secretary  Reitz  and  President 
Burger. 

On  the  following  day  the  speakers  were : — L.  J. 
Meijer,  J.  B.  Krogh,  myself,  State- Secretary  Reitz, 
and  Judge  Hertzog.  The  last-named  made  a  propo- 
sal, which  was  seconded  by  General  C.  H.  Olivier. 
This  proposal,  after  it  had  been  subjected  for  revision 
to  a  Commission,  consisting  of  the  two  Presidents,  Mr. 
Reitz,  and  Judge  Hertzog,  was  accepted  on  the  fol- 
lowing  day.     It  ran  as  follows  : — 

"  The  Governments  of  the  South  African  Republic 
and  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  having  met,  induced 
thereto  by  the  receipt,  from  His  Excellency  Lord 
Kitchener,  of  the  correspondence  exchanged  in  Eu- 
rope between  the  Government  of  His  Majesty  the 
King  of  England,  and  that  of  Her  Majesty  the  Queen 

306 


PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 


of  the  Netherlands,  referring  to  the  desirability  of 
giving  to  the  Governments  of  these  Republics  an  op- 
portunity to  come  into  communication  with  their 
plenipotentiaries  in  Europe,  who  still  enjoy  the  trust 
of  both  Governments  : 

**  And  taking  into  consideration  the  conciliatory 
spirit  which,  as  it  appears  from  this  correspondence, 
inspires  the  Government  of  His  Britannic  Majesty, 
and  also  of  the  desire  therein  uttered  by  Lord  Lans- 
downe,  in  the  name  of  his  Government,  to  make  an 
end  to  this  strife  : 

"  Are  of  opinion  that  it  is  now  a  favourable  mo- 
ment to  again  shew  their  readiness  to  do  everything 
possible  to  bring  this  war  to  an  end : 

"  And  decide,  therefore  to  make  certain  proposals 
to  His  Excellency  Lord  Kitchener,  as  representative 
of  the  Government  of  His  Britannic  Majesty,  which 
may  serve  as  a  basis  for  further  negotiations,  having 
in  view  the  achievement  of  the  desired  peace. 

Further,  it  is  the  opinion  of  these  two  Govern- 
ments that,  in  order  to  expedite  the  achievement  of 
the  desired  aim,  and  to  prevent,  as  far  as  possible,  any 
misunderstanding.  His  Excellency  Lord  Kitchener 
should  be  asked  to  meet  personally  these  Govern- 
ments at  a  time  and  place  by  him  appointed,  so  that 
the  said  Governments  may  lay  before  him  Peace  Pro- 
posals (as  they  will  be  prepared  to  do),  in  order  that, 
by  direct  conversation  and  discussion  with  him,  all 
such  questions  as  shall  arise  may  be  solved  at  once, 
and  also  that  this  meeting  may  further  and  bring 
about  the  desired  result." 

A  letter  was  now  written  to  Lord  Kitchener  (who 
was  at  Pretoria)  enclosing  the  above  Proposal,  and 
signed  by  the  two  Presidents. 

In  the  afternoon  the  two  Governments  met  again, 
to  consider  what  proposals  they  should  make  to  the 
British  Government.  After  a  lengthy  discussion,  it 
was  decided,  on  the  proposal  of  General  De  la  Rey, 

307 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


seconded  by  States-Procureur  L.  Jacobsz,  that  the 
matter  in  hand  should  be  entrusted  to  the  Commis- 
sion, which  consisted,  as  I  have  ah-eady  said,  of  the 
two  Presidents,  States-Secretary  Reitz,  and  Judge 
Hertzog :  and  the  next  morning  this  Commission 
handed  in  the  following  report,  which  was  accepted 
by  the  meeting  : — 

The  Commission,  after  having  taken  into  consid- 
eration the  wish  of  the  meeting,  namely,  that  proposals 
should  be  drafted  (in  connexion  with  the  letter  of 
yesterday,  signed  by  the  two  Presidents,  to  His  Ex- 
cellency Lord  Kitchener)  for  eventual  consideration 
by  His  Excellency  Lord  Kitchener,  proposes  the  fol- 
lowing points : — 

**  I.  The  concluding  of  a  Treaty  of  Friendship  and 
Peace,  including : 

(a)  Arrangements  re  a  Customs  Union. 
(d)  **  re  Post,  Telegraph  and  Rail- 

way Union. 
"  (c)  Granting  of  the  Franchise. 
"  2.  Demolition  of  all  States  Forts. 
3.  Arbitration  in  any  future  differences  which  may 
arise  between  the  contracting  parties ;  the  arbitrators 
to  be  nominated  m  equal  numbers  from  each  party 
from  among  their  own  subjects ;  the  said  arbitrators 
to  add  one  to  their  number,  who  is  to  have  the  casting 
vote. 

"4.  Equal  rights  for  the  English  and  Dutch  lan- 
guages in  the  schools. 

"5.  Reciprocal  amnesty." 

The  same  morning  a  letter  enclosing  this  proposal 
was  sent  to  Lord  Kitchener,  after  which  Judge  Hert- 
zog and  Commander  Louis  Botha  addressed  the  meet- 
ing. 

After  the  latter  had  finished  an  address  of  great  im- 
portance, General  Wilson,  who  had  the  command  at 

308 


PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 


Klerksdorp,  entered  the  room  where  the  meeting  was 
being  held  and  stated  that  Lord  Kitchener  was  pre- 
pared to  grant  us  an  interview,  and  that  we  could  travel 
to  Pretoria  that  very  evening. 

Accordingly,  on  the  evening  of  the  nth  of  April, 
we  went  to  Pretoria,  where,  on  the  following  morn- 
ing, we  met  Lord  Kitchener  and  handed  in  our  pro- 
posal. 

Lord  Kitchener  wished  for  a  proposal  of  a  very  dif- 
ferent character  from  that  of  the  two  Governments ; 
but  as  it  would  not  have  been  proper  for  them  to  make 
any  proposal  injurious  to  Independence,  the  Presidents 
declared  that  they  could  not  do  so,  and  asked  him  to 
send  to  the  English  Government  the  proposal  which 
they  had  already  laid  before  him.  Lord  Kitchener  at 
last  acceded  to  this  request,  and  the  following  telegram 
was  accordingly  sent  to  England  : 

From  Lord  Kitchener  to  the  Secretary  of 

State. 

Pretoria,  April  i2tk,  1902. 
The  Boer  Representatives  desire  to  acquaint  His 
Majesty's  Government  with  the  fact  that  they  enter- 
tain an  earnest  wish  for  peace,  and  that  they,  there- 
fore, have  decided  to  ask  the  British  Government  to 
bring  hostilities  to  an  end,  and  to  proceed  to  formu- 
late a  Treaty  of  Peace.  They  are  ready  to  accept  an 
Agreement,  by  which,  in  their  opinion,  all  future  wars 
between  them  and  the  British  Government  in  South 
Africa  may  be  avoided.  They  think  that  this  aim  can 
be  attained  if  provisions  are  made  in  relation  to  the 
following  points  : — 

**  I.  Franchise. 
2.  Equal  rights  for  the  Dutch  and  English  lan- 
guages in  Educational  matters. 

"  3.  Customs  Union. 

**4.  Demolition  of  all  the  forts  in  the  Transvaal 
and  Free  State. 

309 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


"5.  Arbitration  in  case  of  future  disagreements, 
and  only  subjects  of  the  parties  to  be  arbitrators. 
6.  Mutual  amnesty. 

But  in  case  these  terms  should  not  be  satisfactory, 
then  they  wish  to  know  what  terms  the  British  Gov- 
ernment will  give  them,  so  that  the  result  which  they 
all  desire  may  be  attained." 

On  Monday,  April  15th,  Lord  Kitchener  sent  to 
the  two  Governments  a  copy  of  the  following  tele- 
gram, which  he  had  received  from  the  Secretary  of 
State  :— 

From  Secretary  of  State  to  Lord  Kitchener. 

"London,  April  13//^,  1902. 
His  Majesty*s  Government  shares  with  all  its 
heart  in  the  earnest  wish  of  the  Boer  Representatives, 
and  trusts  that  the  present  negotiations  will  lead 
thereto.  But  they  have  already  declared  in  the  clear- 
est manner  and  have  to  repeat  that  they  cannot  take 
into  consideration  any  proposals  which  have  as  basis 
the  sanction  of  the  Independence  of  the  former  Re- 
publics, which  are  now  formally  annexed  to  the  Brit- 
ish Crown.  And  it  would  be  well  if  you  and  Milner 
were  to  meet  the  Boer  Representatives,  and  make 
this  plain  to  them.  You  must  encourage  them  to 
make  fresh  proposals  which  we  will  willingly  receive." 

In  this  telegram,  as  the  reader  will  have  observed, 
the  name  of  Lord  Milner  is  mentioned.  Up  till  now 
we  were  dealing  with  Lord  Kitchener  alone,  but  at 
our  next  conversation  the  first-named  was  also  present. 

Both  Representatives  of  the  British  Government 
insisted  that  we  should  negotiate  with  them,  taking 
the  surrender  of  our  Independence  for  granted.  We 
could  not  do  so.  We  had  repeatedly  told  Lord 
Kitchener  that,  constitutionally,  it  was  beyond  the 
power  of  our  Governments  to  discuss  terms  based  on 

310 


PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 


the  giving  up  of  Independence.  Only  the  nation 
could  do  that.  Should  however,  the  British  Govern- 
ment make  a  proposal  which  had,  as  a  basis,  the  tem- 
porary withdrawal  only  of  the  Independence,  then  we 
would  lay  this  proposal  before  the  nation. 

Thereupon  the  following  telegram  was  drawn  up 
and  despatched  : — 

From  Lord  Kitchener  to  the  Secretary  of 

State. 

"  Pretoria,  April  \\th,  1902. 
"  A  difficulty  has  arisen  in  connexion  with  the  ne- 
gotiations. The  representatives  declare  that,  consti- 
tutionally, they  are  not  entitled  to  discuss  terms  which 
are  based  on  the  surrender  of  their  independence,  as  the 
burghers  alone  can  agree  to  such  a  basis.  If,  how- 
ever. His  Majesty's  Government  can  propose  terms 
by  which  their  independence  shall  be  subsequently 
given  back  to  them,  the  representatives,  on  the  matter 
being  fully  explained  to  them,  will  lay  such  conditions 
before  the  people,  without  giving  expression  to  their 
own  opinions." 

The  reply  to  this  was  as  follows  : — 

From  the  Secretary  of  State  to  Lord 
Kitchener. 

"  London,  April  i6tk. 
"  With  great  astonishment  we  have  received  the 
message  from  the  Boer  leaders,  as  contained  in  your 
cable.  The  meeting  was  arranged  in  accordance  with 
their  desires,  and  they  must  have  been  aware,  from  our 
repeated  declarations,  that  we  should  not  be  prepared 
to  consider  any  proposal  based  on  the  revival  of  the 
independence  of  the  two  South  African  States.  We, 
therefore,  were  justified  in  believing  that  the  Boer 
representatives  had  abandoned  all  idea  of  Independ- 
ence, and  that  they  would  make  terms  for  the  sur- 
render of  the  forces  still  in  the  Veldt.    They  now 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


declare  that  they  are  not  constitutionally  in  a  position 
to  discuss  any  terms  which  do  not  include  the  restora- 
tion of  their  Independence,  but  they  ask  what  condi- 
tions would  be  made  if,  after  consulting  their  followers, 
they  should  abandon  the  claim  for  Independence.  This 
does  not  seem  to  us  a  satisfactory  way  of  expediting 
the  end  of  the  hostilities  which  have  caused  the  loss  of 
so  many  lives  and  so  much  money.  We  are,  however, 
as  we  said  before,  desirous  of  preventing  any  further 
bloodshed  and  of  accelerating  the  restoration  of  peace 
and  prosperity  in  the  countries  harassed  by  the  war, 
and  we  empower  you  and  Lord  Milner  to  refer  the 
Boer  leaders  to  the  offer  made  by  you  to  General 
Botha  more  than  twelve  months  ago,  and  to  inform 
them  that — although  the  great  decrease  which  has 
lately  taken  place  in  the  forces  opposed  to  us,  and  also 
the  further  sacrifices  involved  by  the  refusal  of  that 
offer,  would  justify  us  in  dictating  harder  terms — we 
are  still  prepared,  in  the  hope  of  a  lasting  peace  and 
reconciliation,  to  accept  a  general  surrender  in  the 
spirit  of  that  offer,  with  such  amendments  with  regard 
to  details  as  might  be  agreed  upon  mutually." 

It  was  quite  self-evident  that  the  Governments  could 
not  accept  this  proposal  of  the  British  Government, 
because  by  it  the  independence  of  the  Republics  would 
be  sacrificed. 

President  Steyn  pointed  out  emphatically  that  it  lay 
beyond  our  right  to  decide  and  conclude  anything  that 
would  endanger  the  independence  of  the  two  Repub- 
lics. The  nation  alone  could  decide  on  the  question 
of  independence.  For  this  reason,  therefore,  we  asked 
if  we  might  consult  the  people,  and  it  was  agreed  by 
Lord  Kitchener  and  Lord  Milner  that  we  should  go 
back  to  our  commandos  and  hold  meetings  in  every 
district,  in  order  to  learn  thus  the  will  of  the  nation. 
It  was  further  agreed  that  at  the  meetings  of  the 
nation  representatives  should  be  chosen  who,  on  the 
15th  of  May,  1902,  at  Vereeniging,  should  inform  the 

312 


PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 


Governments  what  course  the  nation  desired  them  to 
take. 

On  the  1 8th  of  April  Commandant-General  Louis 
Botha,  General  De  la  Rey,  and  I  left  Pretoria,  pro- 
vided with  a  safe  conduct  for  ourselves  and  for  anyone 
whom  we  should  appoint,  and  proceeded  to  our  differ- 
ent commandos. 

I  went  first  to  the  burghers  of  Vrede  at  Prankop, 
where  I  met  General  Wessel  Wessels  with  his  com- 
mandos on  the  22nd  of  April.  The  nation  was  in  a 
very  miserable  condition,  suffering  from  the  want  of 
all  necessaries,  and  living  only  on  meat  and  maize, 
which  food  was  also  exceedingly  scarce,  and  would 
only  last  for  a  few  months  more.  Notwithstanding 
this,  the  burghers  decided,  to  a  man,  that  they  would 
not  be  satisfied  with  anything  less  than  independence, 
and  that  if  the  English  would  not  accede  to  this  they 
would  continue  to  fight. 

Mr.  Wessel  Wessels,  Member  of  the  Volksraad, 
was  elected  as  chairman,  and  Mr.  Pieter  Schravezan- 
der  as  secretary.  The  representatives  chosen  were 
Commandants  A.  Ross,  Hermanns  Botha,  and  Louis 
Botha  (son  of  Philip  Botha). 

My  second  meeting  I  held  at  Drupfontein,  in  the 
district  of  Bethlehem,  on  the  24th  of  April,  with  the 
burghers  under  the  command  of  Commandants  Frans 
Jacobsz,  Mears,  and  Bruwer.  Mr.  J.  H.  Naude  was 
made  chairman,  and  Landdrost  J.  H.  B.  Wessels  secre- 
tary. It  was  unanimously  decided  that  independence 
had  to  be  maintained,  and  Commandants  Frans  Jacobsz 
and  Bruwer  were  chosen  as  representatives. 

The  next  meeting  I  held  on  the  26th  of  April,  at 
Tweepoort  Farm,  with  the  commandos  under  General 
Michal  Prinsloo.  Mr.  Jan  Van  Schalkwijk  was  chosen 
as  chairman,  and  Mr.  B.  J.  Malan  as  secretary.  Here 
also  the  votes  were  unanimous,  and  General  Michal 
Prinsloo,  Commandant  Rautenbach,  and  Comman- 
dant J.  J.  Van  Niekerk  were  elected  as  representatives. 

After  that  on  Roodekraal  Farm.  I  met  the  burghers 

3^3 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


under  Commandants  Cilliers,  Bester,  Mentz,  and  Van 
Coller.  The  chairman  was  B.  W.  Steyn  (Member  of 
the  Volksraad),  and  the  secretary  Mr.  S.  J.  M.  Wessels. 
Here  again  it  was  unanimously  decided  not  to  surren- 
der the  independence,  and  Commandants  Mentz,  Van 
Coller  and  Bester  were  the  representatives  chosen. 

The  fifth  meeting  I  held  with  the  commandos  under 
General  Johannes  Hattingh,  on  the  ist  of  May,  on 
the  Weltevrede  Farm,  under  the  chairmanship  of  Mr. 
Jan  Lategan,  Johannes  C.  Pietersen  being  secretary. 
As  representatives  we  chose  General  Hattingh  and 
Commandant  Philip  De  Vos.  The  voting  was  unani- 
mous that  the  independence  should  be  maintained. 

On  the  3rd  of  May  I  held  my  sixth  meeting,  with 
the  commandos  under  General  C.  C.  Froneman,  at 
Schaapplaats.  Mr.  Jan  Maree  was  chairman,  and  Mr. 
David  Ross  secretary. 

The  result  was  the  same  as  at  the  other  meetings, 
and  General  Froneman,  Commandants  F.  Cronje  and 
J.  J.  Koen  were  chosen  to  represent  the  commandos. 

From  there  I  went  to  Dewetsdorp,  where  I  met, 
on  the  5th  of  May,  General  George  Brand's  com- 
mandos. Mr.  C.  Smith  acted  as  chairman,  and  Mr. 
W.  J.  Selm  as  secretary  ;  the  representatives  chosen 
were  General  Brand  and  Commander  J.  Rheeder ; 
and  the  burghers  were  equally  determined  to  keep 
their  independence. 

I  went  on  to  Bloemfontem,  and  thence  by  rail  to 
Brandfort,  and  afterwards  to  the  Ouaggashoek  Farm, 
where,  on  the  nth,  I  held  my  eighth  meeting,  with 
the  commandos  of  C.  C.  J.  Baden horst.  The  chair- 
man was  Mr.  N.  B.  Gildenhuis,  and  the  secretary 
Mr.  H.  M.  G.  Davis.  The  elected  representatives 
were  General  Badenhorst  and  Commandants  A.  J. 
Bester  and  Jacobsz.  This  was  my  last  meeting,  and 
it  also  decided  on  maintaining  the  independence. 

The  commandos  under  the  Commandants  Van  der 
Merwe  and  Van  Niekerk  (Vredefort  and  Parijs), 
Flemmmg  (Hoopstad),  Nagel  (part  of  Kroonstad), 

314 


PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 


and  General  Nieuwouwdt  (Fauresmith,  Philippolis, 
and  Jacobsdal),  were  visited  by  Commander-in-Chief 
Judge  Hertzog,  Member  of  the  Executive  Council. 
At  meetings  held  with  these  commandos  the  following 
representatives  were  chosen  : — General  Nieuwouwdt, 
and  the  Commandants  Munnik  Hertzog,  J.  Van  der 
Merwe,  C.  Van  Niekerk,  Flemming,  A.  J.  Bester,  F. 
Jacobsz,  H.  Pretorius,  and  Veldtcornet  Kritzinger, 

At  these  meetings  also  the  burghers  were  unani- 
mous in  their  decision  not  to  give  up  their  independ- 
ence. I  must  add  that  Commandant  H.  Van  Nie- 
kerk was  chosen  as  representative  of  the  bodyguard  of 
President  Steyn.  It  had  been  agreed  with  Lord 
Kitchener  at  Pretoria  that  if  the  chief  officers  of  a 
commando  were  chosen  as  representatives,  then  there 
would  be  an  armistice  between  this  commando,  and 
the  English  during  the  time  the  officers  were  absent 
at  the  meeting  at  Vereeniging.  It  was  also  decided 
that  Lord  Kitchener  should  be  informed  of  the  date 
of  the  departure  of  such  officers. 

This  was  done.  I  sent  the  following  telegram  on 
the  25th  of  April  to  Pretoria : — 

"To  His  Excellency,  Headquarters,  Pretoria  : 
At  meetings  held  in  the  districts  of  Vrede  and 
Harrismith  and  in  that  part  of  Bethlehem  east  and 
north-east  of  the  blockhouse  lines  of  Fouriesburg, 
Bethlehem,  and  Harrismith,  General  Wessels  and  the 
Commandants  were  duly  chosen  as  representatives. 

I  have  decided  that  all  the  representatives  shall 
leave  their  different  commandos  on  the  nth  of  May, 
and  therefore,  in  accordance  with  our  mutual  agree- 
ment, I  shall  expect  an  armistice  to  be  granted  to  the 
different  commandos  from  that  date  until  the  return 
of  their  commandants  from  the  meeting  at  Vereenig- 
ing, on  or  about  the  15th  of  May. 

I  should  be  glad  to  receive  Your  Excellency's 
sanction  to  my  request  that  each  Representative  should 
have  the  right  to  take  one  man  with  him. 

315 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


"  Your  Excellency  will  greatly  oblige  by  sending  a 
reply  to  Kaffirsdorp  in  the  district  of  Bethlehem, 
where  I  am  awaiting  an  answer. 

"  C.  R.  DE  WET, 

"  General  Commander-in-Chief,  Orange  Free  State. 
"Bethlehem,  April  2^th,  1902." 

To  this  I  received  the  following  answer  from  Lord 
Kitchener: — 

"Imperial  Residency,  Pretoria, 
April  2^tJi,  1902. 

•*To  General  de  Wet,  Kaffirsdorp. 

"  In  answer  to  your  message,  I  agree  altogether 
with  your  demands  that  during  the  absence  of  the 
chosen  Representatives  from  their  commandos,  from 
the  nth  of  May  until  their  return,  such  commandos 
shall  not  be  troubled  by  us.  I  also  agree  that  every 
Representative,  as  you  propose,  shall  be  accompanied 
by  one  man. 

**  I  shall  also  be  glad  if  you  would  send  an  officer, 
at  least  two  days  before  the  Meeting,  in  order  to  let  me 
know  about  the  number,  and  the  necessary  arrange- 
ments for  the  treatment  of  the  Representatives  at  this 
Meeting. 

(Signed)       "  KITCHENER." 

On  the  nth  of  May  I  sent  a  telegram  to  Lord 
Kitchener,  in  which  I  said  that,  as  all  my  generals  and 
chief  officers  had  been  chosen  as  Representatives,  the 
armistice  must  begin  on  the  nth  of  May.  The  tele- 
gram was  as  follows : — 

From  General  de  Wet  to  His  Excellency 
Lord  Kitchener. 

Pretoria,  May  wth,  1902. 
"The  following  chief  officers  have  been  chosen  as 
Representatives  for  the  commandos  of  the  districts : 

316 


PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 


Hoopstad,  Boshof,  and  parts  of  Winburg  and  Bloem- 
fontein, — districts  to  the  west  of  the  railway  line. 

"  I.  General  C.  Badenhorst. 

"  2.  Commandant  J.  Jacobsz. 

"  3.  Commandant  A.  Bester. 
"  It  thus  appears  that  all  my  generals  and  chief  com- 
manding officers  are  chosen  as  Representatives  to  at- 
tend at  the  Meeting  of  Vereeniging,  on  the  15th  inst., 
and  according  to  our  mutual  agreement  at  Pretoria,  an 
armistice  will  be  given  from  to-day  (nth  May,  1902) 
in  all  districts  of  the  Orange  Free  State  up  to  a  date 
which  shall  be  agreed  upon  after  the  close  of  the  Meet- 
ing at  Vereeniging.  Any  answer,  previous  to  noon 
of  the  nth  inst.,  will  reach  me  at  Brandfort. 

"  Commander-in-Chief, 

"  Orange  Free  State  Armies." 

In  answer  to  this  I  received  the  following  tele- 
gram : — 

"  Imperial  Residency,  Pretoria, 

"To  General  de  Wet,  Brandfort. 

"  I  have  given  orders,  according  to  our  Agreement, 
that  from  to-morrow,  the  13th  inst,  all  commandos, 
whose  leaders  or  chief  officers  have  been  chosen  to  at- 
tend the  Meeting  at  Vereeniging,  shall  be  exempted 
from  being  attacked  by  my  columns  during  the  a!  - 
sence  of  their  leaders,  in  so  far  as  such  commandos 
withhold  from  offensive  operations.  But  that  does 
not  imply  that  outposts  cannot  be  taken  prisoner  in 
case  they  should  approach  our  lines. 

"KITCHENER." 

It  was  rather  surprising  to  me  that  Lord  Kitchener, 
in  this  telegram,  spoke  only  of  an  armistice  beginning 
on  the  13th  of  May,  because  in  his  telegram  of  the 
25th  he  had  agreed  that  there  should  be  an  armistice 
from  the  nth  of  May.    I  heard  also  from  officers  of 

317 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Heilbron,  Vrede,  and  Bethlehem,  whom  I  met,  on  the 
evening  of  the  14th  of  May,  at  Wolvehoek  Station, 
that  the  English  columns  had  operated  in  their  dis- 
tricts on  the  nth,  12th,  13th,  and  14th.  My  order 
was  that  my  officers  should  not  operate,  but  should 
retreat,  if  the  enemy  should  unexpectedly  operate  on 
the  nth.  On  the  above-mentioned  dates  houses  were 
burnt  down,  cattle  carried  away,  maize  and  other  grain 
destroyed,  burghers  taken  prisoner,  and  (in  one  in- 
stance) shot. 

Such  a  misunderstanding  was  very  regrettable,  and 
all  the  more  so  because  we  were  never  indemnified  for 
the  damage  thus  done. 


318 


CHAPTER  XXXVII 


The  End  of  the  War 

ON  the  morning  of  the  15th  of  May,  I  arrived  at 
Vereeniging  with  some  of  the  Free  State  del- 
egates. The  others  were  already  there,  together  with 
the  thirty  Transvaal  delegates,  Commandant-General 
Louis  Botha  and  General  De  la  Rey.  In  addition  to 
the  above,  the  following  had  also  arrived  :  Vice-State 
President  Burger,  States-President  Steyn,  the  members 
of  the  two  Governments,  and  General  J.  C.  Smuts 
(from  Cape  Colony). 

I  was  exceedingly  sorry  to  find  that  President 
Steyn  was  seriously  ill.  For  the  last  six  weeks  he  had 
been  in  the  doctor's  hands ;  and,  since  his  arrival  at 
Pretoria,  had  been  under  the  care  of  Dr.  Van  der 
Merwe,  of  Krugersdorp.  This  physician  said  that 
serious  consequences  might  ensue  if  his  patient  were 
to  attend  our  meetings,  and  advised  him  to  go  to  his 
home  at  Krugersdorp,  where  he  could  be  properly 
nursed.  It  was  sad  for  us  to  receive  this  news  imme- 
diately we  arrived.  We  asked  ourselves  what  we 
should  do  without  the  President  at  our  meetings? 
At  this  moment  he  seemed  more  indispensable  to  us 
than  ever  before. 

President  Steyn  was  a  statesman  in  the  best  sense  of 
the  word.  He  had  gained  the  respect  and  even  the 
affection  of  us  all.  Of  him,  if  of  any  man,  it  may  be 
said  that  he  never  swerved  from  his  duty  to  his  coun- 
try. No  task  was  too  great  for  him,  no  burden  too 
heavy,  if  thereby  he  could  serve  his  people.  What- 
ever hardships  he  had  endured,  he  had  never  been 
known  to  complain — he  would  endure  anything  for 
us.  He  had  fought  in  our  cause  until  he  could  fight 
no  longer,  until  sickness  laid  him  low ;  and  he  was 

319 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


worn  out,  and  weak  as  a  child.  Weak,  did  I  say? 
Yes  !  but  only  in  the  body — his  mind  was  still  as 
strong,  as , brave,  as  clear  as  ever. 

And  thus  it  was  that  President  Steyn  was  only  able 
to  be  present  on  two  occasions  at  our  meetings ;  for, 
on  the  29th  of  May — before  the  National  Representa- 
tives had  come  to  any  decision — he  went  with  Dr.  Van 
der  Merwe  to  Krugersdorp. 

As  I  write  these  lines — six  months  after  the  meet- 
ings at  Vereeniging — and  think  that  during  all  the  in- 
tervening time  he  has  been  lying  on  a  bed  of  sickness — 
1  am  cheered  by  the  news  which  I  received  in  Holland 
that  hopes  are  now  entertained  of  his  ultimate  recovery. 

The  National  Representatives  began  their  important 
deliberations  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  of  May,  1902. 

For  three  days  we  discussed  the  condition  of  our 
country,  and  then  proceeded  with  Lord  Kitchener  and 
Lord  Milner  to  Pretoria.  This  Commission  was  com- 
posed of  Commandant-General  L.  Botha,  Commander- 
in-Chief  C.  R.  de  Wet,  Vice-Commandant-General  J. 
H.  De  la  Rey,  Vice-Commander-in-Chief  Judge  J.  B. 
M.  Hertzog,  and  States-Procureur  J.  C.  Smuts. 

The  negotiations  with  the  representatives  of  the 
British  Government  continued  from  the  i8th  to  the 
29th  of  May ;  and  upon  their  conclusion  the  Commis- 
sion communicated  to  the  National  Representatives 
the  terms  on  which  England  was  prepared  to  conclude 
peace. 

On  May  the  31st  we  decided  to  accept  the  proposals 
of  the  English  Government.^  The  Independence  of 
the  two  Republics  was  at  an  end ! 

I  will  not  attempt  to  describe  the  struggle  it  cost  us 
to  accept  these  proposals.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  when 
it  was  over,  it  had  left  its  mark  on  every  face. 

There  were  sixty  of  us  there,  and  each  in  turn  must 
answer  Yes  or  No.  It  was  an  ultimatum — this  pro- 
posal of  England's. 

>  A  complete  report  of  the  various  proceedings  in  connexion  with  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  will  be  found  in  the  Appendix  of  this  book. 

320 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 


What  were  we  to  do  ?  To  continue  the  struggle 
meant  extermination.  Already  our  w^omen  and  chil- 
dren were  dying  by  the  thousand,  and  starvation  was 
knocking  at  the  door — and  knocking  loudly  ! 

In  certain  districts,  such  as  Boshof  and  Hoopstad, 
it  was  still  possible  to  prolong  the  war,  as  was  also  the 
case  in  the  districts  of  Generals  Brand  and  Nieu- 
wouwdt,  where  the  sheep  and  oxen,  which  had  been 
captured  from  the  enemy,  provided  an  ample  supply 
of  food.  But  from  the  last-named  districts  all  the 
women  and  children  had  departed,  leaving  the  burgh- 
ers free  to  wander  at  will  in  search  of  food — to 
Boshof,  to  Hoopstad,  and  even  into  the  Colony. 

In  other  parts  of  the  Free  State  things  were  very 
different.  In  the  north-eastern  and  northern  districts 
- — for  instance,  in  Ladybrand,  Winburg,  Kroonstad, 
Heilbron,  Bethlehem,  Harrismith  and  Vrede — there 
were  still  many  families,  and  these  could  not  be  sent 
to  Boshof  or  to  Hoopstad  or  to  the  Colony.  And 
when,  reduced  to  dire  want,  the  commandos  should  be 
obliged  to  abandon  these  districts,  their  wives  and 
families  would  have  to  be  left  behind — to  starve ! 

The  condition  of  affairs  in  the  Transvaal  was  no 
better.  We  Free-Staters  had  thought — and  I,  for 
one,  had  supported  the  view  at  Vereeniging — that, 
before  sacrificing  our  independence,  we  ought  to  tell 
the  owners  of  these  farms,  where  there  were  still 
women  and  children,  to  go  and  surrender  with  their 
families,  and  thus  save  them  from  starvation.  But 
we  soon  realized  that  such  a  course  was  not  practi- 
cable— it  would  involve  the  loss  of  too  many  burgh- 
ers. 

Moreover,  even  if,  by  some  such  scheme  as  this,  we 
had  succeeded  in  saving  the  women,  we,  who  re- 
mained in  the  field,  would  still  have  been  exposed  to 
the  dangers  of  starvation,  for  many  of  us,  having  no 
horses,  could  not  have  left  want  behind  us,  by  remov- 
ing to  Cape  Colony  or  some  other  equally  prosperous 
region. 

321 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


In  the  large  eastern  divisions  of  the  Transvaal  also, 
there  were  many  burghers  without  horses,  while  the 
poor  jaded  creatures  that  remained  were  far  too  feeble 
and  exhausted  to  carry  their  masters  into  Cape 
Colony,  without  the  certainty  of  being  captured  by 
the  enemy. 

Our  forces  were  now  only  twenty  thousand  in  all, 
of  which  the  Transvaal  supplied  ten  thousand,  the  Free 
State  six  thousand,  while  the  remainder  came  from 
Cape  Colony.  But  our  numerical  weakness  would  not 
in  itself  have  caused  us  to  abandon  the  struggle  had 
we  but  received  encouraging  news  from  the  Colony. 
But  alas !  reports  which  we  received  from  there  left 
us  no  room  for  hope. 

No  room  for  hope !  that  was  the  message  of  Ve- 
reeniging — a  message  which  struck  a  chill  in  every 
heart.  One  after  another  we  painted  the  destitution, 
the  misery  of  our  districts,  and  each  picture  was  more 
gloomy  than  the  last.  At  length  the  moment  of  de- 
cision came,  and  what  course  remained  open  to  us? 
This  only — to  resign  ourselves  to  our  fate,  intolerable 
though  it  appeared,  to  accept  the  British  proposal,  and 
to  lay  down  our  arms. 

Most  bitter  of  all  was  the  thought  that  we  must 
abandon  our  brethren  in  Cape  Colony  and  in  Natal, 
who  had  thrown  in  their  lot  with  ours.  And  many  a 
sleepless  night  has  this  caused  me.  But  we  could  not 
help  ourselves.    There  was  nothing  else  to  do. 

And  as  things  have  turned  out,  may  we  not  hope 
that  the  Cape  and  Natal  Governments,  following  in 
the  wake  of  the  British  Nation,  will  soon  understand 
that  the  wiser  course  is  to  forgive  and  forget,  and  to 
grant  as  comprehensive  an  amnesty  as  possible  ?  It 
is  surely  not  unjust  to  expect  this  of  these  Govern- 
ments, when  one  remembers  that  whatever  the  Colo- 
nists may  have  done,  must  be  ascribed  to  the  tie  that 
binds  them  to  us — the  closest  of  all  ties — that  of 
blood. 

It  is  now  for  the  two  Governments  to  strive  to 

322 


THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 


realize  the  situation,  and  then,  by  granting  a  general 
amnesty,  to  promote,  as  far  as  in  them  Hes,  the  true 
progress  of  South  Africa. 

****** 

On  the  evening  of  the  31st  of  May,  1902,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Government  of  both  Republics  met  Lord 
Kitchener  and  Lord  Milner,  in  the  former's  house,  at 
Pretoria. 

It  was  there  that  the  Treaty  of  Peace — the  British 
Proposal  which  the  National  Representatives  had  ac- 
cepted— was  now  to  be  signed. 

It  was  a  never-to-be-forgotten  evening.  In  the 
space  of  a  few  short  minutes  that  was  done  which 
could  never  be  undone.  A  decision  arrived  at  in  a 
meeting  could  always  be  taken  into  reconsideration, 
but  a  document  solemnly  signed,  as  on  that  night,  by 
two  parties,  bound  them  both  for  ever. 

Every  one  of  us  who  put  his  name  to  that  document 
knew  that  he  was  in  honour  bound  to  act  in  accordance 
with  it.  It  was  a  bitter  moment,  but  not  so  bitter  as 
when,  earlier  on  the  same  day,  the  National  Repre- 
sentatives had  come  to  the  decision  that  the  fatal  step 
must  be  taken. 

On  the  2nd  June,  1902,  the  Representatives  left 
Vereeniging,  and  returned  every  man  to  his  own  com- 
mando. It  was  now  their  sad  duty  to  tell  their  brave 
and  patient  burghers  that  the  independence  which  they 
cherished  so  dearly  was  gone,  and  to  prepare  them  to 
surrender  their  arms  at  the  appointed  places. 

I  left  Pretoria  on  the  3rd  of  June  with  General 
ElHott,  who  had  to  accompany  me  to  the  various 
centres  to  receive  the  burghers'  arms. 

On  the  5th  of  June  the  first  commando  laid  down 
their  weapons  near  Vredef  ort.  To  every  man  there,  as 
to  myself,  this  surrender  was  no  more  and  no  less  than 
the  sacrifice  of  our  independence.  I  have  often  been 
present  at  the  death-bed  and  at  the  burial  of  those  who 
have  been  nearest  to  my  heart — father,  mother,  brother 

323 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


and  friend — but  the  grief  which  I  felt  on  those  occa- 
sions was  not  to  be  compared  with  what  I  now  under- 
went at  the  burial  of  my  Nation  ! 

It  was  at  Reitz  that  the  commandos  of  Vrede,  Har- 
rismith,  Heilbron  and  Bethlehem  laid  down  their 
arms.  Accordingly  I  went  there  on  the  7th  of  June, 
and  again  had  to  be  a  spectator  of  what  I  fain  would 
never  have  witnessed.  Had  I  then  to  go  on  from 
commando  to  commando,  to  undergo  everywhere  the 
martyrdom  of  beholding  ceaseless  surrenders  ?  No  ! 
I  had  had  enough,  and  could  bear  no  more.  I  de- 
cided, therefore,  to  visit  all  the  other  commandos,  in 
order  to  acquaint  the  burghers  with  what  had  taken 
place,  and  to  explain  to  them  why  we,  however  un- 
satisfactory the  Peace  Proposal  was,  had  felt  bound  to 
accept  it,  and  then  to  leave  each  commando  before 
the  men  handed  over  their  arms  to  General  Elliott. 
Everywhere  I  found  the  men  utterly  despondent  and 
dissatisfied. 

The  whole  miserable  business  came  to  an  end  on 
the  1 6th  of  June,  when  the  burghers  who  had  fought 
under  Generals  Niewouwdt  and  Brand,  laid  down  their 
arms — the  Nation  had  submitted  to  its  fate  ! 

There  was  nothing  left  for  us  now  but  to  hope  that 
the  Power  which  had  conquered  us,  the  Power  to 
which  we  were  compelled  to  submit,  though  it  cut  us 
to  the  heart  to  do  so,  and  which,  by  the  surrender 
of  our  arms,  we  had  accepted  as  our  Ruler,  would 
draw  us  nearer  and  ever  nearer  by  the  strong  cords  of 
love. 

****** 

To  my  Nation  I  address  one  last  word. 

Be  loyal  to  the  new  Government !  Loyalty  pays 
best  in  the  end.  Loyalty  alone  is  worthy  of  a  Nation 
which  has  shed  its  blood  for  Freedom  ! 


324 


CORRESPONDENCE 


A  LETTER  FROM  THE  STATES-SECRETARY  OF 
THE  SOUTH  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC  TO  THE 
BRITISH  AGENT  AT  PRETORIA 

Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs, 

Pretoria,  gth  October,  1899. 

Sir, — 

The  Government  of  the  South  African  RepubHc  feel  them- 
selves compelled  to  again  refer  the  Government  of  Her  Maj- 
esty, the  Queen  of  Great  Britain,  to  the  London  Convention 
of  1884,  concluded  between  this  Republic  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  which  in  Article  XIV.  guarantees  certain  specified 
rights  to  the  white  inhabitants  of  this  Republic,  to  wit: — 

"  All  those  who,  although  not  born  in  this  Country,  yet 
abide  by  the  laws  of  the  South  African  Republic,  (a)  shall 
have  full  freedom  to  come  with  their  families  into,  to  travel 
in,  or  to  reside  in  any  part  of  the  South  African  Republic; 
{h)  shall  be  entitled  to  hold  in  possession  their  houses,  fac- 
tories or  warehouses,  shops,  and  allotments,  either  on  hire 
or  as  their  own  property  ;  {c)  may  transact  their  business, 
either  in  person  or  through  agents,  to  their  own  satisfaction ; 
{d)  shall  not  be  subjected  to  any  other  general  or  local  taxa- 
tion— with  regard  to  their  families  or  properties,  or  their  com- 
merce or  trade — than  those  which  shall  be  laid  on  the  burgh- 
ers of  the  said  Republics." 

Our  Government  wishes  also  to  draw  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  above-mentioned  rights  are  the  only  ones  which  Her 
Majesty's  Government,  in  the  above-mentioned  Convention, 
has  stipulated  for  the  foreign  inhabitants  in  this  Republic,  and 
that  only  contravention  of  these  rights  can  give  the  British 
Government  the  right  of  diplomatic  intervention ;  whereas, 
further,  the  adjustment  of  all  other  questions  concerning  the 
position,  or  the  rights,  of  the  foreign  inhabitants  under  the 
said  Convention  is  vested  in  the  Government  and  National 
Representatives  of  the  South  African  Republic ;  among  the 
questions  the  adjustment  of  which  comes  exclusively  under 
the  authority  of  the  Government  and  the  Volksraad,  are  those 
of  the  Franchise  and  representation  in  this  Republic. 

Although,  therefore,  the  exclusive  right  of  this  Franchise 
and  representation  is  indisputable,  our  Government  has  ap- 
proved of  discussing  in  a  friendly  way  the  Franchise  and  the 

325 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 

representation  with  Her  Majesty's  Government;  without,  how- 
ever, acknowledging  by  so  doing  any  right  thereto  on  the  side 
of  Her  Majesty's  Government.  Our  Government  has  also,  by 
the  wording  of  the  already  existing  Voting  Law,  and  the  de- 
cision concerning  the  representation,  always  kept  this  friendly 
consultation  in  view. 

On  the  side  of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  however,  the 
friendly  manner  of  these  consultations  has  made  way  for  a 
more  threatening  tone;  and  the  minds  of  the  people  of  this 
Republic,  and  of  the  whole  population  of  South  Africa,  have 
been  brought  into  a  state  of  apprehension;  and  a  state  of  un- 
usual tension  has  been  created  by  the  action  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government,  in  no  longer  abiding  by  the  laws  concerning  the 
voting  right,  and  the  decision  concerning  the  representation 
of  this  Republic;  and  lastly,  as  is  expressed  in  your  letter  of 
the  25th  of  September,  1899,  in  breaking  off  all  friendly  com- 
munication, giving  us  to  understand  that  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment were  about  to  formulate  their  own  proposals  for  final 
arrangement.  Our  Government  can  see  in  the  before-men- 
tioned notification  nothing  less  than  a  new  violation  of  the 
Convention  of  1884,  which  does  not  reserve  to  Her  Majesty's 
Government  the  right  of  a  one-sided  adjustment  of  a  question 
which  belongs  exclusively  to  the  inner  policy  of  our  Govern- 
ment, and  has  been  already  settled  by  them. 

On  the  grounds  of  the  tension,  the  considerable  loss  arising 
therefrom,  and  the  interruption  of  business  in  general,  which 
is  caused  by  the  correspondence  on  the  Franchise  and  the  rep- 
resentation of  this  Republic,  Her  Majesty's  Government  has 
not  long  ago  insisted  on  a  speedy  adjustment,  and  finally, 
through  your  intervention,  insisted  on  an  answer — within 
forty-eight  hours — (later  on  somewhat  amended) — to  your 
Memorandum  of  the  12th  of  September,  which  was  answered 
by  the  Memorandum  of  our  Government  of  the  15th  of  Sep- 
tember, and  by  the  Memorandum  of  the  25th  of  September, 
1899;  on  which  other  friendly  negotiations  were  interrupted, 
and  our  Government  received  notice  that  the  proposal  for  final 
arrangement  would  be  made  within  a  short  time ;  but  although 
these  promises  were  repeated,  .  no  such  proposal  has  as  yet 
reached  our  Government.  When  the  friendly  correspondence 
was  still  going  on,  a  great  increase  of  troops  was  made  by  Her 
Majesty's  Government,  which  troops  were  drawn  up  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  frontiers  of  our  Republic.  Taking  into 
consideration  certain  events  in  the  history  of  our  Republic, 
which  events  need  not  here  be  recited,  our  Government  found 
themselves  compelled  to  look  upon  the  Army  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  the  frontier  as  a  threat  to  the  independence  of 

326 


CORRESPONDENCE 


the  South  African  Republic,  because  they  were  not  aware  of 
any  circumstances  which  could  justify  the  presence  of  such  a 
force  in  South  Africa  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  their 
frontier. 

In  answer  to  a  question  concerning  this,  addressed  to  His 
Excellency  the  High  Commissioner,  our  Government  received, 
to  their  great  astonishment,  the  covert  accusation  that  from 
the  State  of  the  Republic  an  attack  on  Her  Majesty's  Colonies 
was  being  arranged,  and  also  a  mysterious  hint  of  coming 
possibilities,  by  which  our  Government  were  strengthened  in 
their  suspicion,  that  the  independence  of  the  Republic  was 
threatened. 

As  a  measure  of  defence,  they  were,  therefore,  compelled  to 
send  a  body  of  burghers  to  the  frontiers  in  order,  if  required, 
to  be  able  to  resist  such  an  eventuality.  The  unlawful  inter- 
ference of  Her  Majesty's  Government  in  the  inner  policy  of 
our  RepubHc,  in  defiance  of  the  London  Convention  of  1884, 
which  interference  consisted  in  the  exceptional  strengthening 
of  troops  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Republic's  borders,  has 
thus  created  an  unbearable  state  of  affairs,  of  which  our  Gov- 
ernment— not  only  in  the  interests  of  our  Republic,  but  also 
in  the  interests  of  the  whole  of  South  Africa, — feel  it  their 
duty  to  bring  to  an  end  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  consider 
themselves  called  upon  to  insist  emphatically  and  energetically 
on  an  immediate  conclusion  of  this  condition  of  things,  and 
to  ask  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  give  them  the  assurance 
(a)  that  all  points  of  mutual  difference  shall  be  adjusted  by 
friendly  arbitration,  or  by  any  other  amicable  way  that  may 
be  agreed  upon  between  our  Government  and  that  of  Her 
Majesty;  (b)  that  the  troops  on  the  frontiers  of  the  Republic 
shall  be  recalled  at  once,  and  that  all  reinforcements  which, 
after  the  ist  of  June,  1899,  have  arrived  in  South  Africa,  shall 
be  removed  within  a  time  agreed  upon  with  our  Government, 
— with  the  counter  assurance  and  guarantee  from  our  Govern- 
ment that  no  attack  on,  or  hostilities  against,  any  part  of  the 
possessions  of  the  British  Government  shall  be  undertaken  by 
the  Republic  during  the  further  negotiations  within  the  time 
which  shall  be  agreed  upon  by  the  Government — our  Govern- 
ment shall,  in  accordance  with  this,  be  ready  to  call  back  the 
armed  burghers  of  the  Republic  from  the  frontiers;  (c)  that 
Her  Majesty's  troops,  which  are  now  on  the  high  sea,  shall 
not  be  landed  in  any  of  the  harbours  of  South  Africa. 

Our  Government  has  to  insist  on  an  immediate  and  favour- 
able answer  on  the  above  four  points,  and  urgently  requests 
Her  Majesty's  Government  to  give  an  answer  in  this  spirit 
before,  or  on,  Wednesday,  October  nth,  1889,  before  5  o'clock 

327 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 

m  the  afternoon.  They  wish  to  add  further,  that  in  case, 
against  their  expectations,  no  satisfactory  answer  within  this 
time  should  be  received  by  them,  that  they,  to  their  great  sor- 
row, would  be  obliged  to  look  upon  the  actions  of  Her  Maj- 
esty's Government  as  a  formal  declaration  of  war,  for  the 
consequences  of  which  they  do  not  consider  themselves  respon- 
sible; and,  in  case  further  movements  of  troops  should  take 
place  within  the  above-mentioned  time  in  the  direction  of  our 
borders,  that  our  Government  will  be  compelled  to  look  upon 
this  also  as  a  formal  declaration  of  war. 

I  have  the  honour  to  be,  etc., 

F.  W.  Reitz, 

State-Secretary, 


328 


CORRESPONDENCE 


MR.  CHAMBERLAIN'S  TELEGRAMS:— 

From  Mr.  Chamberlain  to  the  High  Commissioner,  Sir 
Alfred  Milner. 

(Sent  7.30  p.m.  loth  October,  1899) 

"  loth  October,  No.  7.  The  British  Agent  has,  in  answer- 
ing the  demands  of  the  Government  of  the  South  African 
RepubHc,  to  say  that,  as  the  Government  of  the  South  African 
RepubHc  have  declared  in  their  dispatch,  that  they  will  look 
upon  a  refusal  to  consent  to  their  demands  as  a  formal  decla- 
ration of  war,  he  has  received  orders  to  demand  his  passport." 

From  Mr.  Chamberlain  to  the  High  Commissioner,  Sir 
Alfred  Milner. 

(Sent  10.45  P-"i-  10^^^  October,  1899) 

"  loth  October,  No.  8.  The  Government  of  Her  Majesty 
has  received  with  great  sorrow  the  determined  demands  of  the 
Government  of  the  South  African  Republic  contained  in  your 
telegram  of  the  9th  of  October,  No.  3.  You  will,  as  an  answer 
to  the  Government  of  the  South  African  Republic,  communi- 
cate to  them  that  the  conditions  put  forward  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  South  African  Republic  are  of  such  a  nature  that 
the  Government  of  Her  Majesty  cannot  possibly  think  of  tak- 
ing them  into  consideration." 


329 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  THE  TWO  PRESI- 
DENTS AND  LORD  SALISBURY 

From  the  States-President  of  the  South  African  Re- 
public AND  the  Orange  Free  State  to  His  Excellency 
Lord  Salisbury^  London. 

"  Bloemfontein,  ^th  March,  1900. 

"  The  blood  and  tears  of  the  thousands  who  have  suffered 
through  this  war,  and  the  prospect  of  all  the  moral  and  ma- 
terial ruin  which  now  threatens  South  Africa,  render  it  neces- 
sary for  both  parties  carrying  on  the  war  to  ask  themselves 
calmly,  and  in  the  faith  of  the  Trinity,  for  what  they  are  fight- 
ing and  if  the  aims  of  both  justify  all  this  horrible  misery  and 
devastation.  On  this  account,  and  with  an  eye  to  the  assertion 
of  several  English  Statesmen  that  the  war  was  begun  and 
carried  on  with  the  determined  end  to  undermine  Her  Maj- 
esty's authority  in  South  Africa,  and  to  establish  in  the  whole 
of  South  Africa  a  Government  independent  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government,  we  consider  it  our  duty  to  declare  that  this  War 
was  only  commenced  as  a  measure  of  defence  and  for  the 
purpose  of  obtaining  a  guarantee  for  the  threatened  independ- 
ence of  the  South  African  Republic,  and  was  only  continued 
in  order  to  ensure  the  indisputable  independence  of  both  Re- 
publics as  Sovereign  International  States,  and  to  obtain  the 
assurance  that  the  subjects  of  Her  Majesty  who  have  taken 
part  with  us  in  the  war  will  not  suffer  the  least  hurt  either  in 
their  lives  or  their  possessions.  On  these  conditions  alone  we 
demand,  as  in  the  past,  to  see  peace  restored  in  South  Africa, 
and  an  end  made  to  the  wrong  that  now  exists  there.  _  But  if 
Her  Majesty's  Government  has  decided  upon  destroying  the 
independence  of  the  Republic,  nothing  remains  to  us  and  our 
people  but  to  persist  to  the  bitter  end  on  the  road  now  taken, 
notwithstanding  the  overpowering  might  of  the  British  Em- 
pire, trusting  that  God,  who  has  lit  the  inextinguishable  fire 
of  the  love  of  liberty  in  our  hearts,  and  in  the  hearts  of  our 
fathers,  will  not  abandon  us,  but  will  fulfil  His  work  in  us, 
and  in  our  descendants. 

"We  hesitated  to  lay  this  declaration  earlier  before  Your 
Excellency,  because  we  were  afraid  that  as  long  as  the  advan- 

330 


CORRESPONDENCE 


tage  was  on  our  side,  and  our  Army  had  in  their  occupation 
positions  of  defence  far  into  the  British  Colonies,  such  a  decla- 
ration would  have  hurt  the  feelings  of  the  English  nation; 
but  now  that  the  prestige  of  the  British  Empire  may  be  con- 
sidered to  be  restored,  through  the  capture  of  one  of  our  armies, 
and  we  are  compelled  by  this  to  sacrifice  other  positions  which 
our  armies  occupied,  this  difficulty  is  removed,  and  we  can  no 
longer  hesitate  to  tell  you,  in  the  face  of  the  whole  civilized 
world,  why  we  are  fighting,  and  on  what  conditions  we  are 
prepared  to  make  peace." 

From  Lord  Salisbury  to  their  Excellencies  the  States- 
Presidents  OF  THE  South  African  Republic  and 
Orange  Free  State. 

"London,  iifh  March,  1900. 

"  I  have  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your 
Honour's  cable,  dated  5th  March,  from  Bloemfontein,  of  which 
the  purport  is  principally  whether  Her  Majesty's  Government 
will  acknowledge  the  indisputable  independence  of  the  South 
African  Republic  and  Orange  Free  State  and  treat  them  as 
Sovereign  International  States,  and  will  offer  to  conclude  the 
war  on  these  conditions. 

"  In  the  beginning  of  October  of  this  year,  there  was  peace 
between  the  Queen  and  the  two  Republics,  under  the  Conven- 
tion which  then  held  good.  There  was  a  discussion  carried 
on  during  a  few  months  between  Her  Majesty's  Government 
and  the  South  African  Republic,  of  which  the  purport  was  the 
amendment  of  very  serious  grievances  under  which  English 
inhabitants  suffered  in  the  South  African  Republic.  In  the 
course  of  these  negotiations,  the  South  African  Republic  ob- 
tained the  knowledge  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  had 
made  considerable  preparations  for  war,  and  had  taken  steps 
to  provide  the  necessary  reinforcements  for  the  English  gar- 
risons at  Cape  Colony  and  Natal.  No  inroad  on  the  rights 
guaranteed  by  the  Conventions  had,  until  then,  taken  place  on 
the  English  side.  Suddenly  the  South  African  Republic,  after 
having  two  days  previously  issued  an  insulting  ultimatum,  de- 
clared War  on  Her  Majesty ;  and  the  Orange  Free  State,  with 
which  there  had  been  no  disagreement,  took  a  similar  step. 
Thereupon  an  inroad  was  made  into  Her  Majesty's  territory 
by  the  two  Republics ;  three  towns  within  the  British  frontier 
were  besieged,  a  great  part  of  the  two  Colonies  was  over-run, 
with  great  destruction  of  property  and  life,  and  the  Republics 
claimed  the  right  to  treat  the  inhabitants  of  Her  ]Majesty's 
territory  as  if  this  territory  had  been  annexed  by  one  of  these 
States.    The  Transvaal  having  these  actions  in  view,  had  for 

331 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


years  stored  up,  on  an  enormous  scale,  military  provisions, 
which  could  only  have  been  destined  for  use  against  England. 

"  Your  Excellencies  made  some  remarks  of  a  negative  nat- 
ure concerning  the  aim  for  which  these  preparations  were 
made.  I  do  not  consider  it  necessary  to  discuss  the  question 
which  you  have  thus  raised,  but  the  consequences  of  the  prep- 
arations, made  in  great  secrecy,  have  been  that  the  British 
Empire  has  found  itself  forced  to  repel  an  inroad  which  has 
brought  on  a  costly  v/ar,  and  caused  the  loss  of  thousands  of 
valuable  lives.  This  great  misfortune  has  been  the  punish- 
ment that  Great  Britain  has  had  to  undergo  during  the  last 
few  years  for  having  suffered  the  two  Republics  to  exist. 
Keeping  in  sight  the  use  which  the  two  Republics  have  made  of 
the  position  presented  to  them,  and  the  misfortunes  which  their 
unprovoked  attacks  on  Her  Majesty's  territory  have  brought. 
Her  Majesty's  Government  can  only  reply  to  Your  Honour's 
telegram  by  saying  that  they  are  not  prepared  to  acknowledge 
the  independence  either  of  the  South  African  Republic,  or  of 
the  Orange  Free  State." 


a33 


Appendix  A 


REPORT  OF  THE  MEETING  OF  THE  GENERAL 
REPRESENTATIVES  HELD  AT  VEREENIGING, 
IN  THE  SOUTH  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC,  ON  THE 
15TH  OF  MAY,  1902,  AND  THE  FOLLOWING 
DAYS 

The  first  meeting  of  the  representatives  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments took  place  at  11.30  a.m.  on  May  15th. 
There  were  present : — 

For  the  South  African  Republic — His  Honour  the  Presi- 
dent, S.  W.  Burger,  F.  W.  Reitz,  Commandant-General  L. 
Botha,  Messrs.  J.  B.  Krogh,  L.  J.  Meijer,  L.  J.  Jacobs,  and 
His  Honour  the  Staats-Procureur. 

For  the  Orange  Free  State — States-President,  M.  J.  Steyn ; 
Judge,  J.  B.  M.  Hertzog;  Secretary  of  State,  W.  J.  C.  Breb- 
ner;  Commander-in-Chief,  C.  R.  de  Wet;  and  Mr.  C.  H. 
Olivier. 

The  first  matter  discussed  was  the  formula  for  the  oath 
which  the  delegates  were  to  take,  and  it  was  decided  that  it 
should  run  as  follows : — 

"  We,  the  undersigned,  duly  swear  that  we,  as  special  na- 
tional representatives,  will  remain  true  to  our  people,  country, 
and  Government,  and  that  we  will  serve  them  to  the  best  of 
our  ability,  and  fulfil  our  duties  faithfully  and  with  all  neces- 
sary secrecy,  as  is  the  duty  of  all  faithful  burghers  and  repre- 
sentatives of  the  nation.    So  help  us  God." 

The  question  now  arose  as  to  whether  the  representatives 
had  the  right  to  decide,  if  circumstances  rendered  it  necessary, 
upon  any  matter  touching  the  independence  of  the  country, 
irrespective  of  the  powers  given  to  the  various  delegates,  for 
at  some  of  the  meetings  the  delegates  had  only  received  lim- 
ited powers,  whilst  at  others  full  authority  had  been  given 
them  to  act  according  to  their  own  judgment. 

After  considerable  discussion  it  was  decided  to  lay  the 
matter  before  the  delegates  themselves. 

333 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


The  following  representatives  were  called  into  the  tent,  and 
took  the  oath: — 

For  the  South  "African  Republic, 

1.  H.  A.  Alberts,  Vechtgeneraal ;  for  Heidelberg. 

2.  J.  J.  Alberts,  Commandant;  for  Standerton  and  Wakker- 

stroom. 

3.  J.  F.  De  Beer,  Commandant;  for  Bloemhof. 

4.  C.  F.  Beijers,  Assistant-Commandant-General;  for  Water- 

berg. 

5.  C.  Birkenstock,  burgher ;  for  Vrijheid. 

6.  H.  J.  Bosman,  magistrate ;  for  W akkerstroom. 

7.  Christiaan    Botha,    Assistant-Commandant-General;  for 

Swaziland  and  the  States  Artillery. 

8.  B.  H.  Breijtenbach,  Veldtcornet;  for  Utrecht. 

9.  C.  J.  Brits,  Vechtgeneraal ;  for  Standerton. 

10.  J.  B.  Cilluos,  Vechtgeneraal ;  for  Lichtenburg. 

11.  J.  De  Clercq,  burgher;  for  Middelburg. 

12.  T.  A.  Donges,  Veldtcornet ;  for  Dorp  Middelburg  in  Re- 

geeringswacht. 

13.  H.  S.  Grobler,  Commandant;  for  Bethal. 

14.  J.  L.  Grobler,  burgher ;  for  Carolina. 

15.  J.  N.  H.  Grobler,  Vechtgeneraal;  for  Ermelo. 

16.  B.  J.  Van  Heerden,  Veldtcornet;  for  Rustenburg. 

17.  J.  F.  Jordaan,  Commandant ;  for  Vrijheid. 

18.  J.  Kemp,  Vechtgeneraal ;  for  Krugersdorp. 

19.  P.  J.  Liebenberg,  Vechtgeneraal ;  for  Potchefstroom. 

20.  C.  H.  MuUer,  Vechtgeneraal ;  for  Boksburg. 

21.  J.  F.  Naude,  burgher;  for  Pretoria,  late  Commandant  with 

General  Kemp. 

22.  D.  J.  E.  Opperman,  Veldtcornet ;  for  Pretoria. 

23.  B.  J.  Roos,  Veldtcornet ;  for  Piet  Retief. 

24.  P.  D.  Roux,  Veldtcornet ;  for  Marico. 

25.  D.  J.  Schoeman,  Commandant;  for  Lijdenburg. 

26.  T.  C.  Stoflfberg,  Landdrost;  for  Zoutpansberg. 

27.  S.  P.  Du  Toit,  Vechtgeneraal ;  for  Wolmaransstad. 

28.  P.  L.  Uijs,  Commandant;  for  Pretoria. 

29.  P.  R.  Viljoen,  burgher;  for  Heidelberg. 

30.  W.  J.  Viljoen,  Commandant;  for  Witwatersrand. 

For  the  Orange  Free  State. 

I.  C.  C.  F.  Badenhorst,  Vice-Commandant-in-Chief ;  for 
Boshof,  Hoopstad,  West  Bloemfontein,  Winburg,  and 
Kroonstad. 


334 


APPENDIX  A 


2.  A.  J.  Bester,  Commandant ;  for  Bethlehem. 

3.  A.  J.  Bester,  Commandant;  for  Bloemfontein. 

4.  L.  P.  H.  Botha,  Commandant;  for  Harrismith. 

5.  G.  A.  Brand,  Vice-Commandant-in-Chief ;  for  Bethulie, 

Rouxville,  Caledon  River,  and  Wepener  in  the  eastern 
part  of  Bloemfontein. 

6.  H.  J.  Brouwer,  Commandant;  for  Bethlehem. 

7.  D.  H.  Van  Coller,  Commandant;  for  Heilbron. 

8.  F.  R.  Cronje,  Commandant ;  for  Winburg. 

9.  D.  F.  H.  Flemming,  Commandant ;  for  Hoopstad. 

10.  C.  C.  Froneman,  Vice-Commandant-in-Chief ;  for  Win- 

burg and  Ladybrand. 

11.  F.  J.  W.  J.  Hattingh,  Vice-Commandant-in-Chief;  for  the 

eastern  part  of  Kroonstad,  in  the  district  of  Heilbron. 

12.  J.  B.  M.  Hertzog,  Commandant;  for  Philippolis. 

13.  J.  N.  Jacobs,  Commandant;  for  Boshof. 

14.  F.  P.  Jacobsz,  Commandant ;  for  Harrismith. 

15.  A.  J.  De  Kock,  Commandant;  for  Vrede. 

16.  J.  J.  Koen,  Commandant ;  for  Ladybrand. 

17.  H.  J.  Kritzinger,  Veldtcornet ;  for  Kroonstad. 

18.  F.  E.  Mentz,  Commandant ;  for  Pleilbron. 

19.  J.  A.  P.  Van  der  Merwe,  Commandant ;  for  Heilbron. 

20.  C.  A.  Van  Niekerk,  Commandant;  for  Kroonstad. 

21.  H.  Van  Niekerk,  Commandant. 

22.  J.  J.  Van  Niekerk,  Commandant ;  for  Ficksburg. 

23.  I.  K.  Nieuwouwdt,  Vice-Commandant-in-Chief ;  for  Faure- 

smith,  Philippolis,  and  Jacobsdal. 

24.  H.  P.  J.  Pretorius,  Commandant ;  for  Jacobsdal. 

25.  A.  M.  Prinsloo,  Vice-Commandant-in-Chief ;  for  Bethle- 

hem in  Ficksburg. 

26.  L.  J.  Rautenbach,  Commandant;  for  Bethlehem. 

27.  F.  J.  Rheeder,  Commandant ;  for  Rouxville. 

28.  A.  Ross,  Commandant ;  for  Vrede. 

29.  P.  W.  De  Vos,  Commandant;  for  Kroonstad. 

30.  W.  J.   Wessels,   Vice-Commandant-in-Chief;  for  Har- 

rismith and  Vrede. 

The  meeting  now  proceeded  to  choose  a  chairman,  and  the 
following  were  proposed : — J.  De  Clercq,  C.  F.  Beijers,  C.  C. 
Froneman,  W.  J.  Wessels,  and  G.  A.  Brand. 

The  choice  of  the  meeting  fell  on  General  C.  F.  Beijers,  who 
called  upon  the  Rev.  Mr.  Kestell  to  offer  prayer. 

His  Honour,  S.  W.  Burger,  now  declared  that  the  meeting 
was  formally  opened,  and  after  the  Chairman  had  spoken  a 
few  words,  the  representatives  adjourned  until  three  o'clock. 

When  they  reassembled,  the  Chairman  requested  President 

335 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Burger  to  explain  the  objects  for  which  the  meeting  had  been 
called. 

Then  the  President  spoke  a  few  words  of  welcome  to  all; 
he  expressed  his  sorrow  for  the  absence  of  some  who  would 
certainly  have  been  present  had  they  not  given  their  lives  for 
their  country.  But  still  there  were  many  left  to  represent  the 
two  Republics. 

"  The  difficulties  which  confront  us,"  continued  the  Presi- 
dent, are  like  a  great  mountain,  at  the  foot  of  which  we  have 
just  arrived.  Everything  now  depends  on  us  who  are  assem- 
bled together  here.  It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  the  state  of 
affairs  is  very  serious,  and  that  the  future  looms  dark  before 
us.  Our  position  requires  the  most  careful  consideration,  and 
as  there  are  sure  to  be  differences  of  opinion,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary for  us  to  bear  with  one  another,  and  yet,  at  the  same  time, 
to  speak  our  minds  freely." 

The  President  proceeded  to  refer  to  the  correspondence 
which  had  taken  place  between  Holland  and  England.  A  copy 
of  this  correspondence  had  been  sent,  through  Lord  Kitchener, 
to  the  Governments  of  the  two  Republics.  The  opinion  of  the 
Transvaal  Government  (which  was  the  first  to  receive  the 
correspondence)  was  that  advantage  should  be  taken  of  this 
opportunity.  It  was  proposed  to  ask  Lord  Kitchener  to  allow 
the  Transvaal  Government  to  meet  that  of  the  Orange  Free 
State,  so  that  they  might  discuss  the  desirability  of  making  a 
peace  proposal  to  England.  The  two  Governments  had  ac- 
cordingly met,  and  had  corresponded  with  Lord  Kitchener  and 
Lord  Milner.  As  a  result  of  this,  a  letter,  with  the  above  cor- 
respondence annexed,  had  been  sent  to  the  various  commandos. 

We  felt,"  continued  President  Burger,  that  we  had  no 
power  to  surrender  our  independence,  and  that  we  were  only 
justified  in  making  such  terms  of  peace  as  would  not  endanger 
our  national  existence.  Whether  it  is  or  is  not  our  duty  to 
surrender  our  independence  is  a  question  that  must  be  left  to 
the  decision  of  our  people.  And  it  is  to  represent  the  people 
that  you  are  here.  It  is  from  your  lips,  then,  that  our  Govern- 
ments must  learn  the  opinions  of  the  two  nations.  It  is  clear 
enough  that  the  English  Government  has  no  idea  of  allowing 
us  to  remain  independent — it  expresses  surprise  that  we  even 
dare  to  speak  of  such  a  thing. 

"  You  have  now  to  report  upon  the  condition  of  the  country, 
and  upon  the  circumstances  in  which  your  wives  and  children 
are  placed.  You  have  also  to  decide  whether  you  are  willing 
to  make  any  further  sacrifices.  We  have  lost  so  much  already 
that  it  would  be  hard,  indeed,  to  lose  our  independence  as  well. 
But,  although  this  matter  is  so  near  to  our  hearts,  we  must 

336 


APPENDIX  A 


still  listen  to  the  voice  of  reason.  The  practical  question,  then, 
which  we  have  to  ask  ourselves  is,  whether  we  are  prepared 
to  watch  our  people  being  gradually  exterminated  before  our 
eyes,  or  whether  we  should  not  rather  seek  a  remedy. 

"  The  Government  can  do  nothing  without  the  support  of 
the  nation.  You,  therefore,  must  determine  our  best  course. 
For  instance,  if  you  come  to  the  conclusion  that  we  have  ex- 
hausted every  expedient,  will  you  still  continue  the  struggle? 
Are  w^e  not  to  desist  until  every  man  of  us  is  in  captivity,  in 
exile,  or  in  his  grave  ?  Again  let  me  urge  you  to  speak  freely, 
and  yet  with  consideration  for  the  feelings  of  others.  For 
myself,  I  can  truly  say  that  my  spirit  is  not  yet  broken ;  but  I 
would  hear  from  you  what  the  feeling  of  the  people  is. 

"  At  this  point,  however,  a  difficulty  arises.  Some  of  you, 
having  only  received  limited  powers  from  your  constituencies, 
appear  to  think  that  you  would  not  be  justified  in  exceeding 
your  mandates,  while  others  have  been  authorized  to  act  as 
circumstances  may  seem  to  require.  But  I  do  not  think  that 
this  difficulty  should  be  insurmountable.  At  least  I  beg  of  you 
not  to  allow  it  to  cause  any  dissension  among  you.  Let  us  all 
be  of  one  mind.  If  we  are  united,  then  will  the  nation  be 
united  also  ;  but  if  we  are  divided,  in  what  a  plight  will  the 
nation  find  itself  ?  " 

A  letter  was  then  read  from  the  deputation  in  Europe,  which 
had  been  written  five  months  previously,  and  which  had  been 
brought  through  the  English  lines  in  safety.  It  contained 
little  more  than  an  assurance  that  our  cause  occupied  a  better 
position  in  Europe  than  it  had  ever  done  before. 

The  Chairman  then  asked  Commandant  L.  Botha  to  address 
the  meeting. 

Complying  with  this  request,  the  Commandant  said  that  he 
wished  to  be  assured,  before  anything  further  was  done,  that 
the  fact  that  some  of  the  representatives  had  been  entrusted 
with  lynited  powers,  whereas  others  had  been  given  a  free 
hand,  was  not  going  to  prove  to  be  an  insurmountable  obstacle 
to  united  action  on  their  part. 

To  this  Judge  Hertzog  replied  that  it  was  a  principle  in  law 
that  a  delegate  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  mere  agent  or  mouth- 
piece of  his  constituents,  but,  on  the  contrary  (when  dealing 
with  public  affairs),  as  a  plenipotentiary — with  the  right,  what- 
ever his  brief  might  be,  of  acting  to  the  best  of  his  judgment. 

States-Procureur  Smuts  concurred  in  this  opinion,  which 
appeared  to  satisfy  both  the  Commandant-General  and  also 
all  the  other  representatives,  for  no  further  allusion  was  made 
to  the  subject  by  anybody. 

Commandant-General  Botha  now  made  his  report. 


337 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


In  the  districts  of  Vrijheid  and  Utrecht,  he  stated,  the  store 
of  maize  was  so  small  that  it  could  not  last  for  more  than  a 
short  time;  but  there  was  still  a  great  number  of  slaughter- 
cattle.  In  the  districts  of  Wakkerstroom  there  was  hardly 
sufficient  grain  for  one  month's  consumption.  Two  other  dis- 
tricts had  still  a  large  enough  number  of  slaughter-cattle — 
enough,  in  fact,  to  last  for  two  or  three  months.  In  Ermelo, 
to  the  west  and  north-west  of  the  blockhouses,  and  in  Bethal, 
Standerton,  and  Middelburg,  there  was  grain  for  one  month. 
But  the  Heidelberg  and  Pretoria  commandos  had  now,  for  the 
first  time,  no  corn  remaining  for  food.  In  the  neighbourhood 
of  Boksburg  the  onl}^  grain  left  was  the  old  maize  of  the  pre- 
vious year,  whilst  there  were  no  cattle  at  all  in  the  district. 
When  he  had  visited  Boksburg  he  had  found  that  the  com- 
mandos had  had  no  meat  for  three  days.  In  the  country  be- 
tween Vereeniging  and  Ermelo  there  were  only  thirty-six  goats, 
and  no  cattle  whatsoever.  In  the  Wakkerstroom  district,  how- 
ever, there  were  still  a  few  slaughter-cattle.  The  horses  were 
everywhere  worn  out  and  exhausted.  They  had  been  so  con- 
stantly kept  on  the  move,  owing  to  the  enemy's  increasing 
attacks,  they  could  now  only  cover  the  shortest  distances. 

The  Kaffir  question  was  becoming  from  day  to  day  more 
serious.  At  Vrijheid,  for  instance,  there  was  a  Kaffir  com- 
mando which  had  already  made  several  attacks  upon  the 
burghers.  This  attitude  of  the  Kaffir  population  was  produc- 
ing a  very  dispiriting  effect  upon  the  burghers. 

The  women  were  in  a  most  pitiable  state,  now  that  the  lines 
of  blockhouses  had  been  extended  in  all  directions  over  the 
country.  Sometimes  the  commandos  had  to  break  through 
the  lines  and  leave  the  women  behind  alone;  and  when  the 
burghers  later  on  returned  they  would  perhaps  find  that  the 
women  had  been  driven  from  their  houses,  and,  in  some  in- 
stances, treated  with  atrocious  cruelty. 

Referring  to  the  numbers  in  the  field,  he  said  that  there  were, 
in  the  whole  of  the  Transvaal,  ten  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
sixteen  men,  and  that  three  thousand  two  hundred  and  ninety- 
six  of  them  had  no  horses.  The  enemy  during  the  summer  had 
taken  many  of  the  burghers  prisoner ;  and  since  June,  1901,  the 
commandos  had  diminished  to  the  extent  of  six  thousand  and 
eighty-four  men.  The  burghers  thus  lost  to  them  had  either 
been  killed,  or  taken  prisoner,  or  had  surrendered  their  arms. 

The  number  of  households  was  two  thousand  six  hundred 
and  forty. 

The  Commandant-General  concluded  by  saying  that  the 
three  greatest  difficulties  with  which  they  were  confronted  were 
their  horses,  their  food  supply,  and  the  miserable  condition  of 
their  women  and  children. 

338 


APPENDIX  A 


Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet  then  spoke.  He  said  he  would 
leave  it  to  the  delegates  who  were  officers  to  make  reports. 
They  had  come  from  far  and  near,  and  knew  exactly  what  the 
condition  of  things  was.  He,  however,  could  state  that  the 
number  of  burghers  in  the  Orange  Free  State  was  six  thou- 
sand one  hundred  and  twenty,  of  whom  about  four  hundred 
were  not  available  for  service.  The  Basutos,  he  found,  were 
more  favourably  inclined  to  the  Boer  cause  than  ever  before. 

"  General  De  la  Rey,"  continued  General  de  Wet,  "  like  my- 
self, does  not  quite  know  what  task  he  has  to  perform  here, 
but  he  thinks  with  me  that  the  duty  of  making  reports  belongs 
to  the  delegates.  However,  he  feels  bound  to  state  that  in  his 
divisions  there  is  a  great  scarcity  of  everything.  But  precisely 
the  same  state  of  affairs  existed  there  a  year  ago.  And  when 
his  burghers  were  at  that  time  without  food — well,  he  went 
and  got  it  for  them."  (Cheers.) 

General  Beijers  (Waterberg)  then  addressed  the  delegates, 
telling  them  that  he  would  not  detain  them  long.  In  Zout- 
pansberg,  he  stated,  they  had  still  a  plentiful  supply  of  food, 
for  they  were  able  to  buy  from  the  Kaffirs.  At  Waterberg 
the  Kaffirs  were  neutral,  but  at  Zoutpansberg  they  were  get- 
ting out  of  hand.  Yet,  since  no  co-operation  existed  amongst 
them,  they  were  not  to  be  feared,  and  any  uprising  could  easily 
be  quelled. 

Besides  this  trouble,  they  had  many  difficulties  to  face,  which 
were  produced  by  horse-sickness  and  fever. 

As  to  the  question  of  grain,  there  was  food  enough  for  the 
whole  of  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange  Free  State.  But  now 
the  English  were  beginning  to  buy  up  the  maize  at  ii  a  sack. 

General  Muller  (Boksburg)  reported  that  in  his  division  the 
burghers  had  never  suffered  from  hunger.  He  could  still  hold 
out  for  a  few  months  more,  as  food  could  be  obtained  from 
the  Kaffirs.  There  was,  it  could  not  be  denied,  a  tendency  to 
mutiny  amongst  the  Kaffirs,  but  he  did  not  think  that  this  need 
cause  any  anxiety.  He  believed  that  he  would  be  able  to  carry 
on  operations  until  the  end  of  the  winter. 

General  Froneman  (Ladybrand)  said  that  the  condition  of 
his  divisions,  namely  Winburg  and  Ladybrand,  gave  no  cause 
for  uneasiness.  There  were  still  eighty  families  in  the  dis- 
tricts, but  they  were  able  to  provide  for  all  their  necessities. 
The  Kaffirs  were  peaceable  and  well  disposed,  and  were  of 
great  service  to  the  burghers,  for  whom  they  bought  clothing 
in  Basutoland.  It  was  possible  for  the  burghers,  he  consid- 
ered, to  hold  out  for  more  than  a  year. 

General  Hattingh  (Kroonstad)  declared  that  in  one  part  of 
the  Kroonstad  district  there  were  still  plenty  of  sheep  and 

339 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


cattle,  and  that  seed  had  been  sown  for  next  year's  harvest. 
But  another  part  of  the  district  was  entirely  exhausted,  and 
had  to  obtain  its  suppHes  from  Bethlehem. 

General  Badenhorst  (Boshof)  stated  that  he  could  report  on 
the  Boshof  district  and  the  parts  of  the  Winburg  and  Bloemfon- 
tein  districts  to  the  west  of  the  railway.  There  were  enough 
cattle  to  last  his  commandos  for  years,  even  if  they  had  no 
other  food  at  all.  Recently  he  had  captured  fifteen  hundred 
head  of  cattle,  and  he  was  in  a  position  to  give  assistance  to 
other  districts.  Grain,  however,  was  not  so  plentiful  as  it  had 
been  the  previous  year,  but  nevertheless  there  was  still  a  large 
enough  supply  to  permit  him  to  send  help"  to  others. 

General  Nieuwouwdt  (Fauresmith)  reported  that  his  district 
was  entirely  devastated,  and  that  for  the  last  seven  months 
there  had  been  a  dearth  of  all  provisions ;  nevertheless,  his 
burghers  had  contrived  to  live.  There  was,  moreover,  enough 
corn  left  to  last  them  for  another  year.  There  were  now  only 
three  women  in  the  whole  of  his  district. 

General  Prinsloo  (Bethlehem)  declared  that  he  would  be 
telling  a  falsehood  if  he  were  to  say  that  there  was  no  food  in 
his  district.  He  possessed  slaughter-cattle  and  corn,  and  could 
help  other  districts.  One  of  his  commandants  had  recently 
found  a  store  of  maize  (consisting  of  one  hundred  and  thirty 
sacks)  buried  in  the  ground.  The  enemy  had  made  many 
inroads  into  his  district,  and  especially  during  the  last  few 
months.  The  blockhouses  were  a  source  of  constant  annoy- 
ance to  him. 

General  Brand  (Bethulie)  reported  upon  the  south-western 
part  of  the  Orange  Free  State,  where  he  commanded.  There 
were  some  parts  of  his  division,  he  said,  which  had  been  en- 
tirely laid  waste.  Everything  had  been  carried  off ;  there  was 
not  a  sheep  left ;  and  the  burghers  had  been  without  meat  for 
days.  But  he  was  able  to  capture  booty,  and  could  still  hold 
out  for  a  year. 

General  Wessels  (Harrismith)  drew  attention  to  the  con- 
stant passage  of  large  Kaffir  families  through  the  districts  of 
Harrismith  and  Vrede.  He  could  tell  the  delegates  that  the 
Kaffirs  had  been  quite  astonished  that  there  were  still  cattle  and 
sheep  and  supplies  of  grain  in  the  districts.  He  had  not  yet 
come  to  the  end  of  his  provisions ;  but,  even  if  everything  were 
taken,  he  saw  a  chance  of  obtaining  food  from  elsewhere. 

Commandant  C.  A.  Van  Niekerk  (Kroonstad)  declared  that 
if  there  was  one  part  of  the  country  which  was  entirely  ex- 
hausted it  was  the  part  where  he  was  in  command,  namely 
Hoopstad  and  a  portion  of  Kroonstad.  But  yet,  during  the 
last  twelve  months,  they  had  been  able  to  obtain  food,  and  even 

340 


APPENDIX  A 


to  sow  for  the  ensuing  year.  There  were  no  cattle  in  his  dis- 
trict; but  he  had  taken  a  thousand  sheep  and  fifty-two  cattle 
from  the  English. 

Commandant  Van  der  Merwe  (Heilbron)  spoke  to  the  same 
effect. 

General  Smuts  was  the  next  to  address  the  meeting.  He 
began  by  saying  that  his  expedition  into  Cape  Colony  had  been 
the  outcome  of  the  advice  which  the  deputation  had  given  in 
July,  1901,  namely  to  continue  the  war.  That  he  had  been  in 
command  of  it  had  come  about  in  the  following  way.  News 
had  been  received  in  the  Transvaal  that  affairs  in  Cape  Colony 
were  taking  a  favourable  turn,  and  accordingly  General  De  la 
Rey  had  received  orders  to  go  thither,  and  to  take  over  the 
command  there.  But  afterwards  it  was  thought  wiser  to  annul 
these  orders,  because  De  la  Rey  could  not  well  be  spared  from 
the  western  parts  of  the  Transvaal.  Owing  to  this,  he  (Gen- 
eral Smuts)  took  the  task  upon  his  own  shoulders,  and  crossed 
the  Orange  River  with  two  hundred  men.  He  had  had  a 
difficult  task  to  accomplish.  He  had  marched  through  Cape 
Colony  to  Grahamstad,  and  from  thence  he  had  pushed  on 
towards  the  coast,  through  Graaff  Reinet.  Thence  he  had 
proceeded  to  the  neighbourhood  where  he  was  now  carrying 
on  operations. 

He  had  visited  every  commando,  and  as  he  had  seen  that 
there  were  signs  of  disorder  amongst  them  he  had  taken  them 
all  under  his  own  command.  In  this  way  he  had  found  him- 
self at  the  head  of  some  fifteen  hundred  men.  During  his 
expeditions  Commandant  Lotter  had  been  captured  with  a  hun- 
dred men ;  this  had  reduced  his  force  to  only  fourteen  hundred. 
But  since  then  the  number  had  nearly  doubled,  so  that  they 
now  had  two  thousand  six  hundred  men  (divided  into  twenty 
commandos)  under  arms  in  Cape  Colony.  In  addition  to  these 
men  there  was  a  division  under  General  De  Villiers  operating 
in  Griqualand  West,  and  another  under  Commandant  Van  der 
Merwe  in  Bechuanaland.  The  total  numbers  of  these  two 
divisions  amounted  to  about  seven  hundred  men. 

Passing  on  to  the  question  whether  help  was  to  be  expected 
from  Cape  Colony,  General  Smuts  declared  that  there  would 
be  no  general  rising.  The  reports  which  represented  such  a 
rising  as  possible  had  exaggerated  matters.  There  were  great 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  general  rising.  First,  there  was  the 
question  of  horses — and  in  Cape  Colony  the  want  of  horses 
was  as  great,  if  not  greater,  than  in  the  Republics.  Secondly, 
it  was  exceedingly  difficult  for  Colonials  to  rise,  for  they  knew 
that  not  only  would  they  have  to  be  voet gangers,^  but  also  that 

»  Infantry. 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


if  they  were  captured  they  would  be  very  severely  punished 
by  the  English.  The  scarcity  of  grass  was  also  greatly  against 
any  such  attempt.  The  horses  had  to  be  fed,  and,  as  the 
enemy  had  forbidden  any  sowing,  it  was  almost  impossible  to 
find  food  for  them.  A  counter  proclamation  had  indeed  been 
issued  by  the  Republics,  but  it  had  been  of  no  avail. 

He  was  of  opinion  that  the  small  commandos  which  had 
already  been  in  Cape  Colony  had  done  the  best  they  could. 
The  question  that  now  arose  was  whether  the  whole  of  their 
forces  ought  to  be  sent  from  the  Republics  into  Cape  Colony. 
He  himself  thought  that  there  was  an  opening  for  them,  but 
the  difficulty  was  to  find  a  method  of  getting  them  there.  The 
existence  of  this  difficulty,  and  the  facts  which  he  had  brought 
before  the  delegates,  had  forced  him  to  the  conclusion  that  a 
general  rising  in  Cape  Colony  was  an  impossibility. 

As  to  the  continuation  of  the  war  and  matters  of  that  nat- 
ure, they  must  naturally  be  settled  by  the  Republics,  and  not 
by  Cape  Colony. 

The  meeting  was  then  adjourned  until  eight  o'clock  in  the 
evening. 

Upon  its  reassembling,  Commandant  Nijs  (Pretoria,  North) 
said  that  in  that  part  of  the  district  of  Pretoria  which  lay  to 
the  north  of  the  Delagoa  Bay  Railway  there  were  still  cattle 
enough  to  last  for  a  considerable  time,  but  that  the  store  of 
grain  would  be  exhausted  within  a  fortnight.  The  number 
of  horses  also  was  insufficient.  The  district  could  muster  one 
hundred  and  fifty-three  mounted  men  and  one  hundred  and 
twenty-eight  voetgangers.  In  the  division  of  Onderwijk,  Mid- 
delburg,  there  were  twenty-six  mounted  men  and  thirty-eight 
voetgangers. 

Commandant  Grobler  (Bethal)  stated  that  in  his  district  they 
had  not  been  left  undisturbed  during  the  summer.  Only  a 
short  time  previously  he  had  lost  sixty-three  men  in  an  en- 
gagement, where  he  had  been  besieged  in  a  kraal,  out  of 
which  he,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty-three  burghers,  had  man- 
aged to  escape.  Bethal  had  been  laid  waste  from  one  end  to 
the  other,  and  he  had  no  provisions  for  his  commandos.  He 
had  on  his  hands  three  hundred  women  and  children ;  these 
were  in  a  serious  position,  owing  to  the  lack  of  food ;  some  of 
the  women  had  also  been  assaulted  by  Kaffirs. 

General  Christiaan  Botha  (Swaziland)  then  reported  on 
the  condition  of  the  Swaziland  commando.  They  had  no  pro- 
visions in  hand,  and  were  simply  living  by  favour  of  the 
Kaffirs.  They  had  no  women  there.  His  commando  of  one 
hundred  and  thirteen  men  was  still  at  Piet  Retief.    As  there 


342 


APPENDIX  A 


was  no  grain  to  be  had,  they  were  compelled  to  go  from  kraal 
to  kraal  and  buy  food  from  the  Kaffirs,  and  this  required 
money.  Yet  somehow  or  other  they  had  managed  to  keep  soul 
and  body  together.  "  I  have  fought  for  the  Transvaal,"  he 
concluded,  for  two  and  a  half  years,  and  now,  since  I  hear 
that  there  is  food  in  the  Free  State,  I  shall  fight  for  the  Free 
State  for  two  and  a  half  years  more." 

General  Brits  (Standerton)  said  that  he  had  still  provisions 
for  two  months,  but  no  cattle.  He  had  sixty-five  families  with 
him,  and  found  it  very  difficult  to  provide  them  with  the  neces- 
saries of  life.    Altogether,  things  were  in  a  most  critical  state. 

Mr.  Birkenstock  (Vrijheid)  spoke  as  follows: 

"  I  shall  go  deeper  into  some  of  the  points  which  the  Com- 
mandant-General has  brought  forward  in  his  general  report 
of  the  matter.  At  Vrijheid  we  have  been  harassed  by  large 
forces  of  the  enemy  for  six  or  eight  months,  and  the  district 
is  now  completely  devastated.  The  presence  of  women  and 
children  causes  great  difficulty,  for  of  late  the  English  have 
refused  to  receive  the  families  which,  compelled  by  absolute 
famine,  wished  to  take  refuge  with  them.  There  is  also  con- 
tinual danger  from  the  Kaffirs,  whose  attitude  towards  us  is 
becoming  positively  hostile.  Both  horses  and  grain  are  scarce ; 
but  as  far  as  the  latter  is  concerned  there  will  be  sufficient, 
provided  that  the  enemy  does  not  return.  One  morning  re- 
cently a  Kaffir  commando,  shortly  before  daybreak,  attacked 
a  party  of  our  men,  who  lost  fifty-six  killed  out  of  a  total  of 
seventy.  That  peace  must  be  made  at  all  costs  is  the  opinion 
of  all  the  families  in  my  district,  and  I  feel  it  my  duty  to 
bring  this  opinion  before  you." 

Commandant  Alberts  (Pretoria  and  Middelburg)  said  that 
his  burghers  had  had  no  rest  for  a  year,  and  that  during  that 
period  no  ploughing  or  sowing  had  been  done  in  the  district. 
Consequently  a  commando  would  not  be  able  to  find  the  means 
of  subsistence  there.  On  three  occasions  he  had  been  forced 
to  take  refuge  in  a  kraal,  but  fortunately  had  always  been  able 
to  make  his  escape.  They  had  no  cattle  which  they  could  use 
for  food,  although  he  had  received  some,  through  Commandant 
Roos,  from  the  Free  State.  Their  horses  were  in  the  worst 
possible  condition. 

Landdrost  Bosman  (Wakkerstroom)  then  gave  an  account 
of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  his  district.  They  were  de- 
pendent for  everything,  except  meat,  upon  the  Kaffirs,  giving 
them  meat  in  exchange.  This  year  there  had  been  a  very 
poor  crop  of  mealies,  and,  such  as  it  was,  it  had  been  much 
damaged  by  the  enemy.  Still  the  burghers  might  manage, 
with  what  mealies  they  had,  to  last  out  for  another  two  months ; 

343 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


but  the  women  and  children  also  needed  to  be  provided  for. 
The  cattle  were  beginning  to  run  short,  and  the  few  horses  that 
they  had  were  so  weak  that  they  would  require  a  fortnight's 
rest  before  they  could  be  used.  It  might  become  necessary 
for  the  commandos  to  leave  the  district,  and  if  so,  what  was 
to  become  of  the  families? 

Mr.  De  Clercq  (Aliddelburg)  regretted  that  he  was  unable 
to  give  as  cheery  a  report  as  some  of  the  gentlemen  present 
had  done.  The  part  of  Middelburg  which  he  represented  was 
in  an  almost  hopeless  condition.  There  were  no  slaughter- 
cattle,  and  only  enough  grain  to  last  for  a  very  short  time. 
Out  of  five  hundred  horses  only  one  hundred  now  remained, 
and  these  could  do  no  work,  being  too  weak  even  to  get  away 
when  it  became  necessary  to  retreat  from  the  enemy.  The 
state  of  the  burghers  was  very  discouraging;  if  they  should 
be  compelled  to  leave  the  district  the  question  would  arise 
whether,  considering  the  condition  of  their  horses,  it  would 
be  possible  for  them  to  reach  their  new  destination.  There 
were  fifty  families  in  Middelburg,  and  things  were  going  very 
badly  with  them.  The  district  would  have  to  be  abandoned, 
and  what  would  then  be  the  fate  of  the  families,  which  even 
now  could  only  be  scantily  provided  for?  The  women  had 
wished  to  go  on  foot  to  the  English,  but  he  had  advised  them 
to  wait  until  the  results  of  the  present  negotiations  should 
become  known. 

Commandant  David  Schoeman  (Lijdenburg)  said  that  al- 
though but  a  short  time  ago  there  had  been  eight  hundred 
head  of  cattle  in  his  district,  they  had  now  all  been  carried  oft. 
Grain  there  was  none.  Should  fighting  be  continued,  he  was 
at  a  loss  to  know  how  he  could  provide  for  the  women. 

Commandant  Opperman  (Pretoria,  South)  reported  on  that 
part  of  the  Pretoria  district  which  lies  south  of  the  line.  What 
he  said  agreed  substantially  with  the  report  of  Commandant 
Alberts.    (See  page  343.) 

Commandant  Liebenberg  (Potchefstroom)  stated  that  dur- 
ing the  last  eight  or  nine  months  blockhouses  had  been  erected 
in  his  district.  All  that  was  now  left  to  him  was  a  strip  of 
country  about  twelve  miles  long ;  here  he  could  still  exist.  A 
good  deal  of  seed  had  been  sown,  but  the  crops  had  of  late 
fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  English.  The  grain  was  alto- 
gether spoilt ;  some  of  it  had  been  burnt,  the  rest  trodden  down 
by  the  horses.  There  were  ninety-three  households  in  his  dis- 
trict. Between  Lichtenburg  and  Potchefstroom  there  were 
some  women  from  the  Orange  Free  State  who  were  reduced 
to  the  most  dire  straits.  They  had  told  him  that  if  things  did 
not  improve  they  intended  to  go  on  foot  to  Klerksdorp,  and 

344 


APPENDIX  A 


he  had  replied  that  they  must  wait  for  the  result  of  the  nego- 
tiations. He  had  still  four  hundred  mounted  men,  in  addition 
to  one  hundred  voetgangers.  He  could  hold  out  for  a  short 
time  longer,  and  then  would  have  to  look  for  some  way  out  of 
his  difficulties. 

General  Du  Toit  ( Wolmaransstad)  said  that  there  were  five 
hundred  families  in  his  district,  but  little  enough  for  them  to 
live  on.  Though  his  horses  were  weak,  he  would  be  able  to 
save  himself  by  strategy  if  he  should  get  into  a  tight  corner. 
His  commandos  were  small — only  four  hundred  and  fifty 
mounted  men.  The  cattle  were  in  good  condition,  but  grain 
was  scarce. 

Commandant  De  Beer  (Bloemhof)  had  still  under  his  com- 
mand as  many  as  four  hundred  and  forty-four  mounted  men 
and  one  hundred  and  sixty-five  voetgangers.  Both  grain  and 
cattle  were  scarce,  but  then  Bloemhof  had  never  possessed 
many  head  of  cattle.  So  far  the  families  had  not  suffered 
from  want.    He  would  be  able  to  hold  out  for  another  year. 

General  Kemp  reported  that  he  had  under  him  Krugersdorp, 
Rustenburg,  and  parts  of  Pretoria  and  Johannesburg.  In  the 
district  of  Krugersdorp  no  more  sowing  was  possible,  and  the 
majority  of  cattle  had  been  carried  away.  Yet  there  was  no 
want.  Why  should  he  lack  for  anything  when  he  was  in  pos- 
session of  a  great  commissariat  "  extending  as  far  as  the 
Zoutpansberg,  where  General  Beijers  was  in  command?  He 
took  what  he  wanted  from  the  Kaffirs — it  was  not  their  prop- 
erty ;  he  was  only  taking  back  what  really  beonged  to  the 
burghers. 

Commandant-in-Chief  de  Wet  here  asked  why  the  eastern 
divisions  of  the  Transvaal  could  not  do  like  General  Kemp, 
and  take  what  they  required  from  the  Kaffirs? 

General  Kemp  replied  that  the  fact  that  in  the  eastern  parts 
the  Kaffirs  were  united  with  the  English  made  the  difference. 
The  Kaffirs  there,  he  said,  gave  all  they  looted  to  the  English, 
who  then  sold  them  the  cattle  back  again.  If  then  cattle  were 
taken  in  those  parts,  it  would  be  cattle  which  was  really  the 
property  of  the  Kaffirs.  Moreover,  the  Zulus  were  Kaffirs  of 
a  different  sort  to  those  with  which  he  (the  General)  had  to 
deal.  General  Botha  also  had  said  that  among  the  Kaffirs  in 
the  Eastern  Transvaal  there  were  not  to  be  found  any  cattle 
belonging  to  the  burghers. 

Mr.  J.  L.  Grobler  (CaroHna)  had  not  as  yet  had  to  complain 
of  any  lack  of  cattle  or  grain  in  his  district.  The  English, 
however,  by  their  system  of  blockhouses,  had  cut  the  burghers 
off  from  the  greater  part  of  the  crop.  If  nothing  happened, 
the  newly-sown  crops  ought  to  produce  a  good  harvest ;  but 

345 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


he  did  not  like  the  temper  of  the  Kaffirs.  His  men  could  still 
hold  out  for  another  six  or  seven  months.  The  three  hundred 
horses  still  remaining  to  them  were  in  a  weak  condition ;  such 
as  they  were,  there  was  not  one  apiece  for  the  burghers. 

Mr.  J.  Naude  (Pretoria)  said  that  he  represented  a  part  of 
Pretoria  and  General  Kemp's  flying  column.  In  his  district 
sowing  and  harvesting  went  on  as  usual.  There  were  fortu- 
nately no  women  and  children.  Although  the  commandos 
had  not  a  superabundance  of  cattle,  yet  no  one  lacked  for  any 
of  the  necessaries  of  Hfe. 

The  meeting  was  then  closed  with  prayer,  and  adjourned 
until  the  following  morning. 

Friday,  May  i6th,  1902. 

The  meeting  opened  with  prayer  a  little  after  nine  a.m. 
The  correspondence  which  the  two  Governments  had  ad- 
dressed to  the  burghers,  in  order  that  it  might  be  communi- 
cated to  their  representatives  at  one  of  these  meetings,  was 
first  read.  It  was  then  debated  whether  the  meeting  should 
request  Lord  Kitchener  to  put  it  into  communication  with  the 
deputation  in  Europe.  After  speeches  pra  and  con,  it  was 
decided  not  to  do  so. 

Thereupon  General  Froneman  proposed  the  following  res- 
olution : 

"  This  meeting  is  of  opinion  that  the  Governments  should 
be  asked  in  the  first  place  to  thank  His  Majesty  the  King  of 
England  and  Her  Majesty  the  Queen  of  the  Netherlands, 
through  Lord  Kitchener,  for  the  efforts  which  (as  appears  from 
the  correspondence  between  the  said  Governments)  they  have 
made  to  set  on  foot  negotiations  for  peace ;  and,  in  the  second 
place,  to  express  to  them  the  regret  of  this  meeting  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  has  not  accepted  the  proposal  of  Her 
Majesty's  Government  that  the  representatives  of  the  two 
Repubfics  now  in  Europe  (who  still  enjoy  the  full  confidence 
of  their  fellow-countrvmen)  should  be  allowed  to  return  home, 
and  also  that  Lord  Kitchener  has  declined  a  similar  request 
addressed  to  him  by  the  Governments  of  the  two  Republics." 

This  proposal  was  seconded  by  Commandant  Flemmmg, 
and  carried. 

After  another  proposal,  made  by  H.  J.  Bosman,  and  second- 
ed by  J.  L.  Grobler,  had  been  rejected,  the  correspondence  re- 
ferred to  above  came  under  discussion. 

The  first  speaker  was  Mr.  P.  R.  Viljoen,  who  spoke  as  fol- 
lows : 

"  We  can  apply  to  our  own  country  those  words  of  Scrip- 

346 


APPENDIX  A 


ture, '  The  place  whereon  thou  standest  is  holy  ground.'  The 
soil  on  which  we  are  now  standing,  wet  as  it  is  with  the  blood 
and  tears  of  our  forefathers  and  also  of  the  many  who  have 
fallen  in  this  present  struggle,  may  well  be  regarded  as  '  holy 
ground/ 

"  That  we  should  ever  have  to  surrender  this  country  is  a 
horrible  thought.  Yet  it  must  be  faced.  It  is  certain  at  least 
that  many  districts  must  be  abandoned,  for  the  enemy  is  doing 
his  utmost  to  collect  us  together  at  a  few  isolated  places,  where 
he  will  be  able  to  concentrate  his  forces  upon  us. 

"  From  the  reports  which  we  have  received  it  appears  that 
the  state  of  affairs  in  the  Orange  Free  State  is  still  hopeful. 
Not  so  in  the  Transvaal.  There  our  prospects  are  of  the 
gloomiest. 

"  My  opinion  is  that  we  must  endeavour  to  bring  this  war 
to  an  end.  If  there  was  the  least  chance  of  our  being  able  to 
maintain  our  independence,  we  would  still  fight  on,  and  not 
even  the  bitterest  sufferings  would  appear  unendurable.  But 
have  we  any  such  chance  ? — that  is  the  question  which  we  have 
got  to  answer. 

"  We  know  nothing,  it  will  be  said,  of  the  present  state  of 
affairs  in  Europe,  for  the  report  from  our  deputation,  which 
has  just  been  read  in  your  presence,  is  six  months  old.  Never- 
theless, if  anything  favourable  to  us  had  occurred  since  then, 
we  must  have  heard  of  it  by  now. 

"  It  is  evident  that  we  must  endeavour  to  obtain  peace  on 
terms  honourable  to  ourselves.  But  how  are  we  to  do  so? 
By  keeping  our  independence  in  view  when  making  terms 
with  the  enemy,  you  will  answer.  Nevertheless,  I  think  it 
would  be  advisable  for  us  to  commission  our  Governments  to 
ask  the  English  Government  once  more  what  concessions  it  is 
prepared  to  make  to  us  on  condition  of  our  surrendering  our 
independence.  Until  we  know  this  we  can  come  to  no  final 
decision. 

"  Though  it  is  a  bitter  thing  to  have  to  say,  yet  I  feel  it  my 
duty  to  tell  you  that  I  honestly  believe  it  to  be  impossible  for 
us  to  carry  on  the  war  any  longer." 

Mr.  De  Clercq  then  addressed  the  meeting  in  the  following 
words : 

"  The  question  before  us  is,  whether  or  not  the  war  can  be 
continued?  To  answer  it,  we  must  look  forward  into  the  fu- 
ture. We  must  ask  ourselves  what  consequences  will  ensue 
from  a  continuance  of  hostilities,  and  what  will  be  the  result  of 
their  cessation. 

"  We  have  only  fifteen  thousand  men  against  the  enemy's 
quarter  of  a  million.    Our  food  and  horses  are  scarce,  and  we 

347 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 

have  other  difficulties  besides  these.  It  is  impossible  to  go  on 
with  the  struggle. 

"  Nevertheless,  if  I  beHeved  that  to  do  so  would  give  us  a 
chance  of  retaining  our  independence,  I  also  would  be  ready 
for  further  sacrifices.  But  as  it  is  impossible  to  retain  our 
independence,  surely  we  shall  only  be  storing  up  misery  for 
the  future  if  we  continue  fighting  until  every  man  of  us  is  a 
prisoner  or  in  his  grave.  I  am  of  opinion  that  our  most  rea- 
sonable course  is  to  save  what  is  still  left  to  us — our  existence 
as  a  nation.  It  is  not  too  late  to  save  it  now,  but  who  can  tell 
what  the  future  holds  in  store  for  us  ?  If  we  are  to  be  still  fur- 
ther reduced  in  number,  we  shall  soon  cease  to  exist  as  a  na- 
tion. Can  it  be  right  to  sacrifice  a  nation  which  has  fought 
as  the  African  nation  has  done?  " 

Commandant  Rheeder  (Rouxville)  then  spoke  as  follows: 
I  know  that  the  times  are  very  dark,  but  still  there  are 
some  rays  of  light.  You  have  been  asked  whether  you  will 
continue  fighting  until  you  are  exterminated.  But  there  is 
another  alternative.  Will  you  not  continue  fighting  until  you 
are  relieved?  I  maintain  that  our  independence  must  be  a 
sine  qua  non  of  any  negotiations  that  we  make — we  cannot  give 
it  up.  So  long  as  we  have  life  we  must  continue  to  fight,  and 
we  must  only  lay  down  our  arms  when  relief  arrives." 

General  Kemp  now  rose  to  his  feet.  "  I  am  fully  aware," 
he  said,  "  of  the  very  serious  position  in  which  we  are  placed. 
Yet,  when  the  war  began,  the  position  was  no  less  grave.  We 
must  continue  our  resistance.  When  we  recall  to  our  minds 
how  much  this  war  has  cost  us,  and  what  rivers  of  blood  have 
flowed,  we  feel  that  it  is  impossible  to  surrender.  As  far  as  I 
am  concerned,  unless  rehef  comes,  I  will  fight  on  till  I  die. 

"  But  one  should  not  look  only  at  the  dark  side  of  the  pict- 
ure. It  is  true  enough  that  in  some  districts  food  is  scarce, 
but  there  are  none  in  which  it  is  absolutely  unobtainable.  The 
districts  threatened  by  famine  must  be  abandoned — that  is  the 
way  to  deal  with  the  difficulty. 

It  has  been  pointed  out  that  a  large  number  of  our  men  have 
been  killed  or  taken  prisoners.  This  fact,  however,  only  fills 
me  with  courage.  A  cause  that  has  cost  us  so  dearly  must 
never  be  forsaken.  To  own  ourselves  beaten  would  be  to  dig 
a  grave  for  the  African  nation,  out  of  which  it  would  never 
rise.  Why  should  we  lose  our  trust  in  God?  Up  to  this  mo- 
ment He  has  aided  us,  and  He  will  always  be  our  Helper." 

Vice-Commandant  Breijtenbach  (Utrecht)  then  spoke  a? 
follows : 

The  burghers  whom  I  represent  have  told  me  to  inform 
them,  when  these  deliberations  have  come  to  an  end,  whether 

348 


APPENDIX  A 


a  continuation  of  the  war  is  possible,  and  if  it  be  possible,  how 
it  is  to  be  accomplished.  If  I  cannot  assure  them  that  we  are 
able  to  continue  the  struggle,  the  men  of  Utrecht  will  not  fight 
any  more.    As  you  know,  I  can  give  them  no  such  assurance. 

"  There  are  ten  districts  in  the  Transvaal  which  are  unable 
to  fight  any  longer.  It  surely  is  not  proposed  to  leave  these 
districts  in  the  lurch !  We  must  not  only  consult  our  senti- 
ments, but  also  our  reason.  And  what  does  the  voice  of  rea- 
son say  ?  This — that  the  continuation  of  the  war  is  an  impos- 
sibility. Should  you  decide  now  to  continue  the  war,  you 
would  have  to  start  a  fresh  campaign ;  and  you  know  that  that 
is  beyond  our  powers. 

"  A  previous  speaker  has  referred  to  the  help  of  the  Lord, 
but  who  is  able  to  fathom  His  counsels  ?  Yet  we  can  under- 
stand the  answer  God  has  given  to  our  prayer — that  prayer 
which  we  offered  with  the  Mausers  in  our  hands  when  the  war 
began.  And  what  was  the  answer  we  received  ...  I  leave  it 
to  you  to  reply. 

Yes,  we  must  use  our  reason.  If  we  continue  the  strug- 
gle we  give  the  death-blow  to  our  existence  as  a  nation.  We 
have  been  told  that  there  are  ten  districts  that  cannot  go  on 
fighting.  Are  we  going  to  say,  '  We  will  continue  the  strug- 
gle and  leave  these  districts  to  their  fate  '  ?  No !  We  must 
save  what  we  can." 

General  Liebenberg  then  spoke.  "  I  am  able  to  give  my 
support,"  he  said,  "  to  all  that  has  fallen  from  the  lips  of 
Messrs.  Viljoen  and  De  Clercq.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that 
the  future  is  very  dark.  Yes,  we  can  only  trust  in  God,  and 
use  our  reason  to  the  best  of  our  ability.  I  have  been  com- 
missioned by  those  whom  I  represent  to  retain  our  independ- 
ence if  possible,  and  if  it  be  not  possible  to  make  peace  on  the 
best  terms  that  we  can  get." 

Commandant  Uijs  was  the  next  speaker.  He  explained 
that  if  the  war  were  to  be  continued  he  would  have  to  leave  his 
district  and  abandon  the  women  and  children  to  the  mercy  of 
the  Kafiirs.  He  could  see  a  chance  of  saving  the  mounted 
men  if  only  he  could  feel  certain  that  they  would  all  follow  him, 
but  the  case  of  the  women  and  children  would  be  hopeless. 
A  serious  difficulty  confronted  the  delegates,  and  it  was  with 
them,  and  no  longer  with  the  Government,  that  its  solution 
rested.  Never  before  had  he  been  called  upon  to  face  so  gi- 
gantic a  task.  It  was  not  the  time  now  to  criticize  one  an- 
other, but  to  practise  mutual  forbearance.  The  Bible  had  been 
quoted  by  one  of  the  speakers,  but  let  them  not  forget  the  text 
in  which  the  king  is  spoken  of  who  calculated  whether  he  was 
strong  enough  with  ten  thousand  to  encounter  him  who 

349 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


marched  against  him  with  twenty  thousand.  Then  there  was 
the  question  as  to  the  disposal  of  the  widows  and  orphans. 
What  was  to  become  of  them  if  the  burghers,  by  refusing  to 
come  to  terms  with  the  enemy,  should  no  longer  be  able  to 
act  as  their  mutual  protectors  ?  Let  them  make  no  more  wid- 
ows and  orphans,  but  let  them  open  their  eyes  and  recognize 
that  the  hand  of  God  was  against  them. 

The  next  business  was  the  reading  of  two  letters — one  from 
General  ]\Ialan  and  the  other  from  General  Kritzinger.  Malan 
reported  on  his  doings  in  the  Cape  Colony,  while  Kritzinger 
advised  that  the  war  should  be  discontinued. 

General  Du  Toit  then  spoke,  emphasizing  the  responsibility 
of  the  delegates  and  the  importance  of  the  occasion.  He  went 
on  to  say  that  he  represented  a  part  of  the  nation  which  had 
suffered  very  severely,  but  which  nevertheless  had  commis- 
sioned him  to  stand  up  for  independence,  if  by  any  means  it 
could  be  retained ;  if  he  failed  in  this,  he  was  to  take  whatever 
course  seemed  best  to  him.  In  his  district  the  burghers  were 
not  reduced  to  such  a  pass  as  to  oblige  them  to  surrender,  but 
the  condition  of  other  districts  must  also  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration, and  if  it  appeared  that  the  war  could  not  be  contin- 
ued, the  delegates  must  get  the  best  terms  they  could.  In 
their  demands  they  must  be  united — this  was  the  principal  rea- 
son why  dissension  was  so  much  to  be  avoided.  For  himself,  he 
could  only  say  that  whether  the  meeting  voted  to  continue  the 
war  or  to  bring  it  to  a  conclusion,  he  would  fall  in  with  the 
wishes  of  the  majority.  Any  decision  would  be  better  than 
the  failure  of  this  conference,  as  that  would  leave  everything 
undecided. 

He  was  followed  by  Secretary  of  State  Reitz,  who  said : 

"You  all  know  what  the  Governments  have  done.  The  ques- 
tion now  is,  Is  there  anything  further  that  we  can  do?  For  my 
part,  I  think  that  there  is.  We  might  offer  to  surrender  Wit- 
watersrand  and  Swaziland  ;  we  might  also  relinquish  our  rights 
to  a  foreign  policy ;  we  might  even  accede  to  an  English  Pro- 
tectorate. If  France  has  been  able  to  do  without  Alsace  and 
Lorraine,  surely  we  can  do  without  the  goldfields.  What  ben- 
efit have  they  ever  done  us?  Did  the  money  they  brought 
ever  do  us  any  good  ?  No  !  rather  it  did  us  harm.  It  was  the 
gold  which  caused  the  war.  It  is  then  actually  to  our  advan- 
tage to  cede  the  goldfields,  and  moreover  by  so  doing  we  shall 
be  rid  of  a  very  troublesome  part  of  our  population." 

^Ir.  Reitz  then  went  on  to  discuss  in  detail  the  position  in 
regard  to  Swaziland,  the  question  of  a  British  Protectorate, 
and  the  surrender  of  our  right  to  treat  with  foreign  powers. 

General  Aluller  (Boksburg)  expressed  sympathy  with  the 

350 


APPENDIX  A 


views  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  while  Vice-Commandant  Roux 
(Marico)  said  that  he  was  prepared  to  sacrifice  many  things, 
but  that  he  intended  to  hold  out  for  independence. 

The  next  speech  was  made  by  Landdrost  Stoffberg  (Zout- 
pansberg),  who  said : 

I  agree  with  General  Du  Toit  in  what  he  said  about  the 
necessity  for  unity  amongst  us.  Disunion  must  not  be  so 
much  as  mentioned.  I  have  a  mandate  from  the  burghers  of 
Zoutpansberg  not  to  sacrifice  our  independence.  But  if  any- 
thing short  of  this  will  satisfy  the  English,  I  am  quite  prepared 
to  make  concessions.  Some  of  the  burghers  think  that  it  might 
be  well  to  surrender  the  goldfields  for  a  certain  sum  of  money, 
while  others  point  out  that  the  gold  was  the  cause  of  the  war. 
I  also  think  that  we  have  suffered  through  the  gold,  and  that 
we  might  give  up  the  goldfields  without  doing  ourselves  any 
harm.  For  what  has  the  gold  done  for  us?  It  has  enriched 
us,  many  will  say.  Yes !  but  it  has  also  been  a  stumbling- 
block  to  many  a  man.  And  is  it  not  better  to  be  a  poor  but  in- 
dependent nation  than  to  be  rich  and  at  the  same  time  subject 
to  another  Power.  Let  the  goldfields  go.  We  shall  still,  with 
our  markets,  be  rich  enough." 

Commandant  Mentz  (Heilbron)  then  rose. 

"  I  appeal  to  the  forbearance  of  the  delegates,"  he  said,  "  for 
making  any  speech  at  this  meeting.  I  fear  I  am  unable  to 
give  as  rose-coloured  a  report  as  my  brother  Free- Staters 
have  done :  My  district  has  been  continually  harassed  by  the 
enemy's  troops,  and  great  devastation  has  been  wrought.  But 
the  greatest  trouble  I  have  is  the  presence  of  so  many  families, 
for  there  are  still  two  hundred  in  the  district.  I  have  only 
eighty  burghers  under  my  command,  and  it  is  clear  to  me  that 
I  shall  soon  be  obliged  to  leave  the  district.  What  will  then 
become  of  these  families?  I  received  a  commission  not  to 
sacrifice  our  independence.  But  since  my  burghers  met  more 
than  half  of  them  have  been  made  prisoners.  The  remainder 
have  instructed  me  to  do  my  best  to  preserve  our  independ- 
ence, but  if  I  find  that  it  cannot  be  maintained  to  act  according 
to  my  own  judgment.  It  appears  to  me  that  it  may  be  possi- 
ble to  retain  our  independence  by  ceding  some  part  of  the 
country ;  if  this  be  the  case  it  ought  most  certainly  to  be  done. 
I  can  remember  the  late  President  Brand  saying  in  connexion 
with  the  diamond  fields,  '  Give  them  up ;  you  will  gain  more  by 
giving  them  up  than  by  keeping  them.'  This  remark  may  well 
apply  to  the  present  situation." 

Commandant  Flemming  (Cape  Town)  reported  that  his  dis- 
trict was  well-nigh  devastated.  But  they  still  possessed  a  fair 
number  of  cattle,  which  they  had  carried  away  with  them. 

351 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


But  even  if  they  had  no  cattle,  that  would  be  no  excuse  for 
surrender,  for  in  his  district  it  was  possible  to  live  on  the 
game.  The  view  which  he  and  his  burghers  had  taken  was 
that  since  they  had  already  sacrificed  nearly  everything  they 
possessed,  they  would  not  now  sacrifice  their  independence. 
For  should  this  also  be  lost,  then  there  would  be  nothing  left 
to  them.  That  had  been  their  opinion,  but  they  had  not  then 
known  how  matters  stood  in  the  Transvaal.  Now  that  he  was 
aware  of  the  state  of  afYairs,  he  agreed  with  State  Secretary 
Reitz  that  their  best  course  was  to  cede  a  part  of  their  terri- 
tory. 

Vice-President  Burger  now  rose  from  his  seat,  and  said: 
"  This  meeting  has  to  formulate  a  fresh  proposal  to  the 
English  Government,  and  to  await  its  answer.  If  this  pro- 
posal be  rejected,  well,  you  will  be  no  worse  off  than  you  are  at 
present.  If  there  be  a  man  who  has  earnestly  considered  what 
the  sacrifice  of  everything  means  to  us,  then  I  am  that  man. 
It  has  been  said,  we  must  retain  our  independence,  or  else  con- 
tinue to  fight ;  and  we  are  still  able  to  hold  out  for  another  six 
months,  or  even  a  year.  Now,  supposing  that  we  can  hold 
out  another  year,  what  should  we  gain  by  doing  so?  Why,  we 
should  only  grow  weaker,  whilst  the  enemy  grew  stronger ! 
I  emphatically  state  that  the  war  cannot  be  carried  on  any 
longer ;  and  I  ask  if  there  is  any  man  here  who  can  maintain 
with  a  clear  conscience  that  the  struggle  can  be  successfully 
continued. 

Some  of  you  may  tell  me  that  complications  may  arise  in 
Europe.  But  that  is  a  groundless  hope.  Others  may  say  that 
it  is  astonishing  enough  that  we  have  been  able  to  hold  out  till 
now,  and  that  we  still  have  the  power  of  making  our  voices 
heard.  Yes!  that  is  very  surprising;  but  shall  we  retain  this 
power  long?  I  heard  some  delegates  say,  '  We  shall  fight  till 
we  die ! '  That  is  a  manly  sentiment.  But  was  it  not,  per- 
haps, prompted  by  a  desire  to  make  a  fine  speech,  which  would 
go  down  to  posterity?  Was  not  the  aim  in  some  cases  that 
future  generations  might  recall  these  speeches  when  they  were 
told  of  the  brave  fight  our  men  had  made  ? 

"  Let  every  one  consider  this  well :  Is  he  prepared  to  sacri- 
fice the  nation  on  the  shrine  of  his  own  ambition  ?  Ambition, 
although  it  may  cost  us  our  lives,  can  never  lead  to  martyr- 
dom.   A  martyr  is  made  of  finer  stuff ! 

Have  we  not  arrived  at  the  stage  of  our  history  when  we 
must  pray,  *  Thy  will  be  done  '  ?  That  prayer,  considered 
rightly,  is  a  prayer  of  faith.  Do  not  let  us  imagine  that  we  can 
compel  God  to  do  our  will — that  is  not  faith. 

"  I  beg  of  you  to  consider  what  will  become  of  the  women 

352 


APPENDIX  A 


and  the  children  and  the  banished  burghers  if  you  still  persist 
until  your  last  shot  has  been  fired.  What  right  shall  we  have 
to  intercede  for  these  unfortunate  ones  when  we  have  rejected 
the  proposals  of  the  EngHsh  Government?  We  shall  have 
no  right  whatsoever. 

"  Perhaps  it  is  God's  will  that  the  English  nation  should  op- 
press us,  in  order  that  our  pride  may  be  subdued,  and  that  we 
may  come  through  the  fire  of  our  troubles  purified. 

My  opinion  is  that  we  should  make  a  peace  proposal  to 
England,  yielding  as  much  as  we  rightly  can ;  and  if  England 
rejects  our  proposal,  it  will  be  time  enough  then  to  see  what 
other  course  is  open  to  us. 

"  There  is  one  fact  which  we  cannot  allow  ourselves  to  for- 
get. There  are  ten  districts  in  the  Transvaal  which  must  be 
abandoned.  In  the  Free  State,  too,  there  are  districts  in  a 
similar  pHght.  It  is  the  opinion  of  lawyers  that  so  long  as  the 
inhabitants  remain  in  a  district  their  property  cannot  lawfully 
be  confiscated ;  but  if  the  district  be  abandoned,  then  confisca- 
tions can  take  place. 

"  It  is  criminal  to  say,  '  Come  what  may,  we  will  fight  till 
everything  is  lost  and  all  of  us  are  dead  ! '  " 

The  following  resolution  was  then  proposed  by  General 
Kemp,  and  seconded  by  Mr.  J.  Nand : 

This  meeting  decides,  in  order  to  expedite  the  work  in 
hand,  to  depart  from  the  original  programme ;  and  to  constitute 
a  Commission,  to  he  composed  of  the  Hon.  Jacob  Smits  and  the 
Hon.  Judge  Hertzog,  and  to  give  this  Commission  authority  to 
draw  up,  conjointly  with  the  two  State  Presidents,  a  draft  pro- 
posal, to  he  laid  hefore  the  delegates  to-morrow  morning." 

This  resolution  was  put  to  the  meeting,  and  accepted  by  the 
delegates.    The  meeting  then  adjourned. 


At  half-past  seven  in  the  evening  the  delegates  reassem- 
bled. 

General  Cilliers  (Lichtenburg  and  Marico)  was  the  first  to 
make  a  report.  "  In  my  division,"  he  said,  "  things  are  in  a 
very  favourable  condition.  Yet  we  are  bound  to  take  the 
other  divisions  into  consideration.  My  burghers  said  to  me, 
'  Stand  firm  for  independence !  '  But  when  they  gave  me  the 
order  they  did  not  know  about  the  condition  of  the  other  dis- 
tricts. Will  those  other  districts — such  of  them,  I  mean,  as 
are  in  a  worse  predicament  than  ourselves — be  able  to  co- 
operate with  us  in  continuing  the  war?  Some  of  them  have 
already  answered  my  question  in  the  negative.  Must  we  then 
not  ask  ourselves,  What  will  be  the  best  for  the  nation  as  a 


353 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


whole?  Shall  we  say  continue  the  war,  or  shall  we  approach 
the  enemy  and  make  a  proposal? 

But  are  we  really  justified  in  prolonging  the  struggle,  and 
making  still  further  sacrifices  ?  Some  will  answer,  '  Yes,  for 
we  have  a  God  in  whom  we  have  trusted  from  the  beginning ; 
shall  we  not  continue  to  trust  in  Him  who  has  worked  such 
wonders  for  us  already  ?  '  But  I  have  heard  a  brother  say, 
*  God's  hand  is  against  us.'  It  was  bitter  to  hear  these  words 
from  him,  and  for  myself  I  will  have  none  of  them.  My  vote 
is  given  here  and  now  for  a  continuance  of  the  war. 

But  we  must  hear  what  the  rest  of  the  delegates  have  to 
say,  and  if  they  can  point  out  some  other  way  by  which  we 
can  retain  even  a  portion  of  our  national  independence,  we 
must  be  ready  to  follow  it." 

General  Froneman  next  addressed  the  meeting. 

I  fear,"  he  began,  "  that  too  much  is  being  made  of  the 
condition  of  my  division :  things  are  not  so  prosperous  with  us 
as  some  here  appear  to  imagine.  But  for  all  that,  my  burghers 
are  for  nothing  short  of  absolute  independence.  They  cannot 
forget  the  blood  which  has  already  been  spilt  in  our  cause. 
They  mean  to  hold  out  vmtil  they  are  relieved. 

"  I  sympathize  deeply  with  those  districts  that  are  less 
happily  circumstanced  than  my  own,  but  it  pains  me  to  dis- 
cover that  there  are  some  here  who  doubt  that  God  is  for  us. 
For  what  has  supported  us  up  till  now  save  faith  in  God  ? — the 
faith  of  those  who  first  prayed  God  to  prevent  the  war,  and 
then,  when  they  saw  that  this  was  not  His  will,  fought  Hke 
men,  putting  all  their  trust  in  Him. 

Up  till  now  the  Lord  hath  been  my  helper ;  the  enemy  has 
cut  us  off  from  everything,  and  yet  we  see  our  two  little  Re- 
publics still  full  of  hope,  still  holding  out." 

He  concluded  his  speech  by  saying  that  he  would  like  to 
hear  the  opinions  of  Generals  Botha,  De  Wet,  and  De  la  Rey. 
They  ought  to  be  able  to  throw  much  light  upon  the  matter. 
Commandant  General  Botha  then  rose,  and  said: 

I  am  glad  to  have  an  opportunity  of  giving  my  views  upon 
the  present  state  of  affairs.  We  know  that  differences  of 
opinion  are  to  be  found  everywhere  and  on  every  question ; 
when,  therefore,  a  man  differs  from  those  who  think  that  this 
war  can  and  ought  to  be  continued,  we  must  ascribe  his  opin- 
ion to  discouragement,  weakness,  or  cowardice.  We  must 
acknowledge  the  truth  of  the  facts  from  which  he  draws  his 
conclusions,  and  which  have  compelled  him  to  utter  it.  His 
object  is  to  make  known  the  true  state  of  the  country — which 
indeed  is  his  plain  duty.  Were  he  not  to  do  so  on  the  present 
occasion  he  would  be  accused,  later  on.  of  having  kept  secret 

354 


APPENDIX  A 


what  he  ought  to  have  revealed.  Differences  of  opinion  then 
need  not,  and  must  not,  cause  a  disunion  and  discord.  What- 
ever our  private  opinions  may  be,  yet,  as  delegates  of  the 
burghers,  we  must  speak  and  act  as  one  man. 

The  war  has  now  lasted  two  years.  But  the  question  for 
us  to  answer  is  this :  Are  we  going  forwards  or  backwards  ? 
My  own  conviction — a  conviction  founded  upon  the  views  ex- 
pressed by  my  commandos  and  the  speeches  which  I  have  Hst- 
ened  to  at  this  meeting — is  that  we  are  not  gaining,  but  losing 
ground.  There  is  nothing,  in  my  opinion,  more  evident  than 
that,  during  the  last  six  months,  the  tide  has  been  setting 
steadily  against  us,  and  in  favour  of  the  enemy. 

A  year  ago  there  were  no  blockhouses.  We  could  cross 
and  recross  the  country  as  we  wished,  and  harass  the  enemy 
at  every  turn.  But  now  things  wear  a  very  different  aspect. 
We  can  pass  the  blockhouses  by  night  indeed,  but  never  by 
day.    They  are  likely  to  prove  the  ruin  of  our  commandos. 

"  Then,  as  regards  food.  We  are  told  that  there  is  food 
here,  and  food  there ;  but  how  are  we  to  get  at  it  ?  How  are  we 
to  transport  it  from  one  district  to  another?  Outside  the 
frontiers  of  our  Republics  there  are  plenty  of  provisions,  but  it 
becomes  daily  more  difficult  to  get  them  into  our  hands.  The 
cattle,  for  instance,  that  used  to  be  at  Ladysmith  have  now 
been  removed  to  Estcourt.  Even  the  friendly  Kaffirs,  from 
whom  we  are  now  able  to  obtain  provisions,  may  quite  possi- 
bly soon  turn  against  us.  The  time  is  coming  when  we  shall 
be  compelled  to  say,  '  Hunger  drives  us  to  surrender.' 

"  The  horses  have  been  chased  about  so  incessantly,  and 
have  suffered  so  much  from  want  of  forage,  that  their  strength 
is  almost  exhausted.  They  are  so  weak  that  it  is  almost  im- 
possible to  accomplish  any  long  distance  with  them. 

"  As  to  the  Cape  Colony,  I  had  always  understood  that  the 
Colonists  were  going  to  rise  en  bloc,  but  General  Smuts  has 
just  told  us  that  there  is  no  chance  of  such  a  thing  happening. 
And  he  speaks  from  personal  knowledge,  having  just  returned 
from  paying  them  a  visit.  Moreover,  he  has  seen  our  horses, 
and  says  that  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  go  into  the  Colony, 
so  it  appears  that  our  successes  there  are  over.  This  is  a  se- 
vere check  indeed  ;  but  it  could  not  have  been  otherwise.  We 
have  not  enough  horses  to  enable  us  to  give  the  Colonists  ef- 
fectual help,  and  they  themselves  have  been  cowed  by  the 
heavy  penalties  imposed  upon  all  those  who  did  rise.  Many 
of  those  who  are  well  disposed  towards  us  dare  not  join  us 
now. 

"  Again,  there  is  no  chance  of  European  intervention :  not 
one  of  the  Powers  will  do  anything  for  us.    To  see  this  it  is 

355 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


only  necessary  to  peruse  that  correspondence  between  the 
Netherlands  and  England,  which  was  the  cause  of  these  nego- 
tiations. There  we  shall  find  that  the  Dutch  Minister  says  that 
our  deputation  is  only  accredited  to  Holland,  whereas  it  had 
been  accredited  by  the  two  Republics  to  all  the  Governments 
in  Europe.  Moreover,  the  correspondence  makes  it  very  plain 
that  England  will  not  tolerate  the  intervention  of  any  foreign 
Power  whatsoever.  But  the  truth  is,  that  no  foreign  Power 
wants  to  help  us.  When  the  women  were  first  made  prison- 
ers I  thought  that  European  intervention  might  perhaps  be 
attempted,  because  to  make  prisoners  of  women  is  a  thing 
quite  outside  the  usual  methods  of  warfare.  But  nothing  was 
done  even  then.  We  were  told  that  we  had  the  sympathy  of 
the  nations  of  Europe — their  sympathy,  and  nothing  more ! 

"  I  have  come  to  a  subject  that  is  very  near  our  hearts — our 
women-folk.  If  this  meeting  decides  upon  war,  it  will  have  to 
make  provision  for  our  wives  and  children,  who  will  then  be 
exposed  to  every  kind  of  danger.  Throughout  this  war  the 
presence  of  the  women  has  caused  me  anxiety  and  much  dis- 
tress. At  first  I  managed  to  get  them  into  the  townships,  but 
later  on  this  became  impossible,  because  the  English  refused 
to  receive  them.  I  then  conceived  the  idea  of  getting  a  few 
of  our  burghers  to  surrender,  and  sending  the  women  in 
with  them.  But  this  plan  was  not  practical,  because  most 
of  the  famihes  vv^ere  those  of  prisoners  of  war,  and  the 
men  still  on  commando  were  not  so  closely  related  to  these 
families  as  to  be  willing  to  sacrifice  their  freedom  for  them. 

We  have  heard  much  talk  about  fighting  '  to  the  bitter 
end.'  But  what  is  '  the  bitter  end  '  ?  Is  it  to  come  when  all 
of  us  are  either  banished  or  in  our  graves  ?  Or  does  it  mean 
the  time  when  the  nation  has  fought  until  it  never  can  fight 
again?  As  to  myself,  personally,  I  can  still  continue  the 
struggle.  I  have  horses,  my  household  is  well  provided  for, 
and  as  far  as  my  own  inclination  goes  I  am  all  for  going  on. 
But  am  I  only  to  consider  myself?  Is  it  not  my  first  duty  to 
look  at  the  interests  of  my  nation?  I  have  always  been,  and 
still  am,  of  the  opinion  that,  before  letting  the  nation  go  to 
rack  and  ruin,  it  is  our  duty  to  parley.  We  must  not  let  the 
chance  for  negotiations  slip  out  of  our  hands.  When  our 
numbers  have  fallen  to  only  four  or  five  thousand  men  under 
arms  we  shall  no  longer  have  that  chance,  and  this  will  un- 
doubtedly happen  if  we  hold  out  for  another  year,  or  even  six 
months. 

"  There  are  some  who  say,  '  We  must  trust  in  God  and  keep 
on  fighting,'  and  I  grant  them  that  miracles  are  possible  at  all 
times.    But  it  is  beyond  our  power  to  say  whether  God  will 

356 


APPENDIX  A 


work  a  miracle  for  us.  We  do  not  know  what  His  will  may 
be.  If  we  continue  the  war,  and  if  it  should  afterwards  appear 
that  everything  has  been  in  vain,  our  responsibility  will  be  only 
the  heavier,  the  blinder  our  confidence  now  is.  And  over  and 
over  again  we  shall  hear, '  He  is  dead,' '  and  he,  and  he.'  Will 
not  this  make  our  remorse  all  the  more  bitter?  Our  com- 
mandos are  so  weak,  our  country  so  exhausted,  that  the  loss 
of  one  great  battle,  the  surrender  of  a  single  strong  force, 
would  spell  ruin  for  us. 

But  we  have  managed  to  hold  out  for  so  long.'  Yes,  but 
there  is  a  natural  reason,  a  military  reason,  why  this  has  been 
the  case.  The  fact  that  our  commandos  have  been  spread 
over  so  large  a  tract  of  country  has  compelled  the  British,  up 
to  the  present  time,  to  divide  their  forces.  But  things  have 
changed  now;  we  have  had  to  abandon  district  after  district, 
and  must  now  operate  on  a  far  more  limited  territory.  In 
other  words,  the  British  army  can  at  last  concentrate  its  forces 
upon  us. 

"  I  firmly  believe  that,  under  Hke  circumstances,  no  other 
nation  in  the  world  would  have  fought  as  our  nation  has  done. 
Shall  such .  a  nation  perish  ?  No !  we  must  save  it.  If  we 
delegates  are  convinced  that  we  can  no  longer  offer  resistance 
to  the  enemy,  it  is  our  plain  duty  to  tell  the  people  so.  We 
must  not  let  them  be  exterminated  for  want  of  timely  advice. 
More  than  twenty  thousand  women  and  children  have  died  in 
the  camps  during  this  one  year. 

"  There  are  men  of  our  own  kith  and  kin  who  are  helping 
to  bring  us  to  ruin.  If  we  continue  the  war,  it  may  be  that 
the  Afrikanders  against  us  will  outnumber  our  own  men. 

"  What  is  there  left  to  hope  for?  Are  we  to  retain  our  inde- 
pendence by  ceding  a  part  of  our  territories  ?  Most  assuredly 
yes,  if  such  a  compromise  is  feasible.  As  regards  Swaziland, 
it  is  of  so  little  importance  to  us  that  we  can  give  it  up  with- 
out a  thought.  Then  there  are  the  goldfields — let  them  go. 
They  are  but  a  cancerous  growth,  sapping  the  very  life  of  our 
country. 

"  We  must  face  the  fact  that  things  are  not  at  a  standstill : 
we  are  slipping  back  every  moment.  We  must  all  pull  to- 
gether, or  everything  is  lost.  If  our  sacrifices  will  buy  our  in- 
dependence, well  and  good.  But  suppose  that  we  are  com- 
pelled to  give  it  up — well,  if  it  even  comes  to  this,  we  must 
never  do  so  unconditionally.  An  unconditional  surrender 
would  be  well  enough  if  the  leaders  only  had  to  be  considered. 
But  we  must  think  of  the  interests  of  the  nation.  We  must 
say  to  our  people,  '  We  have  no  thought  of  ourselves :  our 
only  desire  is  to  place  ourselves  in  the  breach,  if  so  we  may 
save  you.' '' 


357 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


General  Botha  then  proceeded  to  discuss  eventualities  in 
the  event  of  independence  being  lost.  Representative  gov- 
ernment, he  said,  might  perhaps  still  be  retained,  and  the 
national  language  need  not  necessarily  be  supplanted.  Thus 
the  nation  would  still  retain  its  old  ideals  and  its  old  customs. 
General  Roux  had  been  pertinently  asked  whether  it  were  bet- 
ter to  strive  for  the  recuperation  of  the  people  now  or  to  wait 
until  they  were  altogether  overpowered  and  reduced  to  such 
straits  that  it  would  require  some  thirty  years  before  they 
could  once  more  call  themselves  a  nation.  He  then  went  into 
the  terms  of  the  proposal  by  the  British  Government,  and 
repeated  that  there  must  be  no  idea  of  unconditional  surren- 
der. 

The  General  concluded  in  the  following  words: 

"  Although  we  do  not  wish  to  accept  terms,  we  have  no 
right  to  refuse  them  altogether.  On  the  other  hand  we  must 
not  say  to  the  English,  '  Do  with  us  as  you  like.'  For  then 
our  descendants  would  eternally  reproach  us.  We  should 
have  lost  the  privilege  of  looking  after  our  own  wives  and 
children.  They  would  be  handed  over  to  strangers.  No  !  we 
must  secure  by  some  means  or  other  that  we  ourselves  shall 
be  able  to  provide  for  them.  The  fate  of  our  country  is  in 
the  hands  of  the  men  in  this  tent.  It  has  been  bitter,  indeed, 
for  me  to  have  to  speak  as  I  have  done.  But  if  I  have  not 
spoken  the  truth,  convince  me  of  my  error,  and  I  will  be  the 
first  to  own  it.  But  do  not  condemn  me,  for  I  have  had  no 
other  object  than  to  tell  you  what  I  beheve  to  be  the  truth." 

General  De  la  Rey  spoke. 
I  will  not  detain  you  long,"  he  began,  "  but  there  are  a 
few  points  to  which  I  wish  to  draw  attention.  In  regard 
to  the  districts  under  miy  command,  every  one  will  under- 
stand that  my  burghers,  after  their  recent  brilliant  successes, 
are  firmly  resolved  not  to  sacrifice  their  independence.  If  I 
allude  to  the  battles  which  I  have  just  fought  it  is  with  no 
thought  of  boasting,  but  only  that  you  may  picture  to  your- 
selves the  effect  which  they  must  have  had  upon  the  enemy ; 
and  that  no  one  may  be  angry  with  myself  and  my  burghers 
for  standing  firm  when  our  feet  are  on  such  solid  ground. 

"  But  since  my  arrival  at  Vereeniging  I  have  heard  about 
our  districts  where  matters  are  in  a  far  less  favourable  condi- 
tion than  in  my  own.  So  far  as  I  myself  am  concerned,  I  can- 
not think  of  laying  down  my  arms.  Yet  it  appears  to  me  that 
some  parts  of  the  country  will  be  compelled  by  starvation  to 
give  up  the  struggle.  It  is  well  that  those  who  represent 
these  parts  have  spoken  openly,  and  not  left  this  meeting  in 
ignorance  of  the  state  of  affairs  only  to  go  and  lay  down  their 
arms. 


3S8 


APPENDIX  A 


"  I  myself  have  never  thought  intervention  possible.  Even 
before  the  war  broke  out  I  said  that  nothing  would  come  of  it. 
I  saw  that  South  Africa  was  divided  between  Germany  and 
England.  And  that  if  only  the  Republics  could  be  extin- 
guished, then  England  and  Germany  would  be  the  only  Pow- 
ers left,  and  Germany  would  be  safe.  But  if  the  Republics 
were  victorious,  then  Germany  would  be  in  danger.  Why 
then  should  Germany  interfere  in  favour  of  the  RepubHcs, 
when  she  has  everything  to  lose  by  such  a  course  of  action  ? 
No !  intervention  was  entirely  out  of  the  question. 

There  has  been  talk  about  fighting  to  the  bitter  end ;  but 
has  not  the  bitter  end  already  come  ?  Each  man  must  answer 
that  question  for  himself. 

"  You  must  remember  that  everything  has  been  sacrificed — 
cattle,  goods,  money,  wife,  and  child.  Our  men  are  going 
about  naked,  and  some  of  our  women  have  nothing  but 
clothes  made  of  skins  to  wear.    Is  not  this  the  bitter  end? 

"  I  believe  that  the  time  has  now  come  to  negotiate.  Eng- 
land will  never  again  give  us  the  chance  of  doing  so,  should 
we  allow  this  opportunity  to  slip  by.  But  how  shall  we  nego- 
tiate ?  I  must  leave  it  to  this  meeting  to  answer  that  ques- 
tion. If  we  do  not  obtain  what  we  ask  for,  we  shall  at  least 
stand  or  fall  together.    Yet  let  us  act  with  reason. 

"  I  cannot  agree  with  one  of  the  opinions  expressed  by 
Commandant-General  Botha  and  States- Secretary  Reitz. 
They  have  stated  that  they  are  against  surrendering  the  gold- 
fields  to  England ;  firstly,  because  England  would  never  ac- 
cept such  a  proposal,  for  by  doing  so  she  would  declare  to  the 
whole  world  that  she  had  only  been  fighting  for  the  goldfields ; 
and,  secondly,  because  if  we  gave  up  the  goldfields  we  should 
lose  a  source  of  revenue,  without  the  aid  of  which  we  could 
not  repair  the  damages  which  the  war  has  wrought." 

Commandant-in-Chief  de  Wet  spoke  as  follows: 

"  I  am  of  opinion  that  the  circumstances  in  the  Orange  Free 
State  are  no  less  critical  than  those  in  the  Transvaal.  Nine 
districts  were  entirely  ruined ;  but  these,  though  at  one  time 
abandoned  by  the  burghers,  have  now  been  reoccupied. 

"  If  I  now  differ  from  those  who  are  of  opinion  that  it  is 
useless  to  prolong  the  war,  it  must  not  be  thought  that  I  am 
lacking  in  respect  for  their  judgment.  By  no  means.  I  know 
that  what  has  been  said  about  the  wretched  plight  of  the  peo- 
ple is  only  too  true ;  but  they  must  not  take  it  amiss  if  I  point 
out  that  the  same  condition  of  affairs  was  described  in  the  cor- 
respondence from  the  Transvaal  which  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  English  at  Reitz.  But,  granting  that  the  facts  have  been 
correctly  stated,  even  then  the  Orange  Free  State  will  refuse  to 

359 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


give  in.  Let  me  be  candid  with  you,  and  say  frankly  that,  m 
my  opinion,  this  is  virtually  the  Transvaal's  war.  This,  how- 
ever, makes  no  difference  to  me.  For  me  the  barrier  of  the 
Vaal  River  has  never  existed.  I  have  always  endeavoured  to 
maintain  the  Nauwere-Vereeniging,^  and  I  feel  strongly  the 
obligation  which  the  union  of  the  two  States  casts  on  each 
one  of  us.    They  are  two  nations,  but  their  cause  is  one. 

What,  then,  is  the  prevailing  feeling  in  the  Orange  Free 
State  ?  Of  the  six  thousand  burghers  who  have  been  attend- 
ing meetings,  I  myself  have  been  in  command  of  five  thou- 
sand, and  I  can  confidently  say  that  never  were  five  thousand 
men  more  unanimous  in  their  opinion  than  were  those  I  led 
when  they  cried,  as  with  one  voice,  '  Persevere ;  we  have 
everything  to  lose,  but  we  have  not  yet  lost  it.'  What,  then, 
is  the  answer  to  be  ?  I  am  firmly  persuaded  that  we  have  only 
one  course  before  us.  If  we  are  unable  to  obtain  what  we  are 
asking  for,  then  it  only  remains  for  us  to  alleviate  as  best  we 
may  the  lot  of  those  who  cannot  help  themselves.  I  do  not  as 
yet  clearly  see  how  this  is  going  to  be  done,  but,  at  all  costs,  let 
us  continue  fighting.  What  was  our  total  strength  when  we 
began  this  war  ?  Sixty  thousand  men  all  told.  Against  this  the 
English  had  a  standing  army  of  seven  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand troops.  Of  these  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand,  or 
one-third,  are  now  in  South  Africa.  We  know  from  expe- 
rience that  they  are  unable  to  send  more  than  one-third. 
And  we  ?    Have  we  not  also  one-third  of  our  army  left  ? 

"  I  do  not  wish  to  imply  that  I  am  not  prepared  to  concede 
something,  but  nothing  will  induce  me  to  consent  to  any  part 
of  the  country  in  our  territory  being  given  up.  It  will  never 
do  to  have  an  English  colony  planted  in  our  midst,  for  Eng- 
land then  would  have  far  too  firm  a  hold  upon  our  country. 

It  is  said,  and  with  some  truth,  that  the  goldfields  have 
been  a  curse  to  us,  but  surely  there  is  no  reason  why  they 
should  continue  to  be  so.  I  fail  to  see  how,  without  retaining 
possession  of  these  goldfields,  the  Republics  are  to  be  saved. 
Swaziland  perhaps  could  be  ceded,  but  never  the  goldfields. 
I  feel  that  any  intervention  is  out  of  the  question;  but  is  not 
the  very  fact  that  it  has  not  taken  place  a  sure  proof  that  it 
was  not  the  will  of  God  ?  Does  it  not  show  that  He  is  minded 
to  form  us,  by  this  war,  into  a  nation  worthy  of  the  name? 
Let  us  then  bow  to  the  will  of  the  Almighty. 

"  My  people  will  perhaps  say,  '  Our  Generals  see  only  the 
religious  side  of  the  question.'  They  will  be  right.  Without 
faith  we  should  have  been  foolish  indeed  to  have  embarked 
on  this  war  and  to  continue  it  for  so  many  months.  Indeed, 

I  Closer  Union. 
360 


APPENDIX  A 


it  must  be  a  matter  of  faith,  for  the  future  is  hidden  from  us. 
What  has  been  is  within  our  ken,  but  what  is  before  is  beyond 
the  knowledge  of  the  wisest  man. 

"  Cape  Colony  is  a  great  disappointment  to  me.  I  do  not 
refer  so  much  to  what  we  have  learnt  about  it  from  the  reports 
as  to  the  fact  that  no  general  uprising  can  be  expected  in  that 
quarter.  So  much  we  have  heard  from  General  Smuts.  But 
though  there  is  to  be  no  uprising,  we  have  no  reason  to  think 
that  there  has  been  any  falling  off  in  the  number  of  our  adhe- 
rents in  the  Colony.  The  little  contingent  there  has  been  of 
great  help  to  us :  they  have  kept  fifty  thousand  troops  occu- 
pied, with  which  otherwise  we  should  have  had  to  reckon. 

I  feel  deeply  for  our  women  and  children ;  I  am  giving 
earnest  consideration  to  their  miserable  plight.  But  their 
sufferings  are  among  what  we  may  call  the  necessary  circum- 
stances of  the  war.  I  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  circum- 
stances. For  me,  this  is  a  war  of  religion,  and  thus  I  can  only 
consider  the  great  principles  involved.  Circumstances  are  to 
me  but  as  obstacles  to  be  cleared  out  of  the  road. 

"  If  we  own  ourselves  defeated — if  we  surrender  to  the  foe 
— we  can  expect  little  mercy  from  him.  We  shall  at  all  events 
have  dug  the  grave  of  our  national  independence,  and,  as 
things  are,  what  difference  is  there  between  this  and  digging 
our  own  graves  ?  " 

Mr.  Birkenstock  said  that  the  question  about  the  goldfields 
must  be  carefully  considered.  This  source  of  income  must 
not  be  given  up. 

The  meeting  was  then  closed  with  prayer. 

Saturday,  May  i/th,  1902. 

The  Chairman  first  called  upon  Chief  Commandant  de  Wet 
to  offer  up  prayer. 

A  private  report  from  Mr.  J.  Schmorderer,  who  had  brought 
the  missive  from  the  deputation  in  Europe,  was  then  read. 

The  first  delegate  to  speak  was  Landdrost  Bosman  (Wak- 
kerstroom),  who  said: 

"  My  opinion  is  that  the  best  way  of  ascertaining  the  proba- 
ble future  course  of  events  is  to  see  what  has  already  happened 
in  the  past.  A  year  ago  there  were  six  hundred  burghers  in 
my  district,  and  each  man  had  a  horse  ;  now  there  are  not  more 
than  half  that  number,  and  many  of  them  have  to  go  on  foot. 
Last  year  we  had  from  three  to  four  thousand  bags  of  maize 
ready  to  hand ;  this  year  there  are  not  more  than  as  many  hun- 
dred, and  how  to  get  at  them  is  more  than  I  can  tell.    If  such 

361 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


has  been  the  history  of  the  past  year,  in  what  sort  of  condition 
shall  we  be  at  the  end  of  the  present  one  ? 

"  The  great  difficulty  with  regard  to  our  families  is  not  how 
to  clothe  them,  but  how  to  feed  them.  I  know  of  a  woman 
who  has  lived  for  weeks  on  nothing  but  fruit.  I  myself  have 
had  to  satisfy  my  hunger  with  mealies  for  days  together,  al- 
though I  have  no  wish  to  complain  about  it.  Even  the  scanty 
food  we  can  get  has  to  be  obtained  from  the  Kaffirs  by  persua- 
sion. Moreover,  the  Kaffirs  side  with  the  EngHsh,  who  in 
their  counter-marches  are  clearing  all  the  food  out  of  the 
country. 

"  The  men  in  my  district  told  me  that  if  I  came  back  and  re- 
ported that  the  war  was  to  be  continued,  they  would  be 
obliged — for  the  sake  of  their  wives  and  children — to  go 
straight  to  the  nearest  English  camp  and  lay  down  their  arms. 
As  to  the  women  it  is  true  that  they  are  at  present  full  of  hope 
and  courage,  but  if  they  knew  how  matters  stood  in  the  veldt, 
they  would  think  very  differently.  Even  now  there  are  many 
of  them  who  say  that  the  war  ought  to  be  put  a  stop  to,  if  only 
for  their  sakes. 

"  The  Kaffirs  are  another  great  source  of  trouble ;  in  this 
problem  they  are  a  factor  which  cannot  be  neglected. 

There  is  no  hope  of  intervention,  nor  can  we  expect  any- 
thing from  the  EngHsh  nation.  Facts  that  have  come  to  my 
knowledge  prove  to  me  that  England  has  become  more  and 
more  determined  to  fight  to  the  bitter  end. 

"  I  do  not  see  what  we  can  possibly  gain  by  continuing  the 
war.  Our  own  people  are  helping  the  EngUsh,  and  every  day 
the  enemy  are  improving  their  position.  What  advantage 
can  there  then  be  in  persisting  in  the  struggle  ?  We  have  now 
a  chance  of  negotiating,  and  we  should  seize  that  chance.  For 
we  have  the  opportunity  given  us  of  obtaining  some  help  for 
our  ruined  compatriots,  who  would  be  entirely  unable  to  make 
a  fresh  start  without  assistance. 

As  to  the  religious  side  of  this  matter,  I  am  not  ashamed 
to  say  that  I  believe  I  am  serving  God  in  the  course  which  I 
am  taking.  We  must  not  attempt  to  obtain  the  impossible 
against  all  reason.  If  we  make  any  such  attempt,  the  results 
will  probably  be  exactly  opposite  to  what  we  wish.  I  have 
the  greatest  doubt  whether  it  really  is  in  order  to  give  glory  to 
God  that  the  nation  wishes  to  retain  its  independence.  On 
the  contrary  I  believe  that  the  motive  is  obstinacy,  a  vice  to 
which  human  nature  is  always  prone. 

"  It  has  been  said  that  it  would  be  shameful  to  disregard 
the  blood  already  spilt;  but  surely  one  ought  also  to  consider 
the  blood  that  might  yet  be  shed  in  a  useless  struggle." 

362 


APPENDIX  A 


The  proposal  of  the  Commission  was  now  read,  and  after 
some  discussion  accepted.    It  ran  as  follows : 

The  meeting  of  national  representatives  from  both  Repub- 
lics— after  having  considered  the  correspondence  exchanged, 
and  the  negotiations  conducted,  between  the  Governments  of 
the  two  Republics  and  His  Excellency  Lord  Kitchener,  on 
behalf  of  the  British  Government ;  and  after  having  heard  the 
reports  of  the  deputies  from  the  dif¥erent  parts  of  both  Re- 
publics ;  and  after  having  received  the  latest  reports  from  the 
representatives  of  the  two  Republics  in  Europe ;  and  having 
taken  into  consideration  the  fact  that  the  British  Government 
has  refused  to  accept  the  proposal  of  our  Governments  m^ade 
on  the  same  basis ;  and  notwithstanding  the  above-mentioned 
refusal  of  the  British  Government — still  wishes  to  give  expres- 
sion to  the  ardent  desire  of  the  two  Republics  to  retain  their 
independence,  for  which  already  so  much  material  and  per- 
sonal sacrifice  has  been  made,  and  decides  in  the  name  of  the 
people  of  both  Republics  to  empower  both  Governments  as 
follows : — To  conclude  a  peace  on  the  following  basis,  to  wit : 
the  retention  of  a  limited  independence  offering  an  addition 
to  what  has  already  been  offered  by  the  two  Governments  in 
their  negotiations,  dated  the  15th  of  April,  1902. 

(a)  To  give  up  all  foreign  relations  and  embassies. 

(b)  To  accept  the  Protectorate  of  Great  Britain. 

(c)  To  surrender  parts  of  the  territory  of  the  South  African 
RepubHc. 

(d)  To  conclude  a  defensive  alliance  with  Great  Britain  in 
regard  to  South  Africa. 

During  the  discussion  it  was  clearly  explained  that  the  terri- 
tory which  it  was  suggested  should  be  ceded  was  the  already 
mentioned  goldfields  and  Swaziland.  The  question  was  put 
whether  the  South  African  Republics  would  have  to  pay  for 
the  damage  done  during  the  war.  "  By  all  means  let  us  pay," 
said  Mr.  De  Clercq.  "  If  I  could  only  buy  back  the  independ- 
ence of  the  Orange  Free  State,  I  would  gladly  give  all  I  pos- 
sess." 

Several  other  Transvaal  delegates  expressed  themselves  in 
the  same  sense,  and  said  that  they  fully  appreciated  the  sacri- 
fices which  the  Orange  Free  State  had  made.  General  Frone- 
man  thanked  them  in  the  name  of  the  Free  State. 

He  felt  that  the  two  Republics  no  longer  thought  of  them- 
selves as  having  conflicting  interests.  In  the  fire  of  this  war 
they  had  been  firmly  welded  together. 

Commandant  Ross  (Vrede)  thought  it  wrong  even  to  dis- 
cuss the  possibility  of  giving  up  independence.  The  dele- 
gates had  received  a  definite  mandate.    They  had  been  com- 

363 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


missioned  to  see  that  the  national  independence  had  remained 
untouched,  whatever  else  might  have  to  be  given  up.  This 
being  the  case,  they  might  come  to  decisions  on  all  other 
points,  so  long  as  they  remembered  that  independence  was 
not  an  open  question. 

Commandant  J.  Van  Niekerk  (Ficksburg)  spoke  to  the 
same  purpose.  He  could  not  even  think  of  sacrificing  inde- 
pendence. 

After  some  other  delegates  had  made  a  few  short  remarks, 
General  Brand,  seconded  by  Commandant  A.  J.  De  Kock,  pro- 
posed the  following  resolution,  which  was  accepted  by  the 
meeting: 

This  meeting  of  the  national  representatives  of  the  two 
RepubHcs  hereby  charge  the  Governments  to  nominate  a 
Commission  for  the  purpose  of  entering  upon  negotiations 
with  His  Excellency  Lord  Kitchener,  acting  on  behalf  of  His 
Britannic  Majesty's  Government.  The  Commission  is  to  en- 
deavour to  make  peace  on  satisfactory  terms,  and  is  then  to 
lay  the  result  of  its  negotiations  before  this  meeting,  for  the 
sanction  of  the  two  Governments." 

The  meeting  was  then  closed  with  prayer. 


Appendix  B 


THE  CONFERENCE  AT  PRETORIA  BETWEEN  THE 
COMMISSION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  REPRE- 
SENTATIVES AND  LORDS  KITCHENER  AND 
MILNER  (MAY  iqth-MAY  28th,  1902) 

Minutes  of  the  Conference  held  at  Pretoria  on  May  19th, 
1902,  between  Lord  Kitchener  and  Lord  Milner,  representa- 
tives of  the  British  Government,  and  Commandant-General 
L.  Botha,  Commander-in-Chief  C.  R.  de  Wet,  General  J.  H. 
De  la  Rey,  Judge  J.  B.  M.  Hertzog,  and  General  J.  C.  Smuts, 
delegates  of  the  national  representatives,  who  had  met  at  Ve- 
reeniging  on  May  15th,  1902. 

Mr.  N.  J.  de  Wet  acted  as  interpreter ;  Mr.  O.  Walrond  was 
secretary  for  the  English  Government ;  and  the  Rev.  J.  D. 
Kestell  and  D.  Van  Velden  acted  in  a  similar  capacity  for  the 
Commission. 

The  Conference  met  at  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  at  the 
house  of  Lord  Kitchener.  After  having  greeted  each  other, 
the  members  took  their  seats  at  the  table  in  the  centre  of  the 
room. 

Commandant-General  L.  Botha  opened  the  proceedings  in 
the  following  words : 

"  Allow  me  to  state  that,  although  the  negotiations  have 
taken  a  longer  time  than  we  expected,  I  am  able  to  assure 
your  Excellencies  that  we  are  acting  in  good  faith,  and  that 
everything  has  been  done  with  the  sole  aim  of  concluding  the 
peace  which  we  all  desire. 

"  I  must  also  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  everything  we 
transact  here  must  be  submitted  to  our  national  representa- 
tives, in  order  to  obtain  their  sanction." 

The  suggestion  was  then  made  that  the  proposals  which  the 
Commission  was  prepared  to  make  should  be  laid  before  the 
Conference,  whereupon  the  following  letter  was  read  to  the 
meeting: 

365 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Pretoria,  igth  May,  1902. 
To  their  Excellencies,  Lord  Kitchener  and  Lord  Milner,  Pre- 
toria. 

Your  Excellencies, — 

With  a  view  to  finally  concluding  the  existing  hostilities, 
and  being  fully  empowered  by  the  Government  of  the  two  Re- 
publics, we  have  the  honour  to  propose  the  following  points — 
in  addition  to  the  conditions  already  offered  in  the  negotia- 
tions of  April  last — as  a  basis  for  negotiations : 

(a)  We  are  prepared  to  cede  our  independence  as  regards 

our  foreign  relations. 
{h)  We  wish  to  retain  self-government  in  our  country, 

under  British  supervision, 
(c)  We  are  prepared  to  cede  a  part  of  our  territory. 
Should  your  Excellencies  be  prepared  to  negotiate  on  this 
basis,  then  the  above-mentioned  points  can  be  elaborated. 
We  have  the  honour  to  be. 

Your  Excellencies'  most  obedient  servants, 
LOUIS  BOTHA. 
C.  R.  DE  WET. 
J.  H.  DE  LA  REY. 
J.  B.  M.  HERTZOG. 
J.  C.  SMUTS. 


When  this  letter  had  been  read,  a  discussion  followed. 

Lord  Milner:  "Considering  the  wide  difference  between 
this  proposal  and  that  made  by  His  Majesty's  Government, 
when  we  last  met,  I  fear  that  I  can  hold  out  very  little  hope  of 
any  good  results  following  negotiations  on  the  basis  you  have 
suggested." 

Lord  Kitchener :  We  can  take  those  proposals  into  con- 
sideration, but  I  cannot  see  how  it  is  possible  to  bring  them 
into  harmony  with  those  of  His  Majesty's  Government." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  If  this  is  the  position  you 
take,  we  should  hke  to  receive  from  you  a  final  answer  to  our 
proposals." 

Lord  Milner :  "  Do  you  wish  us  to  refer  your  proposals  to 
His  Majesty's  Government?" 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  Yes,  unless  you  have  full 
powers  to  give  us  a  final  reply." 

Lord  Milner :  I  am  quite  convinced  that  your  proposal 
will  be  rejected ;  and  I  feel  bound  to  say  that  to  refer  it,  as  it 
stands,  to  His  Majesty's  Government  will  only  do  you  harm.'* 

Commandant-General  Botha :    "  If  you  have  no  power  to 

366 


APPENDIX  B 


decide  upon  this  proposal  here,  we  should  like  you  to  refer  it 
to  His  Majesty's  Government." 

Lord  Milner :  I  have  no  objection  to  taking  the  respon- 
sibility of  refusing  your  proposal  on  myself.  The  instructions 
received  by  myself  and  Lord  Kitchener  are  quite  clear  on  this 
point." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  I  must  then  understand 
that  when  Lord  Sahsbury  said  that  this  war  was  not  carried 
on  with  a  view  to  annex  territory,  he  did  not  mean  it." 

Lord  Kitchener:  It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  territory, 
for  annexation  is  an  accomplished  fact." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  I  am  unable  to  see  how 
our  proposal  is  inconsistent  with  annexation." 

Lord  Milner:  "  I  cannot  now  recall  the  exact  words  used 
by  Lord  Salisbury,  but  it  is  true  that  Lord.  Sahsbury  declared 
that  his  Government  did  not  begin  the  war  with  the  intention 
of  obtaining  territory.  But  in  the  course  of  the  war  circum  - 
stances developed  in  such  a  way  that  the  decision  to  annex: 
the  Republics  became  a  necessity,  and  the  British  Government 
have  pronounced  their  firm  intention  not  to  withdraw  from 
this  decision." 

Judge  Hertzog:  "  I  should  like  to  be  informed  as  to  what 
the  great  difference  is  between  the  basis  now  proposed  by  us 
and  that  laid  down  by  His  Majesty's  Government  during  the 
negotiations  of  last  year — I  do  not  mean  the  difference  in  de- 
tails, but  in  principle." 

Lord  Kitchener:  "Do  you  mean  by  your  proposal  that 
the  Boers  will  become  British  citizens  ?  " 

General  Smuts :  "  I  cannot  see  that  our  proposal  is  neces- 
sarily in  contradiction  to  that  of  last  year.  Our  proposal  only 
makes  provision  concerning  the  administration." 

Lord  Milner  then  quoted  from  the  terms  offered  at  Mid- 
delburg  by  the  British  Government  the  previous  year: — 

"  At  the  earliest  possible  date  military  administration  shall 
cease,  and  be  replaced  by  civil  administration  in  the  form  of  a 
Crown  Colony  Government.  At  first  there  will  be  in  each  of 
the  new  Colonies  a  Governor,  an  Executive  Council  consist- 
ing of  the  highest  officials,  and  a  Legislative  Council,  which 
latter  shall  consist  of  a  certain  number  of  official  members  and 
also  of  a  nominated  non-official  element.  But  it  is  the  wish  of 
His  Majesty's  Government  to  introduce  a  representative  ele- 
ment as  soon  as  circumstances  permit,  and,  in  course  of  time, 
to  grant  to  the  new  colonies  the  right  of  self-government. 

"  It  may  be  that  I  do  not  properly  understand  your  pro- 
posal, but  it  seems  to  me  to  differ  not  only  in  detail,  but  also 
in  spirit  from  the  scheme  I  have  just  read  to  you." 

367 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Judge  Hertzog :    "  I  entirely  agree  with  you  that  there  is 

a  difference  in  idea  between  the  two  proposals ;  but  only  such 
a  difference  in  idea  as  might  well  be  found  between  Colonies  of 
the  same  State.  In  other  words,  one  constitution  is  adapted 
for  one  colony,  whilst  another  constitution  is  found  fitting  for 
another  colony,  but  yet  they  all  belong  to  the  same  Empire." 

Lord  Milner :  "  Exactly.  There  are  different  constitu- 
tions in  different  Colonies ;  but  it  seems  to  me  that  the  policy 
laid  down  in  your  proposal  differs  from  that  laid  down  by  His 
Majesty's  Government." 

Judge  Hertzog:  "  I  think  that  I  am  expressing  the  opin- 
ion of  the  whole  Commission  when  I  say  that  we  wish  for 
peace.  I  draw  attention  to  this  to  show  the  way  in  which, 
according  to  my  opinion,  we  should  consider  the  matter. 
For  if  we  on  both  sides  are  really  desirous  of  coming  to  a 
settlement,  we  should  not  make  too  much  of  theoretical  dif- 
ficulties, so  long  as  the  practical  aim  has  been  obtained.  For 
instance,  the  different  Colonies  which  now  are  joined  to  form 
the  United  States  once  possessed  constitutions  differing  much 
from  one  another.  Now  the  constitution  laid  down  in  our 
proposal  does  not  differ  so  much  from  that  laid  down  in  yours 
that  a  practical  difference  should  arise  therefrom ;  and  such  a 
practical  difference  would  arise  if  you  insisted  upon  carrying 
on  negotiations  on  your  own  basis.  I  imagine  that  England 
has  a  certain  object  before  her  in  South  Africa,  and  I  believe 
that  that  object  can  be  as  well  obtained  by  our  proposal  as  by 
that  of  Middelburg.  I  therefore  ask.  Is  the  difference  so 
great  that,  in  order  for  England  to  obtain  her  object,  an  en- 
tirely new  status  must  be  called  into  existence?  " 

Lord  Milner :  We  are  comparing  two  different  things. 
Here  in  the  Middelburg  scheme  there  are  a  number  of  definite 
proposals,  which  enter  upon  a  great  mass  of  particulars.  I 
do  not  mean  to  imply  that  zee  have  not  the  power  to  go  into 
particulars.  I  perfectly  understand  that  it  Hes  within  the 
power  of  Lord  Kitchener  and  myself  to  carry  on  further  de- 
liberations with  you  about  details,  so  as  to  throw  light  on  any 
doubtful  points,  and,  perhaps,  to  make  such  changes  as  would 
not  fundamentally  affect  the  scheme.  As  you  say  that  your 
proposals  are  not  in  contradiction  with  those  formulated  at 
Middelburg,  then  there  is  no  reason  why  you  should  not  lay. 
aside  your  proposals  and  discuss  the  Middelburg  proposals, 
which  are  definite." 

Judge  Hertzog:  "I  quite  admit  that  you.  Lord  Milner, 
are  entitled  to  say  that  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  be- 
tween our  proposals.  But  it  is  another  question  whether  the 
difficulty  that  thus  arises  is  of  such  a  nature  that  we — those 

368 


APPENDIX  B 


of  us  who  on  both  sides  are  anxious  to  conclude  peace — - 
should  not  be  able  to  find  a  solution  to  it  satisfactory  to  both 
parties.  I  cannot  answer  that  question;  nor  can  I  see  why 
the  same  result  would  not  be  reached  by  negotiating  on  the 
basis  proposed  by  us  as  by  carrying  on  negotiations  on  the 
Middelburg  proposal." 

Lord  Milner :  "  I  understand,  then,  that  you  acknowledge 
that  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  between  the  two  bases. 
Well,  I  do  not  think  that  we  are  empowered  to  negotiate  on 
a  basis  differing  from  that  laid  down  in  the  last  report  of  His 
Majesty's  Government,  and  also  differing  from  the  tenor  of 
the  Middelburg  proposal.  I  may  say  that  I  believe  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  in  their  latest  message  went  as  far  as 
it  was  possible  for  them  to  go  with  the  object  of  meeting 
you.    The  whole  spirit  of  the  telegram  was  to  that  effect." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  I  hope  you  will  under- 
stand that  I  do  not  speak  as  a  lawyer.  (Lord  Kitchener, 
laughing:  That's  the  case  with  me  too!")  I  fully  concur 
with  what  General  Botha  and  Judge  Hertzog  have  said  in 
regard  to  our  eagerness  to  establish  peace.  In  order  to  be 
brief,  I  will  only  remark  that  I  did  not  understand  His  Ex- 
cellency, Lord  Milner,  to  mean — any  more  than  I  myself 
meant — that  we  should  go  to  the  nation  with  the  Middelburg 
proposal,  with  the  idea  of  coming  back  with  it  unaltered." 

Lord  Milner :  "  No ;  if  I  gave  that  impression,  I  did  not 
intend  to  do  so.  But  I  believe  that  when  you  went  to  your 
people  with  the  last  message  from  His  Majesty's  Government 
it  was  with  the  knowledge — which  the  message  itself  made 
clear — that  His  Majesty's  Government  was  not  prepared  to 
take  into  consideration  any  terms  which  differed  widely  from 
the  poHcy  laid  down  in  the  Middelburg  proposal." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  That  was  indeed  what  I 
understood ;  and  accordingly  we  have  now  come  with  a  pro- 
posal which  does  not  differ  very  much  from  the  Middelburg 
proposal." 

General  Smuts :  "  I  thought  that  the  vital  principle  your 
Government  had  in  view  was  the  destruction  of  our  inde- 
pendence, and  in  our  proposal  the  independence  of  the  two 
Republics  with  regard  to  foreign  relations  is  given  up.  I  was 
therefore  of  opinion  that  the  two  parties  might  come  to  an 
arrangement  on  this  basis.  I  did  not  think  that  for  the  res- 
toration of  peace  the  Middelburg  terms  were  essential." 

Lord  Milner :  "  Not  in  the  details,  but  in  the  general 
ideas.  As  the  British  Government  has  laid  down  a  basis,  and 
you  have  had  weeks  in  which  to  consider  the  matter,  it  would 
never  do  for  you  now  to  put  it  on  one  side.    Lord  Kitchener 

369 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


has  given  your  nation  considerable  time  in  which  to  take 
counsel ;  and  now  you  come  back,  and,  ignoring  the  Middel- 
burg  terms,  you  propose  entirely  different  ones  of  your  own, 
and  say,  let  us  negotiate  on  these.  I  do  not  beHeve  that  I  and 
Lord  Kitchener  would  be  justified  in  doing  this.  But  in  case 
he  is  of  another  opinion,  the  British  Government  can  be  asked 
if  they  are  prepared  to  set  on  one  side  all  the  former  delibera- 
tions and  begin  again  on  a  new  basis." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  We  cannot,  of  course, 
prevent  Lord  Kitchener  from  asking  his  Government  any 
questions  he  pleases,  but,  at  the  same  time,  we  request  that 
you  will  cable  our  behests  to  the  English  Government." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  I  cannot  see  that  we  are 
beginning  again  on  a  new  basis,  for,  in  consequence  of  the 
negotiations  in  April  last,  you  were  ordered  by  the  British 
Government  to  encourage  us  to  make  fresh  proposals.  Our 
present  proposal  is  the  direct  result  of  that  order." 

Lord  Milner :  "  I  did  my  best  to  get  fresh  proposals  from 
you,  but  you  would  not  make  any.  You  forced  the  British 
Government  into  making  proposals." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  I  am  of  opinion  that  we 
must  both  work  together  in  this  matter  of  formulating  pro- 
posals." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  You  were  asked  to  make  proposals, 
but  you  did  not  do  so ;  and  now,  after  the  British  Government 
has  made  a  proposal,  you  yourselves  come  forward  with  one 
of  your  own." 

General  De  la  Rey :  "  I  think  that  it  was  the  encourage- 
ment given  us  by  correspondence  between  the  Netherlands 
and  the  British  Government  that  caused  us  to  make  our  pro- 
posals." 

Lord  Milner :  "  That  correspondence  was  at  the  beginning 
of  the  negotiations." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  If  we  had  been  obliged  to 
make  a  new  proposal  in  April,  we  would  not  have  been  able 
to  make  one  so  fair,  and  so  much  to  the  advantage  of  the  Brit- 
ish Government,  as  our  present  one,  for,  not  having  consulted 
the  nation,  we  would  have  been  compelled  to  insist  on  entire 
independence." 

Lord  Milner :  "  I  must  remind  you  of  what  has  taken 
place ;  not  with  the  object  of  putting  you  in  the  wrong,  but  in 
order  to  make  the  position  clear,  for  there  are  some  points 
about  it  which  are  not  very  clear.  You  came  and  made  a  pro- 
posal. The  British  Government  gave  you  a  distinct  answer 
— they  refused  to  accept  it.  Their  answer  was  perfectly  out- 
spoken, and  perfectly  intelligible.    At  the  same  time  they 

370 


APPENDIX  B 


said,  '  We  are  anxious  for  peace ;  will  you  make  other  pro- 
posals ?  '  You  then  said,  '  No !  we  have  no  power  to  do  so ; 
we  must  first  consult  the  nation.'  We  admitted  that  argu- 
ment. Then  you  said,  *  Let  the  British  Government  make 
proposals.'  The  British  Government  did  so,  and  they  are 
fully  entitled  to  an  answer.  In  what  position  do  you  think 
you  are  placing  Lord  Kitchener  and  myself?  You  come 
back  with  a  totally  fresh  proposal,  and  do  not  say  anything' 
about  ours.  This  is  not  fair  treatment  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment, and  we  are  not  bound  to  take  your  proposal  into  con- 
sideration." 

Judge  Hertzog:  ''I  have  endeavoured  to  show  that  our 
reply  really  cannot  be  taken  as  ignoring  the  proposal  of  the 
British  Government.  The  great  question  in  the  correspond- 
ence in  April  between  us  and  the  British  Government  was  the 
question  of  independence;  and  now,  after  having  consulted 
the  nation,  we  come  here  and  say  that  we  are  prepared  to 
sacrifice  in  some  degree  our  independence,  and  we  indicate 
how  far  we  will  give  it  up.  And,  as  General  Smuts  has  said, 
that  is  the  basis  which  we  have  laid  down  in  our  present 
proposal." 

Lord  Milner :  "  You  say  that  you  give  up  your  independ- 
ence as  regards  foreign  relations." 

Judge  Hertzog :  Yes.  But  then  you  must  understand 
that  this  is  only  a  general  principle,  which  we  treat  in  detail 
later  on." 

General  Smuts :  "  The  independence  is  given  up  both  in 
regard  to  our  foreign  relations  and  in  regard  to  interior  ad- 
ministration, which  will  be  placed  under  the  supervision  of 
the  British  Government.  So  that  the  effect  of  these  two 
articles  is,  that  the  independence  is  sacrificed,  and  that  the 
two  Republics  will  not  in  the  future  be  able  to  be  regarded 
as  Sovereign  States." 

Lord  Milner :  I  understand  perfectly  well  that  they  would 
not  be  Sovereign  States  any  longer,  but  my  intellect  is  not 
bright  enough  for  me  to  be  able  to  say  what  they  really 
would  be." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  They  would  be  a  new  kind  of  '  interna- 
tional animal.'  " 

General  Smuts :  "  It  has  more  than  once  happened  in  the 
course  of  history  that  difficulties  have  been  solved  by  compro- 
mise. And  this  draft  proposal  goes  as  near  as  seems  possible 
towards  making  us  a  Colony." 

Lord  Kitchener :     Do  you  accept  the  annexation  ?  " 

General  Smuts :  Not  formally ;  but  I  do  not  see  in  what 
way  this  proposal  is  in  opposition  to  the  annexation  procla- 
mation." 


371 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Lord  Kitchener :  I  am  afraid  I  am  not  clever  enough  to 
comprehend  this.  There  would  be  two  Governments  in  one 
State.  And  how  do  you  imagine  that  this  arrangement  could 
be  carried  on  ?  " 

General  Smuts :  "  A  more  ample  explanation  will  have  to 
be  given  of  the  word  '  supervision  ' ;  and  I  thought  that  this 
was  just  one  of  the  points  on  which  we  could  carry  on  fur- 
ther discussions  and  negotiations." 

Lord  Milner :  "  I  am  certainly  not  going  to  give  up  an 
explicit  basis  for  a  vague  proposal." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  I  feel  convinced  that  your  proposal  would 
never  be  able  to  be  carried  out  in  the  practical  governing  of 
a  country." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  I  agree  that  our  proposal 
has  not  been  fully  worked  out,  but  neither  have  the  Middel- 
burg  proposals.  This  was  clearly  indicated  by  Lord  Kitchener 
and  Lord  Milner  when  these  proposals  were  made,  and  they 
were  only  looked  upon  as  a  basis  on  which  we  could  negotiate, 
so  that  the  business  might  be  begun.  We  naturally  cannot 
compel  the  British  Government  to  accept  our  proposal ;  but, 
at  all  events,  it  is  a  basis." 

Lord  Milner :  "  I  am  very  anxious  that  these  discussions 
should  not  end  in  smoke,  and  I  shall  not  allow  any  formali- 
ties to  stand  in  the  way,  but  to  abandon  the  definite  proposals 
of  Middelburg  (March  7th)  for  a  thing  like  this,  and  to  begin 
a  fresh  discussion  on  the  basis  of  something  which  is  so  very 
vague  will  surely  land  us  in  trouble.  I  believe  we  are  quite 
entitled  to  keep  you  to  the  Middelburg  proposal,  which  we 
might  modify  in  regard  to  details." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  Perhaps  it  would  be  well  if 
you  would  first  give  an  answer  to  our  proposals." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet:  ''I  think  that  (unless  your 
Excellencies  have  power  to  give  a  final  answer  to  our  terms) 
it  would  not  be  unfair  if  we  were  to  ask  you  to  lay  our  pro- 
posal before  your  Government." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  We  are  come  here  with  the 
earnest  intention  of  concluding  peace ;  and  I  think  that  if  our 
proposal  is  carried  out  Boer  and  Briton  will  be  able  to  live 
side  by  side  in  this  country.  I  presume  that  it  is  the  wish  of 
both  parties  to  be  fair  and  just,  and  to  make  a  peace  by  which 
both  can  abide,  and  which  will  be  permanent  in  South  Africa." 

Lord  Milner:  ''That  is  certainly  our  aim." 

Lord  Kitchener :  Your  proposal  would  involve  important 
changes  in  our  own — changes  which,  so  far  as  I  understand 
them,  we  should  be  unable  to  permit." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  I  am  of  opinion  that  before 

372 


APPENDIX  B 


a  proposal  is  made  from  your  side  you  should  give  a  definite 
answer  to  ours." 

Lord  Kitchener  and  Lord  Milner :  "  Well,  then,  change  your 
proposal  into  ours." 

Lord  Milner :  I  do  not  believe  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment is  prepared  to  go  any  further  to  meet  you  than  they  have 
done  in  their  last  proposal.  They  think  that  they  have  already 
gone  far  in  their  efforts  for  peace — further,  indeed,  than  the 
general  opinion  of  the  British  public  would  warrant." 

Lord  Kitchener :  The  difference  between  our  proposals 
seems  to  be  too  great." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  We  shall  always  remain  un- 
der the  supervision  of  the  British  Government." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  Will  you  then  consider  yourselves  British 
subjects?  '  Supervision  '  is  a  new  word,  and  '  suzerainty  '  has 
already  caused  us  too  much  trouble." 

Judge  Hertzog :  The  idea  is  not  so  very  new.  There  are 
several  kinds  of  different  States,  all  belonging  to  the  British 
Empire.    For  instance,  there  is  Basutoland." 

Lord  Milner :  "  There  are  many  different  kinds,  but  this  one 
is  a  new  variety." 

Judge  Hertzog:  "If  your  Excellencies  could  only  under- 
stand us  !  We  have  no  wish  to  lose  a  single  minute.  We  have 
been  to  the  nation,  and  we  know  what  the  nation  wants  and 
what  their  temper  is.  If,  then,  we  are  to  make  a  proposal 
here,  it  must  be: — Firstly,  a  proposal  which  shall  meet  the 
English  Government  in  a  fair  way ;  and,  secondly,  a  proposal 
which  we  are  honestly  convinced  will  be  acceptable  to  our 
nation.  And  such  a  proposal  we  have  laid  before  you.  And 
now  we  are  placed  in  a  disadvantageous  position,  for  we  are 
here  before  your  Excellencies,  who  have  not  full  power  finally 
to  decide  the  matter." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  We  are  in  the  same  position  as  your- 
selves." 

Judge  Hertzog :  We  offer  you  here  what  we  know  is  in 
accordance  with  the  mind  of  the  nation ;  we  cannot  possibly 
do  anything  that  is  against  it." 

Lord  Milner :  Are  we  to  understand  that  the  Middelburg 
proposals  are  not  according  to  the  mind  of  your  people  ?  " 

General  Smuts :  "  As  yet  no  answer  has  been  given  to  them. 
The  only  decision  come  to  by  the  national  meeting  is  that 
which  we  are  now  laying  before  you." 

Lord  Kitchener :  Are  you  prepared  to  set  aside  your 
present  proposal  and  to  hand  in  another  one  bearing  a  closer 
resemblance  to  that  of  Middelburg?  We  must  try  and  find 
some  middle  course ;  and  as  we  are  here  to  endeavour  to  arrive 


373 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


at  something  definite,  let  us  try  to  obtain  a  basis  for  discus- 
sion.   Shall  we  make  a  new  proposal  ?  " 

General  Smuts :  As  soon  as  there  is  a  final  answer  to  our 
proposal  we  shall  be  able  to  take  a  fresh  one  into  consideration." 

Lord  Milner :  I  believe  that  the  fact  that  you  have  refused 
to  enter  upon  the  proposal  made  by  the  British  Government 
justifies  us  in  not  considering  your  proposal.  Let  us  rather 
say  that  your  very  refusal  implies  your  answer  to  what  we 
have  proposed." 

General  Smuts :  "  I  understand  the  position  to  be  as  fol- 
lows— The  British  Government  has  declined  our  proposals, 
and  at  the  same  time  holds  fast  to  the  old  basis,  but  without 
prejudice  to  its  power  of  making  a  new  proposal." 

Lord  Milner :  The  whole  difference  between  you  and  my- 
self is  that  I  take  the  letter  of  7th  March  to  be  the  utmost 
concession  that  the  British  Government  is  able  to  grant;  not 
that  that  letter  binds  us  down  to  every  clause  of  the  proposal, 
but  that  it  is  an  indication  of  how  far  our  Government  is  pre- 
pared to  go  on  the  general  question.  Your  answer,  however, 
is  no  answer  at  all." 

Lord  Kitchener  then  read  his  telegram,  dated  14th  April. 
["  A  difficulty  has  arisen  in  getting  on  with  the  proceedings ; 
the  representatives  state  that  constitutionally  they  have  no 
power  to  discuss  terms  based  on  the  surrender  of  independ- 
ence, inasmuch  as  only  the  burghers  can  agree  to  such  a 
basis.  Therefore,  if  they  were  to  propose  terms,  it  would  put 
them  in  a  false  position  with  regard  to  the  people.  If,  how- 
ever. His  Majesty's  Government  could  state  the  terms  which, 
subsequently  to  a  relinquishment  of  independence,  they  would 
be  prepared  to  grant,  the  representatives,  after  asking  for  the 
necessary  explanations,  and  without  any  expression  of  ap- 
proval or  disapproval,  would  submit  such  conditions  to  their 
people."]  "  Clearly  yovi  have  not  kept  to  what  you  undertook 
in  this  telegram." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  If  it  had  only  been  a  ques- 
tion of  our  feelings  being  hurt  by  having  to  give  an  answer 
on  the  basis  proposed  to  us  by  the  British  then  it  would  not 
have  been  necessary  for  the  people  to  come  together  at  Ve- 
reeniging.  But  in  matter  of  fact  we  have  come  here  with  a 
proposal,  which,  rightly  understood,  is  nearly  equivocal  to  the 
Middelburg  proposal,  and  which  meets  the  wishes  of  the  Eng- 
lish Government  as  far  as  possible." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  I  do  not  see  why  we  should 
insist  so  much  on  our  proposal.  If  it  is  not  to  the  mind  of 
your  Excellencies,  if  it  is  an  unacceptable  proposal,  then  let 
us  have  a  definite  answer  to  it." 


374 


APPENDIX  B 


Lord  Milner :  "  We  wish  to  have  an  answer  to  the  proposal 
made  by  us." 

General  Smuts :  I  do  not  see  that  any  proposal  has  been 
made  by  the  British  Government.  A  certain  basis  only  has 
been  laid  down,  and  therefore  no  formal  answer  is  required." 

Lord  Milner :  "  Our  proposal  is  six  times  as  definite  as 
yours,  and  I  believe  that  the  British  Government  is  justified 
in  wanting  to  know  if  your  people  are  inclined  to  come  to  terms 
on  the  general  lines  which  have  been  placed  before  them." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  Here  is  quite  an  original  suggestion : 
How  would  it  be  if  you  were  to  go  back  to  your  people  and 
ask  them  if  they  would  not  make  a  proposal  ?  " 

General  Smuts :  "  You  must  understand  that  the  Middel- 
burg  proposal,  with  all  that  took  place  in  April,  has  been  read 
to  the  people.  Their  answer  was  neither  *  Yes  '  nor  '  No.' 
They  simply  elected  the  delegates.  The  delegates  as  yet  have 
not  given  any  answer.  They  are  still  considering  the  matter, 
and,  in  order  to  gain  time,  they  have  commissioned  us  to  see 
whether  we  could  not  come  to  some  arrangement." 

Lord  Milner:  "  We  are  getting  away  from  the  subject.  Tell 
us  what  alterations  you  want,  and  then  place  our  proposal 
before  your  people." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  Should  you  agree  that  your  proposal  is 
not  in  opposition  to  the  annexation,  we  shall  have  accomplished 
something." 

General  Smuts :  "  Is  it  your  opinion  that  our  proposal  must 
be  set  aside  ?  " 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  Yes,  surely.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to 
act  on  it." 

Lord  Milner :  "  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  take  your  pro- 
posal into  consideration.  We  can  send  it  to  England,  but  this 
would  certainly  tend  to  hinder  the  negotiations.  This  is  my 
personal  opinion,  which  naturally  you  are  not  bound  to  accept. 
All  that  we  can  say  is,  that  this  is  the  only  answer  that  we 
can  give  you." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  It  would  be  better  to  draw  up  a  new 
document,  in  which  everything  of  importance  would  be  noted 
down,  and  all  unimportant  matters  left  out." 

General  Smuts :  "  But  paragraph  3  of  our  proposal  has  not 
even  been  mentioned.  We  are  prepared  to  cede  a  part  of  our 
territory." 

Lord  Milner :  "  This  would  be  in  contradiction  to  the  an- 
nexation of  the  whole.  If  the  whole  becomes  annexed  by  us, 
how  then  can  a  part  be  ceded  by  you  ?  " 

General  Smuts :  "  The  ceded  part  would  then  become  a 
Crown  Colony,  the  remaining  part  being  governed  as  is  here 
proposed." 

375 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Lord  Milner :  "  You  mean  that  one  part  would  become  a 
British  Colony  of  the  ordinary  type,  and  another  part  a  pro- 
tected Republic  ?  " 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  Two  forms  of  government  in  the  same 
country  would  lead  to  great  friction.  Our  proposals  are  too 
divergent.  From  a  military  point  of  view,  the  two  forms  of 
government  could  not  co-exist.  Before  a  year  was  over  we 
should  be  at  war  again." 

The  meeting  was  then  adjourned  till  the  afternoon. 

During  the  interval  the  Commission  discussed  the  situation, 
and  sent  General  J.  C.  Smuts  to  deliberate  on  several  points 
with  Lord  Kitchener  and  Lord  Milner. 

The  meeting  opened  again  at  four  o'clock. 

Lord  Milner :  In  consequence  of  an  informal  conversation 
with  General  Smuts,  Lord  Kitchener  and  I  have  drawn  up  a 
document,  which  will  show  the  form  in  which,  as  we  think,  the 
only  agreement  that  can  be  arrived  at  must  be  worded.  It  is 
a  draft  document,  and  we  believe  the  Governments  will  be 
able  to  sign  it.  Our  idea  is  that  after  it  has  been  taken  into 
consideration  here  it  might  be  laid  before  the  burghers,  and 
you  could  ask  them,  '  Are  you  willing  that  we  should  put  our 
signatures  to  it  ?  '  " 

This  document  ran  as  follows : — The  undersigned,  leaders 
of  the  Boer  forces  in  the  Veldt,  accepting,  in  their  own  name, 
and  in  that  of  the  said  burghers,  the  annexations  as  mentioned 
in  the  proclamations  of  Lord  Roberts,  dated  respectively  the 
24th  May,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred,  and 
number  15,  dated  ist  day  of  September,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  nineteen  hundred,  and  accepting  as  a  consequence  thereof 
their  status  of  British  citizens,  agree  herewith  immediately  to 
lay  down  their  weapons,  and  to  hand  over  all  guns,  small  arms, 
ammunition,  and  stores  in  their  possession,  or  under  their  hold, 
and  to  cease  all  further  resistance  against  the  Government  of 
His  Majesty  King  Edward  Seventh,  or  his  successors.  They 
do  this  trusting  in  the  assurance  of  His  Majesty's  Government 
that  neither  their  personal  freedom  nor  their  property  shall  be 
taken  away  from  them,  or  from  the  burghers  who  surrender 
with  them;  and  that  the  future  action  of  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment in  relation  to  the  consequences  of  the  war  shall  be  in 
harmony  with  the  declaration  mentioned  below.  It  is  clearly 
understood  that  all  burghers  who  at  present  are  prisoners  of 
war,  in  order  to  be  able  to  enjoy  the  above-mentioned  assurance, 
will  have  to  notify  their  acceptance  of  the  status  of  British 
citizens." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  Are  we  to  understand  that 
our  proposal  is  now  altogether  rejected?  " 

376 


APPENDIX  B 


Lord  Milner  and  Lord  Kitchener :  Yes." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  Then  I  understand  that  you 
are  going  to  be  guided  only  by  the  Middelburg  proposals  ?  " 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  No ;  we  can  alter  them." 

Lord  Milner :  "  This  draft  document  was  originally  written 
out  in  order  to  be  annexed  to  the  Middelburg  proposals.  But 
instead  of  the  Middelburg  proposals,  this  document  is  now 
drawn  up,  in  order  to  place  us  in  the  position  to  formulate  the 
proposals  differently." 

General  Smuts:  If  the  idea  is  then  that  the  Middelburg 
proposals  should  be  amended,  would  it  not  be  best  to  do  so 
now,  and  then  to  annex  them  to  this  document  ?  " 

Lord  Milner :  "  That  which  will  take  the  place  of  the  Mid- 
delburg proposals  has  to  be  added  as  a  schedule  to  this  docu- 
ment, and  we  have  to  work  out  this  schedule  together." 

General  Smuts :  "  I  think  it  would  be  far  better  if  you  were 
to  alter  the  proposal  yourselves,  and  then  lay  it  before  us  for 
consideration ;  we  could  then  see  what  we  could  do  to  meet 
you." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  I  think  that  a  sub-committee  should  be 
formed  by  you  in  order  to  draw  up  the  schedule." 

Lord  Milner :  "  My  idea  is  that  the  schedule  should  be  drawn 
up,  so  that  it  and  the  document  could  be  taken  into  considera- 
tion together." 

General  Smuts :  "  We  should  like  to  consider  first  whether 
we  will  help  in  drawing  it  up." 

Lord  Milner:  I  am  willing  to  draw  it  up  in  conjunction 
with  you,  or  to  let  it  be  drawn  up  by  you  alone,  but,  from  past 
experience,  I  must  decline  to  draw  it  up  by  myself." 

General  Smuts :  "  If  we  were  to  sign  this  document,  would 
not  the  outcome  be  that  we  leaders  made  ourselves  responsible 
for  the  laying  down  of  arms  by  our  burghers." 

Lord  Milner :  Yes.  And  should  your  men  not  lay  down 
their  arms  it  would  be  a  great  misfortune." 

Lord  Kitchener :  I  do  not  think  so,  for  if  some  of  the 
burghers  refused  to  lay  down  their  arms,  the  signatories  could 
not  help  it.    There  are  sure  to  be  some  who  are  dissatisfied." 

General  Smuts :  "  The  document  does  not  mention  this." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  It  can  be  amended." 

General  De  la  Rey:  ''Well,  then,  there  can  be  no  peace, 
for  one  part  of  the  burghers  will  hold  back  and  continue  the 
war." 

Lord  Milner:  "If  the  national  meeting  agrees  to  give  you 
power  to  sign  this  document,  it  will  certainly  mean  that  the 
burghers  as  a  whole  are  agreeable ;  and  those  who  after  this 
do  not  submit  will  be — well,  I  do  not  know  what  I  can  call 


377 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


them — outlaws.  But  we  will  not  consider  such  an  eventuality 
possible." 

General  Botha :  "  We  desire  a  peace  that  will  be  honourable 
to  both  parties.  And,  as  I  understand  this  document,  we  are 
leaving  honour  behind  us,  for  we  are  now  not  only  surrender- 
ing our  independence,  but  we  are  allowing  every  burgher  to 
be  fettered  hand  and  foot.  Where  is  the  '  honourable  peace  ' 
for  us?  If  we  conclude  peace,  we  have  to  do  it  as  men  who 
have  to  live  and  die  here.  We  must  not  agree  to  a  peace  which 
leaves  behind  in  the  hearts  of  one  party  a  wound  that  will 
never  heal.  I  will  do  everything  in  my  power  to  obtain  peace. 
But  it  seems  to  me  that  this  document  asks  too  much  of  us, 
because,  if  I  interpret  it  aright,  it  means  that  we  must  sur- 
render our  independence,  that  every  one  must  give  up  his 
weapons,  and  that  the  leaders,  in  addition,  must  sign  an  under- 
taking to  this  effect.'' 

Lord  Milner :  All  that  we  wish  is  that  the  people  should 
live  peacefully  together  as  British  citizens.  If  we  do  not  ob- 
tain this,  then  I  do  not  know  what  we  do  obtain." 

Lord  Kitchener :  I  do  not  think  that  the  Commandant- 
General  realizes  what  the  schedule  contains.  In  it  we  state 
what  we  are  ready  to  grant.  Perhaps  it  would  be  best  that 
the  schedule  should  be  arranged  now,  and  then  you  will  see 
that  an  honourable  peace  is  proposed." 

General  Botha :     Well,  then,  explain  the  document." 

Lords  Kitchener  and  Milner :  "  You  are  to  help  us :  we  do 
not  know  what  the  burghers  demand." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  By  signing  this  document 
we  shall  place  ourselves  in  the  position  which  the  Commandant- 
General  has  so  clearly  described." 

General  De  la  Rey:  We  cannot  form  a  judgment  on  any- 
thing that  is  not  properly  elaborated.  I  have  no  objection  to 
the  constitution  of  a  sub-committee  with  the  duty  of  helping 
in  the  work." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  I  also  have  no  objection, 
since  I  understand  that  it  binds  nobody  to  anything." 

Lord  Kitchener:  "  No,  nobody  will  be  bound." 

General  De  la  Rey :  We  wish  to  have  the  matter  con- 
cluded, so  that  we  may  know  what  is  before  us." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  I  should  like  to  have  it 
clearly  understood  that  I  do  not  think  there  is  the  least  chance 
of  a  Government  of  which  Lords  Kitchener  and  Milner  are 
the  heads  being  accepted.  An  arrangement  of  this  nature 
would,  it  seems  to  me,  be  an  insurmountable  difficulty.  When 
I  feel  so  strongly  in  this  matter,  it  would  not  be  fair  to  their 
Excellencies  for  me  to  remain  silent." 

378 


APPENDIX  B 


Lord  Kitchener :  I  think  it  would  be  better  if  General  de 
Wet  were  to  wait  until  he  has  seen  the  whole  document  before 
he  gives  his  opinion." 

It  was  then  agreed  that  Judge  Hertzog  and  General  Smuts 
should  act  as  a  sub-committee,  in  order  to  draw  up  a  com- 
plete draft  with  Lord  Kitchener,  who  was  to  be  assisted  by 
Sir  Richard  Solomon. 

The  meeting  then  adjourned. 

On  Wednesday,  2ist  May,  1902,  the  Conference  reassembled. 

Lord  Milner  laid  before  the  meeting  the  documents  which 
he  had  drawn  up  with  the  help  of  the  sub-committee.  It  was 
in  the  form  of  a  contract,  and  the  names  of  the  members  of 
both  Governments  were  now  filled  in.  The  document  was  the 
same  as  that  telegraphed,  with  the  exception  of  Article  11, 
dealing  with  the  notes  and  receipts  and  the  sum  of  three  mill- 
ion pounds. 

It  was  read  in  Dutch  and  English,  and  ran  as  follows: — 
General  Lord  Kitchener  of  Khartoum,  Commander-in- 
Chief,  and  His  Excellency  Lord  Milner,  High  Commissioner, 
on  behalf  of  the  British  Government ; 

"  Messrs.  S.  D.  Burger,  F.  W.  Reitz,  Louis  Botha,  J.  H. 
De  la  Rey,  L.  J.  Meijer,  and  J.  C.  Krogh,  on  behalf  of  the 
Government  of  the  South  African  Republic  and  its  burghers ; 

"  Messrs.  M.  T.  Steyn,  W.  J.  C.  Brebner,  C.  R.  de  Wet, 
J.  B.  M.  Hertzog,  and  C.  H.  Olivier,  on  behalf  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Orange  Free  State  and  its  burghers,  being  anxious 
to  put  an  end  to  the  existing  hostilities,  agree  on  the  follow- 
ing points : — 

Firstly,  the  burgher  forces  now  in  the  Veldt  shall  at  once 
lay  down  their  arms,  and  surrender  all  the  guns,  small  arms 
and  war  stores  in  their  actual  possession,  or  of  which  they  have 
cognizance ;  and  shall  refrain  from  any  further  opposition  to 
the  authority  of  His  Majesty  King  Edward  VII.,  whom  they 
acknowledge  as  their  lawful  sovereign. 

The  manner  and  details  of  this  surrender  shall  be  arranged 
by  Lord  Kitchener,  Commandant-General  Botha,  Assistant- 
Commandant-General  J.  H.  De  la  Rey,  and  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet. 

Secondly,  burghers  in  the  Veldt  beyond  the  frontiers  of 
the  Transvaal  and  of  the  Orange  River  Colony  shall,  on  their 
surrender,  be  brought  back  to  their  homes. 

"  Thirdly,  all  prisoners  of  war,  being  at  the  time  burghers 
out  of  South  Africa,  shall,  on  their  declaring  that  they  accept 
this  status  of  subjects  of  His  Majesty  King  Edward  VII.,  be 
brought  back  to  the  farms  on  which  they  were  living  before 
the  war. 

379 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


"  Fourthly,  the  burghervS  who  thus  surrender,  or  who  thus 
return,  shall  lose  neither  their  personal  freedom  nor  their 
property. 

Fifthly,  no  judicial  proceedings,  civil  or  criminal,  shall  be 
taken  against  any  of  the  burghers  who  thus  return  for  any 
action  of  theirs  in  connexion  with  the  carrying  on  of  the  war. 

"  Sixthly,  the  Dutch  language  shall  be  taught  in  the  public 
schools  of  the  Transvaal  and  of  the  Orange  River  Colony, 
where  the  parents  of  the  children  demand  it ;  and  shall  be  ad- 
mitted in  the  courts  of  justice,  wherever  this  is  required  for 
the  better  and  more  effective  administration  of  justice. 

Seventhly,  the  possession  of  rifles  shall,  on  taking  out  a 
license  in  accordance  with  the  law,  be  permitted  in  the  Trans- 
vaal and  in  the  Orange  River  Colony,  to  persons  who  require 
them  for  their  protection. 

"  Eighthly,  military  administration  in  the  Transvaal  and  in 
the  Orange  River  Colony  shall,  as  soon  as  possible,  be  followed 
by  civil  government ;  and,  as  soon  as  circumstances  permit  it, 
a  representative  system  tending  towards  autonomy  shall  be 
introduced. 

"  Ninthly,  the  question  of  granting  the  franchise  to  the 
natives  shall  not  be  decided  until  a  representative  constitution 
has  been  granted. 

"  Tenthly,  no  special  tax  shall  be  laid  on  landed  property 
in  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colony  to  meet  the  ex- 
penses of  the  war. 

"  Eleventhly,  a  judicial  Commission  shall  be  appointed,  to 
which  the  government  bank  notes,  issued  under  Law  No.  i 
of  the  South  African  Republic,  may  be  presented  within  six 
months.  All  such  notes,  if  found  to  have  been  duly  issued  in 
conformity  with  the  terms  of  the  law,  and  if  the  presenting 
party  shall  have  given  consideration  in  value,  shall  be  hon- 
oured, but  without  interest. 

"  All  receipts  issued  in  the  Veldt  by  the  officers  of  the  late 
Republics,  or  by  their  orders,  may  also  be  presented  to  the 
said  Commission  within  six  months ;  and  if  they  have  been 
given  bona  fide  in  exchange  for  goods  used  by  the  burghers 
in  the  Veldt,  they  shall  be  paid  in  full  to  the  persons  to  whom 
they  were  originally  issued. 

The  amount  payable  on  account  of  the  said  Government's 
notes  and  receipts  shall  not  exceed  £3,000,000;  and  in  case 
the  whole  amount  of  such  notes  and  receipts  accepted  by  the 
Commission  should  exceed  that  amount,  a  pro  rata  reduction 
shall  be  made. 

The  prisoners  of  war  shall  be  given  facilities  to  present 
their  notes  and  receipts  within  the  above-mentioned  six  months. 

380 


APPENDIX  B 


"  Twelfthly,  as  soon  as  circumstances  shall  permit,  there 
shall  be  appointed  in  each  district  of  the  Transvaal  and  of  the 
Orange  River  Colony  a  Commission,  in  which  the  inhabitants 
of  that  district  shall  be  represented,  under  the  chairmanship 
of  a  magistrate  or  other  official,  with  a  view  to  assist  in  the 
bringing  back  of  the  people  to  their  farms,  and  in  procuring 
for  those  who,  on  account  of  losses  through  the  war,  are  un- 
able to  provide  for  themselves,  food,  shelter,  and  such  quanti- 
ties of  seed,  cattle,  implements,  etc.,  as  are  necessary  for  the 
resuming  of  their  previous  callings.  Funds  for  this  purpose, 
repayable  by  instalments  extending  over  a  number  of  years, 
shall  be  advanced — free  of  interest — by  the  Government." 

Lord  Milner :  "  If  we  come  to  an  agreement,  it  will  be  the 
English  document  which  will  be  wired  to  England,  on  which 
His  Majesty's  Government  will  decide,  and  which  will  be 
signed." 

Cornmandant-General  Botha :  "  Will  not  a  Dutch  transla- 
tion be  annexed  ?  " 

Lord  Milner:  "I  have  no  objection  to  the  addition  of  a 
Dutch  translation.  This,  then,  is  the  document  which  we  are 
prepared  to  lay  before  the  English  Government." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  There  are  a  few  points  on 
which  I  wish  to  speak.  The  first  is  in  reference  to  the  receipts 
given  by  our  officers.  It  seems  to  me  quite  right  that  they 
should  be  mentioned  in  the  paragraph  about  government  notes. 
These  receipts  were  issued,  in  accordance  with  instructions 
given  by  our  Government,  for  the  purchase  of  cattle,  grain, 
and  other  necessaries  for  the  support  of  our  commandos ; 
and  the  chief  officers  now  present,  as  well  as  all  other  officers, 
have  acted  according  to  these  instructions  and  issued  receipts. 
Therefore  I  make  this  request.  Some  of  these  receipts  were 
afterwards  paid  in  part,  and  others  in  full,  in  government 
notes.  But  many  were  not  paid  at  all.  I  do  not  believe  that 
the  amount  is  great,  but  it  will  strengthen  our  hands  to  be 
able  to  take  up  this  affair  honourably,  for  our  honour  is  con- 
cerned in  so  far  as  we  have  signed  the  receipts.  It  will  be  a 
great  point  in  our  favour  to  be  able  to  go  before  our  delegates 
and  tell  them  that  they  are  guaranteed  on  this  point,  for  most 
of  them  are  officers." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  I  understand  that  General  Botha  refers 
not  to  commandeer  or  requisition  notes,  but  only  to  actual  re- 
ceipts issued  on  the  Treasury." 

Lord  Milner :  "  I  do  not  see  any  difference  between  these 
receipts  and  commandeer  notes.  The  willingness  of  persons 
to  sell  goods  makes  no  difference  in  a  legal  document." 

Lord  Kitchener :     I  mean  that  it  makes  a  difference  whether 

381 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


it  IS  an  order  on  the  Treasury  or  a  requisition  note.  I  should 
Hmit  this  (guarantee)  to  receipts  on  the  Treasury,  issued  in 
consequence  of  a  law  that  permitted  a  certain  sum  to  be 
issued." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  No  decision  was  come  to 
in  the  Free  State  as  to  how  much  was  to  be  issued." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  Am  I  to  understand  by  this  that  it  is  an 
unlimited  amount,  or  does  it  come  within  the  amount  decided 
on  by  the  Volksraad  ?  " 

General  Smuts :  While  the  Government  existed  the  Volks- 
raad empowered  it  to  issue  notes  up  to  a  certain  amoimt. 
And  this  was  done.  Moreover  the  officers  in  the  Veldt  had 
the  right  to  make  purchases  for  the  commandos  and  to  give 
receipts  for  them." 

Lord  Milner :  I  can  see  no  difference  between  receipts  and 
requisition  notes,  and  they  have  been  issued  for  an  unlimited 
amount." 

General  Smuts :  "  These  receipts  were  issued  under  a  totally 
different  law.  They  were  not  paid  out  of  the  credit  voted  by 
the  Volksraad." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  I  would  have  it  clearly 
understood  that  I  quite  agree  with  what  has  been  said  by  the 
Commandant-General,  namely  that  the  honour  of  every  officer 
is  engaged  for  these  documents,  and  if  your  Excellencies  agree 
it  will  give  us  a  strong  weapon  with  which  to  return  to  the 
delegates." 

Lord  Milner :  "  The  proposal  is  de  facto  that  the  British 
Government  shall  repay  all  the  monies  which  the  Republics 
borrowed  with  the  object  of  fighting  against  England." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  Yet  we  have  fought  hon- 
ourably, and  if  we  give  up  our  independence  it  is  no  more 
than  fair  that  you  should  meet  us  in  this  matter." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  Am  I  to  understand  your 
position  to  be  that  we  must  surrender  everything,  and  that 
whilst  you  take  away  the  freedom  of  our  country  (which 
amounts  to  many  millions)  you  at  the  same  time  refuse  all 
responsibility  for  our  debts.  We  had  been  recognized  by  you 
as  belligerent,  and  so  are  entirely  in  our  rights  in  asking  that 
when  you  seize  the  riches  of  the  country  you  shall  also  take 
its  debts  upon  your  shoulders.  So  long  as  the  British  Gov- 
ernment reaches  the  great  goal  at  which  it  is  aiming,  a  matter 
so  easily  arranged  as  this  should  not  cause  any  difficulty :  we 
are  not  bickering  about  trifles,  but  are  bringing  forward  what 
to  us  is  a  real  hardship,  and  you  must  take  it  for  granted  that 
when  we  say  something  here  we  really  mean  it.  And  now 
we  tell  you  that  this  matter  is  an  obstacle  in  our  way.  Per- 

382 


APPENDIX  B 


sonally,  we  have  not  signed  many  receipts :  it  was  the  officers 
of  lower  rank  who  signed  the  greater  number,  and  it  is  these 
very  officers  who  form  the  majority  of  the  national  meeting 
at  Vereeniging.  In  some  instances,  I  may  add,  special  per- 
sons were  appointed  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  this  work." 

Lord  Milner :  We  do  not  take  over  the  assets  without  tak- 
ing also  the  liabilities.  We  take  over  all  the  debts  owed  by 
the  country  before  the  war,  and  we  have  even  agreed  to  take 
over  a  debt — a  legal  debt — in  the  shape  of  notes,  which  notes 
we  are  fully  aware  it  only  became  necessary  to  issue  on  account 
of  the  war,  and  thus  we  are  already  paying  a  part  of  the  cost 
incurred  in  fighting  us.  I  think  this  is  a  very  great  conces- 
sion ;  and  when  I  agreed  that  it  should  be  put  down  I  said 
that  I  believed  (and  I  still  am  of  the  same  opinion)  that  the 
English  Government  would  take  exception  to  it,  although  I 
hope  that  this  will  not  be  the  case.  But  to  go  further  than 
this,  and  to  ask  us  to  pay  not  only  a  debt  contracted  under  a 
law  for  the  furtherance  of  the  war,  but  also  every  debt  con- 
tracted by  every  officer  in  the  armies  of  both  Republics,  for 
the  purpose  of  fighting  us,  is  to  my  mind  a  most  extravagant 
proposal.  In  answer  to  what  General  Botha  has  said,  I  may 
observe  that  the  Commission  appears  to  think  that  we  have 
no  persons  behind  us  whose  feelings  and  prejudices  (if  you 
use  that  word)  we  are  bound  to  take  into  consideration.  If 
this  matter  causes  a  difficulty  among  your  burghers,  I  can 
only  say  that  I  am  sure  that  your  proposal  will  cause  the 
British  Government  the  greatest  trouble  when  dealing  with 
the  nation,  with  whose  feelings  they  have  to  reckon.'' 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  I  should  like  to  explain  the 
position  of  the  Orange  Free  State.  In  the  Transvaal  a  law 
was  passed  empowering  the  Government  to  issue  i  1,000,000; 
but  in  the  Orange  Free  State  nothing  was  done,  as  the  Govern- 
ment possessed  the  right  to  pay  with  receipts,  and  we  thought 
that  a  receipt  was  as  good  and  as  legal  as  a  note ;  and  there- 
fore, from  my  point  of  view,  the  two  are  of  equal  importance." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  I  might  point  out  that  we 
should  not  insist  so  much  on  the  technical  meaning  of  words 
— and  this  is  especially  true  for  your  side,  because  we  have 
assembled  here  with  the  aim  of  stopping  the  hostilities  which 
cause  you  such  great  expenses  every  month ;  and  our  meet- 
ing may  be  able  to  bring  these  expenses  to  an  end.  Therefore, 
if  you  accept  our  proposal  and  pay  these  receipts,  you  might 
save  almost  enough  to  cover  the  cost  you  incur.  It  would  be 
much  cheaper  to  make  an  end  of  the  war  by  co-operation  than 
to  let  matters  drift  on.  Therefore  I  believe  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  both  parties  to  be  willing  to  make  concessions  when  obstacles 
appear." 

383 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


General  de  Wet :  "  I  can  assure  His  Excellency,  Lord  Mil- 
ner,  that  the  people  always  believed  that  should  everything  be 
lost  they  still  would  be  able  to  obtain  this  money  due  on  re- 
ceipts. If  this  is  not  granted,  I  cannot  imagine  what  the 
results  will  be.  I  am  afraid  of  the  consequences;  and  I  trust 
that  you  will  do  your  best  to  meet  our  wishes." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  It  will  not  be  a  very  large 
sum,  but  we  cannot  give  you  the  exact  amount." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet:  "You  can  well  understand 
that  our  expenses  are  only  a  drop  in  the  ocean  compared  with 
yours.  If  I  am  right,  the  Orange  Free  State  had  three  quar- 
ters of  a  million  when  the  war  began,  and  the  issue  of  receipts 
only  started  when  that  sum  was  exhausted.  Your  Excel- 
lencies must  acknowledge  that  we  have  the  same  obligation  of 
creditor  through  these  receipts  as  we  should  have  in  any  other 
case." 

Commandant- General  Botha :  "  You  have  already  many  of 
our  notes  in  your  possession.  In  one  case  alone  there  were 
fifty  thousand  hidden  away,  and  found  by  you.  I  have  stated 
privately  to  Lord  Milner  that  what  we  are  now  striving  to 
obtain  has  already  been  granted  to  us  de  facto  by  Lord  Kitch- 
ener. In  Lord  Kitchener's  Middelburg  proposal  the  paying 
of  the  Government  notes  was  refused,  but  there  was  a  proviso 
that  the  receipts  should  be  paid  to  the  amount  of  one  million. 
Should  this  now  be  withdrawn,  surely  such  a  withdrawal  would 
form  a  deviation  from  the  Middelburg  proposal.  The  paying 
of  notes  is  legal,  and  is  on  quite  another  footing,  and  I  cannot 
understand  how  it  could  have  been  refused  in  the  Middelburg 
proposal.  That  it  should  be  granted  now  is  only  reasonable. 
But  as  regards  the  payment  of  receipts,  although  it  was  allowed 
then  up  to  a  certain  amount,  it  is  now  withdrawn.  At  this 
present  stage  of  the  proceedings  I  think  that  a  point  which 
had  already  been  practically  conceded  in  the  previous  negotia- 
tions should  not  be  allowed  to  form  a  stumbling-block  to  a 
final  agreement.  I  believe  that  the  amount  is  only  small;  I 
was  for  one  year  in  conjunction  with  De  la  Rey  in  command 
of  the  forces  of  the  South  African  Republic.  During  that 
period  of  time  an  account  was  kept  of  all  the  receipts,  and 
only  a  short  time  back  the  books  were  still  in  our  possession. 
These  receipts  were  issued  in  an  orderly  manner,  and  each  of 
them  was  duly  entered  in  a  book,  as  far  as  I  was  able  to 
judge.  These  receipts  amounted  to  quite  a  small  sum;  and 
although  Lord  Milner  would  draw  back  if  the  sum  was  very 
big,  the  question  how  far  he  will  go  can  be  settled  when  the 
proposal  is  accepted.  Yet  I  personally  think  that  there  are 
no  grounds  for  fear,  and  the  amount  is  really  far  smaller  than 
you  imagine." 

384 


APPENDIX  B 


Lord  Milner :  "  I  do  not  think  it  is  so  much  a  question  of 
amount.  This  paying  of  notes  and  requisition  notes  appears 
to  me  very  unreasonable.  I  beheve  that  in  this  matter  I  am 
only  voicing  the  opinion  of  the  great  majority  of  the  British 
nation  when  I  say  that  my  countrymen  would  much  prefer  to 
pay  a  large  sum  at  the  conclusion  of  hostilities  with  the  object 
of  bettering  the  condition  of  the  people  who  have  been  fight- 
ing against  them  than  to  pay  a  much  smaller  sum  to  meet  the 
costs  incurred  by  the  Republics  during  the  war.  Whether  such 
a  view  is  right  or  wrong,  it  is  a  view  you  have  to  reckon  with. 
We  do  not  wish  to  pay  the  accounts  of  both  parties ;  and  my 
opinion  of  the  clause  quoted  from  the  Middelburg  proposal  is 
that  that  clause  was  one  of  its  faults.  But  should  anything  of 
the  kind  become  necessary,  then  I  think  that  the  paying  of 
the  notes  is  less  objectionable  than  the  paying  of  the  requisi- 
tion notes.  I  placed  this  point  about  the  payment  of  notes  in 
the  draft  because  I  thought  that  if  it  came  to  a  choice  between 
paying  one  or  the  other  you  would  prefer  that  the  notes  should 
be  paid.  However,  if  it  should  be  thought  better  to  return 
on  this  point  to  the  Middelburg  proposal,  although  I  am  greatly 
against  the  clause,  I  will  waive  my  objection  to  it  if  Lord 
Kitchener  is  agreeable." 

General  Smuts :  I  am  afraid  that  we  cannot  agree  to  this, 
for  we  thought  that  the  notes  would  be  beyond  all  dispute." 

Judge  Hertzog :  "  I  do  not  think  that  your  Excellency  is 
representing  the  matter  fairly  when  you  say  that  you  will  not 
pay  the  bills  of  both  parties.  There  is  one  thing  to  be  taken 
into  consideration  as  regards  the  Orange  Free  State,  and  which 
must  be  considered  before  everything  else,  and  that  is,  that  we 
have  made  no  loans  nor  have  we  given  any  government  notes. 
The  notes  we  used  were  notes  of  the  South  African  Republic, 
which  had  been  sent  to  the  Orange  Free  State.  Our  law  was 
formed  on  the  idea  that  in  case  of  war  all  the  costs  should  be 
paid  by  commission  notes.  The  Orange  Free  State  acted  on 
this  principle,  and  receipts  were  issued.  If  we  take  into  con- 
sideration at  the  same  time  that  we  have  been  and  still  are 
recognized  by  you  as  belligerent,  then  we  can  only  say :  On 
our  side  we  surrender  everything  that  we  possess,  and  we  only 
ask  the  other  party  to  acknowledge  the  fact  that  if  we  had 
contracted  a  loan  it  would  have  been  to  the  charge  of  the 
British  Government,  who,  in  taking  everything  from  us,  ren- 
ders itself  responsible  for  our  public  loans.  Lord  Milner 
should  understand  that  it  is  of  just  as  much  importance  to  us 
for  the  receipts  to  be  paid  as  it  is  to  the  South  African  Re- 
public for  the  loan,  which  it  contracted  before  the  war,  to  be 
taken  over  by  the  British  Government.    But  I  can  even  go 

385 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


further  and  give  Lord  Milner  the  assurance  that  we  have  acted 
more  economically  when  issuing  these  receipts  than  we  should 
have  done  had  we  contracted  the  loan  previous  to  the  war. 
Now  we  have  only  what  is  absolutely  necessary  to  meet  our 
present  needs.  So  that  Lord  Milner  must  own  that  we  find 
ourselves  in  the  same  position  towards  those  who  are  in  pos' 
session  of  receipts,  as  we  should  have  occupied  towards  any 
other  creditor  we  might  have  had  before  the  war  began.  I 
must  give  my  support  to  what  the  Commandant-General  has 
said;  and  I  can  only  repeat  what  I  have  already  informally 
told  Lord  Milner,  namely,  that  this  difficulty  is  almost  insur^ 
mountable." 

Lord  Milner :  "  We  can  refer  this  to  our  Government.  But 
your  proposal  is  altogether  antagonistic  to  the  Middelburg 
proposal,  which  absolutely  rejected  the  idea  of  taking  over  all 
the  debts  of  the  two  States." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  I  should  like  to  know  the  amount." 

General  De  la  Rey :  My  issue  of  notes  amounts  to  be- 
tween twenty  and  fifty  thousand  pounds ;  but  I  cannot  say  what 
the  issue  in  receipt  has  been." 

Lord  Milner:  "There  really  is  a  feasible  compromise, 
namely,  to  allow  the  notes  and  receipts  to  come  in  and  to  es- 
tablish the  suggested  limit  of  £1,000,000." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  Would  that  meet  your  difficulty  ?  " 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  No." 

Lord  Kitchener:  "  Well,  would  two  or  three  milHon  be  suf- 
ficient?   We  must  have  a  limit  before  we  can  do  anything." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  It  is  impossible  to  stipulate 
the  amount." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  If  you  were  in  a  position  to  give  a  limit, 
it  would  simplify  matters." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  I  agree  with  that  entirely, 
and  I  can  quite  understand  the  position  in  which  you  are 
placed.  Yet  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  assign  an  amount. 
Will  you  give  us  your  permission  to  adjourn  for  a  moment  in 
order  to  discuss  the  matter?" 

The  meeting  was  then  adjourned.  It  reassembled  at  2.30 
p.m. 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  We  have  agreed  to  fix  on 
a  sum  of  £3,000,000  for  the  government  notes  and  receipts ; 
their  amount  paid  pro  rata  can  be  lowered  should  this  sum 
prove  insufficient.  We  have  drawn  up  an  article  to  lay  before 
the  meeting." 

General  Smuts  then  read  a  draft  which  was  inserted  at  the 
end  of  Article  11  in  the  draft  agreement. 

In  answer  to  a  question  by  Lord  Kitchener,  Commander- 

386 


APPENDIX  B 


m-Chief  de  Wet  said :  The  prisoners  of  war  on  the  different 
islands  who  are  in  possession  of  such  notes  should  be  given  an 
opportunity  of  sending  them  in  for  payment." 

Lord  Milner:  What  is  the  next  point  you  wish  to  raise? 
We  now  understand  what  your  position  is." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  Am  I  to  understand  that 
you  mean  that  we  are  getting  away  from  the  point  in  discus- 
sion ?  " 

Lord  Milner :  "  This  document  contains  your  view  of  the 
matter,  so  we  are  now  aware  of  your  idea." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  We  must  know  what  to  say 
to  the  delegates." 

Lord  Kitchener:  Is  this  the  only  point  you  wish  to  bring 
forward,  or  are  there  others  in  addition  ?  " 

Commandant-General  Botha:  ''There  is  another  concern- 
ing the  protection  of  debtors,  which  is  a  vital  question  for  us." 

Lord  Milner:  "We  must  not  have  any  beating  about  the 
bush.    Everything  must  appear  in  the  document." 

General  Smuts :  "  Most  of  the  debts  contracted  before  the 
war  will  have  to  be  paid  after  the  war ;  and  if  the  debtors  can- 
not pay  we  are  afraid  that  it  will  result  in  the  ruin  of  a  great 
part  of  the  inhabitants.  We  should  like  to  see  steps  taken  to 
prevent  this.  If  Lord  Milner  intends  to  take  such  steps,  we 
should  like  to  be  informed  what  they  are." 

Lord  Milner :  "  I  think  it  would  be  best  if  you  were  to 
make  a  proposal  on  this  point." 

General  Smuts :  ''  Our  proposal  is  roughly  that  all  interest 
which  became  payable  during  the  war  should  be  joined  to  the 
principal,  and  that  this  should  be  payable  six  months  after  the 
war." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  Is  it  necessary  to  make  a  proposal  about 
this?" 

General  Smuts :  "  If  the  Government  is  prepared  to  meet 
us  in  this  difficulty  it  will  be  unnecessary  to  place  a  formal 
clause  in  the  draft  agreement." 

Lord  Milner :  ''  As  I  look  at  the  matter,  the  Government  is 
making  certain  promises  in  this  document,  and  I  consider  that 
all  promises  to  which  a  reference  may  be  made  later  should 
appear  in  it.  Everything  to  which  the  Government  is  asked 
to  bind  itself  should  appear  in  this  document,  and  nothing  else. 
I  do  not  object  to  clauses  being  added,  but  I  wish  to  prevent 
any  possible  misunderstanding." 

General  Smuts:  "  Well,  in  that  case  we  are  quite  willing  to 
propose  such  a  paragraph." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  We  waive  this  question,  so 
that  early  measures  may  be  taken  to  arrive  at  an  understand- 

387 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


ing.  In  case  a  great  number  of  the  inhabitants  become  sub- 
jects of  His  Majesty,  it  is  to  every  one's  interest,  and  princi- 
pally to  that  of  the  Government,  that  these  people  should  not 
be  ruined.  They  will  be  thrown  upon  the  mercy  of  a  Govern- 
ment, whose  duty  it  is  to  study  their  interests.  If  steps  are 
not  taken  to  prevent  it,  speculators  who  have  been  buying  up 
the  liabilities  will,  as  soon  as  peace  is  concluded,  enforce  them, 
and  directly  the  Courts  of  Justice  are  opened  they  will  issue 
summonses.    Against  this  we  have  to  be  on  our  guard." 

Lord  Milner:  "I  agree  with  the  Commandant-General.  I 
think  that  as  these  people  become  subjects  of  His  Majesty, 
then  some  provision  will  have  to  be  made  for  them.  But  I 
believe  it  to  be  neither  necessary  nor  advisable  to  point  out  in 
every  particular  case  the  way  in  which  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment has  to  provide  for  these  people.  I  think  that  an  idea 
exists — perhaps  it  is  a  very  natural  idea — because  we  have 
been  fighting  against  the  burghers  that,  therefore,  after  peace 
has  been  concluded  we  shall  still  retain  a  feeling  of  enmity 
against  them.  Just  the  opposite,  however,  is  the  truth.  Our 
endeavour  will  naturally  be,  from  the  moment  hostilities  cease, 
to  gain  the  confidence  of  the  people  and  to  do  our  best  to 
promote  their  welfare.  But  if  we  have  to  bind  ourselves  be- 
forehand in  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  we  shall  deal  with 
all  sorts  of  involved  legal  questions,  further  misunderstand- 
ings are  certain  to  occur.  If  you  have  not  confidence  in  us — 
that  we  shall  try  to  be  a  righteous  Government,  and  to  main- 
tain the  balance  between  the  dif¥erent  classes  of  His  Majesty's 
subjects — then  you  must  put  in  writing  every  point  that  strikes 
you,  and  let  them  be  laid  before  His  Majesty's  Government, 
to  see  what  they  think  about  them." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  I  trust  that  you  will  not 
think  that  Ave  are  trying  to  tie  the  hands  of  His  Majesty's 
Government.  There  are  many  other  points  which  will  give 
the  Government  opportunity  to  win  the  confidence  of  the 
people.  But  about  things  which  concern  the  financial  posi- 
tion of  burghers  who  are  entirely  ruined  we  feel  it  our  duty  to 
obtain  definite  promises.  They  will  be  a  weapon  in  our 
hands  when  we  return  to  the  delegates." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  I  do  not  quite  understand, 
Lord  Milner.  I  did  not  interpret  Mr.  Chamberlain's  tele- 
gram in  the  sense  that  we  had  to  present  new  proposals  in  or- 
der to  bind  our  hands  further.  I  thought  that  proposals  were 
to  be  made  with  a  view  to  establishing  peace." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "I  do  not  think  that  it  is  altogether 
necessary  to  include  this  proposal  in  the  document.  It  con- 
cerns the  very  involved  legal  questions  as  to  what  the  rights 

388 


APPENDIX  B 


of  creditor  and  debtor  shall  be,  and  as  to  what  the  law  in  the 
Transvaal  may  be  on  the  matter.  I  think  that  every  one  can 
rest  assured  that  the  interests  of  the  Boers  will  be  protected 
by  the  Government  in  every  way ;  and  this,  whether  the  point 
is  put  down  now  or  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Government  with 
the  recommendation  from  this  Commission  to  take  the  matter 
into  serious  consideration. 

"  I  think  that  I  know  of  a  better  way  to  deal  with  this  in- 
volved question.  Let  this  matter  be  brought  under  the  con- 
sideration of  the  Government.  I  may  be  mistaken,  but,  as  far 
as  I  can  see,  it  will  prove  a  very  thorny  question  for  the  law- 
yers, and  will  take  a  long  time  before  it  can  be  clearly  stated. 
It  is,  however,  the  wish  of  us  all  that  you  should  return  to 
the  delegates  equipped  in  such  a  way  that  you  will  be  able  to 
arrive  at  a  decision.  You  may  rest  assured  that  the  matter 
which  you  have  brought  before  us  has  been  included  in  the 
minutes  of  this  meeting.  I  do  not  think  that  it  is  necessary 
for  you  to  go  further  than  this.  The  matter  can  now  be  care- 
fully considered,  not  only  here,  but  also  in  England ;  and  you' 
may  be  quite  sure  that  your  interests  will  receive,  in  every  way, 
full  consideration." 

General  De  la  Rey :  "  I  think  that  the  matter  has  been  suf- 
ficiently discussed  in  the  presence  of  your  Excellencies,  and 
that  it  need  not  be  placed  in  the  draft  contract,  for  by  so  do- 
ing one  might  stumble  on  legal  questions." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  This  is  my  point  of  view : 
There  are  two  parties,  and  one  of  them  is  about  to  cease  to 
exist.  It  is,  therefore,  natural  that  this  party  cannot  allow  a 
vital  question  to  pass  unnoticed.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  I 
cannot  agree  that  this  matter  should  be  omitted  from  the 
draft  contract.  It  will  not  be  necessary  that  the  military  Gov- 
ernment which  now  exists  should  continue  after  the  war." 

Lord  Kitchener:  But  the  question  will  have  to  be  settled 
by  the  Civil  Government.  It  is  a  matter  for  lawyers,  and 
must  be  laid  before  them,  and  will  require  much  considera- 
tion." 

Commandant-General  Botha :  "  When  hostilities  are  con- 
cluded it  will  be  possible  to  summon  a  burgher  for  a  debt  con- 
tracted before  the  war.  I  put  this  request  because  our  law 
states  that  no  burgher  can  be  summoned  till  sixty  days  have 
elapsed  since  the  conclusion  of  peace." 

Lord  Kitchener:  "You  may  entirely  rely  upon  this,  that 
whenever  the  war  is  over  each  burgher  will  have  the  absolute 
right  to  obtain  consideration  for  his  position  in  every  way, 
and  that  his  interests  will  be  protected  under  the  new  as  under 
the  old  regime." 

389 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Commandant-General  Botha :  "  I  understand  that  perfect- 
ly. But  the  possibiHty  exists  that  syndicates  may  be  formed 
to  buy  up  all  the  debts,  and  the  people  may  be  ruined  before  a 
single  burgher  is  in  the  position  to  earn  anything  or  to  have 
his  position  restored." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  I  quite  agree  with  what  the  Command- 
ant-General has  said,  and  he  is  quite  right  to  bring  the  ques- 
tion up.  Yet  I  do  not  think  that  the  draft  contract  is  the  best 
place  in  which  to  bring  it  forward.  Once  peace  is  a  fact,  then 
it  will  be  the  duty  of  every  one  to  draw  the  attention  of  the 
Government  to  what  is  required  to  aid  the  nation  ;  but  to  bring 
up  difficulties  at  the  present  moment,  and  to  attempt  to  right 
them,  seems  to  be  an  endless  task,  and  one  for  which  this  doc- 
ument was  not  destined." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet:  "  I  am  of  opinion  that  this  is 
a  matter  which  should  be  settled  by  a  proclamation ;  but  I 
want  to  have  as  many  weapons  as  possible  in  my  hands  when 
I  return  to  the  national  delegates,  and  one  of  the  first  ques- 
tions that  will  be  asked  me  is  this,  '  What  guarantee  do  we 
possess  that  we  shall  not  be  ruined  by  our  creditors  ?  '  It 
would  not  be  much  trouble  to  you  to  give  us  now  a  draft  of 
the  proclamation  which  would  be  issued  as  soon  as  peace  is 
concluded." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  But  this  would  be  something  quite 
quite  apart  from  the  matter  under  discussion." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet:  Yes." 

Lord  Milner:  "  What  is  the  good  then?" 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  It  is  such  a  vital  question 
for  us  that  you  cannot  take  it  amiss  if  we  insist  upon  it,  for  we 
have  to  give  up  everything." 

Lord  Kitchener:     Of  course,  no  one  is  blaming  you." 

Lord  Milner:  "  But  without  any  thought  of  blame,  I  must 
point  out  that  the  effect  of  their  proposal  would  be  that  an- 
other clause  would  have  to  be  inserted  in  the  draft  contract, 
undertaking  that  such  a  proclamation  would  be  issued." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  I  think  that  as  long  as  the  delegates  re- 
ceive an  assurance  that  the  Government  will  take  this  matter 
into  consideration,  in  the  interests  of  their  subjects,  whom 
they  are  bound  to  protect,  that  such  an  assurance  ought  to 
suffice.  There  should  be  no  written  undertaking,  but  only 
a  promise  that  the  matter  shall  receive  attention.  It  is  not 
advisable  after  the  subject  has  been  brought  before  the  Gov- 
ernment to  press  the  matter  further.  The  feelings  of  the 
burghers,  moreover,  in  other  ways  than  this,  will  be  brought 
before  Lord  Milner." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  If  we  wished  to  do  so,  we 

390 


APPENDIX  B 


could  insist  upon  many  other  little  points,  but  we  only  bring 
up  vital  questions." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  This  is  one  of  the  questions  which,  when 
once  brought  under  the  consideration  of  the  Government  can- 
not be  put  aside ;  and  you  may  tell  the  burghers  that  their  in- 
terests will  be  protected  as  fully  as  is  possible.  I  think  that, 
in  so  complicated  a  matter,  this  ought  to  be  sufficient  for  them. 
All  that  is  debated  here  is  recorded  in  the  minutes,  and  these 
minutes  will  be  considered  not  only  here,  but  also  in  England. 
Are  you  satisfied  with  this  ?  " 

Commandant-General  Botha:  "Yes,  so  far  as  I  am  con- 
cerned." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  I  also  am  satisfied." 

Lord  Milner :  "  I  hope  it  is  quite  understood  that  if  the 
matter  is  allowed  to  remain  where  it  is,  my  Government  will 
be  under  no  obligation  to  treat  the  matter  in  any  particular 
way." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  But  there  is  a  pledge  that  the  matter  . 
will  be  properly  considered." 

Lord  Milner :  "  Yes,  naturally ;  if  we  put  anything  down  in 
writing.  I  am  convinced  that  it  is  necessary  to  make  it  quite 
clear  that  this  document  must  contain  everything  about  which 
there  is  anything  in  the  form  of  a  pledge." 

Lord  Kitchener:  "There  is,  then,  a  pledge  that  the  point 
upon  which  you  have  touched  will  be  considered  in  your  in- 
terests." 

General  Smuts :  "  There  still  remains  the  question  of  the 
payment  of  receipts." 

Lord  Kitchener :  "  That  will  be  placed  before  the  Govern- 
ment. The  sum  is  an  essential  point;  I  believe  the  amount 
to  be  considerable.  I  should  now  like  to  know  that  it  is  un- 
derstood that  we  are  agreed  about  all  these  draft  proposals, 
including  your  amendments,  and  that  there  are  no  further 
questions  to  be  brought  forward — it  is  necessary  to  know  this, 
as  they  would  have  to  be  telegraphed  to  England." 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet :  "  We  have  no  further  points 
to  raise." 

Lord  Milner :  "  The  telegram  that  I  shall  despatch  is  as 
follows : 

'  The  Commission  is  prepared  to  lay  before  their 
burgher  meeting  the  following  document  (in  the 
event  of  it  being  sanctioned  by  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment), and  to  ask  of  the  meeting  a  "  Yes  "  or 
"  No."' 


391 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


"  Is  that  satisfactory?  " 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet:  Yes,  naturally.  Only  I 
cannot  say  that  this  document  has  my  approval.  Yet  I  shall 
be  content  to  abide  by  the  decision  of  the  delegates." 

Judge  Hertzog:  ''  I  should  not  Hke  to  think  that  we  are 
bound  to  use  our  influence  with  the  delegates." 

Lord  Milner :  "  I  think  that  is  understood.  I  understand 
that  the  members  of  the  Commission  are  not  bound  in  respect 
of  the  opinions  they  may  express  before  the  burghers.  They 
are  only  bound,  if  the  British  Government  approves  of  the 
document,  to  lay  it  before  the  people.  I  propose  to  send  the 
following  telegram : 

'  The  Commission  is  prepared  to  lay  the  following 
document  before  the  burgher  meeting  at  Vereeni- 
ging,  for  a  Yes  "  or  "  No  "  vote,  in  the  event  of  His 
Majesty's  Government  approving  of  it.' 

"  I  want  also  to  state  that  we  have  completely  deviated  from 
the  Middelburg  proposal.  I  beUeve  everyone  is  fully  aware 
that  the  Middelburg  proposal  has  been  annulled  altogether. 
Should  an  agreement  be  arranged  in  conformity  with  this 
document,  and  signed,  then  no  attempt  must  be  made  to  ex- 
plain the  document,  or  its  terms,  by  anything  in  the  Middel- 
burg proposal." 

The  meeting  was  now  adjourned. 

Wednesday,  May  28th,  1902. 

The  Commission  met  Lord  Kitchener  and  Lord  Milner  at 
eleven  o'clock  with  the  purpose  of  hearing  the  British  Gov- 
ernment's answer  to  the  draft  proposal  sent  by  their  Lord- 
ships. 

Lord  Milner  read  the  following  memorandum : 

"  In  answer  to  the  telegram  composed  at  our  last  meeting 
with  the  consent  of  the  Commission  and  of  which  the  mem- 
bers have  received  a  copy,  the  following  message  has  been  re- 
ceived from  His  Majesty's  Government: — 

'  His  Majesty's  Government  sanctions  the  laying  before  the 
meeting  for  a  Yes  "  or  No  "  vote  the  document  drawn  uj) 
by  the  Commission  and  sent  by  Lord  Kitchener  on  the  21st 
May  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  with  the  following  amendments : 

'  The  final  proposal  made  by  the  British  Government,  on 
which  the  national  representatives  at  Vereeniging  have  to  an- 
swer "  Yes  "  or  "  No." 

392 


APPENDIX  B 


*  General  Lord  Kitchener  of  Khartoum,  Commander-in- 
Chief,  and  His  Excellency  Lord  Milner,  High  Commissioner, 
on  behalf  of  the  British  Government ; 

'  Messrs.  S.  W.  Burger,  F.  W.  Reitz,  Louis  Botha,  J.  H.  De 
la  Rey,  L.  J.  Meijer,  and  J.  C.  Krogh  on  behalf  of  the  Govern- 
ment of' the  South  African  RepubHc  and  its  burghers; 

'  Messrs.  M.  T.  Steyn,  W.  J.  C.  Brebner,  C.  R.  de  Wet,  J.  B. 
M.  Hertzog,  and  C.  H.  Olivier  on  behalf  of  the  Government  of 
the  Orange  Free  State  and  its  burghers,  being  anxious  to  put 
an  end  to  the  existing  hostilities,  agree  on  the  following 
points : 

'  Firstly,  the  burgher  forces  now  in  the  Veldt  shall  at  once 
lay  down  their  arms,  and  surrender  all  the  guns,  small  arms, 
and  war  stores  in  their  actual  possession,  or  of  which  they  have 
cognizance,  and  shall  abstain  from  any  further  opposition  to 
the  authority  of  His  Majesty  King  Edward  VH.,  whom  they 
acknowledge  as  their  lawful  sovereign. 

'  The  manner  and  details  of  this  surrender  shall  be  arranged 
by  Lord  Kitchener,  Commandant-General  Botha,  Assistant- 
Commandant-General  J.  H.  De  la  Rey,  and  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet. 

'  Secondly,  burghers  in  the  Veldt  beyond  the  frontiers  of  the 
Transvaal  and  of  the  Orange  River  Colony,  and  all  prisoners 
of  war  who  are  out  of  South  Africa,  who  are  burghers,  shall, 
on  their  declaration  that  they  accept  the  status  of  subjects  of 
His  Majesty  King  Edward  VH.,  be  brought  back  to  their 
homes,  as  soon  as  transport  and  means  of  subsistence  can  be 
assured. 

*  Thirdly,  the  burghers  who  thus  surrender,  or  who  thus  re- 
turn, shall  lose  neither  their  personal  freedom  nor  their  prop- 
erty. 

*  Fourthly,  no  judicial  proceedings,  civil  or  criminal,  shall 
be  taken  against  any  of  the  burghers  who  thus  return  for  any 
action  in  connexion  with  the  carrying  on  of  the  war.  The 
benefit  of  this  clause  shall,  however,  not  extend  to  certain 
deeds  antagonistic  to  the  usages  of  warfare,  which  have  been 
communicated  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  the  Boer  Gen- 
erals, and  which  shall  be  heard  before  a  court  martial  imme- 
diately after  the  cessation  of  hostilities. 

'  Fifthly,  the  Dutch  language  shall  be  taught  in  the  public 
schools  of  the  Transvaal  and  of  the  Orange  River  Colony 
when  the  parents  of  children  demand  it ;  and  shall  be  ad- 
mitted in  the  Courts  of  Justice,  whenever  this  is  required  for 
the  better  and  more  ef¥ective  administration  of  justice. 

'  Sixthly,  the  possession  of  rifles  shall,  on  taking  out  a  li- 
cence in  accordance  with  the  law,  be  permitted  in  the  Trans- 

393 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


vaal  and  the  Orange  River  Colony  to  persons  who  require 
them  for  their  protection. 

'  Seventhly,  military  administration  in  the  Transvaal  and 
in  the  Orange  River  Colony  shall,  as  soon  as  it  is  possible,  be 
followed  by  civil  government ;  and,  as  soon  as  circumstances 
permit  it,  a  representative  system  tending  towards  autonomy 
shall  be  introduced. 

*  Eighthly,  the  question  of  granting  a  franchise  to  the  native 
shall  not  be  decided  until  a  representative  constitution  has 
been  granted. 

'  Ninthly,  no  special  tax  shall  be  laid  on  landed  property  in 
the  Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colony,  to  meet  the  ex- 
penses of  the  war. 

*  Tenthly,  as  soon  as  circumstances  permit  there  shall  be 
appointed  in  each  district  in  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange 
River  Colony  a  Commission,  in  which  the  inhabitants  of  that 
district  shall  be  represented,  under  the  chairmanship  of  a  mag- 
istrate or  other  official,  with  the  view  to  assist  in  the  bringing 
back  of  the  people  to  their  farms,  and  in  procuring  for  those 
who,  on  account  of  losses  in  the  war  are  unable  to  provide  for 
themselves,  food,  shelter,  and  such  quantities  of  seed,  cattle, 
implements,  etc.,  as  are  necessary  for  the  resuming  of  their 
previous  callings. 

'  His  Majesty's  Government  shall  place  at  the  disposal  of 
these  Commissions  the  sum  of  £3,000,000  for  the  above-men- 
tioned purposes,  and  shall  allow  that  all  notes  issued  in  con- 
formity with  Law  No.  i,  1900,  of  the  Government  of  the  South 
African  Republic,  and  all  receipts  given  by  the  officers  in  the 
Veldt  of  the  late  Republics,  or  by  their  order,  may  be  presented 
to  a  judicial  Commission  by  the  Government,  and  in  case  such 
notes  and  receipts  are  found  by  this  Commission  to  have  been 
duly  issued  for  consideration  in  value,  then  they  shall  be  ac- 
cepted by  the  said  Commission  as  proof  of  war  losses,  suffered 
by  the  persons  to  whom  they  had  originally  been  given.  In 
addition  to  the  above-named  free  gift  of  £3,000,000,  His  Maj- 
esty's Government  will  be  prepared  to  grant  advances,  in  the 
shape  of  loans,  for  the  same  ends,  free  of  interest  for  two 
years,  and  afterwards  repayable  over  a  period  of  years  with 
three  per  cent,  interest.  No  foreigner  or  rebel  shall  be  enti- 
tled to  benefit  by  this  clause.' 

Lord  Milner :  "  In  making  this  communication  to  the  Com- 
mission we  are  instructed  to  add  that  if  this  opportunity  of 
concluding  an  honourable  peace  is  not  taken  advantage  of 
within  a  time  to  be  fixed  by  us,  then  this  conference  shall  be 
regarded  as  closed,  and  His  Majesty's  Government  shall  not 
be  bound  in  any  way  by  the  present  terms.    I  have,  in  order 

394 


APPENDIX  B 


that  there  may  be  no  mistake  about  these  terms,  made  a  copy 
of  the  documents  and  of  Lord  Kitchener's  telegram,  also  of 
the  amendments  and  additions  determined  on  by  His  Majes- 
ty's Government,  and  of  the  memorandum  to  which  I  have  just 
drawn  your  attention." 

A  debate  now  followed  on  the  time  that  should  be  allowed 
for  the  discussion  of  the  proposals  at  Vereeniging,  and  it  was 
agreed  that  Commandant-General  Botha  should  propose  a 
term  that  very  day  before  the  Commission  left  Pretoria. 

It  was  subsequently  settled  that  the  delegates  must  arrive 
at  a  decision  before  Saturday  evening,  May  31st. 

General  Botha  asked  if  there  were  any  objection  to  the  dele- 
gates erasing  any  paragraph  of  the  proposal  sent  by  the  Brit- 
ish Government. 

Lord  Milner :  "  There  must  be  no  alteration.  Only  '  Yes  ' 
or  *  No '  is  to  be  answered." 

Commandant-General  Botha:  "  I  think  that  the  burghers 
have  the  right  to  erase  any  article  they  may  wish,  for  they  have 
the  right  to  surrender  unconditionally." 

Lord  Milner  replied  that  the  burghers  certainly  had  the 
power  to  do  so,  but  the  document  of  the  British  Government 
could  not  be  changed. 

There  now  followed  an  informal  discussion  about  the  colo- 
nists who  had  been  fighting  on  the  side  of  the  Republics. 

Lord  Milner  communicated  what  the  British  Government's 
intentions  were  with  regard  to  these  colonists ;  and  read  the 
following  document : — 

"  His  Majesty's  Government  has  to  formally  place  on  rec- 
ord that  the  colonists  of  Natal  and  the  Cape  Colony  who  have 
been  engaged  in  fighting  and  who  now  surrender  shall,  on 
their  return,  be  dealt  with  by  the  Colonial  Governments  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  laws  of  the  Colonies,  and  that  ah  British 
subjects  who  have  joined  the  enemy  shall  be  liable  to  be  tried 
under  the  law  of  that  part  of  the  British  Empire  to  which  they 
belong. 

His  Majesty's  Government  has  received  from  the  Govern- 
ment of  Cape  Colony  a  statement  of  their  opinion  as  regards 
the  terms  to  be  ofifered  to  British  subjects  of  the  Cape  Colony 
who  are  still  in  the  Veldt  or  who  have  surrendered  since  April 
i2th,  1901.  The  terms  are  as  follows: — In  regard  to  the 
burghers,  they  all,  on  their  surrender,  after  having  laid  down 
their  arms,  shall  sign  a  document  before  a  resident  magistrate 
of  the  district  in  which  their  surrender  has  taken  place,  in 
which  document  they  shall  declare  themselves  guilty  of  high 
treason ;  and  their  punishment,  in  the  event  of  their  not  hav- 
ing been  guilty  of  murder,  or  of  other  deeds  in  contradiction 

395 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


to  the  customs  of  civilized  warfare,  shall  be  that  for  the  rest 
of  their  lives  they  shall  not  be  registered  as  voters,  nor  shall 
they  be  able  to  vote  in  Parliamentary,  district,  or  municipal 
elections.  As  regards  justices  and  veldtcornets  of  the  Cape 
Colony,  and  all  other  persons  who  had  occupied  official  posi- 
tions under  the  Government  of  Cape  Colony,  and  all  who  held 
the  rank  of  commandant  in  the  rebel  or  burgher  forces,  they 
shall  be  brought  on  the  charge  of  high  treason  before  the  ordi- 
nary Courts  of  the  country,  or  before  such  special  Courts  as 
later  on  may  legally  be  constituted.  The  punishment  for  their 
misdeeds  shall  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Court,  with  this 
reservation,  that  in  no  case  shall  capital  punishment  be  in- 
flicted. 

The  Government  of  Natal  is  of  opinion  that  the  rebels 
should  be  judged  by  the  laws  of  the  Colony." 
The  meeting  now  adjourned. 

The  secretaries  and  Messrs.  de  Wet  and  J.  Ferreira,  with 
the  help  of  lawyers,  set  themselves  the  task  of  making  copies 
of  the  proposal  of  the  British  Government  for  the  use  of  the 
national  representatives  at  Vereeniging.  This  work  kept  them 
engaged  until  the  evening. 

At  seven  o'clock  the  Commission  left  Pretoria  and  returned 
to  Vereeniging. 


^96 


APPENDIX  B 


THE  MIDDELBURG  PROPOSAL. 

Lord  Kitchener  to  Commandant-General  Botha. 

Pretoria,  March  7,  1901. 

Your  Honour, — 

With  reference  to  our  conversation  at  Middelburg  on  the 
28th  February,  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that,  in  the 
event  of  a  general  and  complete  cessation  of  hostilities,  and  the 
surrender  of  all  rifles,  ammunition,  cannon  and  other  munitions 
of  war  in  the  hands  of  the  burghers,  or  in  Government  depots, 
or  elsewhere.  His  Majesty's  Government  is  prepared  to  adopt 
the  following  measures. 

His  Majesty's  Government  will  at  once  grant  an  amnesty 
in  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colony  for  all  bond  fide 
acts  of  war  committed  during  the  recent  hostilities.  British 
subjects  belonging  to  Natal  and  Cape  Colony,  while  they  will 
not  be  compelled  to  return  to  those  Colonies,  will,  if  they  do 
so,  be  liable  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  laws  of  those  Colonies  spe- 
cially passed  to  meet  the  circumstances  arising  out  of  the  pres- 
ent war.  As  you  are  doubtless  aware,  the  special  law  in  the 
Cape  Colony  has  greatly  mitigated  the  ordinary  penalties  for 
high  treason  in  the  present  case. 

All  prisoners  of  war,  now  in  St.  Helena,  Ceylon,  or  else- 
where, being  burghers  or  colonists,  will,  on  the  completion  of 
the  surrender,  be  brought  back  to  their  country  as  quickly  as 
arrangements  can  be  made  for  their  transport. 

At  the  earliest  practicable  date  military  administration  will 
cease,  and  will  be  replaced  by  civil  administration  in  the  form 
of  Crown  Colony  Government.  There  will,  therefore,  be,  in 
the  first  instance,  in  each  of  the  new  Colonies,  a  Governor  and 
an  Executive  Council,  composed  of  the  principal  officials,  with 
a  Legislative  Council  consisting  of  a  certain  number  of  official 
members  to  whom  a  nominated  unofficial  element  will  be  added. 
But  it  is  the  desire  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  as  soon  as 
circumstances  permit,  to  introduce  a  representative^  element, 
and  ultimately  to  concede  to  the  new  Colonies  the  privilege  of 
self-government.  Moreover,  on  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  a 
High  Court  will  be  established  in  each  of  the  new  Colonies  to 
administer  the  laws  of  the  land,  and  this  Court  will  be  inde- 
pendent of  the  Executive. 

Church  property,  public  trusts,  and  orphan  funds  will  be 
respected. 

396<i 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Both  the  English  and  Dutch  languages  will  be  used  and 
taught  in  public  schools  when  the  parents  of  the  children  desire 
it,  and  allowed  in  Courts  of  Law. 

As  regards  the  debts  of  the  late  Republican  Governments, 
His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  undertake  any  liability.  It 
is,  however,  prepared,  as  an  act  of  grace,  to  set  aside  a  sum 
not  exceeding  one  million  pounds  sterling  to  repay  inhabitants 
of  the  Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colony  for  goods  requisi- 
tioned from  them  by  the  late  Republican  Governments,  or 
subsequent  to  annexation,  by  Commandants  in  the  field  being 
in  a  position  to  enforce  such  requisitions.  But  such  claims 
will  have  to  be  established  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  Judge  or 
Judicial  Commission,  appointed  by  the  Government,  to  inves- 
tigate and  assess  them,  and,  if  exceeding  in  the  aggregate  one 
million  pounds,  they  will  be  liable  to  reduction  pro  rata, 

I  also  beg  to  inform  Your  Honour  that  the  new  Government 
will  take  into  immediate  consideration  the  possibility  of  assist- 
ing by  loan  the  occupants  of  farms,  who  will  take  the  oath  of 
allegiance,  to  repair  any  injuries  sustained  by  destruction  of 
buildings  or  loss  of  stock  during  the  war,  and  that  no  special 
war  tax  will  be  imposed  upon  farms  to  defray  the  expense  of 
the  war. 

When  burghers  require  the  protection  of  firearms,  such  will 
be  allowed  to  them  by  licence,  and  on  due  registration,  pro- 
vided they  take  the  oath  of  allegiance.  Licences  will  also  be 
issued  for  sporting  rifles,  guns,  etc.,  but  miUtary  firearms  will 
only  be  allowed  for  purposes  of  protection. 

As  regards  the  extension  of  the  franchise  to  Kaffirs  in  the 
Transvaal  and  Orange  River  Colony,  it  is  not  the  intention  of 
His  Majesty's  Government  to  give  such  franchise  before  rep- 
resentative Government  is  granted  to  those  Colonies,  and  if 
then  given  it  will  be  so  limited  as  to  secure  the  just  predomi- 
nance of  the  white  race.  The  legal  position  of  coloured  per- 
sons will,  however,  be  similar  to  that  which  they  hold  in  the 
Cape  Colony. 

In  conclusion  I  must  inform  Your  Honour  that,  if  the  terms 
now  offered  are  not  accepted  after  a  reasonable  delay  for  con- 
sideration they  must  be  regarded  as  cancelled. 

I  have,  etc., 

KITCHENER,  GENERAL, 
Commander-in-Chief  British  Forces,  South  Africa. 
To  His  Honour,  Commandant-General  Louis  Botha, 


396^ 


Appendix  C 


MINUTES  OF  THE  MEETING  OF  THE  SPECIAL 
NATIONAL  REPRESENTATIVES  AT  ^VEREENT- 
GING,  SOUTH  AFRICAN  REPUBLIC,  THURS- 
~DAY',  the  29TH  OF  MAY,  1902,  AND  THE  FOL- 
LOWING DAYS 

May  29TH,  1902. 

The  Rev.  J.  D.  Kestell  having  offered  prayer,  the  Chairman 
requested  Vice-President  Burger  to  address  the  meeting. 

Vice-President  Burger  said  that  the  documents  laid  before 
the  Governments  by  the  Commission  would  now  be  read  to 
the  meeting.  Thereupon  Mr.  D.  Van  Velden  read  the  follow- 
ing letter : 

Report  of  the  Commission. 

Pretoria,  2Sth  May,  1902. 
To  the  Governments  of  the  Orange  Free  State  and  the  South 

African  Republic: 
Honble.  Gentlemen, — 

In  accordance  with  instructions  received  from  you,  we  went 
to  Pretoria  in  order  to  negotiate  with  the  British  authorities 
on  the  question  of  peace.  We  have  the  honour  to  make  the 
following  report : 

The  meetings  lasted  from  Monday,  May  19th,  to  Wednesday, 
May  28th,  its  prolongation  having  been  principally  caused  by 
the  length  of  time  taken  up  by  the  cable  correspondence  with 
the  British  Government. 

We  first  handed  in  a  proposal  (annexed  under  A)^  in 
which  we  attempted  to  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  a  limited  in- 
dependence with  surrender  of  part  of  our  territory.  Lords 
Kitchener  and  Milner  refused  emphatically  to  negotiate  on 
this  basis,  and  expressed  the  opinion  that  to  cable  this  pro- 
posal to  the  British  Government  would  be  detrimental  to  the 
objects  of  these  negotiations.  They  told  us  they  had  already 
informed  the  two  Governments  that  the  British  Government 

>  See  page  363  et  seq, 
397 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


would  only  negotiate  on  the  basis  of  an  amended  form  of  the 
Middelburg  proposal.  In  order  finally  to  formulate  this  pro- 
posal, Lord  Milner  asked  the  assistance  of  some  members  of 
the  Commission ;  and  this  was  granted,  on  the  understanding 
that  the  assistance  of  these  members  of  the  Commission 
should  be  given  without  prejudice  to  themselves. 

As  the  result  of  the  dehberations  of  this  sub-committee, 
Lord  Milner  produced  a  draft  proposal,  in  which  we  insisted 
that  a  fresh  clause  (No.  ii)  should  be  inserted;  and  this  was 
done.  This  draft  proposal  (annexed  under  B)  ^  was  then  ca- 
bled to  the  British  Government,  revised  by  them,  and  then 
communicated  to  us  in  its  final  shape  (annexed  under  B).^ 
We  were  informed  by  the  British  Government  that  no  further 
revision  of  this  proposal  would  be  allowed,  but  that  it  must 
now  be  either  accepted  or  rejected  in  its  entirety  by  the  dele- 
gates of  the  two  Republics ;  and  that  this  acceptance  or  rejec- 
tion must  take  place  within  a  stipulated  time.  We  then  told 
Lord  Kitchener  that  he  should  know  our  final  decision  by  the 
evening  of  the  next  Saturday  at  latest. 

During  our  formal  negotiations  certain  informal  conversa- 
tions took  place  in  reference  to  the  British  subjects  (in  Cape 
Colony  and  Natal)  who  have  been  fighting  on  our  side.  As 
a  result  of  these  informal  conversations  a  communication  from 
the  British  Government  was  imparted  to  us  (annexed  under 
B).3 

We  have  the  honour  to  remain,  etc., 
LOUIS  BOTHA. 
J.  H.  DE  LA  REY. 
C.  R.  DE  WET. 
J.  B.  M.  HERTZOG. 
J.  D.  SMUTS. 


Vice-President  Burger  said  that  the  delegates  must  proceed 
to  discuss  this  document,  and  that  they  would  then  be  asked 
to  decide — firstly,  whether  the  struggle  should  be  continued ; 
secondly,  whether  the  proposal  of  the  British  Government 
should  be  accepted ;  and,  thirdly,  whether  they  were  prepared 
to  surrender  unconditionally. 

It  was  decided  that  minutes  of  the  meeting  should  be  kept, 
and  the  delegates  then  proceeded  to  discuss  the  different  arti- 
cles of  the  British  Government's  proposal.  The  whole  of  the 
morning  and  a  part  of  the  afternoon  sitting  were  devoted  to 
questions  dealing  with  the  meaning  of  the  several  clauses,  the 

»  See  page  379  et  seq.       »  See  page  391  et  seq.       ^  See  page  395  ct  seq. 

398 


APPENDIX  C 


members  of  the  Commission  answering  to  the  best  of  their 
ability. 

After  these  questions  had  been  disposed  of,  Mr.  De  Clercq 
rose  to  speak.  He  said  that  he  had  already  given  his  own 
opinion,  but  that  now  it  was  for  the  whole  meeting  to  decide 
whether  they  would  give  up  the  war,  and,  if  they  resolved  to 
do  so,  whether  they  would  accept  the  proposal  unconditionally. 
As  to  the  proposal,  it  could  not  be  denied  that  it  did  not  give 
all  that  they  themselves  desired,  but  that  could  not  have  been 
expected.  Should  they  now  return  to  their  commandos  and 
be  asked  by  their  burghers  what  they  had  efYected,  they  would 
have  to  reply,  "  Nothing."  How  would  they  be  able  to  meet 
their  burghers  with  such  an  answer  as  that?  It  would  there- 
fore be  better  to  get  terms  from  the  British  Government ;  and 
by  doing  so  they  would  also  gratify  the  British  nation.  As 
for  himself,  he  was  for  accepting  the  proposal,  unless  it  could 
be  proved  to  him  that  unconditional  surrender  would  be  a 
still  better  course  to  take. 

General  Nieuwouwdt  then  proposed  that  the  meeting  should, 
without  further  delay,  proceed  to  vote  whether  the  war  should 
be  terminated,  and  whether  the  terms  offered  to  them  should 
be  accepted. 

General  Froneman  seconded  this  proposal. 

Mr.  Birkenstock  (Vrijheid)  felt  that  this  was  too  important 
a  matter  to  be  treated  with  such  haste.  A  decision  about 
such  a  document  as  the  one  now  lying  before  the  meeting 
could  not  be  come  to  in  a  moment.  The  delegates  would 
hardly  agree  with  the  last  speaker  in  his  opinion  that  they 
should  at  once  proceed  to  vote  whether  the  war  should  or 
should  not  be  continued.  Time  was  required  before  coming 
to  such  a  decision.  Moreover  it  had  to  be  proved  whether 
it  were  possible  to  continue  the  war.  There  were  some  dis- 
tricts where  it  certainly  could  no  longer  be  carried  on.  Was 
it  possible  for  one  part  of  the  nation  to  continue  fighting  with- 
out the  other?  Then  there  was  the  question  whether  their 
resources  and  the  troops  which  they  still  had  were  sufficient  to 
justify  them  in  prolonging  the  struggle.  If  they  were  insuf- 
ficient the  war  must  be  discontinued  and  terms  must  be  ac- 
cepted. It  would  not  be  an  easy  thing  to  do ;  one  could  not, 
with  a  light  heart,  give  up  the  independence  of  their  country ; 
but  half  a  loaf  was  better  than  no  bread,^  and  even  such  a  sac- 
rifice as  this  might  be  necessary  if  the  nation  was  to  be  saved. 

Commandant  Jacobsz  (Harrismith)  was  at  one  with  the  last 
speaker  in  holding  that  they  must  not  be  in  too  great  a  hurry 
to  vote  on  the  proposal. 

1  The  Boer  form  of  this  proverb  is :  Half  an  egg  is  better  than  an  empty 
shell. 


399 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Mr.  P.  R.  Viljoen  (Heidelberg)  felt  that  the  proposal  of  the 
British  Government  would  so  tightly  bind  them  that  they 
would  never  again  be  free.  They  were  knee-haltered  ^  now, 
but  under  certain  circumstances  they  might  even  be  hobbled.^ 

He  considered  that  the  meeting  should  ask  the  Govern- 
ments to  stop  the  war. 

General  Du  Toit  (Wolmaransstad)  said  that  the  times 
through  which  they  were  passing  were  very  critical ;  every  one 
ought  to  say  exactly  what  he  thought,  and  no  one  ought  to  be 
condemned  for  doing  so.  A  delegate  who  should  say  that  the 
war  could  not  be  continued  must  not  be  considered  disloyal 
to  his  country  because  he  did  so.  As  regarded  the  three 
questions  before  the  meeting,  according  to  the  opinion  of  his 
burghers  the  war  ought  to  be  continued.  The  views  of  his 
burghers  when  he  left  the  commandos  had  been  clearly  ex- 
pressed. "  Let  us  retain  our  independence,  or  go  on  fight- 
ing," they  had  said.  But  why  were  they  of  this  mind?  Be- 
cause they  were  unaware  how  matters  stood  in  other  districts. 
The  eyes  of  the  delegates,  however,  while  directed  towards 
God,  were  also  able  to  observe  the  condition  of  the  eastern 
parts  of  their  country.  If  the  burghers  in  those  parts  could 
not  hold  out,  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  other  commandos 
to  do  so.  It  could  not  be  denied  that  some  of  the  commandos 
were  no  longer  able  to  continue  fighting.  That  being  the 
case,  even  if  there  were  a  majority  in  favour  of  prolonging  the 
struggle,  that  majority  would  have  to  yield  to  the  wishes  of 
the  minority,  and  for  this  reason :  if  the  war  were  to  be  contin- 
ued in  conformity  with  the  wishes  of  the  majority,  and  if  the 
minority  were  to  be  compelled  to  surrender  (and  nobody 
would  be  surprised  at  this),  then  the  majority  would  find  them- 
selves too  weak  to  go  on  fighting.  Thus  there  were  clear  rea- 
sons why  the  war  must  be  ended.  Moreover,  its  continuation 
would  involve  not  only  the  national  but  also  the  moral  death 
of  the  Republics.  But  it  was  still  to  be  proved  that  a  contin- 
uation of  the  war  was  even  possible;  for  himself  he  feared 
that  it  was  not  so,  and  if  fight  he  must  he  could  only  fight 
without  hope  and  without  heart.  If  he  were  now  to  go  back 
to  his  burghers,  and  they  were  to  ask  him  why  he  persisted  in 
the  war,  and  he  was  compelled  to  reply  that  he  was  doing  so 
on  the  strength  of  opinions  expressed  in  newspapers,  and  on 
the  encouragement  given  to  the  cause  of  the  Republics  in 
their  pages,  he  would  be  told  that  he  was  building  on  sand. 
Again,  he  feared  that  if  the  war  were  to  be  continued,  detached 
parties  would  be  formed  which  would  try  to  obtain  terms  from 

» The  head  fastened  to  the  knee. 
'  Having  two  legs  fastened  together. 

400 


APPENDIX  C 


the  English  for  themselves.  And  should  the  commandos  in 
time  become  so  weak  as  to  be  forced  to  surrender  uncondi- 
tionally, what  then  would  be  the  fate  of  the  officers?  Would 
they  not  lose  everything,  and  be  banished  into  the  bargain? 
Let  no  one  think,  however,  that  he  was  trying  merely  to  do 
what  was  best  for  himself.  No.  There  was  now  a  chance  for 
negotiating;  should  the  meeting  let  slip  that  chance,  uncondi- 
tional surrender  would  most  certainly  result,  and  that  would 
be  disastrous  to  all.  He  hoped  that  he  would  not  be  misun- 
derstood ;  if  the  meeting  decided  to  go  on  with  the  war,  he,  for 
one,  would  not  lay  down  his  arms.  No,  he  would  actively 
prosecute  the  war,  and  operate  in  conjunction  with  the  other 
generals.  But  what  would  be  the  use  of  it :  he  sided  with 
those  who  held  that  the  struggle  could  no  longer  be  carried  on. 

Commandant  Rheeder  (Rouxville)  wished  to  reply  to  those 
who  demanded  reasons  for  the  continuation  of  the  war.  One 
reason,  he  said,  was  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  England 
would  not  allow  them  to  have  any  communication  with  the 
deputation  in  Europe  ;  that  meant  that  something  advanta- 
geous to  us  was  being  held  back.  Another  was  the  considera- 
tion of  what  their  descendants  in  time  to  come  would  say. 
"  How  is  it,"  they  would  ask,  "  that  we  are  not  now  free  men  ? 
There  were  a  large  number  of  burghers  in  the  veldt  to  con- 
tinue the  war — what  has  become  of  our  independence  ? " 
And  what  answer  shall  we  be  able  to  make? — we  whose 
courage  failed  us  before  such  tremendous  odds,  and  who  laid 
down  our  arms  when  victory  was  still  possible  ?  The  speaker 
would  only  be  satisfied  if  the  meeting  were  unanimous  for 
stopping  the  war,  not  otherwise.  He  thought  of  the  families. 
How  would  the  delegates  face  their  families  on  their  return, 
after  the  sacrifice  of  independence?  He  considered  that  the 
commandos  should  leave  those  districts  where  resistance  was 
no  longer  possible  and  go  to  others.  If  to  discontinue  the 
war  meant  to  surrender  independence,  then  the  war  must  not 
be  discontinued. 

Vice-President  Burger  said  that  he  had  not  heard  from  the 
last  speaker  any  reasons  whatsoever  for  continuing  the  war. 

Commandant  Rheeder  then  remarked  that  if  they  wanted  to 
surrender  their  country  they  should  have  done  so  earlier, 
when  the  burghers  were  not  entirely  destitute.  But  now  noth- 
ing was  left  to  them.  As  to  the  narrowness  of  the  field  of 
operations,  there  was  still  room  enough  to  fight. 

Commandant  P.  L.  Uijs  (Pretoria)  referred  to  the  frequent 
allusion  which  had  been  made  to  their  European  deputation. 
That  deputation  was  now  in  Holland,  and  must  know  if  any- 
thing was  going  on  there  to  the  advantage  of  the  Republics. 

401 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


If  there  were  any  hopeful  signs  there,  their  comrades  would 
certainly  have  informed  them.  They  had  not  done  so,  and 
therefore  the  meeting  should  dismiss  this  subject  from  its 
thoughts. 

The  meeting  then  adjourned  until  7.15  p.m. 

Upon  reassembling,  Commandant  Cronje  (Winburg)  said 
that  he  would  not  detain  the  meeting  for  long ;  he  only  wished 
to  say  a  very  few  words.  It  had  been  rightly  said  that  they 
were  passing  through  a  momentous  period  of  their  history. 
To  his  mind  the  present  was  the  critical  epoch  in  the  existence 
of  the  African  nation,  whose  destinies  they  had  now  to  decide. 
Delegates  were  asking  what  hopes  they  could  now  entertain. 
But  what  grounds  for  hope  were  there  when  the  war  began? 
In  his  opinion  there  were  none.  It  was  only  that  men  be- 
lieved then  that  Right  was  Might,  and  put  their  trust  in  God. 
And  God  had  helped  them.  When  the  enemy  had  entered 
their  country  everything  was  dark.  There  had  been  a  day  on 
which  more  than  four  thousand  men  had  surrendered.  Then, 
even  as  now,  they  had  been  without  hope.  Then,  even  as 
now,  those  who  wanted  to  continue  the  war  had  been  told 
that  they  were  mad.  That  had  been  some  two  years  ago,  and 
yet  the  war  was  still  going  on.  Then,  even  as  now,  there  had 
been  no  food,  and  yet  they  had  managed  to  live.  The  dele- 
gates represented  a  free  people ;  let  them  not  take  a  step  of 
which  they  would  afterwards  repent.  As  regarded  interven- 
tion, he  had  often  said  that  one  could  not  rely  on  it.  But  they 
could  rely  on  God.  When  he  returned  to  his  burghers,  and 
was  questioned  as  to  his  reason  for  the  course  of  action  which 
he  had  advocated,  he  hoped  to  be  able  to  answer,  Behef  in 
God."  There  had  always  been  times  when  there  was  no  food, 
and  yet  they  had  always  managed  to  live.  A  deputation  had 
been  officially  sent  to  Europe,  and  was  now  there  to  represent 
their  interests.  Had  the  meeting  lost  its  confidence  in  that 
deputation?  Did  it  not  realize  that  if  the  case  of  the  Repubhc 
was  hopeless  in  Europe  the  deputation  would  send  word  to 
that  effect  ?  It  had  been  said  that  by  continuing  the  war  they 
would  be  exterminating  the  nation.  He  did  not  believe  this. 
The  way  to  exterminate  the  nation  was  to  accept  the  British 
proposal.  To  go  on  with  the  war  was  their  only  policy,  and 
it  was  a  very  good  policy.  The  deputation  had  claimed  that 
their  advice  should  be  taken  before  any  negotiations  were  at- 
tempted. What  right,  then,  had  the  delegates  to  give  up  the 
war  on  the  basis  of  the  proposal  now  before  them  ?  To  do  so 
was  to  give  the  death  blow  to  their  national  existence ;  later 
on  they  would  have  cause  to  rue  it.  Moreover,  the  proposal 
did  not  safeguard  the  interests  of  their  brethren  in  Cape  Col- 

402 


APPENDIX  C 


ony.  Again,  landed  property  belonging  to  burghers  had  al- 
ready been  sold,  and  in  all  probability  these  burghers  would 
never  see  any  of  the  proceeds.  The  sum  (£3,000,000)  which 
the  proposal  offered  to  compensate  for  all  damages,  was  not 
sufficient  to  cover  damage  already  done.  For  these  and  other 
reasons  the  proposal  could  not  be  accepted.  No  other  course 
was  open  to  them  except  to  reject  the  proposal  and  to  con- 
tinue hostilities. 

General  Froneman  (Ladybrand)  agreed  with  the  last  speak- 
er. He  loved  his  country,  and  could  not  think  of  surrender- 
ing it.  The  reasons  which  had  induced  them  to  begin  the  war 
were  still  in  force.  He  had  been  through  the  whole  campaign, 
and  saw  stronger  reasons  now  than  ever  before  for  the  contin- 
uing of  the  war.  His  districts,  like  those  of  others,  were  ex- 
hausted, and  yet  his  burghers  remained  in  the  veldt.  He  had 
been  present  at  the  surrender  of  the  four  thousand;  he  had 
seen  General  Cronje  give  up  his  sword.  Those  had  been  dark 
days,  but  the  struggle  still  went  on ;  they  could  still  keep  on 
their  legs.  It  had  been  God's  will  that  this  war  should  take 
place.  Prayers  had  been  offered  that  it  might  be  averted,  but 
God  had  ruled  it  otherwise.  Therefore  they  must  carry  the 
war  through,  and  never  think  of  surrender.  They  were  Re- 
publicans. What  would  it  be  to  have  to  give  up  that  name 
for  ever?  He  had  consulted  his  burghers  and  their  women- 
folk ;  he  had  asked  them,  "  What  conditions  of  peace  will  you 
accept?"  They  had  answered,  "  No  peace  at  all,  if  it  means 
any  loss  of  independence."  And  so,  before  he  could  vote  for 
peace,  he  would  have  again  to  take  the  opinion  of  his  burghers. 

Veldtcornet  B.  H.  Breijtenbach  (Utrecht)  urged  that  a  def- 
inite yes  or  no  must  be  given  to  the  question.  Is  the  war  to 
continue?  The  general  condition  of  the  country  had  been 
laid  before  the  meeting,  and  it  had  been  clearly  shown  that  its 
condition  made  the  carrying  on  of  the  war  impossible.  One 
could  not  escape  from  that  fact.  Why  then  should  they  argue 
any  longer  ?  What  reason  had  they  for  wishing  to  prolong  this 
struggle?  They  surely  would  not  do  so  blindfold.  Unless 
good  reasons  could  be  alleged  for  continuing  it,  the  war  would 
have  to  be  stopped.  As  those  good  reasons  were  not  forth- 
coming, he  would  vote  with  those  who  were  for  peace.  To 
continue  the  war  would  be  a  crime.  Some  of  the  last  few 
speakers  had  stated  that  there  had  been  no  sufficient  reasons 
for  commencing  the  war.  That  might  be  true.  They  might 
have  been  over-confident  then.  Be  that  as  it  might,  they  cer- 
tainly had  lost  so  much  ground  since  then  that  they  must  now 
give  up  the  struggle.  This  was  his  irrevocable  opinion.  It 
had  been  clearly  shown  that  fourteen  commandos  were  unable 

403 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


to  continue  in  the  veldt.  This  made  peace  a  necessity,  for 
what  was  to  be  gained  by  continuing  a  struggle  without  a 
proper  army.  The  war  might  last  a  few  months  longer,  but 
it  must  end  then — and  end  in  disaster. 

Commandant  W.  J.  Mljoen  (Witwatersrand)  said  that  some 
speakers  were  for  and  others  against  the  continuation  of  hos- 
tilities. The  first  were  guided  by  faith  alone ;  the  second  had 
brought  forward  definite  grounds  for  their  opinion.  A  year 
ago  both  parties  had  been  inspired  by  faith,  but  what  had  been 
the  result?  He  would  be  glad  enough  to  be  convinced,  but 
those  who  wished  to  continue  the  war  must  show  grounds  for 
such  a  line  of  action. 

General  De  la  Rey  would  only  say  a  few  words.  He  had 
received  definite  instructions  before  he  went  to  his  burghers 
neither  to  encourage  nor  discourage  them,  whatever  they 
might  say  at  their  meetings.  He  had  strictly  observed  these 
instructions,  and  had  never  attempted  to  influence  them. 
There  were  present  among  the  delegates  nine  men  (one  being 
from  Cape  Colony)  who  represented  his  burghers,  and  who 
would  testify  as  to  their  state  of  mind  and  temper ;  he  need 
not  therefore  say  anything.  The  delegates  could  bear  witness 
how  full  of  courage  the  men  were.  Nevertheless,  the  war 
could  not  be  continued.  Say  or  do  what  they  would  at  that 
meeting,  the  war  must  cease.  Some  had  talked  about  faith. 
But  what  was  faith?  True  faith  consisted  in  saying,  Lord, 
Thy  will,  not  mine,  be  done."  They  must  bow  before  the  will 
of  God.  The  delegates,  he  continued,  must  choose  one  of  the 
three  courses  which  were  open  to  them.  It  would  be  a  great 
calamity  if  they  were  to  decide  to  surrender  unconditionally. 
Had  it  been  necessary  to  do  so  it  should  have  been  done  while 
they  still  possessed  something.  Should  they  then  continue 
the  war?  But  the  question  as  to  what  would  become  of  the 
people  under  those  circumstances  must  be  faced — to  continue 
lighting  would  be  the  ruin  of  the  nation.  The  delegates  might 
go  away  determined  to  fight,  but  the  burghers  would  lay  down 
their  arms,  and  the  state  of  affairs  which  would  thus  ensue 
would  not  redound  to  their  honour.  But  the  British  Govern- 
ment offered  guarantees ;  it  would  help  the  nation  so  that  the 
nation  might  help  itself.  If  any  one  were  to  say  now,  "  Con- 
tinue fighting,"  he  and  his  generals  might  have  the  heart  to  do 
so  if  they  kept  their  minds  fixed  on  their  recent  exploits.  For 
himself,  however,  he  would  refuse  absolutely  to  accede  to  that 
request.  And  what  real  advantage  had  accrued  from  his  suc- 
cesses in  the  veldt?  What  had  "followed  on  them?  All  his 
cattle  had  been  taken  away,  some  three  hundred  of  his  men 
had  been  killed,  wounded,  or  taken  prisoner.    Some  of  the 


404 


APPENDIX  C 


delegates  set  their  hopes  on  the  European  deputation,  but 
what  did  that  deputation  say  a  year  ago  ?  It  said  that  all  de- 
pended on  their  continuing  to  fight.  They  had  continued'  to 
fight.  What  more,  then,  was  there  left  for  them  to  do? 
Some  gentlemen  present  had  definite  mandates  from  their 
burghers,  who  very  likely  had  no  knowledge  of  the  actual  state 
of  affairs  when  they  gave  those  mandates.  He  himself  had 
not  known  at  that  time  in  what  a  plight  the  country  was.  He 
challenged  each  and  all  of  the  delegates  to  show  their  burgh- 
ers the  proposal  of  the  British  Government,  and  then  to  see  if 
those  burghers  were  not  in  favour  of  unconditional  surrender. 
But  if  the  meeting  insisted  on  the  continuation  of  hostilities, 
the  nation  would  be  driven  into  hands-upping;  thus  the  war 
would  end  in  dishonour  and  disgrace. 

Landdrost  Bosman  (Wakkerstroom)  was  glad  that  General 
De  la  Rey  had  spoken  out  so  boldly ;  it  was  every  one's  duty 
to  do  so.  He  himself  also  was  against  the  continuance  of  the 
war. 

Although  it  had  been  said  that  the  war  had  been  begun  in 
faith,  it  ought  not  to  be  forgotten  that  it  had  also  been  begun 
with  hope  of  intervention,  as  was  shown  by  the  sending  of  the 
deputation  to  Europe — that  deputation  which,  as  they  had 
often  heard,  had  done  so  much  good  work.  Another  proof  that 
there  had  then  been  hope  of  intervention  was  that  the  burgh- 
ers had  ordered  the  delegates  to  keep  them  in  communication 
with  the  deputation.  And  that  they  had  not  relied  exclusively 
on  faith  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  was  shown  by  the  fact 
that  they  had  founded  great  hopes  on  what  their  brethren  in 
Cape  Colony  might  accomplish.  These  hopes  had  now  been 
dissipated  by  General  Smuts,  who  had  just  said  that  there  was 
no  chance  of  a  general  insurrection. 

Again,  could  the  war  be  continued  when  their  commandos 
were  so  much  weakened,  and  when  food  was  so  scarce?  It 
was  nonsense  to  say  that  food  had  been  scarce  a  year  ago ; 
there  had  been  a  sufficiency  then,  and  at  the  present  time  there 
was  not.  One  could  ride  from  Vereeniging  to  Piet  Retief 
without  seeing  more  than  two  or  three  herds  of  cattle.  More- 
over, the  women  and  children  were  in  a  most  pitiable  condition. 
One  delegate  had  spoken  against  any  scheme  which  would  be 
as  it  were  a  trampling  on  the  blood  which  had  already  been 
spilt — he  shared  that  delegate's  sentiments ;  but  he  considered 
that  to  shed  yet  more  blood  in  a  cause  which  was  to  all  appear- 
ance hopeless  would  be  still  more  reprehensible.  He  should 
prefer  not  to  enter  into  the  religious  aspect  of  the  question. 
It  was  difficult  to  fathom  the  purposes  of  God  ;  perhaps  it 
might  be  the  Divine  will  that  they  should  lose  their  independ- 

405 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


ence.  All  that  they  could  do  was  to  follow  the  course  which 
seemed  to  be  good  and  right.  Were  they,  then,  to  surrender 
unconditionally  ?  He  would  say  no.  It  would  be  giving  the 
enemy  opportunities  for  doing  things  from  which  they  might 
otherwise  desist.  Moreover,  by  voting  for  such  a  policy  the 
leaders  would  incur  the  displeasure  of  the  nation.  In  choos- 
ing what  course  they  would  pursue  the  delegates  should  let 
nothing  else  sway  them  save  the  good  of  the  nation.  They 
must  not  be  carried  away  by  their  feeUngs ;  they  must  listen 
only  to  the  voice  of  reason. 

Commandant  H.  S.  Grobler  (Bethal)  felt  that,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, the  war  could  not  be  continued.  It  had  already 
reduced  them  to  such  straits  that  they  would  soon  have  to  fly 
to  the  utmost  borders  of  their  territories,  leaving  the  enemy 
unopposed  in  the  very  heart  of  the  country.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  they  had  not  relied  on  faith  alone;  there 
had  also  been  guns,  war  material  and  provisions.  But  now 
none  of  these  things  were  left  to  them.  It  was  terrible  to  him 
to  think  that  they  must  sacrifice  the  independence  of  their 
country.  He  was  a  true  son  of  his  country,  and  could  not 
consent  to  the  surrender  of  her  independence  unless  that  were 
the  only  way  of  saving  the  women  and  children  from  starva- 
tion. But  it  was  not  only  the  women  and  children  who  were 
on  the  verge  of  starvation ;  the  burghers  still  left  in  the  laagers 
were  in  the  same  predicament.  What,  moreover,  was  to  hap- 
pen to  the  prisoners  of  war,  if  the  struggle  were  to  be  contin- 
ued? And  to  the  families  in  the  camps?  The  delegates  must 
not  forget  those  families.  If  the  people  generally  were  dying 
a  national,  the  families  were  dying  a  moral,  death.  It  was  a 
sad  thought  that  there  were  among  their  women  in  the  camps, 
many  who  were  thus  losing  their  moral  vitality.  It  was  a 
thought  which  should  make  them  determined  to  conclude  the 
war. 

Commandant  Van  Niekerk  (Ficksburg)  said  that  his  com- 
mandos had  commissioned  him  to  hold  out  for  independence. 
The  proposal  of  the  British  Government  could  not  be  accept- 
ed. They  must  take  no  hasty  step.  If  they  persevered  m  the 
war,  the  enemy  would  grant  them  better  terms.  All  they  had 
to  do  was  to  act  like  brave  men. 

General  J.  G.  Celliers  (Lichtenburg)  had  already  told  the 
meeting  what  mandate  he  had  received  from  his  burghers. 
But  he  was  there  to  do  the  best  he  could  for  the  nation  as  a 
whole.  The  condition  of  the  country  was  very  critical.  The 
fact  that  his  own  commandos  were  faring  well  was  not  a  suf- 
ficient reason  for  continuing  the  war.  He  must  take  all  cir- 
cumstances into  consideration.    He  had  said  that  he  was  in 

406 


APPENDIX  C 


favour  of  an  arrangement  by  which  peace  should  be  made 
without  the  sacrifice  of  independence.  Such  an  arrangement 
they  had  attempted  to  bring  about.  They  had  elected  a  Com- 
mission, which  had  done  all  in  its  power  to  give  effect  to 
their  wishes  in  this  matter.  And  the  result  was  the  proposal 
of  the  British  Government  now  lying  before  them.  That  was 
what  the  Commission  had  obtained  for  them.  Which  of  them 
could  say  that  he  could  have  obtained  better  terms  for  the  peo- 
ple than  those  contained  in  that  proposal  ?  Or  that,  if  the  war 
were  to  be  continued,  the  people  would  gain  any  advantage ' 
which  that  proposal  did  not  give  them  ?  It  had  been  said  that 
the  deputation  in  Europe  had  encouraged  the  burghers  in 
their  prolonged  struggle.  The  last  message  they  had  received 
from  the  deputation  had  been :  "  Go  on  till  every  remedy  has 
been  tried."  Could  that  be  called  encouragement?  It  had 
also  been  said  that  the  nation  must  have  faith.  He  admitted 
the  necessity — but  it  must  not  be  the  sort  of  faith  which  chose 
what  it  would  believe,  and  what  it  would  disbelieve.  They 
must  be  prepared  to  believe  that  it  might  be  the  will  of  God 
that  they  should  yield  to  the  enemy.  As  he  had  more  insight 
into  the  state  of  affairs  than  his  burghers,  and  therefore  was 
better  qualified  to  form  a  judgment,  he  did  not  feel  himself 
bound  by  their  mandate.  Had  the  burghers  known  what  he 
now  knew,  they  would  have  given  him  a  very  different  com- 
mission. He  felt  that  it  was  a  serious  thing  to  continue  sacri- 
ficing the  lives  of  his  fellow-countrymen.  Moreover,  however 
dear  independence  might  be,  it  was  useless  to  attempt  impos- 
sibilities. Their  one  aim  should  be  to  safeguard  the  interests 
of  the  nation.  His  vote  would  be  with  those  who  were  for  ac- 
cepting the  proposal  of  the  British  Government. 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet  was  the  next  to  address  the 
meeting.    His  speech  was  as  follows : — 

"  As  I  feel  it  to  be  my  duty  to  speak  out  all  my  mind  before 
this  meeting,  I  shall  go  back  to  the  very  beginning  of  the  war. 
And  recalling  my  feelings  at  that  period,  I  can  say  that  I  had 
less  hope  then  for  intervention  than  I  have  now.  I  do  not 
mean  to  say  that  I  am  sanguine  about  it  even  now  ;  but  I  know 
to-day,  what  I  did  not  know  then,  that  great  sympathy  is  felt 
for  us  by  other  nations.  Even  in  England  this  sympathy  is 
to  be  found,  as  is  shown  by  the  largely-attended  "  Pro-Boer  " 
meetings  which  have  been  held  in  that  country.  And  that  the 
feeling  in  our  favour  is  widespread  is  evident  from  the  reports 
which  we  received  by  word  of  mouth  from  the  messenger  to 
whom  the  deputation  entrusted  its  recent  letter,  for  we  can- 
not believe  that  the  deputation  would  have  employed  an  unre- 
liable person.    And  what  did  that  messenger  say?  Among 

407 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


other  things,  he  said  that  our  cause  was  winning  new  adhe- 
rents every  day.  It  may  be  asked,  however,  why  the  deputa- 
tion did  not  send  a  report  of  its  own?  I  reply  that  it  had  its 
hand  upon  the  pulse  of  the  Governments,  and  that  the  infor- 
mation it  was  thus  gaining  was  of  such  a  character  that  it 
could  not  be  entrusted  to  any  messenger  whatsoever.  Per- 
haps the  deputation  was  unable  in  any  way  to  communicate 
what  it  knew  to  us — it  would  never  do  to  noise  abroad  the  se- 
crets of  European  policy.  The  silence  of  the  delegates  ought 
not,  then,  to  discourage  us ;  on  the  contrary,  we  should  regard 
it  as  a  hopeful  sign. 

"  If  there  is  any  one  man  who  feels  deeply  for  the  critical 
condition  of  our  country,  I  am  that  man.  And  critical  our  con- 
dition certainly  is ;  so  that  I  am  not  surprised  that  some  of  us 
are  asking,  '  What  hope  have  we  now  in  continuing  the  strug- 
gle ?  '  But  I  would  ask  another  question :  '  What  hope  had 
we  at  the  beginning  of  the  war?  '  Our  faith  in  God — we  had 
nothing  else  to  rely  on !  At  the  very  outset  of  the  war  I  knew 
that  we,  with  our  forty-five  thousand  troops,  were  engaged  in 
a  contest  against  a  nation  that  had  no  less  than  seven  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  men  under  arms,  and  who  could  easily  send 
against  us  a  third  of  that  number.  And  to  counterbalance 
the  terrible  odds  against  us,  we  had  nothing,  as  I  knew,  but 
our  faith.  At  that  time  there  were  some  who  expected  that 
effectual  help  would  come  from  Cape  Colony.  I  was  never 
deluded  by  this  hope.  I  knew  of  course  that  there  were  men 
there  who  would  fight  with  us  against  England ;  I  knew  how 
much  those  men  sympathized  with  our  cause ;  but  I  also  knew 
that  the  circumstances  of  that  country  would  make  it  impos- 
sible for  the  colonists  to  help  us  more  than  they  have,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  done.  No !  God  was  our  one  Hope  when  the 
war  began.  And  if,  when  the  war  is  over,  victory  lies  with  us, 
it  will  not  be  the  first  time  that  faith  in  God  has  enabled  the 
weaker  nation  to  overthrow  the  stronger. 

"  Those  of  you  who  urge  that  the  war  should  be  discontin- 
ued, ask  us,  who  are  for  carrying  it  on,  what  tangible  reason 
we  have  for  our  hope.  But  what  tangible  reason  for  hope  was 
there  at  the  beginning  of  the  war?  Are  our  affairs  darker 
now?  Quite  the  contrary — miracles  have  been  worked  in 
our  favour  during  the  last  twenty-two  months.  General  Botha 
wrote  to  me  some  time  ago,  saying  that  the  scarcity  of  ammu- 
nition was  causing  him  much  anxiety.  And  he  had  good  cause 
for  that  anxiety — ammunition  was  exhausted.  When  a  burgh- 
er came  to  me  at  that  time  with  an  empty  bandolier,  it  abso- 
lutely terrified  me.  But  now,  to  use  an  expression  of  General 
Joubert's,  my  pleasure  is  tempered  with  shame  when  I  think 

408 


APPENDIX  C 


of  the  plentiful  store  of  ammunition  which  we  possess.  I  am 
not  angry  with  those  of  my  compatriots  who  ask  for  reasons 
— I  give  my  reasons — nor  have  I  given  a  thousandth  part  of 
them. 

"  The  enemy  has  already  made  us  some  concessions.  There 
was  a  time  when  Lord  Sahsbury  said  that  the  English  Gov- 
ernment would  be  satisfied  with  nothing  short  of  uncondition- 
al surrender.  He  does  not  say  so  to-day.  England  is  nego- 
tiating with  us — that  is  to  say,  she  shows  signs  of  yielding  to 
our  demands.  If  we  continue  the  war,  England  will  negotiate 
again ;  she  will  of¥er  still  more  favourable  terms ;  she  will  not 
even  stick  at  independence. 

Do  you  want  more  of  my  reasons  ?  Look  back  once 
more  upon  our  past  history,  and  you  shall  find  them.  Recall 
the  time  when  the  Transvaal  was  at  war  with  England.  At 
that  time  we  did  not  know  the  English  so  well  as  we  now  know 
them ;  we  had  only  thirteen  cartridges  for  each  man  ;  and  there 
were  the  so-called  *  Loyalists  ' — a  chicken-hearted  crew — to 
hamper  us.  Faith  was  our  only  support  then — and  you  all 
know  how  that  war  resulted. 

I  am  asked  what  I  mean  to  do  with  the  women  and  chil- 
dren. That  is  a  very  difficult  question  to  answer.  We  must 
have  faith.  I  think  also  that  we  might  meet  the  emergency 
in  this  way — a  part  of  the  men  should  be  told  off  to  lay  down 
their  arms  for  the  sake  of  the  women,  and  then  they  could  take 
the  women  with  them  to  the  English  in  the  towns.  This  would 
be  a  hard  expedient,  but  it  may  be  the  only  one  possible. 

"  America  has  been  referred  to  by  some  of  the  speakers, 
who  have  compared  our  circumstances  with  those  of  the 
United  States,  when  they  made  war  upon  England.  The 
comparison  is,  in  one  respect  at  least,  an  apt  one,  for  we  also 
have  large  territories  to  which  we  can  always  retreat. 

"  As  to  Europe — we  know  little  of  the  condition  of  things 
there.  Our  information  about  Europe  comes  only  from  news- 
papers, and  '  Jingo  '  newspapers  at  that.  If  there  is  not  a 
great  deal  going  on  in  Europe  which  England  wants  to  hide 
from  us,  why  is  she  so  careful  not  to  let  us  see  European  jour- 
nals? If  there  were  anything  in  them  unfavourable  to  our 
cause,  England  would  flood  our  country  with  them  in  her  own 
interests.  We  must  also  note  that  England  will  not  permit 
our  deputation  to  return  to  us. 

"  Taking  all  these  facts  into  consideration,  and  remember- 
ing that  the  sympathy  for  us,  which  is  to  be  found  in  England 
itself,  may  be  regarded  as  being,  for  all  practical  purposes,  a 
sort  of  indirect  intervention.  I  maintain  that  this  terrible  strug- 
gle must  be  continued.  We  must  fight  on,  no  matter  how 
long,  until  our  independence  is  absolutely  secure." 

409 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


General  Beijers  (Waterberg)  said  that  he  had  to  give  an 
answer  to  the  question  whether  he  ought  to  follow  his  reason 
or  his  conscience ;  he  could  only  reply  that  conscience  had  the 
first  claim  upon  him.  If  he  were  to  perish  whilst  following 
the  guidance  of  reason,  he  would  feel  that  he  had  been  un- 
faithful; whereas,  were  he  to  die  whilst  obeying  the  dictates 
of  conscience,  he  would  not  fear  death.  Martyrs  of  old  had 
died  for  their  faith ;  but  he  feared  that  the  martyr  spirit  was 
now  only  to  be  met  with  in  books !  Those  martyrs  had  died, 
and  with  their  death  it  had  seemed  that  all  was  lost ;  but  the 
truth,  for  which  they  had  given  up  their  lives,  had  Hved ! 

But  how  is  it  now  with  us?  We  think  our  cause  a  right- 
eous one,  but  are  we  willing  to  die  for  it?  Some  spoke  of  our 
existence  as  a  nation — but  whether  that  were  to  be  preserved 
or  lost,  did  not  lie  with  us — it  was  in  the  hands  of  God — He 
would  take  care  of  it.  Right  must  conquer  in  the  end.  They 
must  take  care  to  be  on  the  side  of  right,  should  it  even  cost 
them  their  lives.  He  agreed  with  those  who  said  that,  even  if 
the  present  deliberations  were  to  come  to  nothing,  they  would 
have  another  chance,  later  on,  of  negotiating.  This  had  been 
proved  by  what  had  already  happened.  General  de  Wet  had 
shown  them  how  Lord  Salisbury  had  gone  back  upon  his  first 
demands ;  he  (General  Beijers)  could  tell  them  that  on  one  oc- 
casion Lord  Roberts  had  decHned  even  to  speak  to  General 
Botha — and  yet  the  English  were  negotiating  with  them  now. 
He  was  quite  open  to  conviction,  but  at  present  he  could  not 
see  that  the  war  ought  to  be  stopped.  Nevertheless  he  was 
not  blind  to  the  critical  state  of  their  affairs.  But  their  case 
was  not  yet  hopeless;  their  anxiety  about  food,  their  lack 
of  horses — these  were  not  insurmountable  difiiculties.  They 
might  even  find  some  means  by  which  to  save  their  womenfolk. 

No.  These  difficulties  were  not  insuperable ;  but  there  was 
one  difficulty  which  zvas  insuperable — the  present  spirit  of  the 
nation.  When  a  spirit,  be  it  what  it  might,  inspired  or  ruled 
a  man,  then  that  man  would  submit  to  no  other  sway.  The 
spirit  that  now  ruled  the  burghers  was  a  spirit  that  was  driv- 
ing them  over  to  the  enemy.  Against  that  spirit  it  was  im- 
possible to  contend.  General  De  la  Rey  had  said  that,  if  the 
proposal  now  before  the  meeting  were  to  be  shown  to  the 
burghers,  they  would  at  once  accept  it — that  was  the  sort  of 
spirit  that  was  in  them^  and  one  must  take  it  into  considera- 
tion, for  he  was  convinced  that  it  presented  an  insurmountable 
obstacle  to  the  continuation  of  the  war. 

The  meeting  was  then  closed  with  prayer. 


410 


APPENDIX  C 


Friday,  May  30TH,  1902. 

After  the  preliminary  prayer  had  been  of¥ered,  Vice-Presi- 
dent Burger  said  that  before  beginning  the  business  of  the 
day,  it  was  his  sad  duty  to  inform  the  meeting  that  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Orange  Free  State  had  been  obliged  to  resign,  on 
account  of  serious  illness.  President  Steyn  had  been  com- 
pelled, in  order  to  obtain  medical  assistance,  to  put  himself  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy.  He  had  further  to  communicate  that 
Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet  had  been  appointed  Vice-Presi- 
dent of  the  Orange  Free  State.  He  wished  to  express  his 
deep  sympathy  with  the  representatives  in  the  severe  loss 
which  they  had  sustained.  President  Steyn,  he  said,  had  been 
a  rock  and  pillar  to  their  great  cause. 

Vice-President  de  Wet  having  thanked  the  Vice-President 
of  the  South  African  Republic  for  his  kind  and  sympathetic 
words,  Mr.  J.  Naude  (the  representative  of  Pretoria,  and  of 
General  Kemp's  flying  columns)  put  some  questions  with  re- 
gard to  the  colonists  who  had  been  fighting  on  the  Boer  side. 
These  questions  were  answered  by  General  Smuts.  Mr. 
Naude  then  asked  if  the  delegates  were  expected  to  come  to 
any  decision  about  independence. 

General  Botha  replied  that  the  Governments  had  informed 
Lords  Kitchener  and  Milner  that  they  were  not  in  a  condition 
to  decide  that  question — that  it  was  a  matter  for  the  nation 
to  settle.  The  delegates  had  then  gone  to  their  burghers,  and 
now  had  returned,  and  were  present. 

Mr.  Naude  said  that  it  must  therefore  have  been  known  at 
Klerksdorp  that  the  delegates  had  to  decide  upon  the  ques- 
tion of  independence.  If  that  were  so,  he  found  himself  in  a 
difificulty.  Either  the  delegates  had  been  misled,  or  they  were 
the  victims  of  a  mistake,  for  they  had  never  been  told  that  they 
had  been  elected  as  plenipotentiaries.  Notwithstanding  aU 
that  the  lawyers  might  say,  he  considered  himself  as  having  a 
certain  definite  mission.  He  had  obtained  the  votes  of  his 
burghers  on  the  understanding  that  he  would  take  up  a  cer- 
tain position.  He  had  asked  them  whether  independence  was 
to  be  given  up,  and  they  had  answered  in  the  negative.  He 
could  not  therefore  vote  for  the  acceptance  of  the  proposal 
now  before  the  meeting,  for  that  proposal  demanded  the  sur- 
render of  independence.  His  burghers  had  also  insisted  on 
being  allowed  to  keep  their  arms,  and  on  the  use  of  their  lan- 
guage in  schools  and  Courts  of  Justice,  both  of  which  condi- 
tions were  refused  by  the  British  proposal.  Since,  therefore, 
he  could  not  agree  to  the  proposal,  he  was  for  continuing  the 

411 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 

war.  Some  asked  what  were  the  chances  of  success  ?  He  re- 
membered the  state  of  feehng  among  the  burghers  at  Warme- 
bad — that  was  a  dark  time  indeed.  The  Commandant-Gen- 
eral had  paid  those  burghers  a  visit,  and  had  told  them  that 
they  had  nothing  to  lose,  but  everything  to  win,  by  continuing 
the  struggle.  That  had  been  enough  for  them.  Tliey  had 
not  had  much  prospect  then ;  they  could  not  see  whither  their 
road  was  leading.  But  they  had  found  out  aftenvards.  It 
had  been  a  dark  time  too  when  Pretoria  was  taken,  but  most 
of  the  burghers  had  remained  steadfast.  And  after  the  dark- 
ness the  light  had  come  back.  Again  a  dark  cloud  was  over 
them — it  would  pass  away,  and  the  light  would  reappear. 

General  De  la  Rey  explained  that  he  had  not  intended  to 
mislead  anybody  at  the  gatherings  of  the  burghers.  Every 
document  which  the  Government  had  handed  over  to  him  had 
been  laid  before  those  gatherings.  Mr.  Naude  had  asked 
whether  the  delegates  at  that  meeting  had  to  decide  about  in- 
dependence. Most  certainly  they  had.  And  to  do  so  was  a 
duty  devolving  upon  Mr.  Naude  as  much  as  on  any  other  del- 
egate present.  They  would  have  to  decide,  not  for  their  own 
districts  alone,  but  for  the  whole  country. 

Mr.  Naude  said  that  he  had  no  wish  to  free  himself  from  his 
responsibility,  but  he  could  not  forget  that  he  had  come  there 
with  a  definite  mission. 

Judge  Hertzog  wished  again  to  explain  the  rights  of  the  ques- 
tion from  a  legal  point  of  view.  One  must  ask :  If  the  nation 
were  here,  what  would  it  wish  to  be  done?  And  one  must 
act  in  conformity  with  what  one  thinks  its  answer  would  be. 
The  Judge  then  proceeded  to  speak  on  the  matter  in  general. 
What,  he  asked,  were  the  arguments  in  favour  of  continuing 
the  war?  In  the  first  place,  England  was  growing  weaker 
just  as  their  own  nation  was.  Any  one  could  see  that  with 
their  own  eyes.  It  was  true  as  regarded  the  financial  side  of 
the  question.  No  doubt  England  could  still  collect  millions 
of  pounds,  if  she  wished,  but  the  time  would  come  when  she 
would  have  trouble  with  her  tax-payers.  Already  the  British 
Government  found  it  difficult  to  pay  the  interest  on  the  sum 
borrowed  for  war  expenses,  as  was  proved  by  the  fact  that  a 
corn  tax  had  been  levied  in  England.  That  tax  would  not 
have  been  levied  unless  things  had  been  in  a  serious  condition. 
In  the  second  place,  he  would  ask  how  it  was  they  had  not 
been  allowed  to  meet  their  deputation?  It  would  only  have 
taken  the  deputation  fourteen  days  to  perform  the  journey  ; 
by  now  it  would  have  been  among  them.  But  permission  had 
been  refused  them.  And  why?  It  was  said  that  to  grant  a 
permission  would  have  been  a  military  irregularity.    But  the 

412 


APPENDIX  C 


present  meeting  was  also  a  military  irregularity.  There  must 
be  something  more  behind  that  refusal.  But  what  were  the 
arguments  against  going  on  with  the  war  ?  He  would  enumer- 
ate them — the  situation  in  which  they  found  themselves  was 
critical ;  the  country  as  a  whole  was  exhausted.  Nearly  all  the 
horses  had  died  or  had  been  captured.  The  strongest  argument 
of  all,  however,  was  that  some  of  their  own  people  had  turned 
against  them,  and  were  fighting  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy. 
Then  the  condition  of  the  women  caused  great  anxiety ;  a  fear 
had  been  expressed  that  a  moral  decay  might  set  in  among  the 
families  in  the  camps.  That  consideration  had  great  weight 
with  him.  No  one  with  any  heart  could  remain  indiflferent  to 
it.  If  there  was  one  thing  which  more  than  anything  else 
made  him  respect  Commandant-General  Botha,  it  was  that 
the  Commandant-General  had  the  heart  to  feel,  and  the  cour- 
age to  express,  the  importance  of  that  consideration.  The 
present  war  was  one  of  the  saddest  that  had  ever  been  waged. 
He  doubted  if  there  had  ever  been  a  war  in  which  a  nation 
had  sufifered  as  they  had.  But  all  those  sufferings,  horrible 
though  they  were,  did  not  influence  his  decision.  Did  he  but 
see  the  chance  of  finally  securing  freedom  for  the  nation,  he 
would  put  all  such  considerations  on  one  side,  and  go  on  fight- 
ing till  death.  No ;  it  was  not  the  horror  of  the  situation 
which  influenced  him ;  there  was  something  that  weighed 
upon  his  heart  yet  more  heavily — it  was  the  holding  of  that 
meeting  at  Vereeniging.  He  reproached  no  one.  Every  one 
had  acted  with  the  best  intentions.  Nevertheless  that  meet- 
ing was  a  fatal  error;  it  would  give  them  their  death  blow. 
For  what  had  it  produced — a  statement  from  the  lips  of  the 
Commandant-General  himself  that  the  condition  of  the  coun- 
try was  hopeless.  If  there  were  yet  any  burghers  whose  cour- 
age was  not  gone,  would  they  not  be  utterly  disheartened 
when  they  heard  what  their  leaders  had  said  at  that  meeting? 
That  was  the  saddest  thought  of  all.  He  could  understand 
that  those  burghers  who  had  already  lost  heart  should  be  leav- 
ing the  commandos,  but  now  those  who  had  never  yet  been 
disheartened  would  become  so.  But  notwithstanding  all  this, 
it  was  difficult  to  feel  certain  which  was  the  right  course  to 
pursue — to  give  up  the  war  or  to  continue  it.  He  could  only 
suggest  that  those  who  were  now  in  doubt  on  the  matter 
should  support  the  line  of  action  which,  before  their  doubt  be- 
gan, had  appeared  to  them  to  be  best. 

Mr.  L.  J.  Meijer  (a  member  of  the  Government  of  the  South 
African  Republic)  then  gave  some  account  of  the  devastation 
of  that  part  of  the  country  which  lay  to  the  north  of  the  East- 
ern Railway,  and  on  the  further  side  of  the  Sabi  River.  (This 

41.11 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


report  coincided  with  those  already  given  by  the  delegates.) 
He  went  on  to  say  that  as  they  were  all  in  the  dark,  and  could 
not  see  the  road  they  were  travelling  along,  they  must  take 
reason  and  conscience  for  their  guide.  They  had  already  lost 
much:  let  them  not  lose  everything.  And  what  could  they 
hope  to  gain  by  continuing  the  struggle  ?  To  do  so  might  be 
to  throw  away  their  last  chance  of  peace.  What  would  their 
progeny  say  of  them  if  they  were  to  persist  in  the  struggle  and 
thus  lose  everything  they  had  possessed?  They  would  say, 
Our  forefathers  were  brave,  but  they  had  no  brains." 
Whereas,  if  they  were  to  stop  the  war,  their  progeny  would 
say,  Our  forefathers  did  not  fight  for  their  own  glory."  He 
pointed  out  that  however  little  the  British  proposal  contained 
of  what  they  desired,  it  nevertheless  promised  them  representa- 
tive government.  In  the  past  he  had  been  against  the  war ;  he 
had  wished  that  the  five  years'  franchise  should  be  granted. 
Although  the  people  had  opposed  this  measure  he  had  always 
supported  it.  And  why  ?  Because  he  had  feared  that  were  that 
measure  not  conceded  African  blood  would  stain  the  ground. 
Must  they  still  continue  to  shed  blood?  After  the  capture  of 
Bloemfontein  there  had  been  a  secret  meeting  of  the  council 
of  war  at  Pretoria.  His  Government  had  then  been  willing  to 
surrender,  but  the  Free  State  had  refused.  The  two  Govern- 
ments had  therefore  decided  to  go  on  with  the  war.  A  year 
later,  in  the  month  of  June,  there  had  been  another  meeting. 
A  letter  had  been  sent  to  the  Free  State.  The  two  Governments 
had  met  at  Waterval,  and  had  once  more  decided  to  continue 
the  struggle.  Later  on,  again,  the  Government  of  the  South 
African  Republic  wrote  another  letter  to  the  Free  State ;  but 
there  had  been  no  opportunity  of  meeting  until  the  present 
occasion,  which  saw  thejn  assembled  together  at  Vereeniging. 
Were  they  again  going  to  decide  to  continue  their  resistance? 
It  was  a  matter  for  serious  consideration.  There  was  but  lit- 
tle seed-corn  left.  This  must,  if  they  had  to  go  on  fighting, 
be  preserved  from  the  enemy  at  all  costs ;  were  it  to  be  de- 
stroyed, the  African  nation  must  cease  to  exist.  But  they 
could  not  continue  the  war.  It  was  the  Boers  now  who  were 
teaching  the  English  how  to  fight  against  us ;  Boers  now  were 
with  the  enemy's  forces,  showing  them  how  to  march  by  night, 
and  pointing  out  to  them  all  the  foot  passes. 

Commandant  Van  Niekerk  (Kroonstad)  pointed  out  that 
the  Colonists  had  already  rendered  them  valuable  aid,  and 
could  still  do  so.  Were  they  now  to  abandon  these  Colonists, 
and — thinking  only  about  saving  themselves — leave  them  to 
fight  on  alone?  It  would  be  sad  indeed  if  the  burghers  were 
compelled  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

Commandant-General  L.  Botha  said  that  in  regard  to  the 

414 


APPENDIX  C 


holding  of  a  national  meeting,  he  had  alreaidy  chosen  dele- 
gates with  power  to  act.  He  spoke  of  the  state  of  affairs  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war — the  two  Republics  had  then  at  least 
sixty  thousand  men  under  arms.  In  reference  to  the  Cape 
Colony,  he  said  that  it  had  never  been  expected  that  that  coun- 
try would  allow  its  railways  to  be  used  for  the  transport  of 
troops.  The  Commandant-General  then  proceeded  as  fol- 
lows : — 

"  I  used  to  entertain  hopes  that  the  European  Powers  would 
interfere  on  our  behalf.  AH  that  they  have  done,  however,  has 
been  to  look  on  while  England  was  introducing  all  sorts  of 
new  methods  of  warfare,  methods,  too,  which  are  contrary  to 
all  international  law. 

"  When  the  war  began  we  had  plenty  of  provisions,  and  a 
commando  could  remain  for  weeks  in  one  spot  without  the 
local  food  supply  running  out.  Our  families,  too,  were  then 
well  provided  for.  But  all  this  is  now  changed.  One  is  only 
too  thankful  nowadays  to  know  that  our  wives  are  under 
English  protection.  This  question  of  our  womenfolk  is  one 
of  our  greatest  difhculties.  What  are  we  to  do  with  them? 
One  man  answers  that  some  of  the  burghers  should  surrender 
themselves  to  the  English,  and  take  the  women  with  them. 
But  most  of  the  women  now  amongst  us  are  the  wives  of  men 
already  prisoners.  And  how  can  we  expect  those  not  their 
own  kith  and  kin  to  be  willing  to  give  up  liberty  for  their 
sakes  ? 

"  As  to  the  deputation,  we  must  remember  that  it  was  ac- 
credited to  all  the  Powers  of  Europe.  And  yet  it  has  only 
been  able  to  hand  in  its  credentials  to  the  Netherlands  Gov- 
ernment. Does  not  this  prove  that  no  other  Government  is 
willing  to  receive  it  ?  If  you  need  further  proof,  I  refer  you  to 
the  letter  in  which  the  deputation — they  were  still  allowed  to 
write  to  us  then — said :  '  There  is  no  chance  for  us  in  Europe.* 
The  deputation  wanted  to  be  allowed  to  return  home,  but  our 
Government  advised  them  to  remain  in  Europe,  because  their 
arrival  in  South  Africa  would  be  a  death  blow  to  the  hopes  of 
many.  That  is  why  the  deputation  is  still  in  Europe.  Later 
on  they  said  that,  although  they  knew  that  there  was  no 
chance  of  intervention,  yet  they  felt  that  they  ought  to  persist 
in  their  efforts,  because  of  the  sacrifices  which  we  had  already 
made.  It  is  possible  that  a  war  may  arise  in  Europe  from 
which  we  shall  gain  something,  but  what  right  have  we  to  ex- 
pect such  a  contingency?  Moreover,  great  nations  take  but 
little  interest  in  the  fate  of  small  ones — indeed,  it  is  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  former  that  the  small  nations  should  be  wiped 
out  of  existence. 

**  I  cannot  refrain  from  alluding  to  the  faithlessness  of  some 

415 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


of  our  burghers,  who  are  to  be  found  in  the  ranks  of  the  ene- 
my. But  this  is  not  the  only  sign  of  the  way  in  which  affairs 
are  trending — I  look  back  on  the  past.  I  remember  that  we 
have  been  fighting  a  full  year  since  we  last  heard  of  our  depu- 
tation. What  have  we  gained  since  June,  1901  ?  Nothing. 
On  the  contrary,  we  have  been  going  backwards  so  fast  that, 
if  this  weakening  process  goes  on  much  longer,  we  shall  soon 
find  ourselves  unable  any  more  to  call  ourselves  a  fighting  na- 
tion. What  have  we  not  undergone  in  the  course  of  this  year 
which  is  just  over !  In  the  concentration  camps  alone,  twenty 
thousand  women  and  children  have  died.  When  I  was  in 
'Pretoria  i  received  fepofrs"  frorn  our  inTbrmation  office,  and 
otherwise,  of  our  losses.  I  found  that  there  were  thirty-one 
thousand  six  hundred  prisoners  of  war,  of  whom  six  hundred 
had  died,  and  that  three  thousand  eight  hundred  of  our  burgh- 
ers had  been  killed  in  the  war.  Is  not  a  loss  such  as  this,  in  so 
short  a  time  as  two  and  a  half  years,  a  serious  matter  ?  Think, 
too,  of  the  sufferings  which  those  twenty  thousand  women 
who  died  in  the  camps  must  have  endured ! 

I  am  not  deaf  to  the  claims  of  the  colonists  who  have  been 
fighting  for  us.  I  have  said  that  if  we  surrender  our  inde- 
pendence, we  must  provide  for  them.  Should  we  serve  their 
interests  by  continuing  the  war?  No,  indeed!  The  best 
thing  for  them  would  be  that  we  should  bring  it  to  a  close. 
But  if  we  are  absolutely  determined  to  go  on  fighting,  let  us 
at  least  say  to  them,  '  We  advise  you  to  desist.' 

"  What  I  am  saying  now  is  in  substance  what  I  said  at 
Warmbad  at  a  time  when  there  were  two  thousand  men  of 
that  district  in  the  Veldt.  How  many  are  there  now?  Four 
hundred  and  eighty !  On  that  occasion  I  also  said  that  we 
must  continue  the  war  until  we  were  driven  by  sheer  starva- 
tion to  make  peace.  Well,  in  some  divisions  starvation  has 
already  come.  The  delegates  themselves  have  had  to  confess 
that  our  strength  up  till  now  has  lain  in  the  fact  that  we  have 
been  able  to  continue  the  struggle  in  every  district.  In  this 
way  we  have  divided  the  enemy's  forces.  But  if  we  are  com- 
pelled to  abandon  some  of  our  districts,  and  to  concentrate  on 
certain  points,  then  the  English  also  will  concentrate,  and  at- 
tack us  with  an  irresistible  force. 

"  It  has  been  suggested  that  we  ought  to  march  into  Cape 
Colony.  I  know,  however,  what  that  would  mean — Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet  marched  into  the  colonies.  He  had 
a  large  force,  and  the  season  of  the  year  was  auspicious  for  his 
attempt,  and  yet  he  failed.  How,  then,  shall  we  succeed  in 
winter,  and  with  horses  so  weak  that  they  can  only  go  ap-eeu" 
stap.^ 

■  The  step  of  a  tired  horse. 

416 


APPENDIX  C 


"  What,  then,  are  we  to  do  ?  Some  will  reply,  '  Go  on  with 
the  war.'  Yes,  but  for  how  long  ?  For  ten  or  twelve  years  ? 
But  would  that  be  possible  ?  If  in  two  years  we  have  been  re- 
duced from  sixty  thousand  fighting  men  to  half  that  number, 
where  will  our  army  be  after  another  ten  years  of  war  ?  It  is 
clear  enough  to  me  that  if  we  go  on  any  longer,  we  shall  be 
compelled  to  surrender.  Would  it  not  be  better  to  come  to 
some  agreement  with  the  enemy,  while  we  have  the  oppor- 
tunity ?  We  have  all  received  the  gift  of  reason ;  let  us  use  it 
on  the  present  occasion. 

"  As  far  as  I  and  my  own  burghers  are  concerned,  to  con- 
tinue the  struggle  is  still  possible.  But  we  must  not  only  think 
of  ourselves.  We  must  almost  think  of  others.  There  are, 
for  instance,  the  widows  and  orphans.  If  we  accept  the  terms 
now  offered  to  us,  they  will  remain  under  our  care.  But  if 
we  go  on  with  the  war  until  we  are  forced  to  surrender,  who 
will  then  take  care  of  them?  Or  if  we  were  all  killed,  what 
could  we  do  for  them?  We  should  not  even  be  able  to  send 
a  deputation  to  Europe,  to  ask  for  money  to  help  us  to  rebuild 
our  farms,  and  to  feed  our  burghers. 

"  There  are  three  questions  now  before  us — three  alterna- 
tives between  which  we  have  to  choose — the  continuing  of  the 
war,  unconditional  surrender,  and  the  acceptance  of  the  British 
proposal.  With  regard  to  the  first,  I  fail  to  see  what  satis- 
factory result  can  come  to  us  from  persisting  in  this  unequal 
contest,  which  must  result  in  the  end  in  our  extermination. 
As  to  the  choice  between  the  other  two,  in  many  ways  uncon- 
ditional surrender  would  be  the  better.  But,  for  the  sake  of 
the  nation,  we  may  not  choose  it.  Although  to  reject  it  may 
involve  us  in  many  hardships,  yet  we  must  think  of  nothing 
else  but  the  interests  of  the  nation.  Our  only  course,  then,  is 
to  accept  the  proposal  of  the  English  Government.  Its  terms 
may  not  be  very  advantageous  to  us,  but  nevertheless  they 
rescue  us  from  an  almost  impossible  position." 

After  a  short  adjournment  the  delegates  again  assembled  at 
about  2  p.m. 

General  C.  H.  Muller  (Boksburg)  said  that  his  burghers  had 
sent  him  to  defend  their  menaced  independence.  One  part 
of  them  had  authorized  him  to  act  as  his  judgment  should 
dictate;  another  part  had  ordered  him  to  hold  out  for  inde- 
pendence and  to  try  to  get  into  communication  with  the  Euro-» 
pean  deputation.  He  had  long  ago  told  his  burghers  that  they 
must  trust  in  God  if  they  wished  to  continue  the  war,  for  they 
could  not  do  so  by  relying  only  on  their  guns  and  rifles.  He 
did  not  like  to  think  of  what  they  would  say  if  he  were  to  go 
back  to  them  and  tell  them  that  he  had  not  been  in  xommuni- 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


cation  with  the  deputation,  and  that  the  proposal  of  the 
English  Government  had  been  accepted.  He  could  not  bring 
himself  to  surrender.  Nevertheless,  having  in  view  what  the 
Commandant-General  and  others  had  said,  he  felt  that  he  must 
do  so,  for  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  prosecute  the  war 
single-handed.  But  could  not  the  delegates  continue  to  stand 
by  one  another,  and  make  a  covenant  with  the  Lord?  The 
district  which  he  represented  was  one  of  the  poorest  in  the 
whole  country,  and  the  £3,000,000  offered  by  the  enemy  did 
not  include  any  provision  for  those  who,  like  his  burghers, 
could  do  nothing  to  help  themselves.  He  would  again  sug- 
gest that  the  delegates  should  make  a  vow  unto  the  Lord. 
For  himself,  he  could  not  vote  for  the  acceptance  of  the  British 
proposal. 

General  J.  H.  Smuts  then  spoke  as  follows : — 

"  Up  till  now  I  have  taken  no  part  in  this  discussion,  but 
my  opinions  are  not  unknown  to  my  Government;  we  have 
arrived  at  a  dark  period  both  in  the  history  of  our  war,  and 
in  the  course  of  our  national  development.  To  me  it  is  all  the 
darker  because  I  am  one  of  those  who,  as  members  of  the 
Government  of  the  South  African  Republic,  provoked  the  war 
with  England.  A  man,  however,  may  not  draw  back  from 
the  consequences  of  his  deeds.  We  must  therefore  keep  back 
all  private  feeling,  and  decide  solely  with  a  view  to  the  lasting 
interests  of  our  nation.  This  is  an  important  occasion  for  us 
— it  is  perhaps  the  last  time  that  we  shall  meet  as  a  free  people 
with  a  free  government.  Let  us  then  rise  to  the  height  of 
this  occasion ;  let  us  arrive  at  a  decision  for  which  our  pos- 
terity shall  bless,  and  not  curse  us. 

"  The  great  danger  for  this  meeting  is  that  of  deciding  the 
questions  before  it  on  purely  military  grounds.  Nearly  all 
the  delegates  here  are  officers  who  in  the  past  have  never 
quailed  before  the  overwhelming  forces  of  the  enemy,  and 
who  therefore  are  never  likely  to  do  so  in  the  future.  They 
do  not  know  what  fear  is,  and  they  are  ready  to  shed  the  last 
drop  of  their  blood  in  the  defence  of  their  country. 

"  Now  if  we  look  at  the  matter  from  their  point  of  view, 
that  is  to  say,  if  we  look  at  it  merely  as  a  military  question,  I 
am  bound  to  admit  that  we  shall  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  war  can  be  continued.  We  are  still  an  unconquered  power ; 
we  have  still  about  eighteen  thousand  men  in  the  field — vet- 
erans, with  whom  one  can  accomplish  almost  anything.  From 
a  purely  military  standpoint,  our  cause  is  not  yet  lost.  But  it 
is  as  a  nation,  and  not  as  an  army,  that  we  are  met  here,  and 
it  is  therefore  for  the  nation  principally  that  we  must  consult. 
No  one  sits  here  to  represent  this  or  that  commando.  One 

418 


APPENDIX  C 


and  all,  we  represent  the  African  nation,  and  not  only  those 
members  of  it  which  are  now  in  the  field,  but  also  those  who 
rest  beneath  the  soil,  and  those  yet  unborn,  who  shall  suc- 
ceed us. 

No !  We  do  not  only  represent  our  burghers  on  com- 
mando, the  troops  over  which  we  are  placed  in  command ;  we 
represent  also  the  thousands  who  have  passed  away,  after  mak- 
ing the  last  sacrifice  for  their  country ;  the  prisoners  scattered 
all  the  world  over;  the  women  and  children  dying  by  the 
thousand  in  the  prison  camps  of  the  enemy;  we  represent  the 
blood  and  the  tears  of  the  whole  African  nation.  From  the 
"prisons,  tHFcarnps,  the  graves,  j:he  veldt,  and'from  the  womb 
of  the  future^that  nation  cries  out  to  us  to  make  a  wise  de- 
cision now,  to  take  noltep  v^hich  might  lead  to  the  downfall 
or  even  to  tHF  extermmation  of  their  race,  and  thus  make  aU 
tEeiFsacriHces  of  no  avail.  ,OuiL_struggle,  up  to  the  present, 
fiasnot  been  an  aimless^  one.  We  have  not  Ixcn  fighting  in 
mere  desperation.  We  began  this  strife,  and  we  have  con- 
tihued  it,  because  we  wanted  to  maintain  our  independence 
and  were  prepared  to  sacrifice  everything  for  it.  But  we  must 
not  sacrifice  the  African  nation  itself  upon  the  altar  of  inde- 
pendence. So  soon  as  we  are  convinced  that  our  chance  of 
maintaining  our  autonomous  position  as  Republics  is,  humanly 
speaking,  at  an  end,  it  becomes  our  clear  duty  to  desist  from 
our  efforts.  We  must  not  run  the  risk  of  sacrificing  our  na- 
tion and  its  future  to  a  mere  idea  which  can  no  longer  be 
realized. 

"  And  ought  we  not  to  be  convinced  that  independence  is 
now  irretrievably  lost  ?  We  have  been  fighting  without  cessa- 
tion for  nearly  three  years.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that 
during  that  period  we  have  been  employing  all  the  strength 
and  all  the  means  which  we  possess,  in  the  furtherance  of  our 
cause.  We  have  sacrificed  thousands  of  lives  :  we  have  lost 
all  our  earthly  goodsj  our  dear  country  Ts'becom.e  one  con- 
'tinuous  desert ;  more  than  twenty  thousand  of  our  women  and 
children  have  perished  In  the  camps  of  the_ enemy.  And  has 
this  brought  us  independence?  Just  the  reverse;  it  is  reced- 
ing further  and  further  from  us  every  day.  The  longer  we 
fight,  the  greater  will  be  the  distance  between  us  and  the  aim 
for  which  we  are  fighting. 

"  The  manner  in  which  the  enemy  has  been  conducting,  and 
still  continues  to  conduct  this  war,  has  reduced  our  country 
to  such  a  state  of  exhaustion,  that  it  will  soon  be  a  physical 
impossibility  for  us  to  fight  any  longer.  Our  only  hope  lies 
in  the  chance  of  help  from  outside.  A  year  ago  I,  in  the  name 
of  my  Government,  communicated  the  condition  of  our  nation 

419 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


to  His  Honour  States-President  Kruger,  in  Europe.  He  wrote 
in  reply  that  we  must  rely  on  the  state  of  affairs  in  Cape  Col- 
ony— and  the  sympathy  of  European  nations — and  that  we 
must  continue  the  war  until  all  other  means  were  exhausted." 

The  speaker  here  enlarged  upon  the  political  developments 
which  had  taken  place  in  the  United  States  and  in  the  prin- 
cipal European  countries  during  the  preceding  two  years,  and 
then  continued: — 

"  So  far  as  we  are  concerned,  the  sum  total  of  the  foreign 
situation  is  that  we  obtain  a  great  deal  of  sympathy,  for  which 
we  are  naturally  most  grateful.  More  than  this  we  do  not 
obtain,  nor  shall  obtain  for  many  a  long  year.  Europe  will 
go  on  expressing  sympathy  with  us  until  the  last  Boer  hero 
has  died  on  the  field  and  the  last  Boer  woman  has  gone  down 
to  her  grave — until,  in  fact,  the  whole  Boer  nation  has  been 
sacrificed  on  the  altar  of  history  and  of  humanity. 

"  I  have  already,  on  a  former  occasion,  told  you  what  I 
think  about  the  situation  in  Cape  Colony.  We  have  made 
great  mistakes  there ;  perhaps  even  now  Cape  Colony  is  not 
ripe  for  the  sort  of  policy  which  we  have  been  pursuing  with 
regard  to  it.  At  all  events,  we  cannot  entertain  any  hopes  of 
a  general  rising  of  the  Colonists.  We  cannot,  however,  give 
too  much  honour  to  those  three  thousand  heroes  in  the  Colony 
who  have  sacrificed  all  in  our  behalf,  even  though  they  have 
not  succeeded  in  securing  our  independence  for  us. 

"  Thus  we  have  given  President  Kruger's  advice  a  fair  trial. 
For  twelve  months  we  have  been  testing  the  value  of  the 
methods  which  he  urged  upon  us.  And,  as  a  result  of  it  all, 
we  have  become  convinced  that  those  methods  are  of  no  avail 
— that  if  we  wish  to  remain  independent  we  must  depend  upon 
ourselves  alone.  But  the  facts  which  the  various  delegates 
have  brought  before  our  notice  show  that  we  cannot  thus  de- 
pend upon  ourselves ;  that,  unless  we  obtain  outside  help,  the 
struggle  must  come  to  an  end.  We  have,  then,  no  hope  of 
success.  Our  country  is  already  devastated  and  in  ruins ;  let 
us  stop  before  our  people  are  ruined  also. 

"  And  now  the  enemy  approaches  with  a  proposal,  which, 
however  unacceptable  it  may  be  to  us  in  other  respects,  in- 
cludes the  promise  of  amnesty  for  our  Colonial  brethren  who 
have  been  fighting  side  by  side  with  us.  I  fear  that  the  day 
will  come  when  we  shall  no  longer  be  able  to  save  these  so- 
called  rebels,  and  then  it  will  be  a  just  ground  for  reproach 
that  we  sacrificed  their  interests  in  a  cause  that  was  already 
hopeless.  Moreover,  if  we  refused  the  proposal  which  the 
British  Government  now  makes  to  us,  I  am  afraid  that  we  shall 
considerably  weaken  our  position  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  and 

420 


APPENDIX  C 


thus  lose  much  of  the  sympathy  which  to-day  it  evinces  in  our 
favour. 

"  Brethren,  we  have  vowed  to  stand  fast  to  the  bitter  end ; 
but  let  us  be  men,  and  acknowledge  that  that  end  has  now 
come,  and  that  it  is  more  bitter  than  ever  we  thought  it  could 
be.  For  death  itself  would  be  sweet  compared  with  the  step 
which  we  must  now  take.  But  let  us  bow  before  the  will 
of  God. 

"  The  future  is  dark  indeed,  but  we  will  not  give  up  courage, 
and  hope,  and  trust  in  God.  No  one  shall  ever  convince  me 
that  this  unparalleled  sacrifice  which  the  African  nation  has 
laid  upon  the  altar  of  freedom  will  be  in  vain.  It  has  been  a 
war  for  freedom — not.  only  for  the  freedom  of  the  Boers,  but 
for  the  freedom  of  all  the  nations  of  South  Africa.  Its  results 
we  leave  in  God's  hands.  Perhaps  it  is  His  will  to  lead  our 
nation  through  defeat,  through  abasement,  yes,  and  even 
through  the  valley  of  the  shadow  of  death,  to  the  glory  of  a 
nobler  future,  to  the  light  of  a  brighter  day." 

Commandant  A.  J.  Bester  (Bloemfontein)  said  that  at  the 
meeting  at  which  he  had  been  elected  his  burghers  had  told 
him  that  they  were  resolved  not  to  become  the  subjects  of 
England.  The  arguments  now  urged  against  the  continuation 
of  the  war  were  not  new — they  had  been  used  in  former  times 
of  depression.  History  gave  many  instances  in  which  their 
nation  had  been  deHvered  out  of  the  most  critical  positions. 
One  could  not  help  believing  that  Right  would  conquer.  How 
was  it  to  be  explained  that  two  hundred  and  forty  thousand 
troops  had  failed  to  exterminate  two  small  Republics?  Then 
there  had  been  miraculous  escapes  ;  surely  the  thoughts  of  these 
ought  to  encourage  them.  They  must  all  be  of  one  mind.  His 
own  decision  was  to  stand  or  to  fall  for  his  freedom. 

Mr.  Birkenstock  (Vrijheid)  asked  whether  the  proposal 
could  not  be  accepted  under  protest. 

General  J.  C.  Smuts  answered  that  the  meeting  could  em- 
power the  Governments  to  accept  the  proposal,  and  to  add  that 
they  did  so  with  such  and  such  provisos. 

Commandant  A.  J.  Bester  (Bloemfontein)  thought  that  there 
had  been  enough  said,  and  recommended  that  the  discussion 
be  closed. 

Commandant  F.  E.  Mentz  (Heilbron)  also  thought  that  it 
was  not  necessary  to  argue  any  more.  He  believed  that  the 
war  could  not  be  continued.  In  Heilbron,  Bloemfontein,  and 
part  of  Bethlehem  there  were  not  five  head  of  cattle  left.  The 
helpless  condition  of  the  women  and  children  also  demanded 
consideration.  The  state  of  the  country  was  becoming  so  des- 
perate that  they  were  now  obliged  to  break  away  from  the 

421 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


kraals.  He  himself  had  been  compelled  to  this  not  long  ago, 
and  had  lost  forty  men  in  one  day.  He  would  have  to  leave 
his  district,  but  could  not  bring  it  to  his  heart  to  leave  the 
women  behind.  It  was  quite  clear  to  him  that  the  war  must 
be  stopped,  for  some  parts  of  the  Transvaal  were  absolutely 
unable  to  go  on  fighting.  Moreover,  were  the  war  to  continue, 
commando  after  commando  would  go  over  to  the  enemy. 

General  Kemp  (Krugersdorp)  took  a  more  encouraging 
view  of  affairs.  He  would  stand  or  fall  with  the  indepen- 
dence. His  mandate  was  to  that  effect.  His  conscience  also 
would  not  justify  him  in  taking  any  other  course.  He  thought 
that  the  proposal  of  the  English  Government  was  vague,  that 
there  was  not  sufficient  provision  for  the  Boer  losses  in  it,  and 
that  it  treated  the  Dutch  language  as  a  foreign  tongue.  Cir- 
cumstances had  often  been  dark,  and  the  darkness  would  pass 
away  this  time  as  it  had  done  before.  Remembering  the  com- 
mission which  had  been  given  to  him  by  the  burghers,  he  could 
not  do  otherwise  than  vote  for  a  continuation  of  the  war. 

Vice-President  Burger :  I  have  already  given  my  opinion. 
I  am  sorry  that  the  meeting  seems  to  be  divided.  It  is  neces- 
sary for  the  welfare  of  our  nation  that  we  should  be  of  one 
mind.  Are  we  to  continue  the  war?  From  what  I  have  seen 
and  heard,  it  is  clear  to  me  that  we  cannot  do  so.  I  repeat  that 
there  is  no  possibility  of  it,  neither  does  any  real  hope  exist 
that  by  doing  so  we  should  benefit  the  nation.  It  is  idle  to 
compare  our  condition  in  the  struggle  in  1 877-1881  with  that 
in  which  we  now  find  ourselves ;  I  speak  from  experience. 

"  It  is  true  that  the  victory  was  then  ours ;  that  it  was  so  is 
due  to  the  help  which  we  received  from  outside.  The  Orange 
Free  State  remained  neutral,  but  assistance  came  from  Presi- 
dent Brand  in  South  Africa  and  from  Gladstone  in  England: 
thus  it  was  not  by  our  own  sword  that  we  were  enabled  to  win. 

"  It  will  be  asked  why,  if  we  have  kept  up  the  struggle  for 
two  years  and  a  half,  can  we  not  still  continue  to  do  so? 

"  Because,  in  the  meantime,  we  have  become  weaker  and 
weaker,  and  if  we  persist  the  end  must  be  fatal.  What  grounds 
have  we  for  expecting  that  we  may  yet  be  victorious?  Each 
man  we  lose  renders  us  weaker ;  every  hundred  men  we  lose 
means  a  similar  gain  to  the  enemy.  England's  numerical 
strength  does  not  diminish ;  on  the  contrary,  there  are  even 
more  troops  in  the  country  at  this  moment  than  when  Lord 
Roberts  had  the  command.  England  also  has  used  our  own 
men  against  us,  and  has  not  been  ashamed  of  arming  the  Kaf- 
firs ;  the  enemy  are  learning  from  our  own  men  in  what  way 
they  should  fight — he  must  be  blind  indeed  who  cannot  see 
these  facts. 


422 


APPENDIX  C 


"  I  do  not  think  we  can  appropriately  call  this  altogether  a 
*  war  of  faith.'  Undoubtedly  we  began  this  war  strong  in  the 
faith  of  God,  but  there  were  also  two  or  three  other  things  to 
rely  upon.  We  had  considerable  confidence  in  our  own  weap- 
ons ;  we  under-estimated  the  enemy ;  the  fighting  spirit  had 
seized  upon  our  people ;  and  the  thought  of  victory  had  ban- 
ished that  of  the  possibility  of  defeat. 

The  question  still  remains,  What  are  we  to  do  ?  I  have 
no  great  opinion  of  the  document  which  lies  before  us :  to  me 
it  holds  out  no  inducement  to  stop  the  war.  If  I  feel  com- 
pelled to  treat  for  peace  it  is  not  on  account  of  any  advantages 
that  this  proposal  offers  me:  it  is  the  weight  of  my  own  re- 
sponsibility which  drives  me  to  it. 

If  I  think  that  by  holding  out  I  should  dig  the  nation's 
grave,  nothing  must  induce  me  to  continue  the  struggle. 

Therefore  I  consider  it  my  duty,  as  leader  of  our  nation, 
to  do  my  utmost  that  not  one  man  more  shall  be  killed,  that 
not  one  woman  more  shall  die. 

The  sacrifice  must  be  made ;  is  not  this  also  a  trial  of  our 
faith?  What  shall  we  gain  by  going  on?  Nothing!  It  is 
obvious  that  further  surrenders  will  take  place — here  of  a  few, 
there  of  many — and  our  weakness  will  increase. 

We  shall  also  be  obliged  to  abandon  large  areas  of  the 
country.  Will  this  make  us  stronger  ?  Rather,  will  it  not  en- 
able the  enemy  to  concentrate  still  more  ?  And  the  abandoned 
tracts — to  whom  will  they  belong  ?    To  the  enemy  ! 

"  In  all  probability  this  is  our  last  meeting.  I  do  not  be- 
lieve that  we  shall  be  given  another  chance  to  negotiate :  we 
shall  be  deemed  too  insignificant.  If  we  reject  this  proposal, 
what  prospects  have  we  in  the  future?  If  we  accept  it,  we 
can,  like  a  child,  increase  in  size  and  strength,  but  with  its 
rejection  goes  our  last  opportunity. 

Fell  a  tree  and  it  will  sprout  again ;  uproot  it  and  there  is 
an  end  of  it.   What  has  the  nation  done  to  deserve  extinction  ? 

"  Those  who  wish  to  continue  the  war  are  influenced  chiefly 
by  hope;  but  on  what  is  this  hope  founded?  On  our  arms? 
No.  On  intervention?  By  no  means.  On  what  then?  No 
one  can  say. 

"  I  am  sorry  that  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange  Free  State 
are  at  variance  on  this  point,  and  I  regret  that  it  is  the  Trans- 
vaal which  has  to  declare  itself  unable  to  proceed  further ;  but 
the  enemy  have  concentrated  all  their  forces  in  this  State,  and 
we  can  hold  out  no  longer." 

Mr.  L.  Jacobsz :  I  have  hitherto  not  spoken,  because  I 
am  a  non-combatant.  I  have  also  suffered  much,  although' 
less  than  others.  I  have  listened  to  what  has  been  said,  but 
my  opinion  is  not  changed  by  the  views  I  have  heard  expressed. 

,423 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


"  I  repeat  now  what  I  said  at  Klerksdorp,  namely  that  the 
struggle  cannot  continue.  I  have  noted  the  condition  of  the 
country,  which  is  such  that  the  commandos  can  no  longer  be 
supported.  I  would  point  out  the  condition  of  the  women  and 
children,  of  whom  many  are  dying,  and  all  are  exposed  to 
great  dangers.  If  there  was  a  chance  of  succeeding  in  the 
end,  then  we  might  hold  out,  but  there  is  no  such  chance; 
there  is  no  possibility  of  intervention,  and  the  silence  of  the 
deputation  is  ominous. 

"  I  sympathize  with  the  heroes  present  at  this  meeting ;  we 
must  have  a  foundation  for  our  faith,  and  we  cannot  alto- 
gether compare  our  people  with  the  people  of  Israel.  Israel 
had  promises  made  to  them ;  we  have  none.  I  would  further 
point  out  that,  in  the  interests  of  the  nation,  it  will  not  do  to 
surrender  unconditionally:  the  terms  before  us  may  be  decep- 
tive, but  they  are  the  best  obtainable. 

With  regard  to  the  difficulty  of  those  delegates  who  con- 
sider that  they  are  bound  to  act  as  they  have  been  commis- 
sioned, I  am  of  the  same  opinion  as  Judge  Hertzog  and 
General  Smuts." 

Commandant  J.  J.  Alberts  (Standerton)  spoke  more  or  less 
in  the  same  strain.  He  was  of  opinion  that  the  war  should 
be  finished  by  ceding  territory,  but,  failing  this,  that  it  should 
be  ended  on  any  terms  obtainable. 

Vice-President  de  Wet  expressed  his  opinion  that,  consider- 
ing the  short  time  at  their  disposal,  they  should  proceed,  if 
possible,  to  make  some  proposal. 

General  D.  A.  Brand  said  that  he  would  have  spoken  if  he 
had  not  thought  that  enough  had  been  said;  he  considered  it 
desirable  to  close  the  discussion,  and  was  willing  to  make  a 
proposal. 

Veldtcornet  D.  J.  E.  Opperman  (Pretoria  South)  consid- 
ered that  the  difficulties  of  continuing  the  war,  and  of  accept- 
ing the  proposal,  were  equal.  Some  of  his  burghers  would 
fight  no  longer.  What  troubled  him  most  was  the  condition 
of  the  women ;  it  went  to  his  heart  to  see  these  families  perish. 
He  was  of  opinion  that,  for  the  sake  of  the  women  and  chil- 
dren who  were  suffering  so  intensely,  the  proposal  should  be 
accepted  under  protest. 

Veldtcornet  J.  Van  Steedden,  seconded  by  Veldtcornet  B.  J. 
Roos,  moved  that  the  discussion  be  now  closed. 

The  meeting  was  adjourned  after  prayer. 


424 


APPENDIX  C 


Saturday,  May  31ST,  1902. 
The  meeting  was  opened  with  prayer. 

General  Nieuwouwdt,  seconded  by  General  Brand,  made  the 
following  proposal : — 

"  This  meeting  of  special  deputies  from  the  two  Republics, 
after  considering  the  proposal  of  His  Majesty's  Government 
for  the  re-establishment  of  peace,  and  taking  into  considera- 
tion (a)  the  demands  of  the  burghers  in  the  veldt  and  the 
commissions  which  they  had  given  to  their  representatives; 
(b)  that  they  do  not  consider  themselves  justified  in  conclud- 
ing peace  on  the  basis  laid  down  by  His  Majesty's  Government 
before  having  been  placed  in  communication  with  the  dele- 
gates of  the  Republic  now  in  Europe,  decides  that  it  can- 
not accept  the  proposal  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  and 
orders  the  Governments  of  the  two  Republics  to  communicate 
this  decision  to  His  Majesty's  Government  through  its  rep- 
resentatives." 

Mr.  P.  R.  Viljoen,  seconded  by  General  H.  A.  Alberts,  made 
a  proposal,  amended  afterwards  by  General  Smuts  and  Judge 
Hertzog,  which  appears  later  on  under  the  proposal  of  H.  P. 
J.  Pretorius  and  C.  Botha. 

A  third  proposal  by  General  E.  Botha  and  General  J.  G. 
Celliers  was  laid  upon  the  table,  but  subsequently  withdrawn. 

Mr.  F.  W.  Reitz  considered  it  to  be  his  duty  not  only  to  the 
nation  but  also  to  himself  as  a  citizen,  to  say  that,  in  case  the 
proposal  of  the  British  Government  should  be  accepted,  it 
would  be  necessary  for  the  meeting  to  make  provisions  as  to 
whose  signatures  should  be  attached  to  the  necessary  docu- 
ments. He  himself  would  not  sign  any  document  by  which 
the  independence  would  be  given  up. 

Remarks  were  made  by  several  members  on  the  first  pro- 
posal, and  Mr.  P.  R.  Viljoen  asked  that  no  division  should 
arise. 

Vice-President  de  Wet  then  said  that,  as  the  time  was  lim- 
ited, and  all  could  not  speak,  he  would  propose  that  a  Com- 
mission should  be  nominated  in  order  to  draw  up  a  third 
proposal  in  which  various  opinions  of  the  members  should  be 
set  down ;  and  that,  whilst  the  Commission  was  occupied  in 
this  way,  the  Orange  Free  State  delegates  on  their  part  and 
those  of  the  South  African  Republic  on  their  part,  should  meet 
in  order  that  an  understanding  might  be  come  to  between 
them.  They  must  endeavour  to  come  to  a  decision,  for  it 
would  be  of  the  greatest  possible  advantage  to  them. 

Xommandant-Gen_eraI  Botha  thought  that  this  hint  should 
be  taken.  ^The^had  suffered  and  fought  together:  let_thejn 
not  part  in  anger.  ^ 

^  425 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


The  above-mentioned  Commission  was  then  decided  upon, 

and  Judge  Hertzog  and  General  Smuts  were  elected. 

Then  the  Orange  Free  State  delegates  went  to  the  tent  of 
Vice-President  de  Wet,  whilst  those  of  the  South  African  Re- 
pubHc  remained  in  the  tent  in  which  the  meeting  was  held. 

After  a  time  of  heated  dispute — for  every  man  was  prepar- 
ing himself  for  the  bitter  end — they  came  to  an  agreement, 
and  Judge  Hertzog  read  the  following  proposal: — 

We7Lh"e  national  representatives  of  both  the  South  Afri- 
can Republic  and  the  Orange  Free  State,  at  the  meeting  held 
at  Vereeniging,  from  the  15th  of  May  till  the  31st  of  Alay, 
1902,  have  with  grief  considered  the  proposal  made  by  His 
Majesty's  Government  in  connexion  with  the  conclusion  of 
the  existing  hostilities,  and  their  communication  that  this  pro- 
posal had  to  be  accepted,  or  rejected,  unaltered.  We  are 
sorry  that  His  Majesty's  Government  has  absolutely  decHned 
to  negotiate  with  the  Governments  of  the  Republics  on  the  basis 
of  their  independence,  or  to  allow  our  Governments  to  enter 
into  communication  with  our  deputations.  Our  people,  how- 
ever, have  always  been  under  the  impression  that  not  only  on 
the  grounds  of  justice,  but  also  taking  into  consideration  the 
great  material  and  personal  sacrifices  made  for  their  indepen- 
dence, that  it  had  a  well-founded  claim  for  that  independence. 

We  have  seriously  considered  the  future  of  our  country, 
and  have  specially  observed  the  following  facts : — 

*'  Firstly,  that  the  military  policy  pursued  by  the  British 
military  authorities  has  led  to  the  general  devastation  of  the 
territory  of  both  Republics  by  the  burning  down  of  farms  and 
_towns^,by^Jthe  destruction  of  all  means  of  subsistence,  and  by 
the  exhausting  of  ajl  resources  required  for  the  maintenance 
of  our  Tamilies^JLh^  subsistence  of  our  armies,  and  the  con- 
tinuatiQn_of  the  war. 

'""^^^condly,  that  the  placing  of  our  families  in  the  concentra- 
tion camps  has  brought  on  an'unheard-of  condition  of  suffer- 
mg~and^iickness.  so  that  in  a  comparatively  short  time  about 
tweiitv  thousand  of  our  beloved  ones  have  died  there,  and 
tjiat  tlie  Tiorrid  probabilitxiias  arisen  that,  by  continuing  the 
war,  ourjwh^le  nation  mav  die  out  in  this  way. 

^THTrdly,  that  the  Kaffir  tribe,  within  and  without  the  fron- 
tiers of  the  territory  of  the  two  Republics,  are  mostly  armed 
and  are  taking  part  in  the  war  against  us,  and  through  the 
committing  of  murders  and  all  sorts  of  cruelties  have  caused 
an  unbearable  condition  of  afifairs  in  many  districts  of  both 
Republics.  An  instance  of  this  happened  not  long  ago  in  the 
district  of  Vrijheid,  where  fifty-six  burghers  on  one  occasion 
were  murdered  and  mutilated  in  a  fearful  manner. 

426 


APPENDIX  C 


"  Fourthly,  that  by  the  proclamations  of  the  enemy  the 
burghers  still  fighting  are  threatened  with  the  loss  of  all  their 
movable  and  landed  property — and  thus  with  utter  ruin — 
which  proclamations  have  already  been  enforced. 

"  Fifthly,  that  it  has  already,  through  the  circumstances  of 
the  war,  become  quite  impossible  for  us  to  keep  the  many  thou- 
sand prisoners  of  war  taken  by  our  forces,  and  that  we  have 
thus  been  unable  to  inflict  much  damage  on  the  British  forces 
(whereas  the  burghers  who  are  taken  prisoners  by  the  British 
armies  are  sent  out  of  the  country),  and  that,  after  war  has 
raged  for  nearly  three  years,  there  only  remains  an  insignifi- 
cant part  of  the  fighting  forces  with  which  we  began. 

Sixthly,  that  this  fighting  remainder,  which  is  only  a  small 
minority  of  our  whole  nation,  has  to  fight  against  an  overpow- 
ering force  of  the  enemy,  and  besides  is  reduced  to  a  condition 
of  starvation,  and  is  destitute  of  all  necessaries,  and  that  not- 
withstanding our  utmost  efforts,  and  the  sacrifice  of  every- 
thing that  is  dear  and  precious  to  us,  we  cannot  foresee  an 
eventual  victory. 

We  are  therefore  of  opinion  that  there  is  no  justifiable 
ground  for  expecting  that  by  continuing  the  war  the  nation 
will  retain  its  independence,  and  that,  under  these  circum- 
stances, the  nation  is  not  justified  in  continuing  the  war,  be- 
cause this  can  only  lead  to  social  and  material  ruin,  not  for 
us  alone,  but  also  for  our  posterity.  Compelled  by  the  above- 
named  circumstances  and  motives,  we  commission  both  Gov- 
ernments to  accept  the  proposal  of  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment, and  to  sign  it  in  the  name  of  the  people  of  both 
Republics. 

We,  the  representative  delegates,  express  our  confidence 
that  the  present  circumstances  will,  by  accepting  the  proposal 
of  His  Majesty's  Government,  be  speedily  ameliorated  in  such 
a  way  that  our  nation  will  be  placed  in  a  position  to  enjoy  the 
privileges  to  which  they  think  they  have  a  just  claim,  on  the 
ground  not  only  of  their  past  sacrifices,  but  also  of  those  made 
in  this  war. 

We  have  with  great  satisfaction  taken  note  of  the  decision 
of  His  Majesty's  Government  to  grant  a  large  measure  of 
amnesty  to  the  British  subjects  who  have  taken  up  arms  on 
our  behalf,  and  to  whom  we  are  united  by  bonds  of  love  and 
honour ;  and  express  our  wish  that  it  may  please  His  Majesty 
to  still  further  extend  this  amnesty." 

Mr.  P.  R.  Viljoen  then  withdrew  his  proposal. 

Commandant  H.  P.  J.  Pretorius,  seconded  by  General  C. 
Botha,  presented  the  proposal,  as  read  by  the  Commission. 

General  Nieuwouwdt  also  withdrew  his  proposal,  but  it  was 

427 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


at  once  taken  over  by  General  C.  C.  J.  Badenhorst,  seconded 
by  Commandant  A.  J.  Bester,  of  Bloemfontein. 
The  meeting  then  adjourned  till  the  afternoon. 

In  the  afternoon  at  2.05  it  again  met. 

Proceeding  to  the  voting,  the  proposal  of  H.  P.  J.  Pretorius. 
seconded  by  General  C.  Botha,  was  accepted,  by  fifty-four 
votes  against  six.  Then  Vice-President  Burger  spoke  a  few 
words  suitable  to  the  occasion  as  follows : — "  We  are  standing 
here  at  the  grave  of  the  two  Republics.  Much  yet  remains  to 
be  done,  although  we  shall  not  be  able  to  do  it  in  the  official 
capacities  which  we  have  formerly  occupied.  Let  us  not  draw 
our  hands  back  from  the  work  which  it  is  our  duty  to  accom- 
pHsh.  Let  us  ask  God  to  guide  us,  and  to  show  us  how  we 
shall  be  enabled  to  keep  our  nation  together.  We  must  be 
ready  to  forgive  and  forget,  whenever  we  meet  our  brethren. 
That  part  of  our  nation  which  has  proved  unfaithful  we  must 
not  reject." 

Later,  Vice-President  Burger  spoke  a  few  words  of  farewell 
to  the  Commandant-General,  to  the  Members  of  the  Execu- 
tive Councils,  and  to  the  delegates. 

In  the  afternoon,  as  it  turned  out  for  the  last  time,  Com- 
mandant Jacobsz,  seconded  by  General  Muller,  made  the  fol- 
lowing proposal,  which  was  unanimously  accepted  by  the 
meeting : — 

"  This  meeting  of  Delegates,  having  in  view  the  necessity 
of  collecting  means  to  provide  for  the  wants  of  the  suffering 
women  and  children,  widows  and  orphans,  and  other  destitute 
persons,  who  have  through  this  war  come  to  a  condition  of 
want,  and  also  having  in  view  the  desirability  of  nominating  a 
Committee,  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  arrange  the  necessary 
steps  in  this  matter,  and  to  finally  decide  on  the  management 
and  distribution  of  the  donations  received,  decides : — 

"  To  nominate  the  Hon.  Messrs.  M.  J.  Steyn,  S.  W.  Burger, 
L.  Botha,  C.  R.  de  Wet,  J.  H.  De  la  Rey,  A.  P.  Kriel,  and  J. 
D.  Kestell,  as  the  Committee,  to  carry  out  all  arrangements 
for  the  above-mentioned  purposes,  that  may  seem  desirable 
and  expedient  to  them,  and  also  to  appoint  new  Members, 
Sub-Committees  and  working  Committees ;  and  the  said  Com- 
mittee is  empowered  to  draw  up  regulations,  and  to  amend 
them  from  time  to  time  as  shall  seem  to  fhem  expedient. 

"This  meeting  further  decides  to  send  abroad  from  the 
above-mentioned  Committee,  Messrs.  C.  R.  de  Wet,  L.  Botha, 
and  J.  H.  De  la  Rey,  in  order  that  they  may  help  in  collectmg 
the  above-mentioned  donations." 

Then  this— the  last  meeting  of  the  two  Republics— was 
closed  with  prayer. 

428 


Index 


Aard,  Commandant  Frans  van- 
Election  as  Commandant  of  Kroon- 
stad,  115 

Killed  in  engagement  between  Kroon- 
stad  and  Lindley,  157 
Abraham's   Kraal  —  Bombardment  by 

British,  Boer  Flight,  52 
Achterlaaiers^  3 

Active  Service — Calling  up  of  Orange 
Free  State  Burghers,  4 

Commando  Law  as  to  Equipment, 
Provisions,  etc.,  3 

Notification  to  Orange  Free  State 
Burghers  to  hold  themselves  in  read- 
iness, 3 

Alberts,  Capt. — Tribute  to,  243 
Albrecht,  Major — Command  of  Boer  Re- 
inforcements at  Koedoesberg,  28 
Ammunition  —  Amount    possessed  by 
Boers  in  1902,  408 
Capture  of  Ammunition  by  the  Boers, 
173 

Dewetsdorp,  178 

Doornspruit,  Capture  of  Train  near, 
132 

Roodewal — Amount  captured,  103 
Digging  up,  191,  193 
Disposal  of,  104,  106 
Tweefontein,  282 
De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  Am- 
munition hidden  in  Cave,  298 
Amnesty — General  Amnesty  for  Boer 
Sympathisers  in  Cape  Colony  and 
Natal,  proposed,  322 
Annexation  of  the  South  African  Re- 
pubhc — Battles  fought  after  the  al- 
leged Annexation,  229 
Peace  Negotiations  at  Pretoria,  Refer- 
ences to  the  Annexation,  367 
Armistice  to  admit  of  attendance  of  Offi- 
cers at  the  Vereeniging  Meeting 
(May,  1902),  315 
Misunderstanding  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Columns,  317 
Arms,  Surrender  of,  see  titles  Banish- 
ment and  Surrender 
Assistant-Commander-in-Chief  Gen.  de 
Wet  obtaining  Post  from  Govern- 
ment, 95 

Assistant-Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Orange  Free  State  — 

Prinsloo,  Mr.  Marthinus,  Illegal  Elec- 
tion of,  126 

Steenekamp,  Commandant,  Nomina- 
tion of,  144 


Badenhorst,  Siege  of,  by  Commander. 

in-Chief  de  Wet,  77,  78 
Abandonment  of  Siege,  79 
Badenhorst,  Veldtcornet,  94 
Vice-Commander-in-Chief  in  Districts 
of  Boshof,  etc..  Appointment,  159 
Baggage  Animals  of  British  Troops- 
Exhaustion  of,  148 
Use  of,  279 
Baker's,  Col.,  Column— Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet  lying  in  wait  with  a 
view  to  Reprisals,  271 
Banishment   Proclamation  of  Aug.  7, 
1901  (Lord  Kitchener's  Proclama- 
tion), 247-250 
Battles  fought  subsequent  to,  252 
Burghers,  Effect  on,  252 
Kitchener's,  Lord,  Letter  to  Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet  enclosing 
copy  of  Proclamation,  247 

De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief, 
Reply,  248 
Officers,  Effect  on,  250 
President  and  Commander-in-Chief  of 
Transvaal  and  Orange  Free  State — 
Replies,  250.  251,  257,  258 
Steyn's,   President,  Letter  to  Lord 

Kitchener,  251-259 
Terms  of,  247-251 
Bank  Notes  of  the  South  African  Re- 
public— Peace     Terms,  Arrange- 
ments for  honouring  Notes,  380 
Prisoners    of   War,  Opportunity  of 
sending  in   Notes  for  Payment, 
386 

Barbed  Wire  Fences,  see  Wire  Fences 
Barton,  Gen.,  Attack  on  at  Frederiks- 
stad  by  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet  and  Gen.  Liebenburg,  164-167 
Beijers,  Gen. — Continuance  of  the  War, 
Spirit  of  the  Nation  an  obstacle — 
Speech  at  Vereeniging  Conference, 
410 

Waterberg  District,  Situation  in — Re- 
port to  the  Vereeniging  Conference, 
339 

Bergh,  Capt. — Attacks  on  Boer  Forces 
with  bands  of  Kaffirs.  271 

Bester,  Commandant  A.  J. — Continu- 
ance of  the  War,  Argument  in  fa- 
vour of  at  the  Vereeniging  Confer- 
ence, 421 

Bester  Station,  Skirmish  at,  10 

Bethlehem  —  Commandants  of  Roer 
Forces,  Appointments,  227,  228 


429 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Bethlehem,  cont'triued— 

Defence  of — British  Reinforcements, 
Arrival  of,  121,  122 

Dispositions  of  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet,  120,  121 
Voetgangers   on  Wolhuterskop, 
Bravery  of,  121,  122 
Engagement  near,  194,  195 
Fall  of,  122 
Bethlehem    Commando  —  Fidelity  of 

Burghers,  94,  note 
Bezuidenhoutspas  —  Occupation  by 

Vrede  Commando,  7,  8 
Biddulphsberg     Engagement — English 

wounded  burnt  by  veldt  fire,  84 
"  Big  Constable  " — Transvaalers  mis- 
taking President  Steyn  for  Police 
Agent,  86,  87 
Birkenstock,  Mr. — Continuance  of  the 
War,  Terms  of  Surrender,  etc.,  399 
Situation  in  South  Africa  on  May  15, 
1902 — Report  to  the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  343 
Blauwbank,  Fight  at,  30 

British    Camp    alDandoned  —  Booty 

taken  by  Boers,  33,  34 
British  Convoy,  Commander-in-Chief 
de  Wet's  Attack  on,  32,  33 
Blijdschap — Arrival  of  Laager  of  Wom- 
en, 268 

De  Lange  sentenced  to  death  for  High 

Treason  at,  268,  note 
Massing  of  Commandos  at,  268 
Blikkiecost,  4 
Blockhouse  System — 

"  Blockhead"  System,  alleged,  260 
Boer  Success  in  breaking  through 

Blockhouses,  260,  261 
Bothaville,  Boers  breaking  through 

Blockhouse  Line,  299 
British  loss  of  faith  in  Blockhouses, 

291,  292 

Cost  of  erection  and  maintenance,  262 
Description  of,  262 
Districts  surrounded  by  the  British, 
261 

Failure  of,  alleged,  261 

Lindley-Kroonstad  Line,  Boers  break- 
ing through,  287 

Palmietfontein,  Boers  breaking 
through  Line  near,  289,  290 

Prolongation  of  the  War  by,  alleged, 
263,  264 

Small  number  of  Captures  effected, 
260,  261 

Springhaansnek  —  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet  breaking  through  the 
Line  of  Blockhouses  on  the  march  to 
the  South,  173 

Thaba'Nchu  and  Sanna's  Post,  Forts 
between  —  Capture  by  Comman- 
der-in-Chief de  Wet,  201,  202 

Trenches  dug  by  British  near  Block- 
house Lines,  etc. ,  288,  924,  295 
Bloemfontein — Capture  by  British,  55 

Defence  of — Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet's  Arrangements,  54 


Bloemfontein,  continued— 

Water  Works — Occupation  by  Gen- 
eral Broadwood,  61 
"  Boer  Biscuits,"  3 
Boer  Forces — 

Burghers  who  had  returned  home 
after  fall  of  Bloemfontein,  Re-call 
to  the  front,  71 

Commandos  left  with  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet  after  fall  of  Bloem- 
fontein, note  57 

Confusion  among  Burghers  at  Hol- 
spruits,  294,  295 

Discipline,  see  that  title 

Disposition  of  Forces  after  fall  of 
Bethlehem,  124 

Harrismith  Commando,  Refusal  to 
part  with  Waggons — Return  home, 
161,  163 

Medical  Certificates,  Abuse  of,  note 
Mobility,  see  that  title 
Numbers  at  Outset  of  War,  408,  414, 
415,  491 

Numbers  at  the  Termination  of  the 
War,  322,  338,  339,  347,  348, 359,  360, 
361,  362 

Orange   Free   State  Commandos— 
Commander-in-Chief,  Election  of, 
6,7 

Harrismith,  Concentration  at,  4,  6-7 
Heilbron  Commando,  see  that  title 
Number  of  Burghers  ready  to  fight 

after  fall  of  Pretoria,  94 
Panic  after  Paardeberg,  48,  49,  51,  52, 

note  57 

Permission  given  to  Burghers  by 
Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet  to 
return  home,  56  note,  57— Gen. 
Joubert's  Protest,  57 
Reduction  in  numbers  due  to  Paarde- 
berg Surrender,  etc.,  89,  90 
Roberts',  Lord,  Surrender  Proclama- 
tion— Effect  on  Numbers  rejoining 
Commandos,  60 

Non-observance  of  Terms,  Burghers 
returning  to  Commandos,  80 
Separation  of  Free  Staters  and  Trans- 
vaalers   after   fall  of  Kroonstad, 
Reasons  for,  89,  90 
Boesmanskop  Skirmish,  80 
Boshof,  Vrow— Gift  of  Clothes  to  Burgh- 
ers who  had  swum  the  Orange  River, 
221,  222 

Bosman.  Landdrost — Continuance  of 
the  War,  Terms  of  Surrender,  etc., 
404,  405,  406 
Situation  in  South  Africa  on  15th  May, 
1902 — Report  to  the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  361,  362 

Botha — Capture  at  Honingkopjes,  Sub- 
sequent Escape  and  Death,  110 

Botha,  Commandant-General — 
Continuance  of  the  War,  Arguments 
against — Terms  of  Surrender,  etc., 
414.  415 

Estcourt  Skirmishes — Capture  of  Ar- 
moured Train,  etc.,  19 


INDEX 


Botha,  Commandant-General,  contin- 
ued — 

Fortitude  after  Fall  of  Pretoria,  93 
Independence  of  the  South  African 
Republic  and  Orange  Free  State — 
Vereeniging  Conference  Delegates' 
power  to  decide  as  to  Independence, 
411 

Junction  with  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet  at  Rhenosterriviersburg,  88,  89 

Middelburg  Peace  Proposals,  see  that 
title 

Mission  to  Europe  on  behalf  of  Reliet 
Fund  Committee,  428 

Peace  Negotiations — Member  of  Com- 
mission of  National  Representatives 
at  the  Pretoria  Conference,  320,  365- 
396 

Situation  in  South  Africa  on  15th  May, 
1902 — Report   to   the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  337,  338,  354-358 
Botha,  General  Philip — 

Dewetsdorp  Defences,  Occupation  of, 
175.  176 

Engagement    with  General  Knox's 

Forces,  194,  195 
Kroonstad  War  Council,  Presence  at, 

58 

Reinforcements  sent  to  Commander- 
in  Chief  de  Wet  before  Paardeberg, 
Command  of,  36,  37 

Stinkfontein — Failure  to  recapture  Po- 
sition, 45 

Storming  of,  40 

Tabaksberg,  Engagement  at,  83 
Botha,  Mr.  Jan — Commander-in-Chief 

de  Wet's  Tribute  to,  150,  151 
Bothaville  —  Boers    breaking  through 
Blockhouse  Line,  299 
Surprise  Attack  by  the   British  on 
Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet's 
Forces — Boer  Panic,  168-170 
Losses  of  the  Boers,  170-171 
Bout  Span^  5 

Boys — Presence  with  Commandos,  287, 
289,  290 

Children  killed  and  wounded,  289,  290, 
295,  296 

Brabant's,  General,  Successes,  50 
Brabant's  Horse — Attack  on  Command- 
ant Kritzinger  and  Captain  Scheep- 

ers,  185,  186 
De    Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief, 

Opinion  of,  75,  76 
Brand,  President — Assistance  rendered 

to  South  African  Republic  in  War 

of  1877-1881,  422,  423 
Brandfort,    Boer    Forces   at  —  Hotels 

closed    by  Commander-in-Chief, 

60 

Brandwachten,  22 

Breijtenbach,  Veldtcornet  B.  H.— Con- 
tinuance of  the  War,  Impossibility 
of  Carrying  on  the  Struggle,  403, 
404 

British  Forces— Artillery,  Commander- 
in-Chief  de  Wet's  Tribute  to,  25 


British  Forces,  continued-^ 
March  from  Bethlehem  to  Reitz.  under 

guidance  of  Free  Staater,  263,  264 
Sixty  Thousand  Men,  Cordon  of,  291, 
292,  293,  294 
Broadwood,    General — Occupation  of 
Thaba'Nchu,  65,  66 
Retreat  towards  Thaba'Nchu  before 
General  Olivier,  62 
Broodspioen,  207,  208 
Bruwer,  Commandant — Appointment  to 
Command  of  Bethlehem  District, 
227,  228 

Buller,    Sir     Redvers  —  Drakensberg 
Frontier,  Crossing  of,  93 
Landing  at  Cape  Town,  21 
Relief  of  Ladysmith,  50 
Strength  of  Positions  operated  against 
by  Sir  Redvers  Buller,  21 
Bulwana  Hill — Boers  surprised  by  Brit- 
ish, 21 

Burger,  Vice-President — Continuance  of 
the  War,  Terms  of  Surrender,  etc., 
398,  421,  422,  424,  425 
Meeting  with  Orange  Free  State  Gov- 
ernment, Letter  to  President  Steyn, 
301,  302 

Situation  in  South  Africa  on  15th  May, 
1902 — Address  at  the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  336,  337,  351-354 
Steyn,  President,  Resignation  of— An- 
nouncement at  Vereeniging  Confer- 
ence, 411 


Cape  Colony — 

De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  At- 
tempted Inroad  —  March  towards 
Cape  Colony — 

Blockhouses — Commander-in-Chief 
de  Wet  breaking  through  the  Line 
at  Springhaansnek,  173,  187,  188, 
189 

Dewetsdorp — 

Defences,   British  neglecting  to 
hold,  175,  176 

Storming  of,  175-179 
Forces  under  Commander-in-Chief 

de  Wet,  172 
"  Good  Hope  "  Farm,  Engagement 
near,  i8i 

Knox's,  Gen.,  Arrival  with  British 
Reinforcements,  181 
Gun  and  Amount  of  Ammunition 

taken, 173 
Karnel,  March  towards,  181,  182 
Knox's,  Gen  ,  Pursuit  of  Command- 
er-in-Chief de  Wet,  185,  186,  187, 

189,  190 

Orange  and  Caledon  Rivers  in 
flood  —  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet  "  cornered,"  182,  183 

Prinsloo's,  Commandant  Michal, 
Commando — Appearance  in  the 
nick  of  time,  187,  188 

Retreat  across  Orange  River,  184, 
185 


43 1 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Cape  Colony,  continued — 

De  Wet's^  Commander-in-Chief,  Ex- 
pedition into — 
Capture  of  Farm  held  by  Briti-sh 

Troops,  207,  208 
Courage  and  Endurance  of  Burgh- 
ers, 212 

Diminution  in  number  of  Boer 
Forces,  206,  207 

Engagements  with  British  Troops, 
206,  207,  212 

Escape  of  Boer  Forces  in  the  dark- 
ness, 216,  219,  220 

Fodder,  Lack  of,  206,  207 

Knox's,  Gen.,  Movements,  201,  202, 
203 

Miraculous  Nature  of  Boer  Achieve- 
ments, 223,  224 
Moddervlei,  Passage  of— Boer  Loss 
of  Ammunition  and  Flour  Wag- 
gons, 208,  209,  210,  212 
Officers  serving  with  Commander- 
in-Chief  de  Wet,  195.  196 
Position  of  Boer  Forces  after  cross- 
ing Orange  River,  205,  206 
Retreat  across  Orange  River,  Diffi- 
culties of,  etc.,  217  224 
Strategy  employed  to  mislead  Gen. 
Knox,  202,  203.  204 
General  Rising  of  Burghers,  Impossi- 
bility of— Reports  of  Delegates  at 
the  Vereeniging   Conference,  340, 
341,  342,  355,  360.  36  c,  405,  406 
Position  of  affairs  at  the  beginning  of 
1901 — Colonial  Burghers'  Sympathy 
with  Boer  Cause,  195,  196 
Sheep-farming,  success  of  in  North- 
western Districts,  211 
Small  Commandos  sent  to  Cape  Col- 
ony, Policy  of,  234 
Cape  Alounted  Rifles,  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet's  opinion  of,  77,  78 
Cartwright,  Mr.,  Editor  of  South  Afri- 
can Nevjs — Punishment  for  publica- 
tion  of  "not  to  take  prisoners" 
Anecdote  concerning  Lord  Kitchen- 
er, 184,  185 
Casualties,  see  Losses  in  Killed  and 

Wounded,  etc.,  on  either  side 
Cattle — Blockhouse  Line  between  Lind- 
ley   and   Kroonstad,    Boer  Cattle 
breaking  through,  288 
Capture  of  Boer  Cattle  on  "  Majuba 

Day,"  296,  297 
Destruction  by  the  British,  192,  232 
Supply  available  on  May  15,  1902 — 
Report  of  Vereeniging  Delegates, 
337,  338.  339.  340,  341,  343.  344,  345. 
346,  351,  352 
Causes  of  the  War— British  Government 
Interference  with  the  inner  policy 
of  the  South  African  Republic,  252, 
253 

Declaration  of  War  by  the  South 
African  Republics  as  the  Cause — 
President  Steyn's  Contradiction. 
251,  252 


Causes  of  the  War,  continued — 

Extermination  of  the  Repubhcs  al- 
ready determined  on  by  England, 
alleged,  254,  255 
Franchise  Law — British  Government 

Demands,  252,  253,  254 
Goldfields  the  main  object,  alleged, 
350,  351 

Jameson  Raid  as  a  Cause,  alleged, 
251,  252,  253 

Memorials  to  H.  M.  Government  con- 
cerning alleged  Grievances — Presi- 
dent Steyn's  efforts  to  keep  the 
Peace,  252,  253,  254 

Orange  Free  State  joining  issues  with 
the  Transvaal,  254,  255 

Steyn's,  President,  Letter  to  Lord 
Kitchener,  250-259 

Troops  landed  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment prior  to  outbreak  of  War,  253, 
254 

Ultimatum  of  Boers,  Lord  Salisbury's 
Assertion,  53,  54 
Ceylon — Boer  Prisoners  taken  with  Gen. 

Prinsloo  sent  to  Ceylon,  156 
Chamberlain,  Mr.  J. — Boer  Ultimatum 
— Telegrams  to  Sir  A.  Milner,  329 
Jameson    Raid  —  Defence    of  Mr. 
Rhodes,  President  Steyn  on,  251, 
252 

Cilhers,  Gen.  J.  G. — Continuance  of  the 
War,  Terms  of  Surrender,  etc.,  404, 
405 

Situation  in  South  Africa  on  May  15, 
1902 — Address  at  the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  353,  354 

Cilliers,  Sarah — Death  at  Frederiksstad 
Engagement,  166,  167 

Clothing — De  Wet's,  Commander-in- 
Chief,  Clothes  hidden  in  Cave, 
298 

Difficulty  of  obtaining,  233 

Hides  for  tanning.  Destruction  by  the 

British,  233 
Stripping  British  Prisoners  to  obtain, 

233 

Colenso — British  losses  at,  23 
Colesburg  —  Strength  of    Boer  Posi- 
tions, 26 

Colonial  Burghers  —  British  subjects 
fighting  on  Boer  Side,  Boer  Hopes 
of  Assistance  unfulfilled,  405,  406, 
408.  420 

British  Government  Intentions  with 

regard  to  Rebels,  394,  395 
Proposal  for  General  Amnesty,  413, 

414 

Safeguarding  in  Peace  Negotiations, 
398,  402,  403,  411,  414,  415,  416,  421, 
427 

Commandeering  —  Provisions  of  Com- 
mando Law,  3 

Commander-in-Chief  of  Orange  Free 
State— 

De  Wet,  Gen. — App  intment  of,  49 

Secret  Election  of,  118 
Prinsloo  Election  of,  6,  7 


INDEX 


Commando  Law— Provisions  as  to  Com- 
mandeering, 3 
Commandos — Division  of   into  small 

parties,  225 
Advantages  of,  227 
List  of  Districts  and  Commandants, 

225-227 

Skirmishes,  Splendid  Record,  267 
Small  Commandos  sent  into  Cape 

Colony — De  Wet  s  Policy,  234 
(For  particular  Commandos  see  their 

names) 

Commissariat — Comparison  of  Boer  and 
British  Commissariat  Arrangements, 
4.  5.  6,  7 

Compensation  for  Boer  Losses,  see  Repa- 
triation 

Concentration    Camps  —  Number  of 
Deaths  in,  etc.,  416,  419,  426 
Women — Flight  of  to  avoid  being  sent 
to  Camps,  193,  279 
Maintenance  of  Boer  Women  and 
Children  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment— PresidentSteyn  on, 257,258 
Treatment  of,  232,  257,  258 
Conduct  of  the  War  by  British— Ex- 
haustion of  the  Republics,  419 
Continuance  of  the  War  in  1902,  Veree- 
niging  Conference — 
Burghers,  Attitude  of,  404,  405,  410, 
411 

Effect  on  Vereeniging  Meeting,  413, 
414 

Comparison  of  Situation  with  that  of 
1877-1881,  Futility  of,  421,  422 

De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief, 
Speech,  407 

Kruger's,  President,  Advice,  420 

Possibility,  Question  of — Situation  in 
South  African  Republic,  Reliance 
on  Government,  etc.,  347,  348,  349, 
350,  351,  352.  353,  354-358.  359,  360- 
362,  363,  399,  400,  401,  402,  403,  404, 
405,  407,  408,  410,  412,  413,  414,  415, 
417,  418,  420,  421,  422,  423,  424,  426 

Reasons  for,  400,  401 
Correspondence  relating  to  the  War, 

Preservation  of,  247 
Court  Martial  on  Commandant  Vilonel, 

Composition  of,  note  85 
Cowboys,  Capture  by  Boers — Blauw- 

bank  Capture,  33,  34 
Cronje,  Commandant — Continuance  of 
the  War,  Reliance  on  God,  etc.,  402 

European  Intervention,  Boer  Deputa- 
tion to  Foreign  Courts,  402,  403 

Cronje,  Gen.  A.  P. — Modder  Spruit, 
Command  at,  11 

Banna's  Post,  Share  in  Engagement, 
64 

Vechtgeneraal  of  Orange  Free  State, 
Nomination  as,  11 
Cronje,  Gen.  Piet— De  Wet's,  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Scheme  for  break- 
ing Lord  Methuen's  Railway  Com- 
munications —  Refusal  to  permit 
Execution  of,  23 


Cronje,  Gen.  Piet,  continued— 

Ladysmith,  Occupation  of  Positions 

South  and  Southwest  of,  19 
Magersfontein — Command  at,  23,  24 
Refusal  to  profit  by  Commander- 
in-Chief  De  Wet's  Advice,  25 
Message  in  reply  to  Commander- 
in-Chief  De  Wet's  warning  before 
Paardeberg,  31 
Retreat  towards  Paardeberg,  36,  37 
Surrender  at  Paardeberg  {see  Paarde- 
berg) 

Cronje,  Vechtgeneraal  Andreas — Com- 
mand of  Boers'  Reinforcements  from 
Bloemfontein,  45 

Cropper,  F.  C,  Death  of,  near  Lindley, 
269 

Dakasburg  Engagement,  200 
Dalgety,  Colonel — Command  at  Baden- 
horst,  77 

Davel,  Commandant  —  Command  of 
President  Steyn's  Bodyguard,  191 

Days  of  Thanksgiving  and  Humiliation, 
Appointment  of,  243 

De  Clercq,  Mr. — Continuance  of  the 
War,  Terms  of  Surrender,  399 
Situation  in  South  Africa  on  May  15, 
1902 — Report  to  the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  344,  348 

De  la  Rey,  General — Colesberg  Com- 
mand, 24 

Continuance  of  the  War,  Terms  of 

Surrender,  etc.,  403,  404 
Fortitude  after  Fall  of  Pretoria,  93 
Independence  of  the  South  African 

Republic — Powers  of  Vereeniging 

Delegates  to  decide  on  Question, 

411,  412 

Kraaipan,  Capture  of  Armoured 
Train,  8 

Kroonstad  War  Council,  Presence  at, 
58 

Magersfontein  Laager,  Command  at, 
23 

Mission  to  Europe  on  behalf  of  Relief 
Fund  Committee,  428 

Peace  Negotiations — Member  of  Com- 
mission of  National  Representatives 
at  the  Pretoria  Conference,  320, 
365-396 

Permission  given  to  Burghers  to  re- 
turn home,  56 

Reitfontein,  Work  at,  52 

Roberts',  Lord,  Attempt  to  cross  the 
Orange  River — Success  in  prevent- 
ing, 26 

Situation  in  South  Africa  on  May  15, 
1902  —  Report  to  the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  358 
Steyn's,  President,  and  General  de 
Wet's  visit  to,  300 

De  Lange — Sentence  of  Death  for  High 
Treason  at  Blijelschap,  268  note 

De  Wet,  General  Piet— Advice  to  Com- 
mander-in-Chief De  Wet  after  Siege 
of  Badenhorst,  8i 


433 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


De  Wet,  General  Piet.  continued — 
Discontinuance  of  Struggle  proposed 
— Commander-in-Chief    de  Wet's 
Reception  of  Proposal,  130 
Lindley  Garrison,  Capture  of,  92 
Sauna's  Post  Eagagement,  Share  in, 
64 

Swartbooiskop,  Guarding  after  Fight 
at  Nicholson's  Xek,  17 
De  Wet,  Jacobus,  Capture  of,  296,  297 
De  Wet,  Johannes — Death  near  Smith- 
field,  181 

De  Wet,  Veldtcornet — Wounded  during 
Retreat  from  Dewetsdorp,  181 

Debtors,  Protection  of,  against  Credit- 
ors for  Six  Months  after  the  War — 
Peace  Negotiations  at  Pretoria 
(May,  1902),  387 

Declaration  of  War  by  South  African 
Republic  {_see  Ultimatum) 

Deputation  to  European  Powers  to  ask 
for  Intervention  (1900) — Departure 
from  Delagoa  Bay,  53,  54 
Encouragement  to  continue  Struggle, 
407 

England's  Refusal  to  permit  Return 
of  Deputation,  409,  412,  413 

European  Governments  unwilling  to 
receive,  415,  416 

Failure  of,  355,  356 

Object  of,  54 

Silence  of,  401,  402,  403,  404,  405,  407 
Delagoa  Bay  Harbour,  Forbidden  to 
Boers  by  Portuguese  Government, 
53,  note  54 
Destitution  caused  by  the  War,  321,  322 
Appointment  of  Committee  to  Collect 
and  Administer  Relief  Funds,  428 
Devastation  by  the  British— War  against 
Boer  Property,  192 
Crops  destroyed,  Corn  burnt,  etc., 
note  83 

Male  Attire,  Burning  of,  221,  222 
Farm-burning  and  Waggons  (j^^r*?  those 
titles) 

Dewetsdorp,  Occupation  by  British,  71 
Storming  by  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet's  Forces,  174-179 
Diederiks  of  Boshof,  Commandant,  24 
Discipline  of  Boer  Forces — Imperfect 
Discipline,  7,  8,  9,  57 
Failure  to  remove  Cattle  along  Rail- 
way Line, iii 
Roodewal,   Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet's  Difficulties  in  carrying  away 
Booty,  103,  104 
Sauna's  Post,  irritating  Results  at,  67 
Stricter  Discipline,  Results  of,  61 
Taljaart's  and   Prinsloo's,  Veldtcor- 
nets,  Burghers   "preferred  to  go 
their  own  way,"  286 
Waggon  Difficulty,  120,  121 

Harrismith   Burghers'    Refusal  to 
part  with  their  Waggons  at  Spits- 
kopje,  161-163 
Doornberg,  War  Council  at — Decision 
as  to  Presidential  Election,  197 


Doornspruit  —  Line  near  crossed  by 
Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet,  Capt- 
ure of  Train,  Ammunition,  etc.,  132 
Drakensberg  Range — 

Boundary  between  Boer  and  British 

Territory  in  1899,  7,  8 
Passes,  Occupation  by  Orange  Free 
State  Commandos,  7,  8 
Drive  Tactics  of  British — 

Bethlehem  -  Lindley    to  Frankfort- 
Vrede    Line  —  Cordon    of  Sixty 
Thousand  Men,  290-296 
Boer  Forces  caught  between  Cordon 
of  Troops  and  Vaal  River,  135,  136 
Harrismith,  Heilbron  and  Bethlehem 
District,  285,  286 
Du  Toit,  General — Continuance  of  the 
War,  Terms  of  Surrender,  etc.,  400, 
401 

Dundee,  Line  near,  cut  by  Commander- 
in-Chief  de  Wet,  9,  10 

Elandsfontein  Engagement — Command- 
ant Michal  Prinsloo's  Exploit,  119, 
120 

Elandskop — British  Attack  in  Hope  of 
Capturing  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet,  290,  291 

Elandslaagte  Engagement,  114 

Els,  Veldtcornet  Marthinus,  wounded 
outside  Ladysmith,  20 

Epithets  applied  by  the  British  to  the 
Boer  Forces,  227,  228 

European  Journals  kept  from  Republics 
by  England,  409 

Eustin,  Lieut.  Banie,  wounded  and  capt- 
ured by  British,  204,  205 

Extermination  of  the  South  African  Re- 
publics— British  Determination  to 
exterminate  the  Republics  prior  to 
the  Outbreak  of  War,  alleged,  254, 
255 

Fanny's  Home  Farm — Recapture  of 
Guns  by  British,  285 

Farm-burning,   etc.,  by  the   British — 
Heilbron,  Bethlehem  and  Harri- 
smith District,  285 
Roberts',   Lord,  Proclamations,  or- 
dering, 192 
Shelter,  Lack  of— Women  living  in 

Narrow  Sheds,  290,  291 
Wholesale  Destruction  of  Farms  by 
the  British,  232 

Fauresmith  and  Jacobsdal  Burghers — 
Failure  to  rejoin  Commandos,  60 
Return    Home  without  Permission 
after  Poplar  Grove,  56 

Ferreira,  Mr.  T.  S.,  Commander-in- 
Chief,  at  Kimberley — Death  due  to 
Gun  Accident,  49 

Firing  of  the  Veldt  by  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet.  141,  142 

Fissher,  Abraham— Member  of  Boer 
Deputation  to  Europe  (1900),  53,54 

Food  Supply— Failure  of  Food  Supply, 
Reason' for  Acceptance  of  British 


434 


INDEX 


Food  Supply,  continued— 

Peace  Terms,  233,  321,  401,  402,  405, 
406,  410,  416,  417,  421,  422,  427,  428 
Kemp's,  Gen.,  Plan  of  Commandeer- 
ing Food  Supplies  from  the  Kaffirs, 
345 

Situation  in  the  various  Districts  on 
May  15,  1902 — Reports  of  the  Dele- 
gates to  the  Vereeniging  Confer- 
ence, 337,  338,  339,  340,  341,  342, 
343.  344,  345.  346,  355,  361,  362 
Forces — Comparison  between  numbers, 
etc.,  engaged  on  either  Side  in  the 
War,  339 

(See   also  titles    Boer  and  British 
Forces) 

Fourie,  General  Piet — Bethlehem  En- 
gagement, 281 
Blauwbaak,  Exploits  at,  33,  34,  35 
Cape  Colony  Expedition,  Part  in,  201, 

202,  203,  204,  205,  206,  207,  210,  212, 

213,  221,  222 
Commandos  escaped  from  behind  the 

Roodebergen, Command  of,  238,  239 
Despatch  of,  to  the  South-Eastern 

Districts,  225 
Engagement  with  British  Troops  from 

Bloemfontein  (1900),  80 
Prinsloo's  Surrender,  Escape  from, 

128 

Springhaansnek,  Leader  in  Attack  on 
Blockhouse  Line,  187,  188,  189 

Vice-Commander-in-Chief  in  Bloem- 
fontein District,  Appointment,  157 
Franchise — British  Government  De- 
mands on  the  South  African  Repub- 
lic prior  to  Outbreak  of  War,  252, 
253'  254 

Frankfort,  British  Success  at  (1900),  82 
Ross',     Commandant,  Engagement 
with  Colonel  Rimington's  Troops, 
267 

Fraser,  Gordon — One  of  two  faithful 
Burghers  of  Philippolis  District,  94 
Frederiksstad  Station — Attack  by  Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet  and  Gene- 
ral Liebenberg  on  General  Barton, 
Causes  of  Failure,  etc.,  165-168 
French,  General — 

Koedoesberg,  Fight  for,  27 
Magersfontein — Boer  Lines  broken 
through,  36,  37 
Froneman,  General — 

Continuance  of  the  War  at  all  Costs 

advocated,  402,  403 
Escape  from  Paardeberg,  41 
Frederiksstad,    Attack    on  General 
Barton — Failure  to  hold  advanced 
Position,  165,  166,  167 
Koedoesberg,  Share  in  Fighting  at, 
27,  28 

Kroonstad  War  Council,  Presence  at, 
58 

Prinsloo's  Surrender — Escape  from, 
128 

Railway  Line  wrecked  near  America 
Siding,  115,  116 


Froneman,  General,  continued— 
Reddersburg,  March  on,  72,  73 
Rhenosterriviersbrug  Engagement, 

99,  loi,  104,  105 
Sauna's  Post  Engagement,  Share  in, 

62 

Smithfield  Expedition,  Results  of,  79 
Train  captured  by,  near  Jagersfon- 

tein  Road  Station,  203,  204 
Ventersburg,  Failure  to  hold  Position, 

85 

Gatacre,  General — Capture  of  Storm- 
berg,  50 

Gatsrand — Death  of  Danie  Theron,  153, 
154 

Germany — Attitude  towards  the  War, 
Reasons  for  Non-intervention,  358, 

359 
Gladstone — 
Assistance  rendered  to  South  African 
Republic  in  War  of  1877-1881,  422, 
423 

De    Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief, 
tribute  to,  85 
Goldfields — Surrender  of,  to  the  British 
proposed,  350,  351,  352,  357,  358, 
359.  360,  361,  362,  363,  364 
Gouveneurskop — General    de  Villiers' 

Exploits  at,  83 
Government  of  Orange  Free  State — 
Accompanying  Commander-in-Chief 
de  Wet  in  Departure  from  Roode- 
bergen, 124,  129 
Bethlehem,  Transference  to,  117 
Cape  Colony,  Expedition  into.  De- 
cision to  accompany,  197 
Capture  of  Members  of  the  Govern- 
ment by  the  British  at  Reitz — Es- 
cape of  President  Steyn,  244 
De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  Op- 
erations after  Prinsloo's  Surrender 
— Government  accompanying  Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet,  124,  129 
Executive  Raad,  Constitution  of,  198 
Heilbron,  Transference  to,  86 
Kroonstad,  Transference  to,  58 
Third  Transference,  Reasons  for,  92 
Volksraad  —  Impossibility  of  assem- 
bling a  legally  constituted  Volks- 
raad, 198,  199 
Government   of    South    African  Re- 
public— 

Capture  of  Members  by  the  British  at 
Reitz,  244 

Appointments  to  Vacancies,  244 
Treachery  on  the  part  of  Burgher 
Steenekamp,  244 
Steyn's,  President,  Visit  to  Machado- 
dorp,  144 

Termination  of  the  War  {see  that  title) 
Governments  of  the  Orange  Free  State 

and  South  African  Republic — 
Peace    Deliberations,     Meeting  at 

Klerksdorp.  303,  305 
Peace  Negotiations  at  Pretoria,  Boer 

Proposals   for   Retention  of  Self- 


435 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Governments,  continued— 

Government  under  British  super- 
vision, 366,  371,  372 
Grain  Waggons,  captured  by  British 

near  Vredefort,  133 
"Granary"  of  Orange  Free  State  lost 

to  Boers,  84 
Grant  by  the  British  Government  for 
Repatriation  Purposes,  Re-stocking 
Farms,  etc.,  394 
Great  Britain,  King  of — Thanks  of  Boer 
Generals   for   Efforts   to  promote 
Peace — Resolution  at  the  Vereeni- 
ging  Conference,  346 
Grobler,  Commandant  H.  S. — Continu- 
ance of  the  War,  Impossibility  of 
carrying  on  the  Struggle,  406 
Grobler,  Mr.  E.  R.— Colesberg  Com- 
mand, 22 
Groenkop,  Description  of,  278 
*'  Guerillas  " — 
Designation  of  Boer  Forces  by  the 
British  as  "Guerillas,"  Objections 
to  the  term,  228,  229 
Meaning  of  the  term,  229 
Guns — 

Boer  Captures — 
Blauwbank,  33 
Colenso  and  Stormberg,  22 
Dakasburg  Engagement — 
Capture  of    a  Maxim-Norden- 
feldt,  200 
Dewetsdorp,  178 
Nicholson's  Nek,  16 
Sanna's  Post,  67,  69 
Tweefontem,  282 
Boer  Losses,  208,  209 

Bothaville,  Number  lost  at,  170,  171 
Fanny's  Home  Farm,  Recapture  of 

Guns  by  the  British,  285 
Frederiksstad,  Retreat  after — Loss 

of  one  gun,  167 
Springhaansnek,  Gun  Abandoned, 
189,  190 

Ventersdorp,  Loss  of  Krupp  Gun 
near,  141 


*•  Hands-uppers,"  British  use  of,  18 
Harbour,  Boer  Lack  of,  note  53 
Harrismith — 

Engagement    with    British  Troops 
near,  272-274 
Boer  Casualties,  274 
Failure  of  Boer  Charge,  273 
Orange  Free  State  Troops,  Concen- 
tration at,  4,  6 
Harrismith  Burghers — 
De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  Visit 
to,  260 

Surrender  following  Prinsloo's  Sur- 
render, 128 

Waggon,  Refusal  to  part  with — Re- 
turn home,  161-163 
Hasebroek,  Commandant— Cape  Colony 
Expedition — Holding  the  Enemy  in 
Check,  212,  215,  219,  220 


Hasebroek,  Commandant,  continued— 
Engagement  with  Colonel  White  near 
Thaba'Nchu,  189,  190 

Hattingh,  General — Command  at  Harri- 
smith and  Vrede  Commandos,  161 
Commander-in-Chief  in  the  Drakens- 
berg  Appointment,  117 

Hattingh,  Veldtcornet  Johannes- 
Leader  in  Springhaansnek  Attack 
on  Blockhouse  Lines,  187 

Heenop,  David — Swimming  the  Orange 
River,  220 

Heilbron — District  to  which  Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet  belonged, 
4 

Government  of  Orange  Free  State 
transferred  to,  86 

Mentz,  Commandant  F.  E.,  Engage- 
ment with  Colonel  Byng's  Column, 
267 

Heilbron  Commando  —  Commandant 
Mr.  L.  Steenekamp,  4 

Vice-Commandant,  Election  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet,  7 

Visits  to,  by  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet,  230,  243 
Heliographic  Communication,  Use  by 

Boers,  286  note,  289 
Hertzog,  Judge — Continuance  of  the 
War,  Arguments  for  and  against 
— Vereeniging  Conference,  412 

Despatch  of,  to  the  South-Westem 
Districts,  225 

Mission  to  bring  back  Commandos 
which  had  escaped  from  Prinsloo's 
Surrender,  137 

Peace  Negotiations — Member  of  Com- 
mission of  National  Representatives 
at  the  Pretoria  Conference,  320,  365- 
396 

Rejection  of  British  Terms — Proposal, 
425,  426 

Report  on  Attitude  of  Burghers  in 
North-Western  Parts  of  Cape 
Colony,  195 
Vice-Commander-in-Chief,  Appoint- 
ment in  Districts  of  Fauresmith, 
etc.,  158 

Hides  for  I'anning — Destruction  by  the 

British,  233 
Hijs,  Commandant,  P.  L. — Impossibility 

of  European  Intervention,  401,  402 
Holspruits — Boers    breaking  through 

British  Lines,  293,  294 
Honing  Kopjes — Commander-in-Chief 
de  Wet's   first   Engagement  with 
Lord  Kitchener,  108-110 
Honingspruit  Station,  Failure  of  Com- 
mandant Olivier's  Attack,  115,  116 
Horses- -Bothaville,  Capture  of  Horses 
by  Boers,  299 
Condition  of  Boer  Horses,  338,  339, 

341,  342.  343.  344.  345.  346,  355 
Dependence  of  the  Boers  on  their 

Horses,  172 
Fodder,  Scarcity  of,  341,  355 
Skin  Disease  among,  271,  272 


INDEX 


Horses,  continued — 
Wild  Horses  of  the  Veldt,  Use  of,  by 
the  Boers,  292,  293 
Humihation  Days,  Appointment  of,  243 

Independence  of  the  Republics — 
Afrikander  Feeling  as  to,  58 
British  Government  Attitude  towards, 
337 

Correspondence  between  Presidents 
Kruger  and  Steyn  and  Lord  Salis- 
bury, 330-332 

De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief, 
Meetings  to  ascertain  the  feeling  of 
the  Burghers  as  to  Surrender  of 
Independence,  313 

"  Irretrievably  Lost,"  419 

Maintenance  of — Burghers'  Mandate 
to  Vereeniging  Delegates,  333,  337, 
338,  347,  348,  362,  363,  400,  401,  402, 
403,  404,  405,  407,  411,  412,  417,  421, 
422,  423,  424 

Peace  Negotiations — Conference  at 
Pretoria  between  Commission  of  the 
National  Representatives  and  Lords 
Kitchener  and  Milne.  ("May  19-28, 
1902),  366,  370,  371 

Refusal  of  the  British  Government  to 
consider  Terms  based  on  Retention 
of  Independence,  53,  54,  309,  310, 
397 

Steyn,  President,  Views  of,  306 
Surrender  of— Conditions  offered  by 

the  British  in  exchange,  346,  347,  358 
Vereeniging  Conference,  opinions  of 

Burghers'  Delegates,  333,  336,  346, 

347.  348,  350,  351.  352.  353,  354,  362, 

363,  364 

Intervention  of  Foreign  Powers  on  be- 
half of  the  Republics — 
Attitude  of  England  towards,  356,  362, 
363 

Boer  Deputation  to  European  Powers 
{see  Deputation) 

Boer  Hopes  unfulfilled,  405,  406,  412, 
414,  415,  416,  423,  424 

Germany,  Reasons  for  Non-interven- 
tion, 358,  359 

Improbabihty  of  Intervention,  355, 
358,  359,  360,  361,  362,  363,  433 

Intervention  not  desired  by  Boers,  54 

Steyn,  President,  on,  354,  355 

Jameson  Raid,  President  Steyn  on,  251, 
252 

Jew  at  Nicholson's  Nek— Burgher  de- 
clining to  do  Business,  15 

Johannesburg  Police,  Behaviour  at 
Nicholson's  Nek,  15,  16 

Jonson,  Burgher,  Death  at  Bester  Sta- 
tion—First Victim  in  the  Fight  for 
Freedom,  10,  11 

Joubert,  General — Junction  with  Or- 
ange Free  State  Forces  at  Rietfon- 
tein,  13 

Kroonstad  War  Council,  Presence  at, 
58 


Kaffirs — Arming  by  England,  422,  423 
Attitude  towards  the  Boers — Reports 
of  Vereeniging  Delegates,  337,  338, 
339>  340,  343,  345,  346,  355,  361,  362, 
363 

Boer  Women,  Treatment  of,  151,  152, 
153 

Capture  of  Kaffirs  by  Boers  at  De- 
wetsdorp,  178,  179 

Release  of  Prisoners,  181 

Treatment  of  Kaffirs  by  Boers — Kaf- 
firs captured  at  Leeuwspruit 
Bridge,  113 

Warfare,  Native  Methods — Boer  Suf- 
ferings at  the  Hands  of  Zulus  and 
Basutos,  10 
Kemp,  General — Continuance  of  the 
War,  Independence  of  the  Repub- 
lics, etc. ,  421,  422 

Situation  in  South  Africa  on  May  15, 
1902 — Report  to  the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  345,  347,  348 
Kitchener,  Lord — Armistice  agreed  on. 
to  admit  of  Attendance  of  Boer 
Officers  at  the  Vereeniging  Meet- 
ing, 316 

Misunderstanding  on  the  Part  of  the 
British  Columns,  317,  318 

Capture  of  President  Steyn  and  Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet  anticipated 
— Visit  to  Wolvehock  Station,  290, 
291 

Escape  from  Armoured  Train,  near 
Leeuwspruit  Bridge,  112 

Honingkopjes  and  Roodepoort — Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet's  first  En- 
gagement with  Lord  Kitchener,  108, 
109 

Independence  of  Republics  as  basis 
for  Peace  Negotiations,  Refusal  to 
consider — Pretoria  Conference,  309, 

3io>  397 
Kroonstad,  Arrival  at,  iii 
Middelburg  Peace  Proposals  {see  that 

title) 

Peace  Negotiations — Conference  at 
Pretoria  with  Commission  of  Na- 
tional Representatives  (May  19-28, 
1902),  320,  365,  395,  396 

Proposals  by  the  Boer  Representa- 
tives in  April,  1902,  305-313 

Prisoners,  Order  given  to  Gen.  Knox 
"not  to  take  prisoners"  —  South 
African  News  Statement,  184,  185 
Klerksdorp — Peace  Deliberations, Meet- 
ing of  Governments  of  the  Repub- 
lics, 303,  304,  305 
Knight,  Captain  Wyndham — 

Surrender  at  Rhenosterriviersbrug, 
105,  106 

Tribute  to,  by  Commander-in-Chief 
de  Wet,  107 
Knox,  General  —  Bethlehem,  Engage- 
ment near,  with  Generals  Botha  and 
Fourie,  and  Commandant  Prinsloo, 
194,  195 

Cape    Colony — Commander-in-Chief 


437 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Knox,  General,  continued— 

de  Wet's  Operations — Attempted 
Inroad  —  Fighting  near  Smithfield, 
i8i 

Expedition  into  Cape  Colony,  Dispo- 
sitions to  prevent,  201,  202,  203 
Kroonstad  taken  by,  194,  195 
Pursuit  of  Commander-in-Chief  de 

Wet,  185,  186,  187,  189,  190 
Thaba'Nchu,      Engagement  near, 
with  Gen.  Fourie,  201,  202 
Koedoesberg — Struggle  between  Gene- 
ral   French    and  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet,  27,  28,  29 
Kotze,  Mr.  (General  Prinsloo's  Secreta- 
ry)— Bearer  to  Commander-in-Chief 
de  Wet  of  News  of  General  Prinsloo's 
Surrender,  135,  136,  137 
Kraaipan — Armoured    Train  captured 

by  Boers,  8,  9 
Kritzinger,  Commandant — Crossing  of 
Orange  River,  Seizure  of  British 
Outpost,  195,  196 
Kritzinger,  Commandant,  and  Captain 
Scheepers — Engagement  with  Bra- 
bant's Horse,  185,  186 
Krom  Ellenborg,  Sub-district  to  which 
Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet  be- 
longed, 4 
Kroonstad — British  Advance,  86,  87 
Abandonment  by  Boers,  87,  88 
Capture  by  General  Knox,  194,  195 
Government  of  Orange   Free  State 

transferred  to,  58 
Government  of  Orange  Free  State 

transferred  to  Heilbron,  86,  87 
Kitchener's  Lord,  Arrival — Strength 
of  British  Forces,  etc.,  iii 
Kroonstad  Commando,  Share  in  Battle 

of  Modderspruit,  10,  11 
Kruger,    President — Despatch  of  Mis- 
sion to  Europe  to  represent  Condi- 
tion of  the  Country  to  President 
Kruger,  proposed,  236,  237,  238 
Peace,  Joint  Letter  to  Lord  Salisbury 
stating   Conditions   on  which  the 
Republics   were   willing  to  make 
Peace,  330,  331,  332 
Poplar  Grove,  Visit  to  Boer  Troops 
at,  50 

War  Council  at  Kroonstad,  Presence, 
at,  58 

Krugersdorp — Potchefstroom  Railway 
— Crossed  by  Commander-in-Chief 
de  Wet,  149 


Ladysmith — 

British  Retreat  on  Ladysmith,  9,  10 
Bulwana  Hill  —  Boers  surprised  by 

British,  21 
Engagement  of  3rd  Nov.,  1899,  29, 

20 

Relief,  50 

Landsheer,  Doctor  de — Death  at  Botha- 
ville,  English  Newspaper  Report, 
170,  171 


Language  Question — 
Equal  Rights  for  English  and  Dutch 
Languages  in  Schools — Boer  Peace 
Proposals  to  Lord  Kitchener  (April, 
1902),  308,  309 
Terms  of  the  Peace  Protocol,  380,  393, 
394 

Objections  to,  412,  421,  422 
Leeuwspruit   Railway   Bridge  —  Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet's  Scheme 
for  breaking  British  Lines  of  Com- 
munication, 112 

Froneman's,  General,  Failure  to  carry 
out  Instructions,  113 

Kitchener's  Lord,  Escape,  112 
Leeuwspruit  vScheme,  Failure  of,  112 

Methuen's,  Lord,  Railway  Communi- 
cations— General  Cronje's  Refusal 
to  permit  Execution  of  Command- 
er-in  Chief  de  Wet's  Scheme  for 
Cutting,  23 

Orange  Free  State  Railway — Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet's  Work  on, 
153,  154 

Scheepers,  Captain,  Work  of,  154 
Wolvehoek,  Wrecking  the  Railway, 
163 

Liebenberg,  General — 

Frederiksstad — Failure  of  Attack  on 
General  Barton,  164,  165,  166,  167 

Mooi  River,  Junction  with  Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet,  140,  141 

Retreat  from  Rustenburg,  142,  143 
Liebenbergsvlei — 

British  Retreat,  284 

Guns,  Recapture  by  British  at  Fan- 
ny's Home  Farm,  285 
Lindley — 

British  Garrison  Captured  by  General 
Piet  de  Wet,  92 

Destruction  by  the  British,  Alleged, 
271,  272 

Engagement  near,  268 

Postponement  of  Second  Boer  Attack 
— Escape  of  the  British  during  the 
Night,  270 

Halt  of  Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet's 
Forces,  271,  272 
Lindley  -  Kroonstad  Line  of  Block- 
houses— Boers  breaking  through 
the  Line,  287 
Lines  of  Communication — Boer  At- 
tempts to  cut  British  Lines,  172,  246 

America  Siding  Railway  Line 
Wrecked  by  General  Froneman, 
115,  116 

De     Wet,  Commander-in-Chief, 

Schemes  of,  149,  150,  151,  152,  153 
Frederiksstad  Station — Wrecking  of 

Railway  Bridge  and  Line,  140,  141 
"Little    Majuba" — Name     given  to 

Swartbooiskop    after  Nicholson's 

Nek,  13 

Loans  by  the  British  Government  for  re- 
stocking Farms,  etc.,  394 
Long  Tom  damaged  by  Dynamite,  21 
Looting  by  British,  6,  7 


INDEX 


Losses  in  Killed,  Wounded,  etc.,  on 
either  side  during  the  War,  201,  202, 
247,  265,  266,  415,  416,  417,  422, 
423 

Blijdschap,  269 

Bothaville,  170,  171 

Cape  Colony  Expedition,  206,  207,  208, 

209 
Colenso,  22 

Dakasburg  Engagement,  200 

Dewetsdorp,  177,  178 

Engagement  between  Commandant 

Hasebroek  and    Colonel  White, 

189 

Frederiksstad  Engagement,  166,  167 

Heilbron,  26 

Koffiefontein,  35,  36 

Ladysmith,  Engagement  of  3rd  Nov., 

1899,  20 
Leeuwspruit  Bridge,  112,  113 
Lindley,  267,  269 
Magersfontein,  23 
Modder  Spruit,  11 
Nicholson's  Nek,  16 
Paardeberg,  50 
Prinsloo's  Surrender,  127 
Reitz,  265 

Rhenosterriviersbrug,  105 
Roodewal,  Extent  of  British  Losses, 
102 

Banna's  Post,  66,  67,  68,  69,  70 

Stinkfontein,  40,  46 

Stormberg,  23 

Tijgerfontei!!,  138,  139 

Tweefontein,  181 

Vanvurenskloof,  139,  140 

Verkijkersdorp,  239,  240 

Vredefort  Engagement,  134,  135 
Loyalty  to  British  Government — Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet's  Final  Ad- 
vice to  the  Boers,  324 
Lubbe,    Commandant  —  Return  from 
Paardenberg's  Drift,  36,  37 

Wounded  and  Captured  near  Tha- 
ba'Nchu,  82 
Lyddite  Shells,  Effect  of— 

Bethlehem  Incident,  121,  122 

Magersfontein  Laager,  24 

Maagbommen,  5 

Macdonald,  General  Sir  Hector — 
Command  of  Reinforcements  against 

Bethlehem,  121,  122 
Machadodorp— President  Steyn's  Visit 

to  the  Government  of  the  South 

African  Republic,  144 
Magalies  Mountains,    Passage  of,  by 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet,  145, 

146,  147 
Magersfontein  Engagement — 

Bridsh  Losses,  23 
Magersfontein  Laager — 

De      Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief, 

Command.  23,  24 
Duties  and  Annoyances  of  Command, 

64 

Shelling  hy  British,  24 


Magersfontein  I  aager,  continued— 
Women,  Presence  of— Commander- 
in-Chief  de  Wet's  Failure  to  induce 
Government  to  Prohibit,  25 

Mailbags  captured  at  Roodewal,  Con- 
tents used  by  Boers,  102 

"  Majuba  Day"  —  Capture  of  Com- 
mandant van  Merwe  and  men,  296, 
297 

Malan,  Lieut. — Expedition  into  Cape 
Colony,  206,  207 

Martial  Law — Proclamation  by  Gov- 
ernments of  the  Republics,  7,  8 

Massey,  Major — Command  at  iDewets- 
dorp,  Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet's 
Tribute,  175,  176 

Matthijsen,  Corporal  Adriaan  and  the 
crossing  of  the  Magalies  Mountains, 
146,  147 

Mauser  Rifle  in  Portrait  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  de  Wet,  History  of,  151, 
152 

Mears,  Commandant — Loss  of  Guns  at 

Fanny's  Home  Farm,  285 
Medical     Certificates,    Abuse    of  by 

Burghers,  7iote  59 
Meijer,   Commandant  J. — Tribute  to, 

271,  272 
Mentz,  Commandant  J.  E. — 

Continuance  of  the  War,  Impossibility 

of,  421,  422 
Situation  in  South  Africa  on  isth  May, 
1902 — Report  to    the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  351.  352 
Merve,      Commandant-General  van, 

wounded  at  Sauna's  Post,  68,  69 
Merve,  Commandant  van  der — 
Appointment  to  Command  of  Win- 
burg  Burghers,  64 
Capture  of,  on  ''Majuba  Day,"  296, 
297 

Meyer,  Mr.  J.  L. — Continuance  of  the 
War,  Arguments  against,  Vereenig- 
ing Conference,  413,  414 

Meyer,  Veldtcornet — Loss  of  Position  at 
Stinkfontein,  42 

Middelburg  Peace  Proposals — 
Annulled  by  the  Terms  of  Peace  ar- 
ranged at  the  Pretoria  Conference 
(May,  1902),  392 
Communications  between   the  Boer 
Leaders  with  reference  to  the  pro- 
posed Conference,  230 
Difference  between  the  Basis  of  Ne- 
gotiations proposed  hy    the  Boer 
Representatives  in  May,  1902,  and 
the  Middelburg  Proposals,  367,  372, 
373 

Receipts  issued  by  Boer  Officers, 
Proviso  as  to  Payment,  384,  385 
Milner,  Lord — 

Boer  Ultimatum — Mr.  Chamberlain's 
Telegrams,  329 

Independence  of  Republics  as  Basis 
for  Peace  Negotiations.  Refusal  to 
consider — PretoriaConference,  365- 
396,  397 


439 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Milner,  Lord,  continued— 
Peace  Negotiations  —  Conference  at 
Pretoria  with  Commission  of  Na- 
tional Representatives  (May  18-29, 
1902),  320,  365-396 

Mobility — British  Incapacity  to  keep 
pace  with  Boers,  140,  141  {see  also 
Waggons) 

Modder  River — British  entrenched  at, 
24 

Modder  Spruit,  Battle  of,  9,  10,  11 

Boer  and  British  Losses,  11,  12 
Modderrivierpoort  {see  Poplar  Grove) 
Muller,  Capt. —  Exploit  at  Roodewal, 

lOI 

Muller,  General  C.  H. — Continuance  of 
the  War — Vereeniging  Delegates' 
Refusal  to  accept  British  Surrender 
Proposal,  417 

Myringen,  Burgher,  killed  at  Rhenoster- 
riviersbrug,  105,  106 

Naauwpoort — Prinsloo's  Surrender,  85 
Natal — British  Subjects  fighting  for  the 

Boers  {see  Colonial  Burghers) 
Natal  Operations — 
Absence  of  Commander-in-Chief  de 

Wet  after  9th  Dec,  1899,  21 
Bester  Station  Skirmish,  10,  11 
Colenso,  Magersfontein,  and  Storm- 
berg  Engagements — British  Losses, 
23 

Drakensberg  Passes,  Occupation  by 
Orange  Free  State  Commandos, 
7.8 

Estcourt  Skirmishes — General  Louis 

Botha's  Exploits,  19 
Failure  of  Boers  to  cut  off  English  at 

Dundee  and  Elandslaagte,  9,  10 
Kraaipan,   Capture    of  Armoured 

Train  by  General  de  la  Rey,  8,  9 
Ladysmith  {see  that  title) 
Modder  Spruit,  Battle  of,  9,  10,  11 
Natal  Frontier,  Commander-in-Chief 

C.  de  Wet  s  Reconnaissance,  7,  8 
Nicholson's  Neck  {see  that  title) 
National    Representatives   {see  Peace 

Negotiations) 
National  Scouts — Arming  men  who  had 

taken  the  Oath  of  Neutrality,  159 
Bergh's,  Captain,  Attacks  on  Boers 

with  bands  of  Kaffirs,  271,  272 
Night  Attacks  by  the   British  insti- 
gated by,  263,  264 
Services  to  the  British,  184,  185,  223, 

224 

Naude,  Mr.  J. — Independence  of  the 
South  African  Republic  and  Orange 
Free  State,  Vereeniging  Delegates' 
power  to  decide  as  to  Position  of 
British  Subjects  fighting  on  Boer 
side,  etc.,  411 

Neikerk,  Altie  van — Capture  at  Ho- 
ningkopjes,  186 

Neikerk,  Captain — Appointment  as 
Commandant  of  President  Steyn's 
Bodyguard,  245 


Nel,  Commandant — 

Farm  stormed  by  English — Escape 
of  Commander-in-Chief  C.  de  Wet, 
152,  iS3<  154 

Modder  Spruit — West  Wing  of  Boer 
Forces  commanded  by  Nel,  10,  11 

Nicholson's  Nek— Failure  to  hold 
Swartbooiskop,  13,  14 

Resignation,  115,  116 
Nerwe,  Van  de — Drowned  in  crossing 

Orange  River,  217 
Netherlands — 

Peace  —  Correspondence  with  the 
British  Government,  301,  302 

Boer  Response  to  the  Invitation  im- 
plied in  the  forwarding  of  the 
Correspondence,  etc.,  305,  306,  370, 
371 

Queen  of— Thanks  of  Boer  Generals 
for   efforts    to    promote    Peace — 
Resolution  at  the  Vereeniging  Con- 
ference, 345,  346 
Newspapers — Circulation  of  European 
Papers  prohibited  in  RepubUcs  by 
England,  409 
Nicholson's  Nek — 
Ambulance  for  British  wounded — Sir 

G.  White's  Delay  in  sending,  17 
Booty  taken  by  Boers,  16 
Swartbooiskop — 
Nel's,    Commandant,   Failure  to 

hold,  13,  14 
Storming  by  Steenekamp  and  Com- 
mander-in-Chief C.  de  Wet,  14,  15 
White  Flag  Incident,  15 
Transvaal  Burghers,  Work  of,  17 
Nieuwoudt,  General — Peace,  Rejection 
of  British  Terms,  Proposal,  424,  425 
Night  Attacks  by  the  British — Success 
of,  Losses  caused  to  the  Boers,  263, 
264 

Norvalspont — Commander-in-Chief  C. 
de  Wet's  Schemes  for  Operations  in 
rear  of  British,  81,  82 

Oath  of  Neutrality,  Breaking — Re-arm- 
ing of  Burghers  who  had  taken  the 
Oath,  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet's  Scheme,  156-160 

British   Military  Authorities'  Breach 
of  Terms  of  Lord  Roberts'  Procla- 
mation justifying  Scheme,  159,  160 
Olivier,  Commandant — 

Bethlehem  District,  Appointment  to 
Command,  227,  228 

Honingspruit  Station,  Failure  of  At 
tack  on,  115,  116 

Prinsloo's,  General,  Position  as  Pri- 
vate Burgher,  Dissatisfaction  with, 
118 

Oliviershoekpas — Occupation  by  Beth- 
lehem Commando,  7,  8 
Orange  Free  State — 
Annexation  of— Battles  fought  after 

the  alleged  Annexation,  228,  229 
De  Wet,  Commander-in-Chief,  Re- 
turn of,  144,  150,  15 


440 


INDEX 


Orange  Free  State,  continued — 

Government  {see  Government  of 
Orange  Free  State) 

Number  of  Burghers  in  Arms  alter 
Fall  of  Pretoria,  94 

Outbreak  of  War — Orange  Free  State 
joining  issues  with  the  South  Afri- 
can Republic,  254,  255 

President — Powers  granted  to  Presi- 
dent in  Matters  Concerning  War, 
9,  10 

Situation  of  Boer  and  British  Forces 
in  iqoi,  President  Steyn  on,  255,  256 

Ortel,  Mr.  Charles — Owner  of  Abra- 
ham's Kraal,  51 

Outbreak  of  the  War,  7,  8 

Paardeberg — General  Cronje's  Forces 
surrounded  by  the  British,  Bom- 
bardment of  Laager,  etc. ,  39 
Boer  Reinforcements,  Arrival  of,  45 
Cronje's,  Gen.,  Determination  not  to 

abandon  Laager,  41 
Efforts  to  release  General  Cronje — 
Storming   of  Stinkfontein,  etc., 
40-46 

Abandonment  of  Position  by  Boers, 
44 

Botha's,  General,  Attempt  to  recap- 
ture Position  abandoned  on  25th 
February,  45 

British  Efforts  to  recapture  Position, 

42,  43.  44 
Way  of  Escape  opened  to  General 

Cronje,  41,  43 
Sketch  of  Boer  and  British  Positions, 
38 

Surrender  of  General  Cronje,  47 
Effect  on  Boer  Forces,  48,  49,  51 

Theunisson,  Mr,,  Capture  by  British, 
6,7 

Paardenberg's  Drift,  British  Advance 
on,  30 

Camp  of"  Water-draggers  "  surprised 
by  British,  32,  33 
Palmietfontein — Boers  breaking  through 

Blockhouse  Line,  289,  290 
Panic  among  Boer  Forces — 

Burghers  returning  to  Farms  after 

Fall  of  Pretoria,  93 
Holspruits,  294,  29s 
Peace   Negotiations — Boer  Overtures, 
etc. — 

Armistice  agreed  on,  to  admit  of  at- 
tendance of  Officers  at  the  Vereenig- 
ing  Meeting,  315 

Misunderstanding  on  the  part  of 
the  British  Columns,  317,  318 

Concessions  in  addition  to  the  Terms 
already  offered  in  the  Negotiations 
of  April,  1902,  366 

Conference  at  Pretoria  between  the 
Commission  of  National  Represen- 
tatives and  Lords  Kitchener  and 
Milner  (19-28  May,  1902),  320,  365 
Draft  Document  drawn  up  to  place 
Negotiations    in       position  to 


Peace  Negotiations,  continued— 

amend  the  Middelburg  Proposals, 
376,  377 

Prolongation  of  Meetings  due  to 
Cable  Correspondence  with  Great 
Britain,  397 
Report  of  Commission  discussed  at 
Vereeniging  Meeting,  397 
Governments  of  the  Republics,  Meet- 
ing at  Klerksdorp,  303,  304,  305 
Burger's,  Vice-President,  Letter  to 
President  Steyn,  301,  302 
Independence  {see  that  subheading) 
Middelburg  Peace  Proposals  {see  that 
title) 

National  Representatives — 

Commission  sent  to  the  Pretoria 
Conference  (May,  1902) — 
Decision  to  appoint  Commission, 
364 

Names  of  Members,  412 
Election  of  Representatives  for  the 

Commandos,  313,  314 
Meeting  at  Vereeniging  (15th  May) 

to  consider  the  Situation,  352,  353, 

358,  359,  362,  363 
Peace  Terms  Proposed,  362,  363, 

364 

Netherlands'  Communication  with  the 
British  Government,  301,  302 
Boer  Response  to  the  Invitation  im- 
plied in  the  forwarding  of  the  Cor- 
respondence, etc.,  305,  306,  370, 
371 

Letter  sent  to  Commandos,  336,  345 
346,  347 

Presidents  of  the  Republics — Corre- 
spondence with  Lord  Salisbury,  and 
Lord  Salisbury's  Reply  (5th  March, 
1900),  50,  53.  54,  330-332,  409 

Proposals  to  Lord  Kitchener  (April, 
1902),  299 

Correspondence  between  Lord 
Kitchener  and  the  Secretary  of 
State — Independence  Difficulty, 
401,  402 

Signing  of  Peace  at  Pretoria,  323, 
324 

Steyn's,  President,  Views,  258,  259 
Terms  of  Peace  sanctioned  by  the 

British  Government  and  accepted  by 

the  Boers  (May,  1902) — 

Acceptance  of  British  Terms,  320, 
427,  428 

Acceptance  under  Protest  proposed, 
421 

Dissatisfaction  among  men  of  the 
Commandos,  324 

Failure  of  Food  Supply  as  reason 
for  acceptance,  321 

Unconditional  Surrender  z/.  Accept- 
ance, 399,  401,  404,  405,  417,  423, 
424 

Better  Terms,  Possibility  of  obtaining, 
406,  409,  410,  423,  424 

Decision  as  to  Acceptance  or  Rejec- 
tion essential,  425,  426 


441 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Peace  Negotiations,  continued — 

Middelburg  Proposal  Annulled  by  the 

Terms  of  the  Peace  Protocol  of 

May,  1902,  392 
Milner's,  Lord,  Telegrams,  392 
Rejection  of  Terms  proposed,  424, 

425 

Signatures  to  Acceptance,  Question 

of,  425,  426 
Sub-committee  appointed  to  aid  in 

formulating  Peace  Proposals,  378, 

398 

Text  of  Draft  Proposal  and  of  Draft 
Proposal  with  Amendments  sanc- 
tioned by  the  British  Government, 
379,  393 

Time  allowed  for  discussion  of  Terms, 

394.  395  .       .  , 

"  Ultimatum,"  Description  of  British 
Terms,  321 
Penzhorn,  Mr.,  Relatives  of — Kindness 
to  Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet, 
145 

Petrusberg — Capture  of  by  British,  51 
De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  Vis- 
it, 232 

Plans,  Sketch  Plans  of  Engagements, 
97,  276 

Plessis,  Veldtcornet  du — Death  due  to 
White  Flag  Treachery  at  Redders- 
burg,  76 
Poplar  Grove — 
Concentration  of  Boer  Troops  at,  50 
Kruger's,   President,  Visit  to  Boer 

Troops,  50 
Panic  among  Boers— Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet  unable  to  prevent 
flight,  51 

Potchefstroom,  Portrait  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  de  Wet,  History  of  Mauser 
Rifle,  which  appears  in  the  photo- 
graph, 151,  152 

Potgieter,  Commandant  (of  Wolmaran- 
stadt) — Escape  from  Paardeberg, 
41 

Potgieter,  Mr.   Hendrik — Appointment 
as   Pubhc    Prosecutor   of  Orange 
Free  State,  198 
Preeij,  Vice-Commandant  Ignatius  du, 

killed  near  Bethlehem,  194,  195 
Presidency  of  Orange  Free  State — 
Expiration  of  President  Steyn's  term 
of  office — Difficulties  in  the  way  of 
an  Election,  Action  of  the  Doorn- 
berg  War  Council,  197,  198 
Resignation  of  President  Steyn,  411 
Rhodes,  Mr,,  proposed  as  Candidate, 
198 
Pretoria — 

Capture  by  British,  92 
Panic  ensuing  among  Transvaalers, 
93 

Peace  Negotiations— Conference  be- 
tween Commission  of  National  Rep- 
resentatives and  Lords  Kitchener 
and  Milner  (May  19-28,  1902),  320, 
365 


Pretorius,  Willem — 

Storming  of  British  Schanze  on  Or- 
ange River,  204,  205 
Tribute  to,  271.  272 
Veldtcornet,  Nomination  as,  205,  206 
Prinsloo,  Commandant  Michal — 
Bethlehem  Engagement,  194,  195 
Elandsfontein  Exploit,  119,  120 
Liebenbergsvlei  Engagement,  284 
Springhaansnek,  Covering  Comman- 
der-in-Chief de  Wet's  Passage  of 
Blockhouse  Lines  at,  187,  188 
Train  captured  and  burned  by,  152, 
153 

Vice-Commander-in-Chief  of  Bethle- 
hem and  Ficksburg  Sub-districts, 
Appointment.  227,  228 
Prinsloo,  Mr.  Marthinus — 
Assistant    Commander-in-Chief,  Ir- 
regular Election  as,  126 
Commandant  of  Winburg  District,  6,  7 
Commander  in  Chief  of  Orange  Free 

State,  Election.  6,  7 
Natal    Campaign,    Preliminary  Ar- 
rangements, 7,  8 
Resignation  of  Post  as  Commander- 
in-Chief  in  the  Drakensberg,  117 
Surrender  at  Naauwpoort,  85 

Letter  to  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet  announcing  Surrender  and 
Commander  -  in  -  Chief  de  Wet's 
Reply,  136.  137 
News  brought  to  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet,  135,  136,  137,  138 
Suspicious  Circumstances  of  Sur- 
render, 127 
Prinsloo's,  Veldtcornet,  Burghers,  Capt- 
ure of,  286 
Prisoners — Boer  Prisoners — 

Bank  Notes  of  the  South  African  Re- 
public, Opportunity  of  sending  in 
for  Payment,  386,  387 
Ceylon — Prisoners  taken  with  General 

Prinsloo  sent  to  Ceylon,  156 
Merwe,    Commandant,    and    men — 
Capture  on  "  Majuba  Day,"  296,  297 
Number  taken  by  the  British,  Freder- 

iksstad,  40,  46,  170,  171,  264,  265 
Total  Number  (35,000)  in  the  Hands 

of  the  British  in  1901,  256,  257 
Taljaart's  and  Prinsloo's  Veldtcornets, 

Burghers,  Capture  of,  286 
British  Prisoners — 

Boer  Inability  to  keep  their  Prisoners, 

227,  228,  426,  427 
Clothing  taken  by  the  Boers.  233 
Numbers  taken,  16,  23,  66,  67,  69,  70, 

76,  102,  105,  106,  112,  113.  163.  178, 

179,  185,  186,  194,  195,  202,  203,  205, 

206,  207,  222.  223,  267,  281 
Release  on  Fall  of  Pretoria  due  to 

Transvaalers"  negligence,  92 
Treatment  by  Boers — 

Personal  Property  of  Prisoners,  etc., 
Disposition  of,  loi,  note 

Prisoners  taken  in  Cape  Colony  Ex- 
pedition, Treatment  of,  210 


442 


INDEX 


Prisoners,  continued — 

Kaffir  Prisoners  taken  by  Boers— 
Dewetsdorp,  178,  179 
Release  of  Prisoners,  181 
Leeuwspruit  Bridge,  113 
"  Pro-Boers  "— 
De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  Trib- 
ute to,  218 
Meetings  in  England,  407 
Public    Prosecutor    of    Orange  Free 
State — Appointment  of  Mr.  Hen- 
drick  Potgieter,  198 

Railways — Wrecking  the  Lines,  Cutting 
British  Lines  of  Communication, 
172,  242 

America  Siding,  Line  near,  wrecked 
by  General  Froneman,  115,  116 

De  Aar  and  Hopetown,  Line  blown 
up,  208,  209,  211 

Frederiksstad  Station,  Bridge  and 
Line  wrecked,  115,  116 

Leeuwspruit,  Failure  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  de  Wet's  Attempt,  112, 113 

Orange  Free  State  Line,  Commander- 
in-Chief  de  Wet's  Work  on,  153, 
154,  15s 

Scheepers,  Captain,  Work  of,  153,  154 

Schemes  of  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet,  149,  150,  151,  152,  153 

Wolvehock,  163 
Rebels — Colonial  Burghers  Fighting  on 
Boer  Side  {see  Colonial  Burghers) 

Roberts',  Lord,  Description  of  Burgh- 
ers continuing  to  fight  after  annexa- 
tion of  the  Republics  as  "  Rebels," 
227,  228 

Receipts  issued  by  Boer  Officers  for  the 
Purchase  of  Cattle,   Grain,  etc. — 
Peace  Negotiations,  Boer  Represen- 
tatives' Request  for  a  Guarantee  of 
Payment,  382 
Amount  likely  to  be  required,  386, 387 
Middelburg  Proposal,  384,  385 
Orange    Free    State,    Position  with 
reference  to  Receipts,  383,  384,  385, 
386 

Terms  of  Peace  Agreement,  380 
Reddersburg — Boer  Messenger  fired  on 
by  British,  74 

British  Commanding  Officer's  Reply 
to  Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet's 
Advice  to  Surrender,  74 

De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  Dis- 
positions, 71-74 

Mostertshoek,  British  Failure  to  rein- 
force Detachment  at,  75 

White  Flag  Treachery,  75,  76 
Reich,    Dr. — Commander-in-Chief  de 

Wet's  Meeting  with  at  Senekal,  231 
Reitz — Engagement  near,  263-266 

Surrender  of  Arms  by  Commandos 
after  Declaration  of  Peace,  323,  324 
Reitz,  Secretary  of  State — Situation  in 
South  Africa  on  May  15,  1902,  Re- 
port to  the  Vereeniging  Conference, 
350,  351 


Relief  Funds  for  Destitution  caused  by 
the  War — Appointment  of  Commit- 
tee to  Collect  and  Administer,  428 
Repatriation  of  Boers — Compensation 
for  Losses  sustained  during  the 
War — District  Commissions,  Insti- 
tution of,  393,  394 
Grant   of  ^^3, 000, 000  by  the  British 

Government,  393,  394 
Inadequacy  of  Proposals,  402,  403,  421 
Loans  by  the  British  Government, 
394,  395 

Rheeder,  Commandant — Continuance 
of  the  War,  Terms  of  Surrender, 
etc. ,  401 

Rhenoster  River,  Fighting  on,  89,  90 
Hurried   Retreat  of  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet,  90 
Rhenosterriviersbrug  —  General  Frone- 

man's  Success,  104,  105,  106 
Rhodes,  Mr.  C  — 
Jameson   Raid  —  Mr.  Chamberlain's 

Defence  of  Mr.  Rhodes,  251,  252 
Presidency  of  Orange  Free  State- 
Mr.  Rhodes  proposed  as  a  Candi- 
date, 198 

Rietfontein,    Battle    of    {see  Modder 

Spruit) 
Roberts,  Lord — 
Advance  of,  into   the  Orange  Free 

State,  26 

Bloemfontein,  Appearance  before,  54 
Dispositions  after  Capture  of  Kroon- 

stad  (May  18,  1900),  88,  89 
Inaction  after  Paardeberg,  50 
Thaba'Nchu,  Operations  near  (1900), 

82 

Proclamations — 

Burning  of  Buildings  within  radius 
of  Ten  Miles  from  Railway 
wrecked  by  Boers,  192 
Oath  of  Neutrality,  Proclamation  as 
to  Charge  against  Lord  Roberts 
of  violating  Terms  of  Proclama- 
tion, 80,  159 

Effect  in     preventing  Burghers 
from  rejoining  Commandos,  60 
Roodewal  Disaster  due  to  negligence 

of  Lord  Roberts,  105,  106 
Sanna's   Post,    Failure   to  reinforce 

Troops  at,  70  note 
Ventersburg,  Attack  on,  85 
Roch,  General — Natal  Campaign,  Gen- 
eral Roch's  Command  in  Opening 
Movement  of  Boer  Forces,  9,  10 
Roodebergen — De  Wet's,  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Departure  from,  124,  129 
Occupation  by   Boer  Forces — Com- 
mander-in-Chief De  Wet's  Oppo- 
sition to  Scheme,  124 
Passes  of,  123 
Roodepoort — Commander-in-Chief  De 
Wet's  first  Engagement  with  Lord 
Kitchener,  108,  109 
Roodewal  Station,  Action  at,  98-101 
Booty  burnt  by  Boers,  104,  105 
Sketch  Plan,  97 


443 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Roux,  Assistant  Commander-in-Chief— 
Prinsloo's  Surrender,  weak  and 
childish  Conduct  of  General  Roux, 
126,  127 

Roux,  Deacon  Paul,  Appointment  as 

Vechtgeneraal,  85 
Russian  Reception  of  Escaped  Burghers, 

110  note 

Rustenburg — General  Liebenberg's  Re- 
treat, 142,  143 


Salisbury,  Marquess  of — Peace  Negotia- 
tions, Boer  Proposals  of  March  5, 
1900— Reply  to,  so,  53,  54,  409 

Peace — Correspondence  with  Presi- 
dents Kruger  and  Steyn,  330-332 
Sauna's  Post,  Action  at — 

Broadwood's,  General,  Troops,  Arri- 
val of,  65,  66 

De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  Prep- 
arations, 62,  64 

Koornspruit,  Position  occupied  by 
Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet,  64, 
65.  66 

Women    and    Children   from  Tha- 

ba'Nchu,  Commander-in-Chief  de 

Wet's  Care  for,  66,  67 
Scheepers,  Captain,  and  Commandant 

Kritzinger — 
Brabant's  Horse,  Engagement  with, 

185,  186 

Despatch  Rider  chosen  by  Command- 
er-in-Chief de  Wet,  to  carry  Mes- 
sage to  General  Cronje  before 
Paardeberg,  31,  32 

Orange  River,  Crossing  of — Seizure 
of  British  Outpost,  195,  196 

Railway  Lines,  Wrecking  of,  152, 153, 
154 

Scouting  Services,  124,  131 

Zandnek  Engagement,  139,  140 
Scouting — 

Boer  and  British  Methods— Services 
rendered  to  the  British  by  Boer  De- 
serters, etc.,  18,  121,  122 

Importance  of,  165,  166 

National  Scouts,  Services  of  {see 
National  Scouts) 
Secrecy  as  to  Future  Movements — Com- 
mander-in-Chief de  Wet's  Deter- 
mination to  keep  his  Plans  secret, 
61,  199 

Self-Government,  Retention  of  under 
British  Supervision — Peace  Nego- 
tiations, Boer  Representatives'  Pro- 
posals at  the  Pretoria  Conference 
(May  19,  1902),  366,  371,  372 

Sheep— Huge  Tail  of  African  Sheep, 
211 

Situation  in  South  Africa  on  May  15, 
1902  —  De  Wet's  Commander-in- 
Chief,  Address  at  the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  358-362 

Situation  of  the  Boer  and  British  Forces 
in  1901,  President  Steyn  on,  255, 
256 


Sketch  Plans  of  Engagements,  38,  97, 
276 

Smith,  Veldtcornet  Hans,  of  Rouxville, 
Desertion  after  Roodewal,  106,  107 

Smuts,  General — 

Continuance  of  the  War,  Arguments 
for  and  against — Vereeniging  Con- 
ference, 418 
Peace  Negotiations — Memberof  Com- 
mission of  National  Representatives 
at  the  Pretoria  Conference,  320, 
365-396 

Situation  in  South  Africa  on  May  15, 
1902 — Report  to  the  Vereeniging 
Conference,  340-342 
Sobriety  of  Boers,  60 
South  African  News — Publication  of. 
Order  not  to  take  Prisoners,  Anec- 
dote of  Lord  Kitchener,  184,  185 
South  African  Republic — 

De  W^et's,  Commander  -  in  -  Chief, 
Journey  with  General  De  la  Rey, 
Incidents  during,  238,  239,  242 

Extermination  of,  by  the  British  de- 
termined on  prior  to  the  Outbreak 
of  War,  alleged,  254,  255 

Government  of  {see  Government  of 
South  African  Republic) 

Situation  of.  in  1902 — ImpossibiHty  of 
continuing  the  War,  421,  422 

Situation  of  Boer  and  British  Forces  in 
1901 — President  Steyn  on,  255,  256 
Speller,   Veldtcornet,    of   Wepener — 
Capture  by  British  at  Stinkfontein, 
44 

Springhaansnek  —  Blockhouse  Line 
broken  through  by  the  Boers,  173, 
187,  188 

Spruit,  Commandant — Capture  by  Brit- 
ish at  Stinkfontein,  42,  43  ;  Subse- 
quent Escape,  43 
States-Procureur  of  Orange  Free  State 
— Capture  of  Mr.  Jacob  de  Villiers 
at  Boihaville,  170,  171.  198 
Steenekamp,     Burgher — Betrayal  01 
Members  of  the  South  African  Gov- 
ernment to  the  British,  244 
Steenekamp,  Commandant — 
Assistant-Commander-in-Chief,  Nomi- 
nation as,  144 
Heilbron  District,   Commandant  of, 

4.  6,  7 
Illness  of,  7,  8,  9,  10 
Vredefort  Road  Station,  Attack  on, 
98.  105,  106 
Steyn,  President — 
Accompanying  Commander-in-Chief 
de    Wet   in  his    departure  from 
Roodebergen.  129 
Bethlehem  Engagement,  Presence  at, 
"7 

Bloemfontein,  Departure  from,  57 
Bodyguard — 
Davel,  Commandant,  Command  of, 
191 

Niekert,  Captain— Appointment  as 
Commandant,  245 


444 


INDEX 


Steyn,  President,  continued— 

Botha,  General  Philip,  Visit  to,  86,  87 
Burgher's  Vice-President,  Request  for 

Meeting  with  Orange  Free  State 

Government,  301,  302 
Cape  Colony  Expedition,  Decision  to 

accompany,  197 
Capture  of  Members  of  Governments 

of  the  South  African  Republics  by 

the    British    at     Reitz — President 

Steyn's  Escape,  244 
Causes  of  the  War — Letter  to  Lord 

Kitchener,  250-259 
Commander-in-Chief  of  Orange  Free 

State,  Refusal  to  allow  Election — 

Consent  to  Election  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  de  W^et,  118 
De     Wet's,    Commander-in  -  Chief, 

Schemes  for  operating  in  the  Rear 

of  the  British,  Opposition  to,  82 
De      Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief, 

Tribute  to,  212 
Eyes,  Weakness  of — Visit  to  Dr.  van 

Rennerkamp,  300 
Government  of  the   South  African 

Republic,  Meetings  with — 

Machadodorp  Visit,  144 

Vrede  Meeting,  231 
Illness  of,  319 

Independence  of  the  Republic,  Re- 
fusal to  surrender,  306 

Intervention  of  Foreign  Powers,  Atti- 
tude as  to,  54 

Kroonstad  War  Council  presided 
over  by  President  Steyn,  58 

Peace  —  Correspondence  between 
Presidents  Kruger  and  Steyn  and 
Lord  Salisbury,  330-332 

Resignation  owing  to  Illness,  411 

Ventersdorp  —  Meeting  with  Com- 
mander in  Chief  de  Wet,  168, 
169 

Western  Parts  of  the  State,  Visit  to, 
298-302 

Steyn,  Willie,  Capture  at  Honing  Kop- 
jes— Subsequent  Escape,  no  note 

Stinkfontein,  Stormed  and  Abandoned 
by  Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet, 
40 

Stormberg — 

British  Losses  at,  22,  23 
Capture  by  General  Gatacre,  50 

Stormjagers^  5 

Strauss,  David — Prisoner  taken  by  the 
British  in  contravention  of  Lord 
Roberts'  Proclamation,  80 

Stripping  British  Prisoners  in  order  to 
obtain  Clothing,  233 

Supervision  of  the  British  Government 
— Peace  Negotiations,  Boer  Repre- 
sentatives' offer  to  accept  Super- 
vision as  a  Compromise  on  the 
Independence  Question,  366,  371, 
372,  373 

Surrender — 
Banishment  Proclamation  {see  that 
title) 


Surrender,  continued^ 
Oath  of  Neutrality,  Lord  Roberts' 
Proclamation  {see  Oath  of  Neutral- 
ity) 

Peace  Negotiations  at  Pretoria  in 
May,  1902  —  Draft  Agreement, 
376 

Surrender  of  Arms  after  Declaration  of 

Peace,  323,  324 
Swartbooiskop — 
Nel's  Commandant,  Failure  to  hold, 

13.  14 

Storming  by  Commandant  Steene- 
kamp  and  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet,  14,  15 

Swaziland — Cession  to  the  British,  Pro- 
posals of  the  Vereeniging  Confer- 
ence, 350,  351,  360,  361,  363,  364 

Sympathy  felt  for  Boer  Cause  in  Eng- 
land— Indirect  Intervention,  etc., 
407,  410,  420 


Tabaksberg  Engagement,  83 

Taljaart's,  Veltcornet,  Burghers,  Capt- 
ure of,  286 

Telegraph  Wires — cutting  wires  be- 
tween Wolvebock  and  Viljoensdrift, 
299 

Telegraphic  Communication  between 
Orange  Free  State  and  Transvaal, 
92 

Termination  of  the  War — 

Attitude  of  the  Burghers,  237,  238 
Boer  Women,  Opinion  of,  361,  362 
Conference  between  Transvaal  and 
Orange  Free  State  Governments — 
Decision  to  continue  Fighting,  242, 
243 

Klerksdorp  Meeting,  303,  304,  305 
De   Wet's,    Commander  -  in  -  Chief, 

Forebodings,  58 
Letter  from  Commandants  in  the  Field 
to  Secretary  of  the  Orange  Free 
State- 
Conference  with  Transvaal  Govern- 
ment, 242 
Discussion  of,  by  President  Steyn 
and  Generals  De  la  Rey  and  De 
Wet,  234 
Steyn's    President,    Answer,  Ex- 
tracts from,  236-239 
Terms  of.  234-237 
Mission  to  President  Kruger  on  behalf 
of  South  African  Republic  proposed, 
236,  237,  238 
Vereeniging    Conference — Views  of 
the  Representatives,  346,  347,  348, 
349.  350,  351.  352,  353.  354,  354-358, 
359.  360-362.  363 
Territory,  Session  of — Peace  Negotia- 
tions— 

Pretoria  Conference,  Boer  Repre- 
sentatives' Offer,  366,  375 

Vereeniging  Conference  Proposals 
(15th  May,  1902),  350,  351,  352.  357, 
358,  359.  360.  361,  362,  363. 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Thaba'Nchu — 

De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  Re- 
treat on  after  Badenhorst,  8i 

Occupation  by  General  Broadwood, 
65,  66 

Thanksgiving  Days,  Appointment  of, 
243 

Theron,  Danie — 

Death  at  Gatsrand,  153,  154 

Paardeberg — Passing  Enemy's  Lines 
to  carry  Message  from  Commander- 
in-Chief  de  Wet  to  General  Cronje, 
46 

Scouting  Party,  Appointment  as  Chief 
by  Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet,  54 

Scouting  Services,  88,  89,  124,  131 

Train  Captured  by,  132 
Theron,  Jan — Appointment  to  succeed 
Commandant  Danie  Theron,  153, 
154 

Theunissen,  Commandant  of  Winburg, 
45 

Capture  by  British  at  Stinkfontein,  46 
Election  as  Commandant  of  Winburg, 
6,  7 

Thring,  Veldtcornet — War  Experiences, 

Commander-in-Chief    de  Wet's 

Tribute,  etc.,  87,  88,  89 
Tijgerfontein  Engagement,  138,  139 
Tintwaspas — Occupation  by  Kroonstad 

Commando,  7,  8 
Tonder,  Mr.  Gideon  van — Killed  by 

Lyddite  Shell  at  Magersfontein,  25 
Trains — 

Blowing  up  with  Dynamite,  230,  246 
Devices  to  throw  the  British  off  the 

Scent,  246 
Mechanical  Devices,  246 
Boer  Captures  of,  132, 152, 153,  203,  204 
Transvaalers — 

Negligence  in  leaving  Prisoners  at 

Pretoria,  92 
Nicholson's  Nek,  Work  at,  17 
Truter,  Commandant — Abandonment  of 

Krupp  gun  and  Ammunition,  182 
Tweefontein — Attack  on  British  Posi- 
tion, 275-283 
Sketch  Plan,  276 


Uijs,  Commandant — Situation  in  South 
Africa  on  May  15,  1902,  Report  to 
the  Vereeniging  Conference,  349, 
350 

*'  Uitschudden  " — Institution  of,  in  order 

to  obtain  Clothing,  233 
Ultimatum  by  the  South  African  Re- 
public— 
Cause  of  the  War  alleged — 

Salisbury's,  Lord,  Assertion,  53,  54, 
409 

Salisbury's,  Lord,  Demand,  53,  54, 

409 

Steyn's,   President,  Contradiction, 
251.  252 

Chamberlain's,  Mr.  J.,  Telegrams  to 

Sir  A.  Milner,  329 
Text  of  the  "  Ultimatum,"  325-328 


Unconditional  Surrender— Discussion 
at  Vereeniging  Meeting  of  May  29, 
1902,  398,  399,  401,  405,  406,  423, 
424 

Vaal  River  —  Crossing  of  President 
Steyn's  Party,  300 

Valsch  River  Bridge,  Destruction  by 
Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet,  88,  89 

Van  Dam,  Under  Captain — Command 
of  Johannesburg  Police  at  Nichol- 
son's Nek,  16 

Van  Niekerk,  Commandant — Continu- 
ance of  the  War,  Argument  in 
favour  of,  414,  415 

Van  Reenen's  Pass — 

Occupation  by  Harrismith  and  Win- 
burg Commandos,  7,  8 
War     Council     at — Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet  attending  in  place  of 
Commandant  Steenekamp,  8,  9 

Vanvurenskloof,  Boer  Retreat  from,  139, 
140 

Vechtgeneraal  of   the   Orange  Free 
State- 
Abolition  of  Post,  95 

Creation  of  Post,  9,  10 

De  Wet,  Commander-in-Chief,  Ap- 
pointment of,  22 

Roux,  General  Paul,  appointed  by 
Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet,  85 

Ventersburg  —  Boer    Lines  broken 
through,  85 
Ventersdorp — 

Fighting  near,  140,  141,  142 

Meeting  between  President  Steynand 
Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet,  168, 
169 

Vereeniging — 

Meeting  of  General  Representatives 
to  discuss  the  Situation  (May  15, 
1902),  333-364 

Authority  given  to  Delegates  to 
voice  the  wishes  of  their  Constit- 
uencies, 333,  337,  338,  400,  402, 
403,  404,  405,  407,  411,  412,  417, 

421,  422,  423,  424 

Thanks  of  the  meeting  to  the  King 
of  England    and  Queen  of  the 
Netherlands  for  efforts   to  pro- 
mote Peace,  345,  346 
Unity  among  Delegates  essential, 
337,  338,  349.  350,  351,  357 
Meeting  of  Special  National  Repre- 
sentatives to  discuss  British  Peace 
Terms  (May  29,  1900),  397 
Armistice  agreed  on  to  admit  of  At- 
tendance of  Officers,  315 
Misunderstanding  on  the  part  of 
the  British  Columns,  317,  318 
Divisions   among  Delegates,  421, 

422,  423,  424,  425,  426 
Meeting  a  Fatal  Error,  413,  414 
Questions  to  be  decided,  398,  411, 

417 

(For  details  of  subjects  discussed 
see  Independence,  Peace  Negotia- 
tions, etc.) 


446 


INDEX 


Verkifkersdorp  —  Capture  of  Women's 
Laager  near,  by  the  British,  and 
Rescue  by  Commander-in-Chief  de 
Wet's  Commando,  238-241 
British  Casualties,  239,  240 

Vice  -  Commanders  -  in  -  Chief,  Orange 
Free  State — 
Badenhorst,  Veldtcornet,  C.  C,  Ap- 
pointment for  Districts  of  Boshop, 
etc.,  159 

De  Wet,  Gen,,  Appointment  of,  49 

Fourie,  Gen.,  Appointment  for  Dis- 
tricts of  Bloemfontein,  etc. ,  157 

Hertzog,  Gen.,  Appointment  for  Dis- 
tricts of  Fauresmith,  etc.,  158 
Vice-President  of  Orange  Free  State — 

Appointment  of  Commander-in-Chief 
de  Wet,  411 

Creation  of  Temporary  Post,  198 
Viljoen,  Mr.  P.  R.— Situation  in  South 
Africa  on  May  15,  1902,  Report  of 
the  Vereeniging  Conference,  346, 
347 

Vilhers,  General  de  —  Death  due  to 
Wound  received  at  Biddulphsberg, 
84 

Natal   Expedition,   Commanding  as 

Vechtgeneraal,  8,  9 
Prinsloo's  Surrender,  Escape  from, 

128 

Work  in  South-Eastern  Districts  of 
the  Orange  Free  State,  83 
Villiers,  Mr,  Jacob  de,  States-Procureur 
of  Orange  Free  State,  Capture  of 
at  Bothaville,  170,  171,  198 
Vilonel,  Commandant — 

Resignation  —  Enforced  Resignation 

due  to  Insubordination,  64 
Surrender  to  British — Recapture  by 
Captain  Pretorius  and  Trial  for  De- 
sertion, 84 

Removal  from  Bethlehem  to  Fou- 
riesburg,  121,  122 
Waggons,  Persistence  in  use  of,  62 
Visser,  Commandant — Death  of  at  Ja- 
gersfontein  Engagement,  Faithful- 
ness and  Valour  of  Commandant 
Visser,  158 
Vleeschkorporaal,  Duties  of,  4,  5 
Vrede — 

De    Wet's,    Commander  -  in  -  Chief, 

Meeting  with  Louis  Botha,  231 
Meeting  between  President  Steyn  and 
the  Transvaal  Government,  231 
Vrede  Commando,  Surrender  following 

Prinsloo's  Surrender,  128 
Vredefort — 

Capture  of  British  Outpost,  232 
Engagements  near,  133,  134,  135 
Retreat  of  the  Boers  to  the  Vaal 
River,  164,  165 
Surrender  of  Arms  by  Commando 
after  Declaration  of  Peace,  323,  324 
Vredefort-weg  Station  —  Commandant 
Steenekamp's  Success  at,  98,  105, 
106 

Vrijheid — Kaffir  Atrocities,  Murder  and 
Mutilation  of  Burghers,  426,  427 


Waggons — 

Boer  Reluctance  to  abandon  use  of, 
62,  120,  121,  129,  131,  135,  136 

Harrismith  Burghers'  Refusal  to 
part  with  their  Waggons  at 
Spitskopje,  161-163 
De  Wet,  Commander-in-Chief,  Use 

of  Little  Waggon,  293,  294,  398 
Destruction  by  British,  120,  121,  191 
No  Waggons  with  Commander-in- 
Chief  de  Wet's  Commando,  279 
Vilonel's,  Commandant,  Persistence 

in  using  Waggons,  62 
Waggon  Camps,  Regulation  prohib- 
iting, 58 

War  Commission — Orders  to  commence 

Natal  Campaign,  4 
War  Councils,  19 
Decisions  of  Council  of  March  28, 

1900,  61 

Doornberg,  Council  at — Decision  as 

to  Presidential  Election,  197 
Kroonstad  Council — Officers  present. 
Decisions,  etc.,  58  note,  59 
War  of.1877-1881 — Futihty  of  Compari- 
son with  War  of  1899-1902,  421,  422 
Warfare,  Boer  Methods  of — 

Checking  an  Enemy's  Advance — Boer 

Tactics,  213 
Rapidity  of  Action,  Importance  of,  75 
Wauchope,  General — Death  at  Magers- 

fontein,  23 
Weilbach,  Commandant — Desertion  of 

Post  at  Bloemfontein,  54 
Wessels,  General  J.  B. — 

Kroonstad  War  Council,  Presence  at, 
58 

Sanna's  Post  Engagement,  Share  in, 
64 

Wessels,  Mr.  C.  J.— 

Commander-in-Chief  of  Free  Staters 
at  Magersfontein  and  Kimberley, 
23 

Member  of  Boer  Deputation  to  Eu- 
rope (1900),  53.  54 
Wessels,  Veldtcornet — 

Capture  of,  at  Frederiksst.id,  166,  167 
Dewetsdorp  Exploits,  176,  177,  178 
White,    Colonel  —  Engagement  with 
Commandant  Hasebroek  near  Tha- 
ba'Nchu,  189,  190 
White  Flag  Treachery  at  Reddersburg, 

75.  76 
Wire  Fencing — 

Bothaville  Boers  cutting  the  Wire, 
299 

Erection  of,  by  the  British,  262 
Lindley-Kroonstad    Line   oi  Block- 
houses— Escape  of  Boers,  287 
Palmietfontein,     Boers  breaking 
through  Line,  289,  290 
Witkopjes     Rheboksfontein  Engage- 
ment, 135,  136 
Witwatersrand,  Cession  to  the  British — 
Proposals  of  the  Vereeniging  Con- 
ference, 350,  351,  360,  361,  363,  364 
Wolfaard  Brothers — Wounded  by  Lyd- 
dite Shell  at  Magersfontein,  25 


447 


THREE  YEARS  WAR 


Wolmarans,  Daniel— Member  of  Boer 
Deputation  to  Europe  (1900),  53, 
54 

Wolvehock  —  Railway  blown    up  by 

Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet,  163 
Women  and  Children — 

De  Wet's,  Commander-in-Chief,  Care 
for,  after  Sauna's  Post,  66,  67 

Difficulties  of  providing  for — Deliber- 
ations of  the  Vereeniging  Confer- 
ence, 333,  339,  342,  343,  344.  345. 
349,  350,  351,  352,  353<  356,  405.  406, 
410,  412,  413,  415,  416,  417,  423,  424, 
425,  426,  427 

Flight  of  Boer  Women  to  escape 
Capture  by  the  British,  279 

Kaffir  Treatment  of  Boer  Women, 

151,  152,  153 
Magersfontein  Laager,  Presence  in, 

25 

Sufferings  in  Concentration  Camps, 
etc.,  198,  290,  291,  421,  422 

Treatment  by  the  British,  232,  239, 
240,  241,  257,  258 


Women  and  Children,  continued— 
Verkijkersdorp  Laager,  Capture  of 
by  British,  and  rescue  by  Comman- 
der-in-Chief de  Wet's  Commando, 
238-241 

Wonderkop — General  de  Villiers'  Ex- 
ploits, 83 

Wounded,  Boer  Treatment  of— 
Doomspruit,  Care  of  Wounded  after, 
133.  134 

Nicholson's  Nek — Care  for  Wound- 
ed by  Commander-in-Chief  de  Wet, 
17 

Yeomanry,  Imperial  —  Gallantry  at 
Tweefontein,  281 

Yule,  General — Ladysmith  Retreat  con- 
ducted by,  9,  10 

Zandnek — Captain  Scheepers'  Engage- 
ment near,  139,  140 

Zwavelkrans  Farm  —  British  Convoy 
Captured  by  Commander-in-Chief 
de  Wet,  96,  98 


448 


GENERAL   MAP  OF  SOUTH  AFRICA- 1902 


Date  Due 

t  AW 

m 

PRINTED 

IN  U.  S.  A. 

